Judgment S.S.SANDHAWALIA, J. 1. Can the period of six months ordinarily prescribed for an inquiry under sub-sec. (6) of S. 116 of the Cr. P. C. 1973 be further extended beyond another six months or more, by an order of the Magistrate, is the somewhat ticklish question for an authoritative decision by the Division Bench in this criminal miscellaneous petition. 2. The facts are not in dispute and lie in a narrow compass. Proceedings under S. 107 of the Cr. P. C., 1973 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Code) were started against the eight petitioners and the private respondents way back on the 4th June, 1980. It is averred on behalf of the petitioners that in the police report no specific overt act was alleged but a general apprehension of the breach of peace was expressed. In pursuance to the notices issued, the petitioners appeared in the court of the Magistrate on 16th June, 1980. Despite the mandate of S. 116(6), the proceedings were not completed within six months and thereupon the petitioners preferred an application for dropping the same, whilst another application by respondent 2 was made for extending its life. It is averred that though no fresh material had come on the record, the learned Magistrate extended the period of inquiry by an order dt. 15th Jan., 1981. It would appear that when the proceedings still continued to drag on, the petitioners preferred an application dt. 8th July, 1981 alleging that since a further period of six months had expired, the same must necessarily be dropped. This application was opposed by the private respondents and ultimately, by the impugned order (annexure 1) dt. 11th Aug. 1981, the learned Magistrate rejected the application on the ground that since the period of inquiry had been once ordered to be extended, there was no further limitation of time thereon under the Code. Aggrieved thereby, the present criminal miscellaneous petition under S. 482 has been preferred. 3. This case had originally come up before my learned Brother, Nazir Ahmad, J., sitting singly. Before him, the issue strenuously pressed was that the extension of the period of enquiry could not go beyond a further period of six months in the light of the provisions of sub- sec. (6) of S. 116. 3. This case had originally come up before my learned Brother, Nazir Ahmad, J., sitting singly. Before him, the issue strenuously pressed was that the extension of the period of enquiry could not go beyond a further period of six months in the light of the provisions of sub- sec. (6) of S. 116. Noticing the significance of the issue and the paucity of precedent on the point, the matter was referred for an authoritative decision by the Division Bench and that is how it is before us now. 4. As before the learned single Judge, so before us, the main plank of the counsel for the petitioners is that the extended period of inquiry is equally governed by the original limitation of six months and cannot travel beyond the same. It was contended that any other construction would be anomalous and tending to frustrate the very purpose of the provision for imposing a limitation of time. 4A. For appraising the aforesaid submission and construing the provisions of S. 116(6) and (7), it is first apt to notice the larger purpose of Chapter VIII of the Code in which these are contained. It must be pointedly recalled that the object of the Legislature herein is not any conviction or punishment for any offence. It is primarily and pristinely a preventive jurisdiction. Indeed, in the old Code Part IV was expressly labelled as the "prevention of offences". In particular, as regards S. 107 the same is directed to the maintenance of public peace and tranquillity. It is axiomatic that the obligation to keep the peace is even otherwise the duty of the citizen and only to enforce the same power is conferred on the authorities for demanding security in the likelihood of its breach. It is with that end in view that the Legislature has now mandated the completion of these preventive proceedings within six months and an automatic termination thereafter unless they are extended for special reasons to be recorded in writing by the Magistrate. 5. For a proper interpretation of sub-sec. (6) of S. 116, it seems necessary to first view the same in the context of its legislative history and the rule in the celebrated Heydons case. 5. For a proper interpretation of sub-sec. (6) of S. 116, it seems necessary to first view the same in the context of its legislative history and the rule in the celebrated Heydons case. Herein one must first look at the state of the pre-existing law, and as to what was the mischief or the defect which was sought to be remedied by the Parliament by way of amendment or addition, and the reasons therefore, it is worth recalling that S. 117 of the old Code (which is the equivalent of the present S. 116 of the Code) did not contain any provisions corresponding to sub-secs. (6) and (7) of S. 116 of the present Code. Consequently, no limitation of time at ail was provided for the inquiries under the preventive sections. The actual working of the old Code disclosed that the preventive provisions thereof at times became the subject matter of gross procedural abuse. What in law was intended to be a summary and expeditious procedure for preventing a breach of public peace and tranquillity was not unoften converted into a long drawn out inquiry proceeding hanging over the parties like the proverbial sword of democles. These inquiries were inordinately protracted with their poor victims, who were not guilty of commission of any offence, being required to attend the proceedings continuously over long periods. The power to demand security and to set the same at a high figure and in the event of either failure or refusal to accept the sureties, to detain the person during the pendency of the inquiry was also an abuse or a misuse, which was not of a rare occurrence. This was, in terms, noticed in the report of the Joint Committee of the Houses of Parliament. One cannot do better than quote the relevant observations in extenso: "The Committee notes with concern that in some States proceedings under Chapter VIII of the existing Code particularly those under S. 107 drag on for as long as one year or even more and in many of these cases the person concerned particularly if he happens to be poor, is kept under detention all the time. Obviously, the provisions are not intended to be used for keeping persons in detention without trial for such long periods. Obviously, the provisions are not intended to be used for keeping persons in detention without trial for such long periods. The object of the provisions is to prevent breach of the peace and unless the proceedings are completed within a reasonable time, recourse to drastic powers under these provisions would not be justified. Similar considerations would apply also to proceedings relating to bonds for good behaviour. After a careful consideration of the various aspects of the matter, the Committee feels that a time-limit should be prescribed for completing the proceedings under this