Ram Palat Singh v. Sri Kalpnath Rai — 1984 DIGILAW 387 (ALL)

JUDGMENT R. B. Lal, J. - By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has prayed for quashing the revisional order of the District Judge, Azamgarh dated 19.11.1983 and the allotment order dated 11.11.1983 and the order in Norm-B dated 11.1 1.1983 passed by the Rent Control and Eviction. Officer/District Supply Officer, Azamgarh. The petitioner has also prayed for the issue of a direction or order commanding respondents Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 not to disturb his occupation of the premises in dispute and also to grant such other and further relief as may be necessary. 2. According to the petitioner Sri Ram Palat Singh, the relevant facts are these: House No. 23 situate in mohalla Naroli Ward No. 14, Azamgarh belongs to Parmeshwar Lal Gupta, respondent No. 2. He (petitioner), is an engineer in the Public Works Department of Uttar Pradesh and was transferred from Jaunpur to Azamgarh in July, 1974 and occupied the aforesaid house in October, 1974 for residential purposes. The area in which the house was situate was brought within the Municipal Limits of Azamgarh on or about the 5th April, 1975 and since then the house become subject to the provisions of the U. P. Urban Buildings Regulation of letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (briefly the Act). The landlord continued to accept rent from him without any objection. He, therefore, became entitled to regularisation of his occupation of the house under the provisions of section 14 of the Act. One Sri Abdul Qavi Khan, Executive Engineer (P. W. D ), was transferred to Azamgarh, and made an application for allotment of the said house. The application of Sri Khan was rejected by the District, Supply Officer by his order dated 21.12.1979 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) and his (petitioner's) occupation of the house was held to be good. At that time the stand taken up by him was that he was entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Act. Sri Kalap Nath Rai, who is a Minister of State in the Government of India applied for allotment of the house. The Rent Control Inspector visited the house on 27.9.1983 and made certain enquiries from the petitioner's wife and submitted a report that very day (Annexure 2 to the writ petition). Sri Kalap Nath Rai, who is a Minister of State in the Government of India applied for allotment of the house. The Rent Control Inspector visited the house on 27.9.1983 and made certain enquiries from the petitioner's wife and submitted a report that very day (Annexure 2 to the writ petition). No prior notice of the proposed inspection was given to him for any member of his family. The Inspector came to the conclusion that there was likely to be a vacancy in respect of the house in question and, therefore, recommended that necessary notice may be issued according to law. He (petitioner) came to know that the District Supply Officer. Azamgarh was taking steps for declaring the house either vacant or likely to be vacant and, therefore, he made a representation dared 3 8.1983. The District Supply Officer, by his order dated 11-11-1983, held that the house was likely to fall vacant and passed the order of allotment of the house in favour of Sri Kalap Nath Rai, respondent No. I. (hereinafter to he referred to as the allottee) By the same order the District Supply officer also rejected the release application of the landlord. (The order dated 11.11.1983 is Annexure 4 to the writ petition.) The order in Form B in favour of the allottee was passed on 11.11.1983 (Annexure V to the writ petition). In pursuance of the allotment order, in petitioner's absence, the allottee took forcible possession of a part of the house in question on 12.11.1983 with the help of the police. The allottee could not take possession over the entire house because his petitioner's) wife and children were living there and that part continued, to be in his occupation. The District Supply Officer (respondent No. 4) had not heated the house to be a case of vacancy or deemed vacancy or unauthorised occupation by him (the petitioner). He had treated it as a case of likely vacancy. The District Supply Officer could not sit in appeal over the order of his predecessor-in-office who had accepted the case that the petitioner's occupation of the house had become regularised under section 14 of the Act. This order was not challenged by the landlord or by anyone else and became final and binding and cannot be reopened. The proceedings for allotment of the house were collusive. This order was not challenged by the landlord or by anyone else and became final and binding and cannot be reopened. The proceedings for allotment of the house were collusive. He had been maintaining his family at Azamgarh because he had not been able to get a residential accommodation from the Government at places to which he was transferred from Azamgarh. He admitted that he was transferred from Azamgarh to Gorkhpur in the year 1977. From Gorkhpur he was transferred to Deoria and from Deoria to Lucknow. At none of these places he could get a house for residence of his family and, therefore, continued to maintain his family in the house in question at Azamgarh. He never shifted his family from this house. His forcible dispossession by the allottee was causing him irreparable loss which was incapable of compensation in terms of money. 3. Aggrieved by the orders of the District Supply Officer dated 11.11.1983. the petitioner filed a revision in the court of the District Judge, Azamgarh The learned District Judge dismissed the revision by order dated 19.1 1.1983 (Anneature 8 to the writ petition). The petitioner filed the present writ petition in this Court on 21.12.1983. 4. Sri Panchanan Rai, Pairokar of the allottee, respondent No. 1. filed a counter affidavit in reply. He took up the stand that on his transfer to Gorakhpur in the year 1977 the petitioner ceased to have any right in respect of the house in question. The house was totally vacant or in any case it was likely to fall vacant. The wife of the petitioner had told the Rent Control Inspector that they were thinking to vacate the premises as soon as some other accommodation was available at the place of posting of her husband. The occupation of the petitioner from the very inception was unauthorised and against the consent of the landlord. respondent No. 2. The petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Act. The District Supply Officer, Azamgarh, respondent No. 4, had treated the case to be of a deemed vacancy. There was no collusion in the allotment proceedings. On 12.11.1983 the house was totally vacant and peaceful possession was taken by respondent No. I (the allottee). It was also said that the petitioner should make a search for a house at the place of his posting. There was no collusion in the allotment proceedings. On 12.11.1983 the house was totally vacant and peaceful possession was taken by respondent No. I (the allottee). It was also said that the petitioner should make a search for a house at the place of his posting. His conduct was not justified in continuing his family at the place of his earlier posting as it would create chaos. Telephone, electricity and water connections had been installed within a week of taking over possession on 12.11.1983 and the allottee is paying the bills. 5. Later on, Sri Kalap Nath Rai, the allottee, filed his counter affidavit. He also took up the stand that the house was never allotted to the petitioner and he had also not taken possession of the house with the consent of the landlord. The wife of the petitioner had informed the Rent Control Inspector that the petitioner m as intending to vacate the premises. The petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Act. On 12.11.1983 when possession was taken over, the house was virtually vacant. The petitioner was not occupying any part of the house. The intimation of taking over possession of the house was given to the District Supply Officer on 14.11.1983. The allottee denied that possession was taken over by force. The order of allotment was a valid one. 6. Sri Jai Shanker Prasad, District Supply Officer, Azamgarh, respondent No. 4, also filed a counter affidavit. He took up the stand that the occupation of the petitioner was as an unauthorised occupant and he was not entitled to the benefit of section 14 of tie Act. The allottee genuinely needed the accommodation to make public contact at Azamgarh. There was no pressure from the allottee on him or the District Magistrate to allot the accommodation. Also there was no collusion with the allottee Since the petitioner had been transferred from Azamgarh, he should have made arrangements for keeping his family at the place of his posting and the allotment order was passed on, the basis of deemed vacancy or the accommodation being likely to fall vacant. The report of the Rent Control Inspector had indicated that the house was likely to fall vacant and on that basis, taking it to be a case of deemed vacancy, the allotment order was passed. The report of the Rent Control Inspector had indicated that the house was likely to fall vacant and on that basis, taking it to be a case of deemed vacancy, the allotment order was passed. The allottee had taken peaceful possession over the house without assistance of the police as it was vacant, and he gave intimation of obtaining possession as well. The contents of this affidavit have been sworn on the basis of perusal of record. This counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the District Magistrate, respondent No. 3, as well. 7. Landlord respondent No. 2 has not put in appearance and has not filed any counter affidavit. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length, 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated what has been said in the writ petition and assailed the three impugned orders. He has stressed that the petitioner was not an unauthorised occupant of the house and his possession stood regularised under section 14 of the Act. This position was recognised in the order dated 21.12.1979. Nothing happened thereafter to render him an unauthorised occupant. An order for allotment could be passed on the basis that the house was about to fall vacant but it could not be given effect to unless the petitioner had actually vacated the house. The allotment proceedings were collusive and mala fide. Petitioner was forcibly dispossessed from a potion of the house, and this high handedness should not be countenanced by this Court and a direction for restoration of possession should be issued in favour of the petitioner. 10. The learned counsel for the allottee has justified the impugned orders as legally valid and unassailable. He has emphasised that the petitioner was merely an unauthorised occupant of the house. He has seriously disputed the allegations of collection and mala fide. 11. The learned Chief Standing Counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 3 and 4 has also tried to support the validity of the impugned orders. 12. It will be useful to refer to some provisions of the Act at the outset. He has seriously disputed the allegations of collection and mala fide. 11. The learned Chief Standing Counsel appearing for respondents Nos. 3 and 4 has also tried to support the validity of the impugned orders. 12. It will be useful to refer to some provisions of the Act at the outset. As the long title and the preamble of the Act indicates, the object of the Act is to regulate and control letting and rent of certain classes of buildings and also the eviction of tenants there from Chapter III of the Act deals with "Regulation of letting." This chapter consists of sections 11 to 19. Section 11 imposes prohibition on letting of any building except in pursuance of an allotment order. Section 12 mentions certain situations in which a landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy it. The situations described in sub-sections (l) and (3-A) of this section need special mention and are as under : "12. Deemed vacancy of building in certain cases.-(1) A landlord or tenant of a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if- (a) he has substantially removed his effects therefrom, or (b) he has allowed it to be occupied, by any person who is not a member of his family, or (c) in the case of a residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere. (2) ................... (3) .................. ((3-A) If the tenant of a residential building holding a transferable post under any Government or local authority or a public sector corporation or under any other employer has been transferred to some other city, municipality, notified area, or town area then such tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy such building with effect from the thirtieth day of June following the date of such transfer or from the date of allotment to him of any residential accommodation (whether any accommodation be allotted under this Act or any official accommodation is provided by the employer) in the city, municipality, notified area or town area to which he has been so transferred, whichever is later." 13. Sub-sections (2), (3) and (3-B) of section 12 also deal with situations in which a landlord or tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy a building, but these sub-sections are not relevant in the present case. Sub- section (4) of section 12 provides that were a landlord or a tenant has ceased to occupy a building within the meaning of sub-section W. or sub-section 2), or sub-section (3), or sub-section (3 A), or sub-section (3-B), it shall, for the purposes of Chapter III, be deemed to be vacated Section 13 places restriction on occupation of a building without an order of allotment or release under section 16, and provides that any person. who occupies the building in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be an unauthorised occupant of the same. 14. A joint reading of sections 1 1 and 13 makes it clear that neither a landlord can let out a premises nor can any one occupy the same without an allotment order. Any one occupying a building without an allotment order, shall be only an unauthorised occupant and his possession would not he recognised. The premises would be treated as vacant. Section 13 is common to both sections 11 and 12 and applies to cases covered by these sections. 15. Section 14 deals with regularisation of occupation of existing tenants. It provides that any tenant in occupation of a building with the consent of the landlord immediately before the commencement of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1970, shall he deemed to be a tenant of such building provided on suit or proceeding for his eviction was pending on the date of the commencement of the Amending Act. The Amending Act of the 1976 came into force with effect from 5.7.1976. This section is in the nature of an exception to sections 11 and 13 of the Act. Section 15 as an obligation on the landlord as well as on the tenant who is vacating the building, to give notice of vacancy to the District Magistrate. 16. Section 16 deals with allotment or release of buildings. Sub-sections (1), (3) and (4) of this section are very important and may be set out. Section 15 as an obligation on the landlord as well as on the tenant who is vacating the building, to give notice of vacancy to the District Magistrate. 16. Section 16 deals with allotment or release of buildings. Sub-sections (1), (3) and (4) of this section are very important and may be set out. They read as follows :- "16, Allotment and release of vacant building.-(1) Subject to the provisions of the Act, the District Magistrate may by order "(a) require the landlord to let any building which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant, or a part of such building but not appurtenant land alone, to any person specified in the order (to be called an allotment order); or (b) release the whole or any part of such building, or any appurtenant thereto, in favour of the landlord (to be called a release order) : Provided that in the case of a vacancy referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 12, the District Magistrate shall give an opportunity to the landlord or the tenant.- as the case may be, of showing that the said section is not attracted to his case before making an order under clause (a). "(2) .................. "(3) The allotment order shall specify "(a) whether the building shall be used by the tenant for residential or non-residential purposes ; "(b) in the case of business purposes, the names of proprietors or partners of the business ; "(c) the date, which shall not be earlier than seven days after , the date of the order, by which the landlord shall deliver possession to the allottee : "(d) such other particulars as may be prescribed. "(4) Where the allottee or the landlord has not been able to obtain possession of the building, allotted to him or, as the case may be, released in his favour, or any part thereof, the District Magistrate, on an application of the allottee or the landlord, as the case may be, may by order evict or cause to be evicted any person named in the order as well as every other person claiming under him or found in occupation, and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary and put or cause to be put the allottee or the landlord in possession of the building or part." 17. Sub-section (2) of section 16 deals with release application of a landlord. Sub-section (5) deals with review of an allotment, or release order. Sub-section (7) provides that every order under section 16 shall subject to any order made under section 18, be final. Sub-sections (6), (8), (9) and (10) are not relevant for the present case. 18. Here reference may also be made to Rules 8 to 12 and Rule 14 of the Rules framed under the Act. Rule 8 lays down procedure for ascertainment of vacancy of a building. This rule covers cases falling under section 12 as well a, under section 16(1). Rule 9 deals with notification of vacancy Rule 10 lass down the procedure of allotment. Rule 11 indicates the order of priorities of allotment. The first priority category under this rule is "for public purposes." Rule 12 provides that an allotment order shall be issued in Form B. This Form makes a special provision for delivery of possession of a building where the building has been allotted on the basis of its likely to he vacated by the tenant. This Form specifically says that delivery of possession shall be given to the allottee by the landlord within ten days of the building being vacated by the existing tenant. Rule 14 relates to enforcement of an order of allotment or release. It is significant and may be quoted : Where any building about to fall vacant is allotted, or released under section 16(1), proceedings for putting the allottee or the landlord, as the case may be, in possession shall be taken by the District Magistrate on by after the building has actually fallen vacant is held by him through an enquiry conducted in that behalf, to have fallen vacant......" (emphasis supplied). 19. Section 17 provides within what period the District Magistrate shall pass an order of allotment and in what circumstances the landlord may nominate a person of his choice as an allottee. Section 18 provides for a revision against a final order passed under section 16. Under this section the District Judge is the revisional authority and his powers of revision are analogous to the powers under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Section 19 provides for re allotment of a building released in favour of the landlord, where he makes misuse of the release order. 20. Under this section the District Judge is the revisional authority and his powers of revision are analogous to the powers under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Section 19 provides for re allotment of a building released in favour of the landlord, where he makes misuse of the release order. 20. From the above provisions it is evident that tinder the Act concept of deemed vacancy is quite distinct and different from the concept of likely vacancy, (building about to fall vacant). Under the Act, an order of allotment of a building can be passed in one of these circumstances, namely, if the building (a) is or has fallen vacant, or (b) is about to fall vacant, or (c) is decried vacant, or (d) is in unauthorised occupation of some one. In the case of a bulling about to fall vacant the person in occupation thereof is a lawful tenant and continues to be so, and the allotment is made on the assumption that he intends to vacate the building in the near future, and then it would be available for occupation by the allottee. Such a tenant has a right to continue in the building as long as he chooses. Form B and Rule 14 too make it clear that the existing tenant cannot be forced out of the building and he can choose his own time to vacate it. In such a case the allottee cannot press for immediate delivery of possession and the District Magistrate to cannot take action until the building actually falls vacant. The case where a building is deemed vacant, implies that at the inception occupation of the tenant was lawful one but later on, on account of arising of a situation as laid down in section 12, the building is to be deemed vacant. This is not a case of actual vacancy but a vacancy created by fiction of low. In a case where the building is in occupation of an unauthorised occupant, the possession of such a person is illegal from its very inception. Under the Act such an unauthorised occupation is to be ignored and the building is to be treated as vacant and available for allotment. In a case where the building is in occupation of an unauthorised occupant, the possession of such a person is illegal from its very inception. Under the Act such an unauthorised occupation is to be ignored and the building is to be treated as vacant and available for allotment. Where an allotment cat building has been made on the basis that it is to he deemed vacant or it is in occupation of an unauthorised occupant, the occupant has no right to continue in the building. If lie does not care to vacate the building, the authorities have a right to forcibly evict him and put the allottee in possession of the building. 21. Now I proceed to examine the revisional Court's judgment and order dated 19.11.1983. 22. The learned District Judge referred to the decision Hari Swarup v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer 1983 A.L.J. 112 (D.B.),' and said that approving the case of Chatarsen vs. District Judge 1979 (U.P.) R.C.C. 379,' the High Court had held that the binding regarding declaration of vacancy cannot be challenged in revision under section 18 of the Act. Fie added that in view of these authorities, the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declaring vacancy could not be challenged in revision and also could not be considered by him. This view of the learned District Judge is too widely-worded and is based on a misreading of Hari Swarup's case. In that case a notification of vacancy was made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Hari Swarup, the petitioner. who claimed to be the sitting tenant of the building, challenged that notification by writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The writ petition was resisted on the ground that it was premature and in support of this submission reliance was placed on the decision Trilok Singh v. District Magistrate, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1988 Lucknow. In Trilok Singh's case, the question before the Supreme Court was also whether a writ petition Iay against the declaration or notification of vacancy. The writ petition was resisted on the ground that it was premature and in support of this submission reliance was placed on the decision Trilok Singh v. District Magistrate, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1988 Lucknow. In Trilok Singh's case, the question before the Supreme Court was also whether a writ petition Iay against the declaration or notification of vacancy. The Supreme Court observed that "a notification of the vacancy is a step-in-aid of an order of allotment or release and it is only when such an order of allotment or release is passed that the landlord or the tenant as the case may be, can have a grievance." The Supreme Court held that the writ petition against the declaration or notification of vacancy was premature. The learned counsel for Hari Swarup petitioner tried to distinguish this decision of the Supreme Court on the ground that it related to the provisions of the Act as they stood prior to their amendment by the U.P. Amending Act No. 28 of 1976. By the said amending Act a proviso to section 16(1) was added and that made all the difference. The Division Bench did not :-accept this submission and hold that even after the aforesaid amendment, the writ petition against the declaration or notification of vacancy was premature. 23. Before the aforesaid Division Bench, the learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the finding on the question of existence of vacancy is a finding of a jurisdictional fact and is liable to be reconsidered in revision or in a writ petition on its merits by a reappraisal of the evidence relating to it. The Bench considered what is a jurisdictional fact. After referring to the Supreme Court decisions Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P. AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1621, Chaubey Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi AIR 1959 Supreme Court 492 and the Newspapers limited v. State Industrial. Tribunal, U P. AIR 1957 Supreme Court 532 the Division Bench observed that a jurisdictional fact is a fact which is collateral to the actual matter which a tribunal or authority is empowered to decide or deter- mine. A question or matter which is an integral part of the issue which the tribunal has been authorised to decide is not a collateral or jurisdictional Fact. A question or matter which is an integral part of the issue which the tribunal has been authorised to decide is not a collateral or jurisdictional Fact. Under the Act, the District Magistrate has been authorised to pass on order of allotment or release under section 16. As integral part of the proceedings the District Magistrate has to decide whether an accommodation is vacant. The notification or declaration of vacancy is a step-in-aid of the passing of an order of allotment or release. This is one face of the issue which the District Magistrate has been authorised to decide namely, allotment or release of the accommodation. A