JUDGMENT - R.A. JAHAGIRDAR, J.:---The petitioner is a Zambian National who is at present in custody at Yervada Central Prison pursuant to an order of detention passed against him by the Government of Maharashtra on 29th of June, 1984. That order of detention has been passed under section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, hereinafter referred to as the "COFEPOSA Act". The material which has come on record in this case shows that the petitioner is an official of Zambian Airlines and was at the relevant time posted in Bombay. The order of detention passed on 29th of June, 1984 was based upon the grounds of detention which were formulated on the same day. The Advisory Board has confirmed the detention of the petitioner. Hence this habeas corpus petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. The order of detention has been challenged on several grounds. It is necessary to briefly summarise the grounds as disclosed to the petitioner is order to understand the challenge made by the petitioner. In the early hours of 13th of June, 1984, the petitioner checked in two suitcases meant for Zambian Airways Flight No. 781. After checking in the two suitcases, he followed the same through the immigration into the Departure Customs Hall where he was stopped by the Customs Officers. On being asked as to whom the suitcases belonged, the petitioner disclosed that they did not belong to him but they belonged to a passenger called Alfred Juma Ndemanga, hereinafter called "Alfred" for the sake of convenience, who has checked in for the same flight namely Flight No. 781. The petitioner was further asked as to whether he knew the contents of those suit cases. The answer of the petitioner was that as per his knowledge, they contained narcotics. 3. The grounds of detention further disclose that thereafter the petitioner was taken to what has been described as the Security Hold where two passengers, Mr. Kikota Wina and princess Wine, were sitting along with the aforesaid Alfred. From the material which has been reproduced in the grounds of detention it is easily seen that the said Alfred was an attendant of the couple Wines and he was travelling with them by the same flight from Bombay to Lusake. Both Mr. and Mrs. Wina disclaimed the ownership of the suitcases. So also Alfred. From the material which has been reproduced in the grounds of detention it is easily seen that the said Alfred was an attendant of the couple Wines and he was travelling with them by the same flight from Bombay to Lusake. Both Mr. and Mrs. Wina disclaimed the ownership of the suitcases. So also Alfred. Alfred, however, mentioned that he had given his ticket to the petitioner for clarification of the class by which he was travelling. Asked about the baggage claim tags which were found on his ticket, Alfred said that when he gave the ticket to the petitioner the baggage tags were not on the ticket. As is customary in such cases, statements of all the persons who, according to the Customs authorities, were involved were recorded. The statement of the petitioner has been summarised in the grounds of detention. He has stated that on the day in question he was staying at Room No. 346 at Holiday in and at about 10 O'clock the suitcases were brought to him by Alfred. Mr. and Mrs. Wina were advised by the petitioner to go directly to the airport. The petitioner thereafter left the hotel for the airport with the suitcases and being an official of the Zambian Airlines he checked in the two suitcases on Alfred's ticket. He has further mentioned in his statement, as summarised in the grounds of detention that he checked in the two suitcases on the ticket of Alfred at the instance of Mrs. Wina though, as we have already noted above, Mr. and Mrs. Wina both have disclaimed any knowledge of or connection with the two suitcases. 4. An attempt made by the petitioner to get the two suitcases transported by the Zambian Airways free of cost has also been mentioned in some details in the grounds of detention. So also is mentioned the fact that ultimately the petitioner was able to persuade the Airline authorities to transport the two suitcases by the flight on the condition that the surplus baggage charges will be paid at Lusaka and not in Bombay. There is nothing in the conversation which the petitioner had with the airline authorities which would indicate that he was trying to persuade them to transport something against the rules or regulations governing the carriage of luggage. 5. There is nothing in the conversation which the petitioner had with the airline authorities which would indicate that he was trying to persuade them to transport something against the rules or regulations governing the carriage of luggage. 5. It has been then mentioned in the grounds of detention that the two suitcases, which were by this time disclaimed by all the persons, were broken open to disclose that they contained what has ben mentioned in the grounds of detention as 110 packets of Mandarex tablets approximately weighing 44 Kilograms. The value of the said mercantile was estimated by the Customs authorities at Rs. 1,10,000. The Detaining Authority thereafter in paragraph II of the grounds has stated as follows :--- "You conspired with Sikota Wina, Alfred Juma Ndemanga and Princess Simota Wina, in the smuggling of Mandarex tablets out of India. You checked in the two suitcases containing Mandarex tablets, hence, you aided and abetted the attempt of smuggling of Mandrex tablets out of India." The Detaining Authority thereafter proceeds to mention that he considers it necessary that the petitioner should be detained under COFEPOSA Act with a view to prevent him from indulging in such type of prejudicial activities in the future. It is this order of detention, which has been confirmed by the Advisory Board, that is the subject matter of challenge in this petition. 6. Before we consider the challenge made by the petitioner, it would not be disadvantageous to pinpoint the basic facts which have emerged from the grounds of detention which grounds themselves contained the summary of the various statements made by the different persons upon which the Detaining Authority sought to rely. That the petitioner is a Marketing Executive of Zambian Airways is an admitted position. Part of the petitioner's duly was to help the passengers who were travelling by Zambian Airways and on 13th of June, 1984 he helped a passenger called Alfred who was travelling from Bombay to Lusaka by Flight No. 781. He was the attendant of two persons called Mr. and Mrs. Wina who have been described as VIPs Mrs. Wina has also been described as Princess Wina. The petitioner admittedly checked in two suitcases at the Zambian Airways Counter and thereafter followed them through the immigration to the Departure Customs Hall. He was the attendant of two persons called Mr. and Mrs. Wina who have been described as VIPs Mrs. Wina has also been described as Princess Wina. The petitioner admittedly checked in two suitcases at the Zambian Airways Counter and thereafter followed them through the immigration to the Departure Customs Hall. In this area, on question put to him by the Customs authorities, he identified the said two suitcases as those checked in by him and those belonging to a passenger whose ticket also he had checked in earlier. That passenger is, as we have already seen, Alfred. Alfred, however, disclaimed ownership of the suitcases. On a further question put to him the petitioner told the Customs authorities that as per his knowledge those suitcases contained "narcotics". From these relevant facts the detaining authority drew the inference that the petitioner had conspired with Sikota Wina, Princess Wina and Alfred in the smuggling of Mandarex tablets out of India. The Detaining Authority has also inferred that the petitioner aided and abetted the attempt of smuggling of Mandarex tablets out of India. 7. The question which has been naturally raised in this petition is whether on the material which has been reproduced in the grounds of detention and on which the detaining authority has placed reliance it could be legitimately inferred that the petitioner had aided or abetted the attempt of smuggling of Mandarex tablets out of India. Indeed, the question is whether there was any attempt at all of smuggling Mandarex tablets out of India. In this question there are two further questions involved, namely whether there was, in the first place, an attempt to smuggle Mandarex tablets out of India and in the second place whether the export of Mandarex tablets, as the law stood on the day in question, was prohibited. We have already in great details mentioned the various facts on which the Detaining Authority has placed reliance. They show that the petitioner did not disclaim any knowledge about the ownership of the two suitcases. He mentioned a fact which has not been rejected by the Detaining Authority, namely that the suitcases did not belong to him but belonged to a passenger who was travelling by Zambian Airways' Flight No. 781 on the morning of 13th June, 1984 from Bombay to Lusaka. He mentioned a fact which has not been rejected by the Detaining Authority, namely that the suitcases did not belong to him but belonged to a passenger who was travelling by Zambian Airways' Flight No. 781 on the morning of 13th June, 1984 from Bombay to Lusaka. He has stated that the two suitcases had been checked in by him at the Zambian Airways Counter. He has also, in reply to a question asked by the Customs authorities, frankly admitted that the two suitcases contained narcotics. From this is it possible to infer that the petitioner did make an attempt to smuggle narcotics out of India or did he aid or abet the attempt to smuggle narcotics out of India? In order to convert an activity of smuggling or an attempt at smuggling, that activity must be carried out stealthily without the knowledge or consent of the concerned authorities by attempting to delay the relevant law governing the export of commodities and by sending the authorities concerned on false recent of giving them incomplete, incorrect or false information. In the instant case, the questions that naturally occur to us are : Has the petitioner disclaimed the knowledge of the suitcases? The answer is "No" because he himself has admitted that it was he who had checked in the two suitcases at the Zambian Airways counter. Has he disclaimed the knowledge of the contents of the two suitcases? The answer, again, is "No" because the grounds of detention themselves mention that the petitioner, in reply to a question, admitted that the two suitcases contained narcotics. When questioned about the contents of the two suitcases, the petitioner did not say that the Customs officers should go and inquire with the passenger on whose ticket these suitcases were checked in. On the other hand, he disarmingly told them that according to his knowledge they contained narcotics. 8. Another question which must naturally be asked while deciding whether the petitioner made an attempt or abetted the attempt to smuggle the goods is : Has he tried to get the two suitcases across the Customs barrier by hook or crook ? On the other hand, he disarmingly told them that according to his knowledge they contained narcotics. 8. Another question which must naturally be asked while deciding whether the petitioner made an attempt or abetted the attempt to smuggle the goods is : Has he tried to get the two suitcases across the Customs barrier by hook or crook ? The answer to this question is necessarily "No." Considering these facts on which the Detaining Authority relied it is impossible to inter in law that the petitioner made an attempt to smuggle the goods or that he attempted to abet the smuggling of the goods. If the goods were being smuggled a person who would abet would naturally say something or do something which would facilitate the removal of the goods across the Customs barrier. Nothing of the king has been admittedly done by the petitioner in the instant case. In our opinion, it is impossible to infer in law that the petitioner attempted to smuggle the goods or abetted the attempt to smuggle the goods. 9. It has been mentioned in the grounds of detention that Alfred falsely denied about the ownership of the said suitcases. If this is so, Alfred could possible be involved in the smuggling. But it has not been mentioned anywhere in the grounds of detention that Alfred gave that answer at the instance or instigation of the petitioner. There is no material on which the detaining authority has relied or could have possible relied which would indicate that the petitioner instructed the said Alfred to deny both the ownership and the contents of the suitcases. Legally, therefore, it is not possible to infer from the material on which the Detaining Authority has relied that the petitioner has attempted to or aided or abetted the attempt to smuggle what has been described by him as narcotics out of India. 10. The next challenge to the order of detention has been made by the petitioner by contending that the export of what has been described by the Detaining Authority as Mandarex is not prohibited by the Import and Exports Control Act, 1947 and the Export Trade Control Order, 1977. The petitioner has reproduced certain paragraphs from Modi's Medical Jurisprudence to show us what the composition of Mandarex tablets is. The petitioner has reproduced certain paragraphs from Modi's Medical Jurisprudence to show us what the composition of Mandarex tablets is. He has also specifically asserted that it is not covered by Entry No. 27 as far as the Export Trade Control Order is concerned. He has specifically taken a stand in the petition that the grounds of detention do not indicate the provision of law under which the export of Mandarex tablets is prohibited and also how the export of the said product becomes a criminal offence. He has stated that the grounds of detention proceed on the assumption that Mandarex is a narcotic drug and has further stated that Mandarex is not a narcotic. According to the petitioner, in India the export of narcotics is prohibited under the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 and Mandarex is not covered by the provisions of this Act. 11. In reply to this challenge in the petition, contained in grounds (C), (D) and (E), the Detaining Authority has stated in his affidavit that the drug Mandarex tablets are prohibited from being exported vide Notification No. 119/82 Customs dated 24th April, 1982 as amended by Notification No. 27/83 dated 26th February, 1983. The learned Public Prosecutor has made available for our perusal copies of the said notification. Notification dated 24th of April, 1982 mentions that the Central Government being satisfied that it was necessary for the purpose of protection of human health to prohibit the export of psychotropic substances specified in the notification, prohibits the export of the same, except on an export authorisation. In the list of 14 substances mentioned in this notification we do not see that Mandarex is one. What has been stated by the learned Public Prosecutor, on instruction, is that Item 11 in this notification, which is Methaqualone, is the substance which goes into the manufacture of Mandarex talents and, therefore, it must be held to have been prohibited by the said notification. 12. We also see the notification dated 26th of February, 1983 which makes certain amendment in the earlier notification of 24th April, 1982. The effect of the said notification is to prohibit the export of not only Methqualone but also Methaqualone including all isomers, suits and preparations thereof. According to Mr. Barday, the learned Public Prosecutor, Mandarex is a preparation of Methaqualone and, therefore, its export is hit by the two notifications mentioned above. The effect of the said notification is to prohibit the export of not only Methqualone but also Methaqualone including all isomers, suits and preparations thereof. According to Mr. Barday, the learned Public Prosecutor, Mandarex is a preparation of Methaqualone and, therefore, its export is hit by the two notifications mentioned above. We are somewhat perplexed by this interpretation which is being placed by the learned Public Prosecutor on the grounds of detention. Nowhere in the grounds of detention has the Detaining Authority stated that he thought that the export of Mandarex is prohibited because it is a preparation or Methqualone. When the detaining authority drew an inference is paragraph II of the grounds of detention that it was necessary to detain the petitioner in order to prevent him from aiding and abetting the attempt of smuggling Mandarex tablets out of India, it was incumbent upon him to get himself satisfied in the first place that it is Mandarex that is prohibited by the notification issued in exercise or any provision or law. This has not been done by the Detaining Authority. On the other hand, he proceeds straightaway to accept the fact that Mandarex which was allegedly found in the two suitcases was itself prohibited by the relevant law. This, in our opinion, shows a casual manner of approach on the part at the Detaining Authority in passing the order which has the effect of depriving on individual, who is the subject to the laws of India, of his personal liberty. Such a casual manner of approach has been frowned upon on several occasions by this Court as well as the Supreme Court of India. 13. When law of preventive detention is being administered, it is the duty of the Detaining Authority to apply his mind to each and every facet of the case before him before putting his signature to an order that deprives an individual of his personal liberty. The fact that the Detaining Authority proceeded to say, in paragraph 8 of his affidavit, that the concerned notification prohibited the export of Mandarex tablets further discloses that there is a non-application of his mind to the facts of this case. If he had carefully gone through the notifications, which we have done here, he could have easily seen that Mandarex is not an item the export of which is prohibited by any of the two notifications. If he had carefully gone through the notifications, which we have done here, he could have easily seen that Mandarex is not an item the export of which is prohibited by any of the two notifications. It is possible, as Mr. Barday hastens to tell us, that the detaining authority was informed that Mandarex tablets consists of Methqualone or its preparation and on the basis of this information. If he came to the conclusion that Mandarex was an item whose export was prohibited, it cannot, therefore, be said that the Detaining Authority has not applied his mind to the facts of this case. But this is not what the Detaining Authority himself says in his affidavit in reply. He tells only blindly that it is Mandarex tablets whose export has been prohibited by the relevant notifications. In our opinion, therefore, it has not been proved that there is a proper application of mind to the facts of the case before the order of detention was passed. 14. Mr. Jethmalani, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, has further challenged the order of detention by contending that there are certain procedural irregularities and illegalities in the instant case. The procedural illegality on which Mr. Jethmalani has concentrated his attack is the denial of opportunity to the petitioner to plead his case before the Advisory Board in the manner permitted by law. In order to appreciate the contentions of Mr. Jethmalani in this regard it would be advantageous to notice the relevant provisions of law as well as the law declared by the Supreme Court on the question of the procedure which is to be followed by the Advisory Beards. Section 8(e) of the COFEPOSA Act provides that :--- "A person against whom an order of detention has been made