section (S. 116, new Code)." The first part of the newly added sub-cl. (6), (sub-sec. (6) of new S. 116) accordingly provides that if the inquiry under the section is not completed within a period of six months from the date of the commencement thereof, such inquiry should stand terminated on the expiry of that period. A special power has been retained with the Magistrate to extend this period where there are special reasons to do so. The provision would apply to all proceedings whether or not the person concerned is in detention. Where the person is in detention, a further provision has been made to the effect that the proceedings shall stand terminated on the expiry of a period of six months of detention. This is an absolute limit and the Magistrate will have no power to extend the period of detention or the inquiry in such cases." It was for the aforesaid reasons that sub-secs. (6) and (7) of S. 116 were inserted in the Code to remedy the evil Since the whole controversy turns around their language, it is necessary to quote them for facility of reference: "116. Inquiry as to truth of information. x x x (6) The inquiry under this section shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of its commencement, and if such inquiry is not so completed, the proceedings under this Chapter shall, on the expiry of the said period stand terminated unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs: Provided that where any person has been kept in detention pending such inquiry, the proceeding against that person, unless terminated earlier, shall stand terminated on the expiry of a period of six months of such detention. (7) Where any direction is made under sub-sec. (7) Where any direction is made under sub-sec. (6) permitting the continuance of proceedings, the Sessions Judge may, on the application made to him by the aggrieved party, vacate such direction if he is satisfied that it was not based on any special reason or was perverse." 6. Now, a plain reading of sub-sec. (6) aforesaid, would indicate that the Legislature, in express terms, has mandated that the inquiry must be completed within a period of six months from the date of its commencement. The word employed is shall. Not only that, it is further directed that if such inquiry is not so completed within the time prescribed then it shall automatically stand terminated on its expiry. It would thus appear that the Legislature, in inserting sub-sec. (6), virtually prescribed the limit of the inquiry as six months and only, as a matter of abundant caution, vested a discretion in the Magistrate to extend the same in exceptional circumstances. Herein again it was spelt out that special reasons must exist and these should be expressly recorded in writing for any extension beyond the prescribed period of six months. Yet another safeguard was provided by sub-sec. (7) and the aggrieved party was given the express right of making an application to the Sessions Judge on the ground that no special reason existed for such extension or the same was perverse. The Sessions Judge was given the power to set aside the extension if he was satisfied that the same was not based on any special reasons or otherwise did not satisfy the test of reasonableness. 7. The proviso to sub-sec. (6) is again indicative of the Legislatures solicitude that the inquiry proceedings must ordinarily be completed within the prescribed period of six months. In all those cases where any person had been kept in detention during the inquiry it would stand automatically terminated on the expiry of the period of six months and could not thereafter be extended for any reason whatsoever. In such cases, the power of the Magistrate to extend even for special reason is absolutely barred. 8. All the aforesaid factors, to my mind, are the clearest pointer to the Legislatures categoric intent of a speedy culmination of these inquiry proceedings. In such cases, the power of the Magistrate to extend even for special reason is absolutely barred. 8. All the aforesaid factors, to my mind, are the clearest pointer to the Legislatures categoric intent of a speedy culmination of these inquiry proceedings. A virtual outer limit of six months herein was prescribed by the Legislature which could only be deviated from in exceptional circumstances for special reasons recorded in writing. Could it possibly be the intent of the Legislature that what was meant as an exception should override and travel beyond the period of original six months without any limitation of time thereafter? In my view, it would be incongruous and anomalous to hold that once such extension was made, it could continue ad infinitum without any further bar on its length. To test an argument, it is sometimes apt to carry it to its logical length. Could it possibly be said that though expressly the original completion is limited to six months, its extension thereafter may continue for six years? The answer would seem to be obviously in the negative, and by the very nature of things, the parameter of the time prescribed for the inquiry would equally govern and limit the extension thereof. 9. The view I am inclined to take receives support from the observation of the Full Bench in Sitaram Singh V/s. State of Bihar AIR 1980 Pat 257 . Therein, whilst holding that the commencement of the inquiry under S. 107 would begin when a party appears in the court of the Magistrate, it was further observed as under (at p. 262.) : "The law desired the inquiry to be a short affair and not to be dragging its feet for years. Every endeavour should be made by Magistrates to complete the inquiry as soon as possible. That can be done only by limiting the number of adjournments. Magistrates would be well advised to call upon the party at whose instance the proceeding has been initiated to be present with his witnesses on the date fixed for appearance of the opposite party." 10. To finally conclude, the answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in negative, and it is held that the period of six months ordinarily prescribed under sub-sec. (6) cannot be extended beyond another six months by the order of the Magistrate. 11. To finally conclude, the answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in negative, and it is held that the period of six months ordinarily prescribed under sub-sec. (6) cannot be extended beyond another six months by the order of the Magistrate. 11. Now applying the above, it is common ground before us that the period of more than six months had elapsed from the order of the Magistrate extending the inquiry on 15th Jan., 1981. This would thus be beyond the limitation imposed by S.116(6). The view of the Magistrate that since the period of inquiry had once been extended, there was no further limitation of time thereon cannot be sustained. The impugned order (Annexure 1) dt./- 11th Aug. 1981, being thus plainly beyond jurisdiction has to be quashed. As a necessary result thereof, the proceeding against the petitioners would stand terminated. The criminal miscellaneous petition is allowed in the terms aforesaid. NAZIR AHMAD, J. 12 I agree.