decision on the question whether a building or accommodation is vacant or otherwise is not it decision on a collateral jurisdictional fact. Hence the legal position that a finding on a jurisdictional fact is amenable- to reconsideration on certiorari or revision on its merits, cannot be utilised. After saying that a decision on the question whether a building is vacant or otherwise, is not a decision on a collateral or jurisdictional fact, the Division Bench observed thus: "the finding of the District Magistrate including the finding on the question of vacancy would be liable to be adjudged by the District Judge in a revision only on the grounds mentioned in section 18". As indicated earlier, a revision under section 18 lies only on the grounds, which may in short be called jurisdictional errors only. 24. From the above observations of the division Bench it is amply clear that the revisional authority can also examine the legality of the finding on the question of vacancy but only on the grounds mentioned in section 18, Thus, the unqualified observations of the learned District Judge that the finding, regarding declaration of vacancy cannot be challenged in a revision or that the question of vacancy cannot be considered by the revisional court are not legally sound. The finding on the question of vacancy can be gone into by a revisional court but only on the limited grounds mentioned in section 18. It cannot decline to consider the finding on the question of vacancy as bing outside the scope of its revisional authority. It is a different matter that it may decline to upset the finding on case for interference under section 18 of the Act has been made out. It cannot decline to consider the finding on the question of vacancy as bing outside the scope of its revisional authority. It is a different matter that it may decline to upset the finding on case for interference under section 18 of the Act has been made out. In the instant case, the learned District Judge did not approach the finding of vacancy recorded by the respondent No. 4 (Rent Control and Eviction Officer/ District Supply Officer) from this stand point. In this way, the learned Judge himself failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him. 25. Though the learned District Judge took the view that the question of declaration of vacancy could not be considered by him in revision, still he proceeded to consider the submissions of the revisionist (present petitioner). He observed that the revisionist was not a lawful allottee of the premises and he had been giving an impression that he would vacate the premises in question as soon as he would get a house of allotment at the place of his posting. His Chief Engineer had given directions to him to vacate the premises but he had not complied. In this state of affairs, the revisionist was not entitled to challenge the order of allotment. Referring to the claim of the revisionist that he was entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Act, the learned District Judge observed that the plea was not open to him specially when even the landlord had at no point of time claimed that he had admitted him (revisionist) as tenant, rather lie (landlord) has been pressing for release of the premises on the ground that the revisionist had already been transferred long back. These observation of the learned District Judge do not amount to a. consideration of the finding on the question of vacancy in a legal manner on the grounds mentioned in section 18. These observations only show a confused and haphazard treatment of the entire subject. It is true that the present petitioner claimed to be the allottee of the house in question but did not produce any order of allotment in his favour at any stage. The learned District Judge was, therefore, justified in proceeding on the basis that the petitioner was not in possession of the house in question in pursuance of an order of allotment. The learned District Judge was, therefore, justified in proceeding on the basis that the petitioner was not in possession of the house in question in pursuance of an order of allotment. However, this could not be the end of the matter. Amditiedly, the petitioner was in occupation of the house since October, 1974. The amended section 14 relating to regularisation of occupation of existing tenants come into force with effect from 5.7.1976. The petitioner was continuing in possession of the premises since before 5.7 1976 and also claiming benefit of the provisions of section 14. It was, therefore, essential for the learned District Judge to consider whether the requirements of section 14 were fulfilled in the case of the present petitioner. The requirements of this section were : "(a) that the petitioner was in occupation of the house on 4-7-1976; "(b) that the petitioner continued in occupation of the house on and after 5.7.1976; "(c) that the occupation of the petitioner on 4.7.1976 was as a. tenant with the consent of the landlord; and "(d) that no suit or preceding for eviction was pending before any court or authority on 5.7.1976 against the petitioner. 26. In the instant case, it was no body's case that requirements (a), (b). and (d) were not fulfilled. Only it had to be seen if the requirement (c) above was made out in the case of the petitioner. It has been held by this Court in several decisions that the consent of the landlord may be express or implied. A consent is said to be implied if it is manifested by actions, or facts or by inaction or silence, which raises a presumption that the consent has been given. This consent should, be one given prior to 5.7 1976. See. Dr. (Mrs. Gyan Thapa v. District Judge 1979 A.R.C. 50 and Kishori v. District Judge. Banda 1981 A.R.C. 194," The learned District Judge should have, therefore, considered if the petitioner was in occupation of the house as a tenant with the implied consent of the landlord had on 4.7.1976. He did not approach the question of consent from this stand point. He merely said that he landlord had at no point of time claimed to have admitted the revisionist (present petitioner) as tenant. This could not be conclusive because his did not negative implied consent. He did not approach the question of consent from this stand point. He merely said that he landlord had at no point of time claimed to have admitted the revisionist (present petitioner) as tenant. This could not be conclusive because his did not negative implied consent. In paragraph 6 of the writ petition, the petitioner asserted that he landlord respondent No. 2) continued to accept rent from him. This was not denied by any of the respondents. The fact that the landlord had later on applied for release of the house on the ground that the petitioner had been transferred longback from Azamgarh, could not by it self lead to the conclusion that the petitioner was not living in the house in question 4 7.1976 as a tenant with the consent of the landlord. The learned District Judge also did not consider the order of the District Supply officer dated 21.12.1979 to which a reference was made in the grounds of revision by way of amendment. I will deal with this order dated 21.12.1979 a little later. Here, it would suffice to say that by this order, the then District Supply officer had rejected the application for allotment of Sri Abdul Qavi Khan, Executive Engineer, and the release application of the landlord, respondent No. 2, saying that the possession of Shri Ram Palat Singh (present petitioner) over the house was good and no case under section 12 (2-A) of the Act was made out. At that time the landlord did not take up the stand that the present petitioner was not his tenant and was merely an unauthorised occupant of the house. Section 1 2 (3-A) implies that the occupation of the person concerned was as a lawful tenant. The circumstance that petitioner was giving out the impression that he would vacate the house in question as soon as he would get a house of allotment at the place of his posting, and that the Chief Engineer had also pressed him to vacate the house, had no relevance to the question whether the occupation of the petitioner was .regularised in view of the provisions of section 14 of the Act. 27. The stage of allotment is reached only after the finding of vacancy of building is recorded. If the finding of vacancy suffers from an error of law and is not sustainable. The order of allotment will automatically fall. 28. 27. The stage of allotment is reached only after the finding of vacancy of building is recorded. If the finding of vacancy suffers from an error of law and is not sustainable. The order of allotment will automatically fall. 28. It may also be pointed out that the revisional judgment shows,that the learned District Judge did not consider the finding regarding vacancy from the standpoint that the premises in question Were about fall vacant or the provisions of section 12.(3-A) or 12(1) (c) of the Act were applicable to the case. 29. From the above discussion it become clear that the revisional judgment suffers from grave errors of law. The learned District Judge did not approach the question which arose for his consideration, from correct legal stand points. The impugned judgment and order dated 19.11.1983 cannot be legally sustained and deserve to he quashed. 30. Next, I proceed to consider the legality of the allotment osier and the order in Form B, both dated 1 1.11.1983 passed by the District Supply Officer, Azamgarh. 31. The proceedings for the allotment of the house in question started with the application of the allottee respondent No. 1, dated 2.6.1983 praying for allotment of the house in his favour. Under orders of respondent No. 4 the Rent Control Inspector inspected the house on 29.7.1983 at 4 p.m. and submitted a report the same day (Annexure 2 to the with petition). The inspector reported that one lady, who gave herself as the wife of Sri Ram Palat Singh, was present in the house and informed him that her husband had been transferred in Oct., 1977 to Gorakhpur. From there he was transferred to Deoria, and from Deoria to Lucknow. As soon as her husband would get a house they would vacate the house. The Rent Control Inspector, therefore, said in his report that there was likelihood of the house falling vacant very early. He suggested that the likely vacancy of the premises be notified. It is noteworthy that the Rent Control Inspector did not say that the lady had given out that they would vacate the house at an early date; it was his own inference that the house was likely to fall vacant very early. 32. On receipt of the report of the Rent Control Inspector the vacancy of the house was notified on 1.8.1983. This notification is as required under Rule 8(2). 32. On receipt of the report of the Rent Control Inspector the vacancy of the house was notified on 1.8.1983. This notification is as required under Rule 8(2). The requirement is that the conclusion of the inspection report shall be pasted on the notice board of the office of the District Magistrate. This notification of vacancy has not been filed by any party. It appears that the petitioner received a letter No. 2747 dated 1.8.1983 from the District Supply officer, Azamgarh, regarding the vacancy of the house and the sent representation dated 3.8.1983 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition). In this representation the petitioner said that this entire family was living in the premises in question and the same was neither vacant nor likely to fall in vacant in the near future. He also referred to the order of December, 1979 passed by the then District Supply Officer Azamgarh on the application for allotment of Sri Abdul Qavi Khan. The petitioner added that the information that the house was likely to fall vacant in the near future was not correct and no proceedings for allotting the house to any one should be taken It appears that the landlord also made application for release of the house in his favour. 33. The respondent No. 4 disposed of the released application of the landlord ; the application for allotment made by respondent No. 1, and the applications of some other prospective allottee's by the impugned allotment order dated 11.11.1983, (annexure 4). It does not appear that he considered the representation of the petitioner and disposed it of. This allotment order is very significant and shows hew the respondent No. 4. tried to sidetrack and confuse the real questions which logically arose for consideration and passed this order. The first thing which the respondent No. 4 said in this order was that the petitioner had taken possession over the house without any allotment order and therefore, he was in unauthorised occupation of the same. He made a reference to the order dated 21.12.1979 passed by an earlier District Supply officer on the application of Abdul Qavi Khan, but did not say that was is effect. He made a reference to the order dated 21.12.1979 passed by an earlier District Supply officer on the application of Abdul Qavi Khan, but did not say that was is effect. He further said that the letter bent by Sri Umesh Chandra, the then District Supply Officer, to the Executive Engineer in the year 1978 saying that the possession of the petitioner was regularised under section 14 of the Act, was without jurisdiction No such declaration could be made by him, and the petitioner had not taken up such a stand before him, (respondent No. 4.) or before his predecessors in office. He also said that the landlord nowhere said that the petitioner had taken possession of the house under some agreement. He also emphasised that the petitioner had also moved an application for allotment of the house on 3.3.1975 which indicated that he had not taken possession over it with the consent of the landlord. After saying all this, the respondent No. 4 took a turn and said that whatever may be the position, the fact remained that by his order dated 1.8.193 he had held that the house was likely to fall vacant in the near future. In this connection he stressed that no one bad challenged his order dated 1. 8.1983 in any superior court. After this discussion of the status of the petitioner, the respondent No. 4 proceeded to consider the release application of the landlord and rejected it. Thereafter he considered all the allotment applications and held that respondent No. I was entitled to allotment of the house in his favour because he was the first applicant and further, he wanted the house in order to establish contact with the general public at Azamgarh which was a genuine public purpose. 34. The allotment order in Form B which is also dated 11.11.1983, bet- rays the real working of the mind of the respondent No. 4. This order does not say anything about the likely vacancy of the house. It clearly says that the house is vacant on account of its being in unauthorised occupation of Sri Rant Palat Singh. 35. Both the above orders suffer from serious errors of law. This order does not say anything about the likely vacancy of the house. It clearly says that the house is vacant on account of its being in unauthorised occupation of Sri Rant Palat Singh. 35. Both the above orders suffer from serious errors of law. These orders are, to my mind, nothing but a deliberate exercise to confuse the real issues in order to create a semblance of justification for proceeding to pass an allotment order in respect of the house. 36. Though the petitioner had taken the stand that he was an allottee of the house in question. it appears that he could not produce any allotment order at any stage. His reliance was on section 14 of the Act, as it stood on 5.7.1976 after amendment by U. P. Act, No. 28 of 1976, merely because the petitioner had entered into possession of the house in 1974 without an allotment order it could not necessarily follow that he was an unauthorised occupant of the house in the year 1979 or at the time when the impugned allotment orders were passed. It was the duty of respondent No. 4. to consider and decide if the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of section 14 and his occupation as a tenant was regularised under that section. It is true that a Rent Control and Eviction officer has no jurisdiction to grant a mere declaration for regularisation of occupation or tenancy under section 14 of the Act. This has been held by this court in Mirza Samiullah Beg v. The District Magistrate 1979 A.L.R. 449 The Ratio of this case was that the District Magistrate is not a Court of general jurisdiction he has limited jurisdiction in respect of matters for which express provision has been made in the Act, Section 14 does not empower the district Magistrate to entertain proceeding only to make a declaration. This decision was followed by another Division Bench in Zarif Ahmad v. RC & E.O. 1980 A.R.C. 581. However, these decisions did not lay down that the District Magistrate has no power to consider and decide the question of regulation under section 14 if it arises as an integral part of the proceedings for allotment or release of a building. This decision was followed by another Division Bench in Zarif Ahmad v. RC & E.O. 1980 A.R.C. 581. However, these decisions did not lay down that the District Magistrate has no power to consider and decide the question of regulation under section 14 if it arises as an integral part of the proceedings for allotment or release of a building. The letter which Sri Umesh Chandra, the then District Supply officer, sent in the year 1978 is not on the record and it is not clear as to what was the language used therein. Even if it were to be ignored being in the nature of a declaration which was without jurisdiction, the respondent No. 4 should have proceeded to decide the question whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of section 14. or not. The fact that the petitioner had moved an application for allotment on 3.3.1975 could not negative the application of section 14 to his case. According to the understanding of the petitioner the Act became applicable to the house in question in the beginning of 1975 and it may be that he thought of obtaining an allotment order for this reason. the other reason given by respondent No. 4 to negative the application of section 14, was also not conclusive. The mere fact that the landlord had not said that the petitioner had taken possession with his consent under some agreement, was not enough to deny the benefic of section 14 to the petitioner. As discussed earlier, it was to be seep if the petitioner was in occupation of the house as a tenant with the consent of the landlord on 4.7.1976 The unsent could be an implied one as well. The circumstances which could be relevant in connection with implied consent were not consent at all considered. 