JUDGMENT : Nazir Ahmad, J. - This application has been filed under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code), by petitioner Nageshwar Sahai, for a direction to the Additional Sessions Judge II, Patna, to furnish copies of the statements of the prosecution witnesses cited in the charge-sheet and recorded by the Deputy Superintendent of police (Criminal Investigation Department) in the course of further investigation relating to the accused persons in Sessions Trial No. 36 of 1981. 2. This application was originally placed before a single Judge of this Court and he referred the matter for hearing by a Division Bench, vide ORDER :dated 8.7.82, as the points involved in this case are whether after the submission of the charge-sheet by the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station the State Government can direct an enquiry by the D. S. P., C. I. D. and whether the report submitted by the D. S. P., C. I. D. and the evidence recorded by him should be treated as further investigation in respect of the offence under section 173 (8) of the Code, and hence the matter has been placed before a Division Bench. 3. The case of the petitioner may be briefly stated. The petitioner is employed as Section Officer in the Public Works Department of the Government of Bihar and is posted at Patna Secretariat. The petitioner and five others are under-going a trial in the Court of Sri Om Prakash, Additional Sessions Judge II, Patna in Sessions Trial No. 36 of 1981. 4. According to the petitioner, the prosecution case is to the effect that on 1.2.1979 at about 4 P. M. accused Nityanand son of accused Lallan Prasad made a gesture with his hand from across the road to Kanti Devi, daughter of Rameshwar Dutt, the deceased. At about 6 P.M. the deceased accompanied by his family members went to the apartment of accused Lallan Prasad, with a view to remonstrate about the conduct of accused Nityanand. Accused Lallan Prasad was not found present at his house, but a quarrel developed between the ladies of the two families and there was also an exchange of abuses. At about 11 P.M. accused Lallan Prasad along with his two sons, namely, Nityanand and Satyanand, his Sala Rewati Raman and some others want to the apartment of the deceased.
Accused Lallan Prasad was not found present at his house, but a quarrel developed between the ladies of the two families and there was also an exchange of abuses. At about 11 P.M. accused Lallan Prasad along with his two sons, namely, Nityanand and Satyanand, his Sala Rewati Raman and some others want to the apartment of the deceased. Accused Lallan Prasad began to beat the outer door of the apartment of the deceased and as the door was at first not opened there was an exchange of hot words between accused Lallan Prasad and the deceased Rameshwar Datta. When the door was opened, accused Lallan Prasad, his two sons Nityanand and Satyanapd, his Sala Rewati Raman and two or three others entered the flat of the deceased. Those who went inside the flat, began to assault the deceased Rameshwar Dutt and his son Vijoy Kumar Dutt. Subsequently, accused Lallan Prasad and his son Nityanand caught hold of the deceased and pushed him down across the railing of the inner verandah. The deceased Rameshwar Dutt fell down from the second floor of the building and he died. On the next day Vijoy Kumar Dutt, the son of the deceased gave a written report about the occurrence to the office-in-charge of Shashtri Nagar Police Station on the basis of which the present case was instituted. 5. According to the petitioner, Braj Kishore Prasad Sinha, one of the accused, occupied a flat in the same building and the petitioner is said to be his friend and that the petitioner and accused Braj Kishore Prasad Sinha were also found present at the sport, although the petitioner has claimed that they were outside the door and that they did not go inside the flat and that they continued to stand at the door. 6. In the petition it has also been asserted that sometime after the charge-sheet was submitted, it came to the notice of the State Government that the investigation in the case was not conducted justly and fairly, and the State Government directed investigation of the case by an officer of the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police in the Criminal Investigation Department. Shri Nalini Kant Mishra, D. S. P. who conducted the further investigation, examined some of the prosecution witnesses afresh and he also examined some more persons residing in the locality. 7.
Shri Nalini Kant Mishra, D. S. P. who conducted the further investigation, examined some of the prosecution witnesses afresh and he also examined some more persons residing in the locality. 7. It has also been asserted in the application that on a further investigation the Deputy Superintendent of police came to the conclusion that the petitioner as well as accused Braj Kishore Prasad Sinha were wholly innocent and they have been falsely implicated. 8. When the trial commenced before the learned Additional Sessions Judge II, Patna, the petitioner filed an application before him making a prayer that the report of the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the record of the statements of the witnesses examined by him might be called for from the Home Department of the State Government so that the materials disclosed during further investigation might be considered while determining the question of framing a charge against the petitioner and also to enable the petitioner to defend himself effectively at the trial. By ORDER :dated 18.11.81 the learned Additional Sessions Judge II held that the report of the Deputy Superintendent of Police (C. I. D.) and the statements of the witnesses recorded by him in the course of further investigation are not necessary in the case at this stage of hearing on charge arid the same may be relevant at a later stage. He also directed for calling for the above report and the copies of the statements from the Home Department of the State Government. This will be evident from Annexure 1 to this application. 9. Against the aforesaid ORDER :the petitioner filed Criminal Misc. No. 300 of 1982 which was withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to file a fresh application vide ORDER :dated 22.1.82 of this Court vide Annexure 2. 10. Subsequently, charges were framed against the accused persons including, the petitioner and so a prayer was made for calling for the report of the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the statements of the witnesses recorded by him from the Home Department of the State Government.
10. Subsequently, charges were framed against the accused persons including, the petitioner and so a prayer was made for calling for the report of the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the statements of the witnesses recorded by him from the Home Department of the State Government. By ORDER :dated 6.3.82, vide Annexure 3, charge under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the Penal Code), was framed against Lallan Prasad and Kumar Nityanand, and charge under section 302/149 of the Penal Code was framed against accused Rewati Raman Prasad, Braj Kishore Prasad Sinha and petitioner Nageshwar Sahai, and under section 323 of the Penal Code against Rewati Raman Prasad and Kumar Nityanand, and under section 449 of the Penal Code against all the accused persons. By the same ORDER :the learned Additional Sessions Judge II, Patna, allowed the prayer of the petitioner and called for the entire file from the Home Commissioner; Bihar. 11. On 20.3.82 the report of the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the record of the statements of witnesses examined by the Deputy Superintendent of Police were produced before the learned Additional Sessions Judge II by the Home Department of the State Government and then a prayer was made that copies of the statements of prosecution witnesses recorded by the D. S. P. in course of further investigation might be supplied to the petitioner. By ORDER :dated 22.3.82 the learned Additional Sessions Judge II, rejected the prayer of the accused persons and he expressed his view that the accused persons were not entitled to get copies of the statements of the witnesses recorded by the D. S. P. (C. I. D.). Hence this application has been filed for a direction to furnish copies of the statements of the prosecution witnesses cited in the charge-sheet recorded by the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) in the course of further investigation. 12. The argument in the case was heard on 18.9.1984. Mr.
Hence this application has been filed for a direction to furnish copies of the statements of the prosecution witnesses cited in the charge-sheet recorded by the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) in the course of further investigation. 12. The argument in the case was heard on 18.9.1984. Mr. Surendra Prasad on behalf of the petitioner, relied on the assertions made in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the application, which have been supported by an affidavit dated 13.4.1982, that after submission of the charge-sheet, it came to the notice of the State Government that the investigation in the case was not conducted justly and fairly and the State Government directed a further investigation of the case by the Deputy Superintendent of Police in the Criminal Investigation Department and that Shri Nalini Kant Mishra, D. S. P. who conducted the further investigation examined some of the prosecution witnesses afresh and he also examined some more persons residing in the locality, and the D. S. P. found that the petitioner as well as accused Braj Kishore Prasad had been falsely implicated in the case. 13. Mr. Awadhesh Kumar Datta, on behalf of the State of Bihar-opposite party, submitted that he was not aware as to under what circumstances the further investigation was made by Shri Nalini Kant Mishra, D. S. P. He also submitted that even if the State Government directed an investigation, it was an administrative investigation and not a judicial investigation under section 173 (8) of the Code and so the petitioner is not entitled to get copies of the statements of witnesses examined by the D. S. P. (C. I. D.). 14. I find that the records of the Home Department are in the file. It appears that at the direction of the Chief Minister a further investigation was directed by the State Government and ultimately the D. S. P. (C.I.D) submitted a report dated 28.1.81 in which he gave details of the occurrence and also the place of occurrence and he recorded the statements of various witnesses. The occurrence had taken place on 1.2.79 and the information was lodged at 7 A.M. on 2.2.79, further investigation was conducted in view of the complaint made to the Chief Minister that innocent persons had been implicated.
