Judgment :- 1. Defendants 3 in number in O.S. 617 of 1978 are the appellants. The suit was for recovery of possession of property described in the plaint schedule after demolishing the building therein which has been described as item No. 2, on the strength of title of the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, permission was given to the 1st defendant to construct a building in plaint item No.1 on condition that she will surrender the building whenever demanded. The property in question is now required by the plaintiff bona fide for constructing a building for her son Asokan. 2. The defendants resisted the suit putting the plaintiff to prove her title and possession over the plaint schedule properties and also contending that it was Joseph, the husband of the 1st defendant,who obtained permission from Marshall, the husband of the plaintiff, to construct a building. It was also contended that it was after obtaining permission from Marshall, Joseph started residence in plaint item No. 2 and this permission was given 30 years back. The defendants were residing in the plaint item No. 2 along with Joseph, who died subsequently. The transactions between the plaintiff and the defendants, evidence tenancy and she is entitled to fixity of tenure and in any view, she is entitled to the Kudikidappu right under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. There were other contentions also. 3. Before the trial court, five issues were framed. The 2nd issue was "whether the first defendant is a Kudikidappukaran in the property." The third issue was "whether the defendants are liable to be evicted." Issue No. 2 was referred to the Land Tribunal for a finding under S.125 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, here-in-after called 'the Act'. The Land Tribunal entered a finding that the first defendant is not a Kudikidappukaran. Thereafter the the suit was tried on other issues. The plaintiff was examined as Pw.l and Exts. Al to A4 were marked on her side; while the first defendant was examined as Pw.l and there was no documents to be marked on her side. 4. The trial court found under issue No.1 that the plaintiff is the owner of the plaint schedule property and under issues 2 and 5 accepting the finding of the Tribunal, it was found that the first defendant is not a kudikidappukaran in the property and under issue Nos. 4. The trial court found under issue No.1 that the plaintiff is the owner of the plaint schedule property and under issues 2 and 5 accepting the finding of the Tribunal, it was found that the first defendant is not a kudikidappukaran in the property and under issue Nos. 3 and 4, it was found that the plaintiff has title and possession over the plaint item No. 1, and on the strength of title, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for recovery of possession after evicting the defendant from plaint item No.2. The suit was decreed in the light of the above findings. 5. This decree and judgment were challenged by defendants in appeal and the learned Subordinate Judge, Cochin after hearing both sides dismissed the appeal confirming the decree and judgment of the trial court. 6. This Second Appeal was admitted by my learned brother, who formulated the following as substantial question of law. "Whether the appellants are entitled to the protection of S.60 of the Indian Easements Act is the question of law arising in this case and issued notice." 7. Attacking the decree and judgment of the lower appellate court, the learned advocate appearing for the appellants submitted that the lower appellate court seriously erred in holding that S.60 (b) of the Indian Easements Act does not apply to the facts of this case and the two grounds given by that court for not applying the said provision and granting the benefits thereunder to the appellants are not sound in law, and on the facts of the case. 8. The learned advocate appearing for the respondent strongly contended that the question formulated is really not a substantial question of law but it is only a mixed question of fact and law, that in the absence of any pleadings in this regard and an issue on this point, the lower appellate courts ought not have considered this point and in any view the finding of the lower appellate court on the facts and evidence in the case, that S.60(b) of the Indian Easements Act has no application to the case on hand is correct and it is not liable to be interfered with. 9. 9. The only point that was urged before the first appellate court was that the licence granted to the first defendant or her predecessor-in-interest to construct item No. 2 building is irrevocable by virtue of the provisions in S.60(b) of the Indian Easements Act. The learned Subordinate judge rejected this plea on the ground that S.60(b) of the Indian Easements Act does not apply when there is a contract to the contrary and that in the present case, there is a contract to the contrary. The second ground on which this point was rejected by the appellate court was that no plea has been raised by the defendants in this respect before the trial court and no argument in this regard also was addressed there. 