37. The respondent No. 4. merely referred to the order dated 21.12.1979 passed by the then District Supply Officer but did not consider its effect. This order was passed on a consideration of the application of Abdul Qavi Khan for allotment it of the house in his favour, the application of the landlord for release of the house, and the objection of the petitioner. The arguments cantered round section 12 (3-A) of the Act, which has been discussed earlier. This order was passed on a consideration of the application of Abdul Qavi Khan for allotment it of the house in his favour, the application of the landlord for release of the house, and the objection of the petitioner. The arguments cantered round section 12 (3-A) of the Act, which has been discussed earlier. The District Supply Officer held that there was no basis to deem the house vacant under the provisions of section 12 (3-A). He also observed that an allotment or release order could be passed under section 16 if the accommodation was vacant, or was about to fall vacant and none of these contingencies was present. This order does not show that the question of regularisation of occupation as a tenant under section 14 was specifically raised at that time; however, it is amply clear that no one including the landlord, took up the stand that the occupation of the petitioner was unauthorised. This order was not characterised as without jurisdiction by respondent No. 4. The then District Supply Officer had jurisdiction to pass this order. The District Supply Officer who passed the impugned orders dated 11.11 1983 could not challenge or ignore this order. He should have considered the effect of this order on the rights of the petitioner. He committed an error of law is not considering the effect.of this order. 38. The respondent No. 4 claimed, in view of the report of the Rent Control Inspector, notify the vacancy of the house in question on 1.8.1983, but on 11.11.1983, he had no justification to say that the house was about to fall vacant in the near future. His emphasis that this order dated 1.8.1983 was not challenged by any one in a superior court and, therefore, it will be deemed that the house was about to fall vacant in future, is also based on an erroneous view of law. This aspect of the matter has been discussed earlier while discussing the case of Hari Swarup (Supra). The notification of vacancy dated 1.8.1983 could not be challenged for superior court in revision under section 18 or by way of a writ petition. It would be so challenged only after the order of allotment had been passed. However, that petitioner could not under Rule 8. The respondent No. 4 totally ignored this salutary provisions of law. The notification of vacancy dated 1.8.1983 could not be challenged for superior court in revision under section 18 or by way of a writ petition. It would be so challenged only after the order of allotment had been passed. However, that petitioner could not under Rule 8. The respondent No. 4 totally ignored this salutary provisions of law. Rule 8(2) shows that the notification of vacancy is nothing but notification of the conclusion of the inspection report. An order of allotment can be passed after expiry of three days, from the date of notification. If in the mean time any objection is received, no allotment order can be passed until the objection is disposed of. Rule 8 (3) enjoins that any evidence adduced by the objector shall be taken into consideration while deciding the objection. These provisions imply that the District Magistrate has power to review and rescind the notification of vacancy in a fit case. In the instant case the petitioner had made representation (objection) within time i.e. on 3.8.1983. Without deciding that objection, the respondent No. 4 could not treat the notification dated 18.1983 as final. The Respondent No. 4 did not say that he was accepting the notification of vacancy as final because he did not find any substance in the objection of the petitioner. 39. The wife of the petitioner had not said anything to the Rent Control Inspector to give an impression that the house would be vacated shortly or within any particular time. The statement that the house would be vacated when a house is available at the place of posting of the petitioner, could not reasonably be construed as an indication that it was about to fall vacant. Whatever doubt the respondent No. 4 might have entertained on this point should have been dispelled by the categorical assertions made by the petitioner in this representation dated 3.8.1983. This too made it obligatory for respondent No. 4 to reconsider the question of vacancy and record a finding thereon. This he, obviously, did not do. 40. As said earlier, the order in Form 3 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) speaks only one situation namely, that the house is vacant because it is in unauthorised occupation of the petitioner. This too made it obligatory for respondent No. 4 to reconsider the question of vacancy and record a finding thereon. This he, obviously, did not do. 40. As said earlier, the order in Form 3 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) speaks only one situation namely, that the house is vacant because it is in unauthorised occupation of the petitioner. It does not say a word to indicate that the allotment is being made on the basis that the house is about to fall vacant as the present occupant (petitioner) in tends to vacate it in the near future. Here it will be helpful to quote the proforma of Form B: FORM B (See Rule 12) Allotment, Order (Office of the District Magistrate...... (No........ Dated ......... 19. (In exercise of the powers under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 16 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972), 1 hereby direct that the building/part of building specified below which is vacant) which is likely to be vacated by Sri............ shall. be let by the landlord Sri............to the allottee (Sri............ (The allottee is required to pay or offer to the landlord a sum of Rs. ...(Rupees in...words) as one month's/six months presumptive rent in accordance with sub-section (9) of section 16 of the said Act. (The landlord is also directed to deliver possession of the building/ part of building to the allottee by (date)..... or within ten days of its being vacated by Sri......and that such building/part of building shall he used by the allottee for residential purposes. (The building/part of building is allotted for business purposes only and the names of the proprietors/partners of the business are as under : Signature.............. ... Designation..... ... . ... (Dated......... 19. (Description of the building/part of building allotted Municipal No. Mohala. Allotted portion. Name of the person vacating. 41. In the above proforma I have underlined the portions which apply to the case of a building which has been allotted on the basis that it is about to fall vacant. The proforma clearly indicates that the allottee can get possession over the building only after the sitting tenant actually vacates it. This has also been provided in Rule 14 which has been referred to earlier. 42. The proforma clearly indicates that the allottee can get possession over the building only after the sitting tenant actually vacates it. This has also been provided in Rule 14 which has been referred to earlier. 42. Thus, the position remains that the allotment order dated 11.11.1983 and the order in Form B dated 11.11.1983 were passed by the respondent No. 4 On the basis that thee house in question was vacant as the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation thereof. The allotment was not made on the basis that the house was about to fall vacant. These two impugned orders could not be passed on the above basis without first considering the question whether the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of section 14 and had made out a case under it. Even if respondent No. 4 wanted to pass an order of allotment on the basis that the house was about to fall vacant, he could not do so without first recording a finding on a consideration of the entire material and the circumstances of the case that the petitioner in fact was intending to vacate the house in question in the near future. Further, if this were to be the basis of the allotment order, the order in Form B should have been in conformity with such basis for allotment and should not have said that the petitioner was an authorised occupant and, therefore, the house was vacant. 