The occurrence had taken place on 1.2.79 and the information was lodged at 7 A.M. on 2.2.79, further investigation was conducted in view of the complaint made to the Chief Minister that innocent persons had been implicated. It also appears that accused Braj Kishore Prasad Sinha and accused Lallan Prasad are in service in the Patna Secretariat and it cannot be doubted that they maneuvered through political leaders to get a further investigation made. The question may arise as to what was necessity of further investigation after lapse of two years when the police had already investigated the case and submitted the charge-sheet. 15. It appears that after submission of the charge-sheet the petitioner and Braj Kishore Prasad Sinha were released on bail but they were placed under suspension by the department and as such they were anxious to be relieved from suspension and so they wanted further investigation in the case. Thus it is evident that further investigation has been made at the instance of the petitioner and Braj Kishore Prasad Sinha. It will be for the trial court to see as to what reliance can be placed on the statements of the witnesses recorded by the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) after a lapse of two years. However, the question is whether this further investigation is covered by section 173 (8) of the Code. Section 173 (8) of the Code lays down that nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer-in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he snail forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2). The report of the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) is not in any prescribed form as it was a report to the Additional Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department.
The report of the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) is not in any prescribed form as it was a report to the Additional Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department. However, if there is any further investigation at the instance of the State Government then it can be only under section 173 (8) of the Code and although the report was not forwarded to the Magistrate at that time but now in view of the ORDER :dated 18.11.81 and 6.3.82, vide Annexures 1 and 3, the entire file has been called for. 16. Learned Advocate for the State, Mr. Awadhesh Kumar Datta, has submitted that further investigation was an administrative investigation and so no action should be taken on the report of the D. S. P. (C. I. D.). 17. Mr. Surendra Prasad, learned Advocate for the petitioner, has placed reliance on the case of State of Bihar and another vs. J.A.C. Saldanna and others (1980 Criminal Law Journal 98). In this decision under the direction and ORDER :s of respondent no. 3, respondent no. 4 had already submitted final report on February 6, 1979. A communication was addressed to respondent no. 5, Superintendent, Railway Police, one Mr. Mohammad Sulaiman, who had taken over in the meantime from respondent no. 6 who was transferred, to move the Court not to accept the final report and await report of the police after completion of the further investigation which was directed by the Government in the matter and the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate passed ORDER :to await report of further investigation. In these circumstances the effect of various sections were considered. A reference was made to section 3 of the Indian Police Act, where it has been laid down that the superintendence of the police throughout a general police district shall vest in and, shall be exercised by the State Government to which such district is subordinate; and except as authorised under the provisions of this Act, no person, officer or Court shall be empowered by the State Government to supersede or control any police functionary. It has also been stated that section 12 confers power on the Inspector General of Police, subject to the approval of the State Government, to make rules and the Bihar Police Manual, 1978 was issued.
It has also been stated that section 12 confers power on the Inspector General of Police, subject to the approval of the State Government, to make rules and the Bihar Police Manual, 1978 was issued. It has also been held in this decision that the Inspector-General, Vigilance, being appointed for the whole of the State, is a police officer considered to be on duty for all purposes of the Act in the whole of the State and it is open to the State Government to employ him as police officer in any part of the general district, and so it was held that the Inspector-General, Vigilance could be directed by the State Government in exercise of its executive administrative function to take over investigation of a cognizable offence registered at railway police station because when he was directed to take over the investigation it would mean that he was employed as a police officer in that police station for the detection of the crime. For this purpose reliance was placed on section 36 of the Code which lays down that police officers superior, in rank to an officer in charge of a police station may exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station. It was also held that the use of the word 'rank' in section 36 of the Code comprehends the hierarchy of police officers and it is equally clear that the Inspector-General of Police will have jurisdiction over the whole of the State. It has also been held that if the Inspector-General of Police is an officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station, he could in view of section 36 of the Code exercise the powers or an officer in charge of a police station throughout the local area to which he was appointed meaning thereby the whole of Bihar State as might be exercised by an officer in charge of a police within the limits of his police station. In this decision it has also been held that the State of Bihar is governed by the Indian Police Act, 1861.
In this decision it has also been held that the State of Bihar is governed by the Indian Police Act, 1861. It has also been observed in paragraph 16 of this JUDGMENT : that the general power of superintendence as conferred by section 3 of the Indian Police Act, 1861, would comprehend the power to exercise effective control over the actions, performance and discharge of duties by the members of the police force throughout the general district and that the word 'superintendence' would imply administrative control enabling the authority enjoying such power to give directions to the subordinate to discharge its administrative duties and functions in the manner indicated in the ORDER :. It has also been held in this decision that the power of superintendence would comprehend the authority to give directions to perform the duty in a certain manner, to refrain from performing one or the other duty, to direct some one else to perform the duty and no inhibition or limitation can be read in this power unless, the section conferring such power prescribes one. It has also been held in paragraph 17 of this decision that section 173 (8) of the Code enables an officer in charge of a police station to carryon further investigation even after a report under section 173(2) of the Code is submitted to Court. It has also been held that if the State Government has otherwise power to direct further investigation it is neither curtailed, limited nor denied by section 173(8), more so, when the State Government directs an officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of police station thereby enjoying all powers of an officer in charge of a police station to further investigate the case, and such, a situation would be covered by the combined reading of section 173(8) with section 36 of the Code and such power is claimed as flowing from the power of Superintendence over police to direct a police officer to do or not to do a certain thing because at the stage of investigation the power is enjoyed as executive power untrammeled by the judiciary. It has also been held in paragraph 18 of this decision; that section 3 of the said Act does not prescribe any special procedure for investigation contrary to one prescribed in the Code.
It has also been held in paragraph 18 of this decision; that section 3 of the said Act does not prescribe any special procedure for investigation contrary to one prescribed in the Code. It has also been held that an officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station could as well exercise the power of further investigation under section 173(8) in view of the provision embodied in section 36 of the Code. It has also been observed in paragraph 19 of this decision that the High Court was in error in holding that the State Government in exercise of the power of superintendence under section 3 of the said Act lacked the power to direct further investigation into the case, as provided in section 173(8) of the Code. It has also been observed in paragraph 25 that on a cognizance of the offence being taken by the Court the police function of investigation comes to an end subject to the provision contained in section 173(8). Thus it is evident that a further investigation under section 173(8) is possible even after cognizance of the offence is taken. 18. In view of the aforesaid decision, which is a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court, I have only to see whether the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) is appointed for the whole of the State of Bihar. The report of the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) shows that the D. S. P. (C. I. D.), Bihar posted at Patna in the Secretariat. Thus, it cannot be doubted that in Patna district, if not for the whole of the State of Bihar, the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) is superior in rank to the officer-in-charge of Gardanibagh police station. I hold that as the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) is posted in the Secretariat, he will be a superior officer to the officer-in-charge in whole of the State of Bihar, and this is why the report has been submitted to the Additional Inspector General of Police in Criminal Investigation Department, Bihar, Patna. Thus in view of the aforesaid decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court the State Government could entrust investigation to him. The notings in the file clearly goes to show that the matter was placed before the Chief Minister through the Additional Chief Secretaryan4 the Home Commissioner.
