JUDGMENT : 1. The unsuccessful landlord (plaintiff) has filed this appeal under Section 100 Civil Procedure Code, against the judgment and decree dated October 26, 1983, of the Additional District Judge, Nohar, by which he confirmed the judgment and decree regarding dismissal of the suit vide judgment dated May 5, 1982 of Munsiff, Bhadra. 2. It is not necessary to recount the facts in detail for the reason that in this appeal, the only point involved is whether the learned additional District Judge, Nohar, was right in maintaining the finding of the Munsiff regarding issue No. 6 which relates to the comparative hardship as envisaged by Section 14(2) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (No. XVII of 1950) for short `the Act' hereinafter). 3. The plaintiff instituted a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment. Ejectment was inter alia sought on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity. The suit was contested by the defendant on various grounds. The Munsiff framed necessary issues. Issue Nos. 4 and 5 relate to the reasonable and bonafide necessity of the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff is entitled to evict the defendant even on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity. Issue No. 6 is as follows:- 6- okn xzLr nqdku ds [kkyh ,oa ugha dh fLFkfr esa oknh ,oa izfroknh esa ls fdldks vkf/kd dfBukbZ gksxhA This relates to the comparative hardship. The learned Munsif held that the plaintiff has been successful in establishing reasonable and bonafide necessity. He, however, decided issue No. 6 holding that the plaintiff (sic) if the decree for ejectment is passed in favour of the plaintiff went in appeal and the learned District Judge maintained that finding. The plaintiff has filed this second appeal. 4. In the memo of appeal, the following two substantial questions of law have been stated:- "(a) Whether the finding of the Court below on issue No. 6 is vitiated on account of being based on misreading of evidence and misconception of law and bad ? (b) Whether the Courts below were right in the facts and circumstances of the case in holding that the respondents would suffer greater hardship in the event of suit being decreed than that would be suffered by the appellant in the event of appeal being dismissed ? (b) Whether the Courts below were right in the facts and circumstances of the case in holding that the respondents would suffer greater hardship in the event of suit being decreed than that would be suffered by the appellant in the event of appeal being dismissed ? The learned counsel for the appellant urged that the finding of comparative hardship is vitiated as the statements of P.W. 1 Chabil Dass (Plaintiff) and P.W. 2 Nathuram (Plaintiff's son), D.W. 1 Chabil Dass (defendant) and D.W. 2 Gajanand misread and unwarranted inference have been drawn form their testimony. He also submitted that the learned Additional District Judge misdirected himself in arriving at the conclusion to which he did in view of Section 14(2) of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the judgment under appeal relating to issue No. 6 for the reasons mentioned by the learned Additional District Judge and controverted the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant in support of the appeal. 5. Mr. N.P. Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant, has placed the copies of the statements of P.W. 1 Chabil Dass, P.W. 2 Nathuram, D.W. 1 Chabil Dass and P.W. 2 Gajanand for my perusal. I have considered the aforesaid four statements of the witnesses of the parties in the light of the judgment of the Additional District Judge under appeal. Having considered them in view of the submission relating to the misreading of the statements, I am of opinion that the learned Additional District Judge has not misread them in a manner so that a different conclusion from the one which has been recorded by the learned Additional District Judge could be arrived at. Issue No. 6 which has been reproduced above is to the effect that if the decree for ejectment is not passed, whether the plaintiff would be put to greater hardship and if the decree for ejectment is passed, the defendant would be put to greater hardship. Both the parties have led evidence. The learned Munsiff examined that evidence in detail and held that the defendant would be put to greater hardship if the decree for ejectment is passed. Both the parties have led evidence. The learned Munsiff examined that evidence in detail and held that the defendant would be put to greater hardship if the decree for ejectment is passed. In appeal, the learned Additional District Judge, appreciated that evidence as a Court of First Appeal and also the circumstances emerging therefrom and thereafter concurred with the finding of the learned Munsif, then the question that arises is whether this finding gives rise to a substantial question of law or being a finding of fact it cannot be interfered with in second appeal. It was held by a single Judge of this Court in Ganga Ram v. Smt. Gurkirtan Kaur, 1978 RLW 167, that finding on question of comparative hardship of landlord and tenant is a finding of fact and High Court cannot disturb that finding in second appeal. This decision was referred to by a Divisional Bench in Narottam Lal (Appellant v. Mukat Lal, (Respondent), ILR XXIX (Raj) 1001, wherein the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench held that Section 100 Civil Procedure Code, has been amended and now unless a substantial question of law is involved in second appeal as envisaged under sub-section (3) of Section 100 Civil Procedure Code, a second appeal is not maintainable and that a finding on the question of comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant is finding of fact and cannot be assailed in second appeal before the High Court. In Narottam Lal's case (supra) Munilal v. Prescribed Authority, AIR 1978 SC 29 , was noticed in which P.N. Bhagwati, J speaking for the Court held that finding on the question of comparative hardship of landlord and tenant is a finding of fact and High Court cannot disturb the same in writ proceeding and High Court cannot reappraise evidence and come to its own conclusion different from that of the district Judge and the Prescribed Authority. Having examined the evidence of the comparative hardship, I am satisfied that the finding on issue No. 6 relating to comparative hardship is not vitiated on account of substantial error of law or of procedure and being finding of fact on the basis of the aforesaid decision of this Court as well as of Supreme Court, cannot be interfered with in second appeal. Here it will be pertinent to refer to Bhaichand Ratanshi v. Laxmishanker Tribhovan (SC), 1982 (1) RCJ 242, on which reliance was placed by Mr. N.P. Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant. In para 7 of the report it was held that if the lower Courts applied their mind properly in deciding a matter as under Section 13(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947, then High Court not to substitute its own finding for the one reached by the Courts below, on a reappraisal of evidence. It may be stated that Section 13(2) of the aforesaid Bombay Act relates to the proof of greater hardship of the plaintiff (landlord) or the tenant. So far as the principle laid down for determining the question of comparative hardship in Bhaichand Ratanshi's case (supra) is concerned, suffice it to state that the learned Additional District Judge has examined the questions keeping in view the aforesaid principles laid down therein. 6. Mr. N.P. Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant also cited Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan . He has taken pains to read certain portions of the aforesaid decision. I have carefully considered them and am of considered opinion that decision cannot be availed of by him in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. 7. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that the appeal does not involve question of law what to say of substantial question of law.The appeal is dismissed summarily.Appeal dismissed.