43. On account of the aforesaid grave errors of law the two impugned orders dated 11.11.1983 cannot be sustained, and deserve to be quashed. 44. While criticising that allotment order dated 11.11.1982 the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the passing, pointed out that the allottee needed the house to make public contacts at zarngarh in connection with his public and political activities, could not be considered a public purpose within the meaning of the Act. Whatever further the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the individual, alone can be regarded as public interest. The need of the allottee was his individual need to maintain and advance his own public and political career. This did not serve the general interest of the community. I think that the other applicants for allotment, whose applications were rejected, alone could agitate this paint 32. The need of the allottee was his individual need to maintain and advance his own public and political career. This did not serve the general interest of the community. I think that the other applicants for allotment, whose applications were rejected, alone could agitate this paint 32. Since no other applicant is a party to this writ petition, I do not consider it necessary to discuss and answer this point. It is left open. 45. The grievance of the petitioner is that on 12.11.1983 the house was not vacant and his family was occupying the same. The allottee was able to take forcible possession over a portion of the house on 12.11.1983 with the help of the police and ruffians of the town. Despite this forcible deprivation of possession over a part of the house, his family was living in the remaining portion of the house. By order dated 13.1.1984 this court had passed a stay order directing that the petitioner shall not be dispossessed from the house in question and the District Magistrate, Azamgarh and the District Supply Officer, Azamgarh, respondent Nos. 3 and 4 shall restore possession of the remaining portion of the premises in question to the petitioner. This order was passed after respondents Nos. 1, 3 and 4 had filed counter affidavits, and the petitioner had filed rejoinder affidavits. This order was made absolute for the duration of the writ petition by order dated 14.2.1984. 46. The reply of the allottee is that the house in. question was actually vacant or practically vacant on 12.11.83 and he took possession over the same peacefully. Intimation of taking possession was given to the District Supply Officer on 14.11.1983 (Annexure 1 to the counter affidavit of Sri Jai Sankar, District Supply Officer). The allottee has further submitted that the story of taking forcibly possession set tip by the petitioner was merely an afterthought. No report was lodged with the police about this forcible dispossession. No application was made to the District Magistrate or the District Supply Office in this behalf. No grievance of this conduct of the allottee was made to the learned District Judge while filing the revision. The case of forcible possession was for the first time taken up in the writ petition which was filed on 21.12.1983. No application was made to the District Magistrate or the District Supply Office in this behalf. No grievance of this conduct of the allottee was made to the learned District Judge while filing the revision. The case of forcible possession was for the first time taken up in the writ petition which was filed on 21.12.1983. It has also been argued that the question of alleged forcible dispossession of the petitioner is disputed question of fact which cannot be gone into in writ proceedings. 47. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted in reply that a complaint to the police or the District Supply Officer would have been of no use because they would not have taken cognisance of it as the allottee was Central Minister. The District Judge could not go into the question of forcible dispossession in view of the limited scope of his revisional powers. The mere fact that the question was raised for the first time before this court could not lead to the conclusion that the averment of forcible dispossession was false. He has further submitted that the totality of the circumstances point out that the stand of the petitioner is correct and the allottee could not have obtained peaceful possession of the premises on 12.11.1983, and, therefore, the question can be gone into in these proceedings. It is essential for doing justice to the petitioner. 48. 1 feel that in this case, the question whether the petitioner was forcibly dispossessed from a portion of the house. can be decided on the basis of the facts and circumstances available on the record. On a careful consideration, I find that the case of the petitioner is correct on this point. The time gap between the order in Form B and the alleged taking of peaceful possession over the house is so short that the petitioner or his family members could not have possibly removed their effects from the house. If the petitioner had shifted his family and vacated the house before 11.11.1983, the respondent No. 4 would not have passed the kind of allotment order dated 11.11.1983 (Annexure S), which he did. Then he would have simply said that the petitioner had vacated the house and it had fallen vacant and was available for allotment. The application dated 14.11.1983 giving intimation of taking possession is also very significant. Then he would have simply said that the petitioner had vacated the house and it had fallen vacant and was available for allotment. The application dated 14.11.1983 giving intimation of taking possession is also very significant. In this application the allottee said that possession has been obtained over the house according to law on 12.11.1983. The exact words used were : [HINDI MATTER] 49. In this application it was not indicated as to who delivered and received possession of the house in question. It was also not said that the house was found lying vacant or practically vacant. The counter affidavits of Sri Panchanan Rai and Kalap Nath Rai do not say that they or any of them was present at the time of taking over possession of the premises on 12.11.1983. These counter affidavits do not indicate as to who had actually taken possession over the premises on 12.11.1983. In the counter affidavit of the allottee in paragraph 5 it was stated that the accommodation was "actually lying vacant"' In paragraph 8 it was said that the accommodation was "practically vacant". The use of these differing expressions shows in decision about the actual state of vacancy on 12.11.1983. Further, if the petitioner had vacated the house before 12.11.1983 or had amicably handed over possession to someone on behalf of the allottee, he would not have normally indulged in litigation by filing a revision thereafter coming to this Court in writ jurisdiction. If the petitioner had actually shifted his family from the premises before 12.11.983, either the allottee or the respondent No. 4 would have been in a position to state where his family was actually residing since then. his would have been a very important circumstance in favour of the story that the house was lying vacant and the allottee just walked into it. The petitioner Lad filed representation on 3.8.1983 against the notification of vacancy dated 1.8.1983. This representation was not disposed of prior to 11.11.1983. Hence, the petitioner could not have felt any need till 11.11.1983 to shift this family from the house. After the passing of the order dated 11.11.1983, the petitioner could on learning about it, set about thinking whether or not he should shift from the house. This representation was not disposed of prior to 11.11.1983. Hence, the petitioner could not have felt any need till 11.11.1983 to shift this family from the house. After the passing of the order dated 11.11.1983, the petitioner could on learning about it, set about thinking whether or not he should shift from the house. An unauthorised occupant cannot be thrown out of the accommodation immediately, on the passing of an allotment order in Form B. Rule 19 allows fifteen days time from the date of service of a notice on him, to such occupant to vacate the premises by himself. The petitioner could not, therefore, be in hot-haste to vacate the premises immediately after the passing of the orders on 11.11.1983. For all these reasons, I am inclined to accept the case of the petitioner that on 12.11.1983. in his absence, his family members were forcibly dispossessed from a portion of the house in question under the cover of the allotment order in Form B. However, it is not clear as to who were the persons who actually took forcible possession over a portion of the house in question and whether they did so on their own or under the instructions of the allottee. It may be that those persons were local supporters of the allottee. 50. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not only prayed for quashing the allotment orders and the revisional order, but has also urged for a direction to respondents No. 13 and 4 deliver back possession to the petitioner of that portion of the house which was forcible occupied on 12.11.1983, after actual eviction of the allottee, respondent No. 1 from that portion. The learned counsel has urged that the allotment proceedings were collusive, or at any rate, the District Supply Officer had intentionally and deliberately passed the order of allotment in dubious language to enable the allottee to take forcible possession of the house. This act of the District Supply Officer was mala fide and, therefore, this Court could issue a suitable direction for restoration of possession over a part of the house after eviction of the allottee. He has urged that the powers of this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction are very wide. In support of these submissions the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision Dwarka Nath v. The 1. He has urged that the powers of this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction are very wide. In support of these submissions the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision Dwarka Nath v. The 1. T. Officer AIR 1966 Supreme Court 81 and Promod Kumar Tewari v. Badri Narain Pandey AIR 1977 Allahabad 479 51. In reply the learned counsel for the allottee has urged that 'possession of the allotted house was taken without the aid and intervention of the District Magistrate, or the District Supply Officer, or the police. Hence, no writ of mandamus could be issued against the allottee respondent No. 1 for a direction to restore possession to the petitioner. If the petitioner succeeds in getting the allotment order quashed, his remedy for restoration of possession lies by way of a civil suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. The learned counsel has also denied the allegation of collusion between the District Supply, Office respondent No. 4. and the allottee. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the following observations of their lordships of the Supreme Court in the decision Sohan Lal v. The Union of India. Their Lordship observed: ""Normally, a writ of mandamus does not issue to or an order. in the nature of mandamus is not made against a private individual. Such an order is made against a person directing him to do some particular thing, specified in the order, which appertains to his office and is in the nature of a public duty." Their Lordships further observed: ""The eviction of a displaced person in contravention of the express provisions of S, 3 of the public Premises (Eviction) Act is illegal and a writ of mandamus can issue to or an order in the nature of mandamus can be made against the Union of India to restore possession of the property to him from which he has been evicted if the property is in possession of the Union of India. If, however, the property is in possession of another dis- placed person and he is not in collusion with the Union of India or has no knowledge that the eviction was illegal, a writ of mandamus cannot issue to or an order in the nature of mandamus cannot be made against him." The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue directions or orders was explained by the Supreme Court thus, in the case of Dwarka Nath (Supra): ""This article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it enface confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The Constitution designedly used a wide language in describing. the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England, but the scope of those writs, also is widened by the use of the expression "nature", for the said expression does not equate the' writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, High Courts can also issue directions, order or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Articles 226 of the Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of Government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself." 52. From the above it is apparent that an appropriate direction can he issued in exercise of powers under Article 226 to give adequate relief to an aggrieved petitioners, if the Court feels that it is imperative that some kind of consequential relief should also be granted. 53. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the article itself." 52. From the above it is apparent that an appropriate direction can he issued in exercise of powers under Article 226 to give adequate relief to an aggrieved petitioners, if the Court feels that it is imperative that some kind of consequential relief should also be granted. 53. The observations of the Supreme Court is Sohan La1's case supra show that a writ of mandamus or an order in the nature of mandamus would not be issued against a private individual if it is found that he was in possession of the property in question without being in collusion with the authority concerned or without the knowledge that the eviction was illegal. In the instant case, collusion between the District Supply Officer and tie allotted, may not be inferred, but it is clear from the conduct of the said officer that for some reason or the other he had acted in a manner to oust the petitioner and enable the allottee to have possession of the house. Taking of forcible possession over a part of the house on 12.11.1983 was clearly an illegal act of these person who actually took it. Though the allottee may not be personally held responsible for such an illegal act, yet the shadow of such an illegal and wanton act must fell on his right to retain possession of that portion. The entire allotment proceedings show a calculated effort in the direction of allotting the house in question in favour of respondent No. 1. The manner in which the allotment order and the order in Form B were passed, and the forcible taking possession over a part of the house, shock the judicial conscience. The wrong done to the petitioner requires that he should be granted the relief of restoration of possession as a consequential relief. 54 There is another aspect of the matter. In the preceding discussion I have held that the allotment order and the order in Form B both dated 19.11.1983 and the revisional order dated 19.11.1983 suffer from serious errors of law, and deserve to be quashed. An order of allotment passed on whatever ground, is an order of allotment under section 16(1) (a) of the Act, because there is no other provision for making allotment of a building. An order of allotment passed on whatever ground, is an order of allotment under section 16(1) (a) of the Act, because there is no other provision for making allotment of a building. Sub-section (3) of section 18 of the Act provides that where an order under section 16 is rescinded, the District Magistrate shall on an application being made to him in that behalf place the parties back in the position which they occupied but for such order as has been rescinded and may for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary. The language of this sub-section is wide and would include a case where an order of allotment has been quashed by this Court in writ jurisdiction. In view of this legal provision also the petitioner would be entitled to restoration of possession. A direction by this Court for restoration of possession to the petitioner would be only in line with this provision. 55. In view of the foregoing discussion, the three impugned orders must be quashed and direction for restoration of possession should also be issued in favour of the petitioner. 57. Taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration I think that it is a fit case where the petitioner should get his costs from respondents Nos. 1 and 4. who are the main contesting respondents. 58. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of allotment dated 11.11.1983 and the Form B dated 11.11.1983 and the revisional judgment and order dated 19 11.1983 are hereby quashed. It is hereby directed that respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 4 shall forthwith restore to the petitioner, possession of that portion of the house from which he was dispossessed. The petitioner shall get costs of this writ petition from respondents Nos. I and 4.