under this Act, shall not be entitled to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the reference to Advisory Board..." From the aforesaid provision confined in the COFEPOSA Act this much is clear that a detenu cannot by way of right insist that he should b allowed to be represented before the Advisory Board by a legal practitioner. But one must not fail to notice that the said provision does not debar the Advisory Board from permitting the detenu in a given case to be represented by a legal practitioner. But one must not fail to notice that the said provision does not debar the Advisory Board from permitting the detenu in a given case to be represented by a legal practitioner. Unlike in certain other laws, there is no total bar against the appearance of legal practitioners in the proceedings before the Advisory Board. 15. In (Kavita v. State of Maharshtra)2, A.I.R. 1981 Supreme Court, 1641, it was pointed out that where a detenu makes a request for legal assistance, his request would have to be considered on its own merit. While section 8(e) disentitles a detenu from claiming as of right to be represented by a lawyer, it was pointed out by the Supreme Court, the said provision does not disentitle him from making a request for the services of a lawyer. The importance of legal assistance could never be over-stated and as often than not adequate legal assistance may be essential for the protection of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution and the right to be heard given to a detenu by section 8(e) of the COFEPOSA Act. On the facts of Kavita's case, however, it was found that the Government had merely informed the detenu that he had no statutory right to be represented by a lawyer before the advisory Board. Since it was for the Advisory Board and not for the Government to afford legal assistance to the Detenu, the detenu could have, when he was produced before the Advisory Board, made a request to the Advisory Board for permission to be represented by lawyer. Reading this judgment as a whole, therefore, it is clear to us that the Supreme Court recognised the fact that a detenu had no legal right to be represented by a legal practitioner. But it also noticed that the provision contained in section 8(e) of the COFEPOSA Act did not disentitle to detenu from making request to the Advisory Board which request has to be considered by the Advisory Board on its own merit. 16. In (A.K. Roy v. Union of India)2, A.I.R. 1982 Supreme Court, 710, the Supreme Court regretfully noted that a detenu had no right to appear through a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board. 16. In (A.K. Roy v. Union of India)2, A.I.R. 1982 Supreme Court, 710, the Supreme Court regretfully noted that a detenu had no right to appear through a legal practitioner in the proceedings before the Advisory Board. In paragraph 95 of the judgment, the travails of a detenu who is suddenly taken before the Advisory Board have been graphically described. Relying upon certain observations made in this paragraph Mr. Jethmalani suggested that in the instant case the Advisory Board should have informed the petitioner of his right to be represented by a friend. The Advisory Board having not done so the right of the detenu to make his representation effectively before the Advisory Board has been seriously impaired. The last mentioned submission does not commenced itself to us. It is now well-settled that the authorities exercising powers under the COFEPOSA Act, or for that matter under any law of preventive detention, need not tell the law to a detenu. However, it is not necessary for us to dwell on this point any longer because as we will show presently we are inclined to accept, on the facts of this case, that the right of the petitioner to make a proper representation before the Advisory Board has been otherwise considerably defeated. Before we proceed to notice the foundation of this submission we may also note another aspect of the representation that has been brought out be the Supreme Court in A.K. Roy's case and that is to be found in paragraph 105 of the judgment. 17. It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that it did not see any objection to the right of the detenu to lead evidence in rebuttal before the Advisory Board. "Neither the Constitution nor the National Security Act contains any provision denying to the detenu the right to present his own evidence in rebuttal of the allegations made against him. The detenu may, therefore, offer oral and documentary evidence before the Advisory Board in order to rebut the allegations which are made against him." The Supreme Court, however, uttered the caution that if the detenu desired to examine any witnesses he should himself keep them present at the appointed time and there was no obligation cast upon the Advisory Board to summon those witnesses. This necessarily means that if the detenu wants to lead oral evidence he should be allowed to do so. 18. This necessarily