JUDGMENT 1. - The plaintiff (petitioners) have filed' this revision under section 115 C P. C. against the order dated February 3, 1981, of the Civil Judge, Churu, by which the order dated. September 13, 1983, of the Munsif Churu deciding issue No. 5 in favour of the plaintiff, and subsequent direction for return of the plaint for presentation to the competent court, was maintained. 2. The plaintiffs filled a suit against the defendants on September 6, 1979 for mandtory and permanent prohibitory injunction Learned counsel for the petitioner has made a copy of the plaint available to me for the disposal of the revision. 2. The plaintiffs filled a suit against the defendants on September 6, 1979 for mandtory and permanent prohibitory injunction Learned counsel for the petitioner has made a copy of the plaint available to me for the disposal of the revision. It is necessary to refer the following paras of the plaint : ua0 4 ;g fd uD'ks ,sEl0 esa ,0ch0lh0Mh0 ekdZ }kjk fn[kkbZ xbZ Hkwfe oxZ QqV 1235 oknhx.k o izfroknhx.k dh 'kkeykrh pkSd dh Hkwfe dk Hkw&Hkkx gS blfy;s oknhx.k dks dkuwuu o balkQ pkSd dh ckdh eknk ekjkth ds lkFk fookfnr Hkwfe es eqLrdh miHkksx o mi;ksx dk gdgkfly gS pawfd izfroknhx.k dh mDr yksgs dh rkjksa dh QsaflZx ls fookfnr Hkwfe ds mi;ksx o miHkksx ls izdkj.k oknhx.k oafpr jg x, gS blfy, oknhx.k U;k;ky; }kjk uD'ks ,Dl esa ,0ch0lh0Mh0 ekdZ ls fn[kkbZ xbZ yksgs dh rkjksa dh QsflZx gVkdj izfroknhx.k ds uke fpj LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk ikfjr djkus dk vf/kdkjh gS fd og fookfnr Hkwfe dks miHkksx o iz;ksx djus ls oknhx.k dks uk jksds vkSj uk gh dksbZ ,slk dk;Z ;k vdk;Z djs ;k djkosa ftlls mDr fookfnr Hkwfe ij tksbaV dsjsDVj tksbaV dsjsDVj u"V gks tkos vkSj oknhx.k dks blds miHkksx o mi;ksx djus esa dksbZ ck/kk mRiUu gksA uEcj 7 % -----------------vr% Li"V rkSj ij ;g QsfUlx uktk;t dCtk djus dh fu;r ls fd;k x;k FkkA buds vykok vkf[kj ckj e`rd Jh jkefuokl ckWa?kyk izfroknh ds ewuhe Hkh uanyky ckWa?kyk dks Hkh fnukad 22&1&1973 dks pq: esa yksgs ds rkjksa dh QsfUlx gVkus ds fy, dgk exj mlus lkQ bUdkj dj fn;k ,oae fookfnr Hkwfe dks izfroknhx.k dh fefYd;r gksuk tkfgj fd;k tks loZFkk xyr ,oae fujk/kkj gSA a a a a a The relevant para relating to the relief is as follows:- d & eSusMsVjh bUtd'ku izfroknhx.k 1@1] 1@2 ds f[kykQ bl vej dk tkjh fd;k tkos fd og uD'ks ,Dl esa fn[kk, ,0ch0lh0Mh0 Hkw&Hkkx ij ls yksgs ds rkjksa }kjk fd;k gqvk QsfUlx gVk ysosA [k & izfroknhx.k 1@1] 1@2 ds f[kykQ fu"ks/kkKk bl vej dk tkjh fd;k tkos fd og oknhx.k dh gosyh es vkxs eq'rdkZ pkSd ds mi;ksx o miHkksx es vk;Unk dHkh Hkh fdlh izdkj dh ck?kk ;k :dkoV uk MkysA 3. The suit was contested by the defendants. The suit was contested by the defendants. It was asserted by the defendant that the land in dispute marked A,B,C,D. is not part of the 'chowk' but it is exclusively owned by the defendants and they are entitled to keep it in their possession and use it. The suit was valued by the plaintiffs at Rs. 400/- and court -fee of Rs. 30/- was paid by them The defendants denied the valuation. It was alleged that the valuation of the land in question is at least Rs. 16,500/- and the cost of the wires is Rs. 250/- and so the suit should have been valued at Rs. 16,750/- and court-fee should have been paid on this valuation. As the suit was under-valued, an objection was raised that the suit is not triable by the Munsif. 4. Inclusive of the relief, eight issues were framed. In this revision, I am concerned with issue No.5 which when translated into English reads as follows:- "Whether the suit has been under-valued, and, if so, what is the effect?" The burden of this issue was placed on the defendants. The evidence of the parties was recorded on all the issues. Learned Munsif took issue No.5 first for decision and after considering the plaint averments and the evidence of the parties, came to the conclusion that the value of the land in dispute stated by the defendants as Rs. 16,750/- is correct and 1/2 of this amount comes to Rs. 8,375/- and this should rave been valuation of the suit. As the plaintiffs have valued their suit at Rs. 400/- whereas it should have been valued at Rs. 8,375/-, the learned Munsif opined that he has no jurisdiction to hear it and therefore, ordered for its return vide judgment dated September 13,1982. In view of his finding onissue Nazi he did not decide that other issues. The plaintiffs went in appeal. 400/- whereas it should have been valued at Rs. 8,375/-, the learned Munsif opined that he has no jurisdiction to hear it and therefore, ordered for its return vide judgment dated September 13,1982. In view of his finding onissue Nazi he did not decide that other issues. The plaintiffs went in appeal. The learned Civil Judge, Ctruru held vide order dated February 3, 1984 that the vauation of the land found by the Munsif is correct as this is established from the evidence of the parties and so the court-fee payable on the plaint is as provided under section 26(a) of the Rajasthan Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act (No. XXIII of 1961) for short the Act hereinafter) and that the suit on that valuation is not triable by the munisif He, therefore, concurred with the learned Munsif that he hid no jurisdiction to hear the suit and as such it was not necessary for him to have decided the other issues. He also considered the provisions of O. XI V, r. 2(2) C P.C. and while repelling the contentions raised on behalf of the plaintiffs observed that hail the Munsif recorded findings on the other issues, those findings would have also been without jurisdiction as while deciding issue No. 5, he came to the conclurion that he had no jurisdiction to try them. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs have filed this revision. 5. Mr. Rajesh Balia lodged caveat on behalf of non-petitioner No. 1. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 6. Mr. O.N. Gaur, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the learned Civil judge has exercised his jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity when he applied section 26(a) of the Act, for according to him section 26(c) of the Act is applicable He substantiated his submission by stating that the plaintiffs petitioners have not claimed their exclusive right or claim on the land in question and so the question of denial of the plaintiffs' title by the defendant does not arise. According to the learned counsel the land in question is jonn and so section 26(c) of the Act would be applicable and not section 26(a) of the Act. In the connection, he placed reliance on(l) Jaya Shanker v. Chandra Moulee Swara Chettiar (1961) 2 M L J. 481. According to the learned counsel the land in question is jonn and so section 26(c) of the Act would be applicable and not section 26(a) of the Act. In the connection, he placed reliance on(l) Jaya Shanker v. Chandra Moulee Swara Chettiar (1961) 2 M L J. 481. Mr Rajesh Balia, learned counsel for non-petitioner No.1 (Caveator) supported the order under revision and submitted that the valuation of suit should have been 1/2 of Rs. 16,750/- i.e. Rs. 8,375/- and the court-fee is also payable on this amount. As the valuation of the suit should have been Rs. 8,375/- and it was undervalued, the learned Munsif rightly order d for the return of the plaint and was justified in declining to decide the remaining issues, though he has recorded evidence on all the issues. 7. I have given my careful consideration to the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. 8. Section 26 of the Act dealt with suits for injunction. Its material portion for the present purpose is as follows: Section 26 Suits for injunction.- In a suit for injunction:- (a) where the relief sought is with reference to any immovable property and where the plaintiff alleges that his title to the property denied, fie. shall be computed n one-half of the market value of the property or on rupees three hundred, whichever is higher. (b) .............. (c ) in any other case, where the subject matter of the suit has a market value or not, fee shall be computed on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or on rupees four hundred, whit hover is higher." 9. From the averments made in the plaint, it is clear that the plaintiffs have sought relief in respect of a 'chowk' which is an immovable property. It is abundantly clear from the various allegations made in the plaint and in particular from para 7 that the defendants have claimed their ownership over the land in question which according to the plaintiffs is wrong and baseless. This constitutes denial of the plaintiffs' title. From the averments made in paras 4 and 7 and having regard to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs, it can safely be inferred that whatever title the plaintiffs have claimed in respect of the land in question that was denied by the defendants. This constitutes denial of the plaintiffs' title. From the averments made in paras 4 and 7 and having regard to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs, it can safely be inferred that whatever title the plaintiffs have claimed in respect of the land in question that was denied by the defendants. Section 26(a) of the Act is attracted when the relief of injunction is with respect to the immovable property and where the plaintiffs alleges that his title to that property has been denied by the defendants. In such a situation, the court-fee payable is on one half of the market value of the property or on Rs. 300/- whichever is higher. The leatned Civil judge, as stated above, on the evidence of the parties, found that the market value of the 'chowk' is Rs. 16,750/- and one hair of it is Rs. 8,375/- and court-fee, is payable on this valuation. It is not in dispute that if this is the valuation for the purpose of payment of court fee then the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction is as to the same vide Section 48 and with Section 7 of the Act. A suit which if valued at Rs. 8,375/- cannot be entertained, tried and heard by a Munsif as admittedly in this case he can take cognizance of the suit valued upto Rs. 5,000/ 10. Section 26 of the Act was examined by a learned Judge of this Court in (2) Municipal Council, Udaipur v. Charaudas 1980 WLN(UC)102. This decision is nearer home. In that case the title of the plaintiffs to the property in dispute was denied. The plaintiffs were treated as trespassers over the land. The question was whether's 26(a) of the Act is applicable or not? The learned Judge scrutinised the averments made in the plaint and repelled the argument that the plaintiff in that case had not alleged that the title to the property is denied by the Municipal Council, Udaipur. He held that for the purpose of payment of court-fee the suit clearly fell within the purview of section 26(a) of the Act and the court-fee payable is on the half valuation of the market value of the property or Rs. 300/- whichever is higher. He held that for the purpose of payment of court-fee the suit clearly fell within the purview of section 26(a) of the Act and the court-fee payable is on the half valuation of the market value of the property or Rs. 300/- whichever is higher. The learned judge also opined that it is the duty of the court to look to the whole of the plaint and not to allow itself to be misled by the language used in it for evading payment of proper court fee by suppressing the real purpose of the suit. 11. In my opinion, the learned Civil judge, when he maintained the finding on issue No. 5 that the suit is not triable by the Munsif, did not commit any jurisdictional error. 