Thus in view of the aforesaid decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court the State Government could entrust investigation to him. The notings in the file clearly goes to show that the matter was placed before the Chief Minister through the Additional Chief Secretaryan4 the Home Commissioner. This will be evident from the note in the file dated 28.4.81. Of course the Chief Minister took the view that no further action in the matter is necessary as the trial was proceeding and, so this report was not forwarded to the trial court, but it has been forwarded to the trial court after it was called for from the Home Commissioner, Bihar. 19. Learned Advocate for the petitioner, Mr. Surendra Prasad, has referred to rules 410, 411, 426, 429 and 431 of Chapter 15 of the Bihar Police Manual, 1978. Chapter 15 relates to Criminal Investigation Department. Rule 408 shows that the Criminal Investigation Department is under the control of an officer generally not below the rank of a Deputy Inspector-General of Police. Rule 410 shows that the functions of the Criminal Investigation Department shall include such crimes about whom the Inspector-General gives special ORDER :s. It also shows that murder squad is also a branch of the Criminal Investigation Department. Rule 411 lays down that "Investigation" has the meaning attached to it in the Code. Rule 426 shows that the Deputy Inspector-General, Criminal Investigation Department, may cause inquiry to be conducted by officers of the Criminal Investigation Department under his immediate control instead of through the Superintendent. Rule 429 lays down that the position of officers of the department vis-a-vis subordinate local officers shall be determined by their relative rank. Rule 431 lays down that under section 36 of the Code Inspectors and superior officers of the C. I. D. are superior in rank to an officer-in-charge of a police station. Thus, it cannot be doubted that the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) is an officer-in-charge of police station. 20. Mr. Surendra Prasad, learned Advocate for the petitioner, has placed reliance on the case of Khatri & others vs. State of Bihar and others (1981 B. B. C. J. 124-S.C.).
Thus, it cannot be doubted that the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) is an officer-in-charge of police station. 20. Mr. Surendra Prasad, learned Advocate for the petitioner, has placed reliance on the case of Khatri & others vs. State of Bihar and others (1981 B. B. C. J. 124-S.C.). In this decision the effects of sections 162 and 172 of the Code were considered but the effect of section 173 of the Code was not considered in this decision and so it is not helpful for the decision of this case. 21. Learned Advocate for the petitioner has also relied on the case of State of Kerala Vs. Raghavan etc. (1974 Criminal Law Journal 1373) where it has been held that the prosecution cannot pick and choose and refuse to supply to the accuse the copies of the statements which are contradictory to the prosecution case on the ground that the prosecution is not going to rely on the statements of those witnesses, otherwise it would mean deviation from the mandatory provisions of criminal law and to deny the accused the just and fair trial. In this case a prayer was made that a copy of the statements recorded on 14.2.73 from C. W. 2 Viswambharan by the Circle Inspector of police, Shertalli, during the course of investigation might be given to the petitioners-accused. The objection of the State to the grant of the copy was on the ground that the prosecution did not propose to rely on that statement recorded by Circle Inspector, Shertalli, and therefore the accused were not entitled to it.
The objection of the State to the grant of the copy was on the ground that the prosecution did not propose to rely on that statement recorded by Circle Inspector, Shertalli, and therefore the accused were not entitled to it. The case of the Staff was that in terms of the provisions contained in section 173(4) of the Code the accused is entitled, as a matter of right, only to the copies of those documents or extracts thereof on which the prosecution seeks to rely, and that in that case subsequent to the questioning of C. W. 2 done by the Circle Inspector of Shertalli, the investigation was taken over by the Crime Branch and the Detective Inspector, Crime Branch, C.I.D. had questioned the very same witness on 20.2.73 and it is that investigation made by the Detective Inspector that had culminated in the final report on which alone the prosecution sought to rely in the trial court and so it is only copies of those statements on which the prosecution seeks to rely, need be furnished to the accused under the mandatory provisions of section 173 (4) of the Code. It has been observed in paragraph 5 of this decision that if there are embellishments or contradictions in the statements given by the very same witness on different occasions, the veracity and trustworthiness of the evidence of the witness have to be tested in cross-examination with the aid of such materials. It has also been observed that it should not certainly be the concern of the prosecution in such circumstances to deviate from nor circumvent the relevant provisions incorporated in the Code with a view to ensure that the accused gets every opportunity to meet the case brought against him. It was also held that in fairness, and according to law, the copies of the statements recorded from the witness on 14.2.1973 and 20.2.1973 ought to be furnished to the accused. It has also been finally observed that where the statements given by a witness on different occasions during the course of investigation are of conflicting nature on material points the position of the Public Prosecutor undoubtedly is not unenviable; even then he is expected to display a sense of detachment and fairplay without being unduly influenced by a desire to secure the conviction of the accused at any cost.