10. It is not disputed that where there is a contract to the contrary, S.60(b) of the Indian Easements Act does not apply. But the learned advocate appearing for the appellants submitted that there is no reliable evidence that there was a contract to the contrary and therefore, this finding of the appellate court is wrong. The counsel referred to the evidence of Dw.1 that there was no such agreement as alleged. In para 2 of the plaint, it has been specifically stated that the first defendant has agreed to demolish the building in question whenever demanded Pw.1 has also given evidence in support of it. It is true that Dw.1 has denied that there was such an agreement. The dispute in this regard is a question of fact depending on the appreciation of evidence. The first appellate court on a due consideration of the evidence in this behalf found that the case put forward by the plaintiff that there is an agreement to the contrary has been proved by evidence of Pw.1. The counsel for the appellant relied on the statements in para 2 of the plaint in support of his contention that he is entitled to the benefit of S.60(b). It is true that the statements in para 2 of the plaint show that permission was granted to the first defendant to construct item No. 2 building on condition that she will demolish the building whenever demanded. It is true that the statements in para 2 of the plaint show that permission was granted to the first defendant to construct item No. 2 building on condition that she will demolish the building whenever demanded. It was argued on behalf of the appellants that eventhough there was no pleadings taken as such in the written statement, he is entitled to rely on the pleadings or the facts disclosed in the pleadings of the opposite side. Even if a specific plea has not been taken in the written statement in this regard, if that plea is covered by another issue by implication and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then merely because that plea has not been specifically taken in the written statement would not disentitle a defendant from relying on such a plea. But when a party relies on an admission or a pleading, it must be taken as a whole. The written statement of the defendants was read out in the Court. There is no plea either specifically or impliedly or alternatively taken in the written statement that the licence in question is irrevocable under S.60(b) of the Indian Easements Act. There was also no issue framed on this question by the trial court. If really the defendants wanted to rely on this plea and was aware of the plea on the facts of the case, they could have got the issues already amended or tiled an application for framing additional issues in this respect. This was not done either in the trial court or before the first appellate court. The main plea of the defendant was that she has got a kudikidappu right and she is not liable to be evicted under the Act. In this regard, the finding of the Land Tribunal which was accepted by the trial court was not challenged before the appellate court as disclosed from para 6 of its judgment. The irrevocability of a licence under S.60(b) has to be pleaded and proved. The plea that the licence in question is irrevocable by virtue of the provisions under S.60(b) of the Indian Easements Act was taken for the first time before the first appellate court. 11. In Lakshmi Narain v. State (AIR. 1977 Patna 73), a Division Bench of the Patna High Court had occasion to consider the object and purpose of pleadings. The plea that the licence in question is irrevocable by virtue of the provisions under S.60(b) of the Indian Easements Act was taken for the first time before the first appellate court. 11. In Lakshmi Narain v. State (AIR. 1977 Patna 73), a Division Bench of the Patna High Court had occasion to consider the object and purpose of pleadings. 0.6 R.2 and 0.8 R.2,3 and 4 Of the Code of Civil Procedure deal with object of pleadings. The Division Bench observed that "the sole object of the pleading is, as was pointed out by the Privy Council in (1895)22 Ind App 4 (PC), that each side may be fully alive to the questions that are about to be argued in order that they may have an opportunity to bringing forward such evidence as may be appropriate". The importance of the pleadings cannot, of course, be ignored, because it is the pleadings that lead to the framing of issues and a trial in every civil case has inevitably to be confined to the issues framed in the suit. The whole object of framing the issues would be defeated if parties are allowed to travel beyond the issues and claim or oppose reliefs on grounds not made in the pleadings and not covered by the issues. Still cases may occur where a particular plea is not specifically included id the issues, and parties might know that in substance the said plea is being tried and might lead evidence about it. It is only in such a case where the Court is satisfied that the ground on which reliance is placed by one or the other of the parties, was in substance, at issue between them and that both of them have had opportunity to lead evidence about it at the trial that the formal requirement of pleadings can be relaxed. (See Ram Manohar v. State of Bihar, AIR. 1966 SC 735). 12. In Udhay Singh v. M. R. