JUDGMENT K. N. Misra, J. 1. PETITIONER Samiullah was a candidate in an election which took place relating to the office of Block Pramukh of Block Shri Dutt Ganj in the district of Gonda. The petitioner was declared duly elected as Block Pramukh in the election which took place on 29th May, 1983, Salim Mehmood, opposite party no. 2, who had lost in the election, had filed an election petition before the District Judge, Gonda under Rule 35 of the U. P. Kshettra Samities (Election of Pramukhs and Up Pramukhs and Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules, 1962 (for short the Rules). Notices were issued to the petitioner and other opposite parties who were also candidates in the election and were made proforma parties in the election petition. The petitioner filed written statement in the election petition before the District Judge, Gonda. The District Judge passed the order dated 12-9-1983 transferring the election petition to the Special Judge for decision. The order reads as under :- "Nyayalaya Special Judge Gonda Ko Niyamanusar Nistrain Hetu Hastantarit." (Emphasis supplied). 2. AN application was moved by the petitioner before the Special Additional District Judge, Gonda on 25-1-1984 challenging his jurisdiction to try the instant election petition and it was prayed that this question of jurisdiction be determined as preliminary issue. Opposite party no. 1 framed issues, which are re-produced below :- (1) Whether the court has got jurisdiction to try the election petition ? (2) Whether the petitioner has secured majority valid votes ? if so, its effect ? The aforesaid issue no. 1 was treated to be a preliminary issue and was disposed of by opposite party no. 1 vide order dated 5-3-1984 holding that he has jurisdiction to hear and decide the election petition on merits. The petitioner had challenged this order in the present writ petition. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at some length and have gone through the impugned order passed by opposite party no. 1 very carefully. 3. 1 vide order dated 5-3-1984 holding that he has jurisdiction to hear and decide the election petition on merits. The petitioner had challenged this order in the present writ petition. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at some length and have gone through the impugned order passed by opposite party no. 1 very carefully. 3. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner Sri H. S. Sahai, referring to Rule 35 of the Rules urged that the reference to "Judge" in Rule 35, as per definition of the word "Judge" under clause (g) of Rule 2, means the "District Judge before whom election petition challenging the election of Block Pramukh or Up-Pramukh could be filed." According to him the District Judge being a persona designata could not delegate his authority by transferring the election petition to the Special Judge for decision on merits. LEARNED counsel further contended that the Rules contained under Chapter IV require the District Judge as persona designata to determine the dispute and the Special Additional District Judge could not have jurisdiction to try and dispose of the election petition on the basis of transfer order passed by the District Judge. The opposite party no. 1, therefore, cannot proceed with the case having no jurisdiction to decide it on merits. 4. IN reply learned counsel for the opposite parties Sri A. N. Verma urged that opposite party no. 1, who has been named and designated by the District Judge to decide the election petition by the transfer order dated 12-9-1983, is competent to decide the election petition on merits. He urged that the order dated 12-9-1983 passed by the District Judge, Gonda, authorising opposite party no. 1 cannot be treated to be merely a routine order of transfer in exercise of powers by the District Judge, but by that order opposite party no. 1 was vested with the jurisdiction to decide the election petition on merits. Learned counsel further contended that the District Judge, under the aforesaid Rules, cannot be taken to be a persona designata and so the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that he could not delegate and assign the election petition for decision to opposite party no. 1 by the aforesaid order of transfer is unsustainable. The sole crucial question which crops up for consideration in the present case is whether opposite party no. 1 by the aforesaid order of transfer is unsustainable. The sole crucial question which crops up for consideration in the present case is whether opposite party no. 1 could be vested with jurisdiction by the above quoted order dated 12-9-1983 passed by the District Judge to decide the election petition on merits or not. 5. AN election petition calling in question election of a Pramukh or Up-Pramukh is to be presented to the "Judge" within the period prescribed under Rule 35. "Judge" referred in Rule 35, as per definition in clause (g) of Rule 2 means, District Judge and includes any other subordinate Civil Judicial Officer named or designated by the District Judge in this behalf. The District Judge, therefore, cannot be taken to be a person as persona designata. 6. IT is well settled that a persona designata is a person selected to act in his private capacity and not in his capacity as a Judge. A persona designata is a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character.-See Maharaja Dharamendra Prasad Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1969 AWR 66 (FB). Thus, the argument that the District Judge being a persona designata could not nominate and assign the case to opposite party no. 1, cannot be accepted. Under the definition of "Judge" referred to above, any subordinate Civil Judicial Officer named and designated by the District Judge would be competent to decide election petition on merits. Such a subordinate Civil Judicial Officer would be covered by definition of "Judge" to whom election petition is transferred for decision on merits according to the rules. 7. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that the District Judge, Gonda had, by order dated 12-9-1983, merely transferred the election petition to Special Judge, Gonda in the routine manner and this order cannot be taken to vest jurisdiction in opposite party no. 1 to decide the election petition on merits because the District Judge by said order cannot be said to have named and designated opposite party no. 1 to decide the election petition, which could alone confer jurisdiction upon opposite party no. 1 to deal with the election petition. I am unable to accept this contention as well. 8. 1 to decide the election petition on merits because the District Judge by said order cannot be said to have named and designated opposite party no. 1 to decide the election petition, which could alone confer jurisdiction upon opposite party no. 1 to deal with the election petition. I am unable to accept this contention as well. 8. ALMOST similar question cropped up for consideration by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Talkies Limited, Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad, 1961 AWR 238 (SC). As per facts of that case Dwarka Prasad applied to the District Magistrate for permission to eject Central Talkies Limited from the premises and the permission was granted by the Additional District Magistrate (Rural Area) and thereupon suit for ejectment was filed on the basis of the permission granted. It was argued that the suit was incompetent because permission of the District Magistrate, required by section 3 of U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947, had not been obtained and the Additional District Magistrate, to whom the District Magistrate had transferred the application moved under section 3 of the Act for decision on merits was not competent to grant permission. It was urged that the District Magistrate, u/Sec. 3 of the Act, being a persona designata, could not validy transfer and confer jurisdiction upon the Additional District Magistrate to decide the petition. The Division Bench of the Court held that the suit was competent. Raghubar Dayal, J., held that the Additional District Magistrate, who granted the permission, was empowered by the Provincial Government under section 10 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to exercise all the powers of a District Magistrate under the Code and all the laws for the time being in force and the requirements of section 3 were complied with. Brij Mohan Lal, J. expressed the view that the District Magistrate by transferring the case to the Additional District Magistrate (Rural Area) had authorised him to perform his functions under the Act in this behalf and that the Additional District Magistrate, being thus included in the definition of "District Magistrate" under section 2 (d), was competent to grant the permission. Brij Mohan Lal, J. expressed the view that the District Magistrate by transferring the case to the Additional District Magistrate (Rural Area) had authorised him to perform his functions under the Act in this behalf and that the Additional District Magistrate, being thus included in the definition of "District Magistrate" under section 2 (d), was competent to grant the permission. The views expressed by the learned Judges of this Court were upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and referring to the view expressed by Brij Mohan Lal, J., which is relevant for the purposes of the present case, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that:- "......By the act of transferring the case to Additional District Magistrate, the District Magistrate must be deemed to have authorised him to exercise his powers under section 3 of the Eviction Act." (Emphasis supplied) In this view of the matter I find that by the act of transferring the case by the District Judge to opposite party no. 1, the District Judge must be deemed to have authorised him to exercise his powers under Chapter IV of the Rules for deciding the election petition on merits. The District Judge, as already observed above, could authorise any subordinate Civil Judicial Officer named by him in this behalf. Thus, by order dated 12-9-1983, the opposite party no. 1 became fully competent and vested with jurisdiction to decide the election petition filed by the petitioner under Rule 35 of the Rules. 9. LEARNED counsel further contended that even if District Judge could authorise any of his subordinate Civil Judicial Officers for deciding the election petition, but after having entertained an election petition under Rule 35, the District Judge could not authorise any subordinate Civil Judicial Officer to decide the election petition on merits, but he himself had to proceed with the election petition entertained by him and to decide it on merits. I am unable to agree with this contention as well. 10. THERE is nothing in the Rules to prevent the District Judge authorising any subordinate Civil Judicial Officer to decide election petition on merits though it was entertained and pending before him. In Central Talkies Ltd. case, 1961 AWR 238 (SC) the application under section 3 of U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947 was entertained by the District Magistrate and the same was transferred to Additional District Magistrate for decision on merits. In Central Talkies Ltd. case, 1961 AWR 238 (SC) the application under section 3 of U. P. Act No. 3 of 1947 was entertained by the District Magistrate and the same was transferred to Additional District Magistrate for decision on merits. The transfer order passed by the District Magistrate, being a valid authorisation in the eye of law, was upheld in the aforesaid decision. Although specifically the aforesaid question does not appear to have been raised and considered in said decision by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but on similar facts, as are of the present case, it was held that the order passed by the Additional District Magistrate was validly passed by him on transfer of case to him by the District Magistrate. Thus, I do not find that the said (case) is distinguishable and not applicable to the facts of the present case. 11. THE transfer of a case by any court, Tribunal or Authority (for short the Court) after entertaining it to some other court for disposal implies that the case was already pending there before it was transferred to the transferee court. THE transferee court would have jurisdiction to decide the case if it is competent to deal with the matter having been validly authorised in that behalf in accordance with the statutory provisions. THE vital question in such matters is to first determine whether the court entertaining the case has got statutory power or jurisdiction to 'nominate and designate', which connote to duly authorise, any other Court to deal with it and decide it on merits or not. 12. IT is well settled that the jurisdiction of any Court, Tribunal or Authority (for short the court) created and constituted under a statute to deal with and decide the matter arising under the statute for which it is constituted, is strictly to be construed with reference to the provisions of that particular statute and the general principles applicable are subordinate to the actual words used in the statute itself. In the absence of any enabling provisions in the statute itself conferring jurisdiction and power to authorise any other court to deal with or decide the case, the order of transferring the case would not be valid. The existence of this jurisdictional power has got to be found out in the statute itself and not on general principles. In the absence of any enabling provisions in the statute itself conferring jurisdiction and power to authorise any other court to deal with or decide the case, the order of transferring the case would not be valid. The existence of this jurisdictional power has got to be found out in the statute itself and not on general principles. In the instant case we find and the District Judge has been vested with the jurisdiction to nominate and designate any subordinate Civil Judicial Officer in that behalf. The words "nominate" and "designate" carrying the meaning of making due authorisation for dealing with and deciding the election petition. The power to make authorisation by the District Judge is, thus, expressly provided and is inherently mainfest. This power given in the statute, which in the absence of any provision to the contrary, can be exercised at any time and at any stage of the proceedings in the election petition entertained by the District Judge. I, therefore, find that the District Judge had validly passed the order transferring the case, which amounts to due authorisation of opposite party No. 1 to deal with and decide the election petition on merits. Learned counsel for the petitioner in the end contended that it was conceded by the learned counsel for opposite party No. 2, Salim Mehmood, before opposite party No. 1 that the election petition, which has been received by order of transfer from the District Judge, cannot be decided on merits by opposite party No. 2. Learned counsel urged that in view of this admission of the learned counsel, the opposite party No. 1 erred in not accepting the contention of the petitioner which was not challenged. He, thus, urged that opposite party No. 1 acted illegally in proceeding to decide the case on merits. I am unable to agree with this contention as well. 13. IT is well settled that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of parties nor the court's jurisdiction can be ousted by any such admission of the parties. The question of jurisdiction of any Court, Tribunal or Authority, created or constituted under the Statute has to be determined with reference to the provisions of the statute itself. The question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law and the parties can neither confer nor oust the jurisdiction of the Court, Tribunal or Authority by their consent. The question of jurisdiction of any Court, Tribunal or Authority, created or constituted under the Statute has to be determined with reference to the provisions of the statute itself. The question of jurisdiction is a pure question of law and the parties can neither confer nor oust the jurisdiction of the Court, Tribunal or Authority by their consent. When the question of jurisdiction is raised, the Court has to determine that question on merits, according to law even if the opposite party may concede that the challenge to the want of jurisdiction raised in the case is sustainable. In this view of the matter I do not find any error has been committed by opposite party No. 1 in passing the impugned order. 14. IN view of what has been said above, I find no error in the impugned order passed by Opposite Party No. 1 who is competent to decide the election petition on merits. No other point was pressed before me. In the result, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, fails and is accordingly dismissed. I, however, direct the parties to bear their own costs. The interim order dated 9-4-1984 is hereby vacated and opposite party No. 1 is directed to decide the election petition expeditiously. Petition dismissed.