means that if the detenu wants to lead oral evidence he should be allowed to do so. 18. We may also at this stage profitably refer to another judgment of the Supreme Court in (Nand Lal v. State of Punjab)3, A.I.R. 1981 Supreme Court 2041. The facts of Nand Lal's case disclosed that the Advisory Board disallowed the detenu's request for legal assistance though the Detaining Authority himself was allowed to be represented by a Counsel. The Supreme Court stated : "It appears that the Advisory Board blindly applied the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 11 of Prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act to the case of the detenu felling to appreciate that it could not allow legal assistance to the Detaining Authority and deny the same to the detenu". In this procedure adopted by the Advisory Board the Supreme Court found an arbitrariness. This position was affirmed in A. K. Roy's case (page 747 of the report) by saying that "...if the Detaining Authority or the Govt. takes the aid of a legal practitioner or a legal adviser before the Advisory Board, the detenu must be allowed the facility of appearing before the Board through a legal practitioner". The Supreme Court was informed that the officers of the Government in the concerned departments often appear before the Board and assist it with a view to justifying the detention orders. If this was the case, the Supreme Court said, then the Board should not permit the authorities to do indirectly what they could not do directly. If frowned upon the attempt to take shelter behind the excuse that such officers were not "legal practitioners" or legal advisers. Regard must be had to the substance and not the form since, especially, in matters like the proceedings before the Advisory Boards whosoever assists or advises on facts or law must be deemed to be in the position of a legal adviser. The Supreme Court hoped that Advisory Boards will take care to ensure that the provisions of Article 14 were not violated in any manner in the proceedings before them. 19. From the examination of the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above, the following propositions, in our opinion, emerge :--- (1) There is neither a constitutional right nor a legal right available to a detenu to be represented by a legal practitioner. 19. From the examination of the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above, the following propositions, in our opinion, emerge :--- (1) There is neither a constitutional right nor a legal right available to a detenu to be represented by a legal practitioner. (2) Where, however, the department is represented by a legal practitioner or a legal adviser, then the detenu cannot be denied the right to be similarly represented. (3) If the department is represented by an official before the Advisory Board to assist the latter, then that official must be regarded as a legal adviser or a legal practitioner for the purpose of deciding whether the detenu is entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner. (4) Though there is no constitutional or legal right available to a detenu to be represented by a legal practitioner, there is no legal bar to the detenu being so represented. (5) A request may be made by the detenu for being represented by a legal practitioner and the Advisory Board may grant such a request. (6) A request made by a detenu for being represented by a legal practitioner must be considered on merits and cannot be turned down on the ground (i) that the law does not give such a right to the detenu, or (ii) that it was the practice of the Board not to allow representation of a detenu by a legal practitioner. (7) A detenu has a right to produce and examine witnesses before the Advisory Board in support of his case though the Advisory Board is under no obligation to summon such witnesses on the date fixed for the hearing of the detenu's case. 20. We now turn to the facts of this case. On behalf of the petitioner a letter had been written to the Advisory Board on 28th of July, 1984 requesting therein that he should be allowed to represent his case through a lawyer of his choice at the meeting and also to produce, assist and cross-examine Shri Murli Punjabi and Mr. Lawrence and the Bell Boy Captain of Holiday Inn. In reply to this letter, the Secretary of the Advisory Board, by order of the Chairman, wrote a letter dated 16th August, 1984 to the detenu wherein he drew the attention of the detenu to the provisions contained in section 8(e) of the COFEPOSA Act. Lawrence and the Bell Boy Captain of Holiday Inn. In reply to this letter, the Secretary of the Advisory Board, by order of the Chairman, wrote a letter dated 16th August, 1984 to the detenu wherein he drew the attention of the detenu to the provisions contained in section 8(e) of the COFEPOSA Act. Proceeding further, the Secretary stated as follows :--- "The present Advisory Board under the COFEPOSA Act for the State of Maharashtra has so far not permitted any legal practitioner to appear in any reference made to it by the Government under the Act. Therefore, your request to allow you to plead your case through a lawyer of your choice, it is regretted, cannot be acceded to." It is clear from this letter that it was stated on behalf of the Advisory Board that it was the practice of the Advisory Board not to permit any legal practitioner to appear for any detenu and on that account the petitioner's request for being represented by a legal practitioner was turned down. The request was not turned down on its merits by examining the facts of the petitioner's case. This, in our opinion, is clear contrary to the legal position laid down by the Supreme Court. 21. From the letter written by the Secretary of the Board there seems to be a rejection of the petitioner's request without examining whether on the facts of the petitioner's case he should or should not be given the facility of being represented by a legal practitioner. We have already noticed that the petitioner is a foreign national. Normally such a person would think of being represented by a legal practitioner of the country in which he is facing legal proceedings. May be, after examining this aspect of the case the Advisory Board could have considered his case sympathetically. But this was not done. His request for being represented by a legal practitioner was turned down on two grounds, namely that the provisions of section 8(e) of the COFEPOSA Act do not bestow a right upon the detenu to be represented by a legal practitioner and secondly, that it was the practice of the Advisory Board not to permit a legal practitioner to appear in any proceedings before it. This, in our opinion, is not the correct method of deciding the question. This, in our opinion, is not the correct method of deciding the question. An element of arbitrariness is necessarily involved in the procedure adopted by the Advisory Board vis-a-vis petitioner before us. He has, therefore, been denied the right to make adequate or proper representation of his case before the Advisory Board. 22. On the second question, it has not been pressed by Mr. Jethmalani that the petitioner had a right to cross-examine the three witnesses on whose statements the Detaining Authority had relied. However, Mr. Jethmalani contended that the petitioner's request was to allow him to produce his witnesses before the Advisory Board and it was so understood by the Advisory Board itself because in paragraph 3 of the letter dated 16th August, 1984 sent by the Secretary of the Board it has been stated as follows : "If you want to tender evidence of any witnesses, you may do so in the form of an affidavit and send four copies of such affidavit to the Advisory Board will in advance." Mr. Jethmalani says that by informing the petitioner that he could produce the oral testimony only through the affidavits, the Advisory Board has denied the opportunity to the petitioner to produce his witnesses and examine them before the Advisory Board. This, according to him, is the denial of the right which we have mentioned in proposition (7) above. We do not think it necessary to examine this question at length because oral evidence could be tendered by examining this witnesses themselves; it could also be tendered in the form of affidavits. It is for the authority or the Court receiving the evidence to decide in a given case or generally in what way that oral evidence should be received by it. However, we do not express any final opinion on the same. In view of the fact that we have found that the petitioner was prevented from representing his case before the Advisory Board in a manner permitted by law, the continued detention of the petitioner must be held to be rendered illegal. 23. Before we proceed to pass the final order in this petition we may only note one feature of the letter written by the Secretary of the Advisory Board to the petitioner. At the foot of the said letter it has been mentioned that the Secretary has written this letter "by order of the Chairman". 23. Before we proceed to pass the final order in this petition we may only note one feature of the letter written by the Secretary of the Advisory Board to the petitioner. At the foot of the said letter it has been mentioned that the Secretary has written this letter "by order of the Chairman". We presume that the decision communicated by the Secretary to the petitioner was taken by the Board as a whole and communicated by the Chairman. 24. In the result this petition is allowed. The order of detention dated 29th June, 1984 passed by the Government of Maharashtra against the petitioner under section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act is set aside. We have also held that the continued detention of the petitioner is rendered illegal. On both these ground, the petitioner is entitled to be set at liberty and he shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless required in any other case. -----