If this decision is taken in view then the copies of the statements recorded by the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) have to be made available to the petitioner whatever be the worth of the same. 22. Mr. Surendra Prasad, learned Advocate for the petitioner, has also placed reliance on the case of R. P. Kapur and others vs. Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon and others (A. I. R. 1961 Supreme Court 1117) where it has been held in paragraph 10 that the Additional Inspector-General of Police to whom the Sethi’s complaint was sent, was without doubt, a police officer superior in rank to an officer-in-charge of a police station and that Sardar Hardayal Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, C. I. D., Amritsar, was also an officer superior in rank to an officer-in-charge of a police station and that both these officers could, therefore, exercise the powers, throughout the local area to which they were appointed, as might be exercised by an officer-in-charge of a police station within the limits of his police station. It has also been held in this decision that both of them have jurisdiction throughout the State. This decision supports the case of the petitioner. 23. Learned Advocate for the petitioner also relied on the case of Banka Kandaswamy Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (1982 Criminal Law Journal 393). In this decision the accused persons who were being tried for various offences before the Sessions Judge and the cases was being investigated into by the local police, relation of one of the accused in the said case sent a petition to the D. I. G. of Police alleging that the local police were colluding with the prosecution party and requested investigation to be entrusted to C. B., C. I. D. Under the instruction from the D. I. G. a C. B., C. I. D. Inspector examined some witnesses and submitted a report. The accused applied under section 91 Cr. P. C. to summon the petition made to the D. I. G. and the statements of witnesses recorded by the Inspector, C. B., C. I. D. during the inquiry conducted by him.
The accused applied under section 91 Cr. P. C. to summon the petition made to the D. I. G. and the statements of witnesses recorded by the Inspector, C. B., C. I. D. during the inquiry conducted by him. The Superintendent of Police, C. B., C. I. D. while producing the documents, claimed privilege under section 124 on the ground that "public interests" would suffer b) the disclosure and in those circumstances it was held that neither the petition made to the D. I. G. nor the statements recorded by the Inspector, C. B., C. I. D. constituted documents relating to any affairs of the State and they did not also answer the description of communication made to a public officer in official confidence and that the documents were in the nature of communication made by the private persons to a public officer. It was, therefore, held that the claim of privilege was improper. 24. From various decisions mentioned above it is evident that the D. S. P (C. I. D.) could make investigation under the direction of the State Government and this could be further investigation within the meaning of section 173(8) of the Code as it related to a murder case and so he statements of witnesses recorded by the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) will also be treated as the statements recorded under section 161 of the Code. It cannot be doubted that under section 207 of the Code the accused is entitled to copies of the statements of witnesses recorded under subsection (3) of section 161 of the Code of all persons whom the prosecution proposed to examine as its witnesses. The further investigation under section 173(8) of the Code is covered by the provisions of section 173(5) of the Code. Under such circumstances I hold that the petitioner is entitled to get copies of those statements of witnesses recorded by the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) who are named in the charge-sheet. 25. The petitioner has prayed for copies of the statements of those prosecution witnesses whose statements have been recorded by the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) and whose names are found in the charge-sheet submitted by the officer-in-charge of the police station.
25. The petitioner has prayed for copies of the statements of those prosecution witnesses whose statements have been recorded by the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) and whose names are found in the charge-sheet submitted by the officer-in-charge of the police station. I, therefore, hold that the petitioner is entitled to get copies of those statements in view of my discussions made above and in view of the decisions referred to above. It is for the trial court to consider the worth of the statements of witnesses recorded by the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) after a lapse of about two years from the date of occurrence. However, I do not express any opinion regarding the merits of the statements recorded by the D. S. P. (C. I. D.). I, therefore, direct that the petitioner should be furnished copies of the statements recorded by the D. S. P. (C. I. D.) of those witnesses who are mentioned in the charge-sheet submitted by the officer-in-charge of Gardanibagh police station who will be examined in the case. 26. In the result the application is allowed and the ORDER :dated 22.3.1982 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge II, Patna, passed in Sessions Trial No. 36 of 1981 is hereby set aside.