12. I may now notice the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 13. Section 26 of the Act is analogous to section 27 of the Madras Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act (No.XIV of 1955). The applicability of section 25(a) and (d), section 30 and section 38 came up for consideratian in Jaya Shanker's case (1). The suit was for a declaration of the plaintiff's right to joint possession with the defendant as trustee. The question arose what should be the valuation for the purpose of court-fee. The learned judge opined that the provision of section 25(a) and section 30 of the Madras Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act (No.XIV of 1955) would be applicable only to the cases where the plaintiff seeks exclusive possession and that section 38 would apply only to cases where joint possession is sought as substantive relief and not as a consequential one. It was further held that there is no specific provision in the Act and it is the residuary provision of section 25(d) of the aforesaid Act that would apply in such cases. In view of the aforesaid finding, the learned judge came to the conclusion that the valuation adopted by the plaintiff under section 21(3) of the Madras Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act (No. XIV of 1955) is proper one. Having considered the aforesaid Jaya Shanker's case (1), I have no hesitation to say that this cannot be of any assistance to the learned counsel for the petitioners. 14. Having considered the aforesaid Jaya Shanker's case (1), I have no hesitation to say that this cannot be of any assistance to the learned counsel for the petitioners. 14. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Munsif should have decided all the issues in the suit since evidence had been recorded on all the issues had this was in contravention of the provisions contained in Order 14, Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to (3) Asha Ram v. Ramlal (1977) R. C.J. 801 (Raj), (4) Ghewarcband v. Gajsingh (AIR 1980 Rajasthan 202), and (5) A. v. Subrahmanyam v. C. Venkataramanameiha (AIR 1981 A. P. 147). The last two authorities were cited for the purpose of showing that section 11 of the Act is merely directory and not mandatory. In Asharam's case (3) the petitioner made an application for an additional issue to the effect whether the proper court-fee has been paid. The trial court framed the additional issue. It, however, passed the order that it would be decided along with other issues. A revision was filed. It was contended before this Court that the additional issue should be decided as a preliminary issue. The contention was rejected on the ground that the trial court was of the opinion that the additional issue required evidence and so it will be decided along with other issues and in doing so, no error of jurisdiction was committed, for, there is no compulsion in law to decide this issue as a preliminary one. I regret, I have not been able to appreciate the purpose of citing the aforesaid three authorities by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Order 14, Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code provides that the court should pronounce judgment on all the issues. It is as follows : "R. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues. (1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) pronounce judgment on all issues. Order 14, Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code provides that the court should pronounce judgment on all the issues. It is as follows : "R. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues. (1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) pronounce judgment on all issues. (2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to:- (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue." 15. Issue No. 5 was not tried as a preliminary issue as envisaged by sub-rule (2) of r. 2 of O. XIV Civil Procedure Code In the case on hand, evidence on all the issues was recorded by the Munsif. Arguments were heard and thereafter learned Munsif decided issue No. 5. He observed as under : "While recording finding in respect of issue No. 5 that the suit has been under-valued and it cannot be heard by me." 16. He, therefore, did not decide the other issues and ordered for return of the plaint. The learned Civil Judge on appeal maintained that order. In this revision, I have concurred that the suit is not triable by the Munsif and in doing so he has not committed any jurisdictional error. In these facts, no interference can be made with the order under revision solely on the ground that all the issues should have been decided by the learned Munsif. 17. No other point survives for my consideration in this revision petition. 18. There is no merit in this revision petition and it is accordingly dismissed summarily. *******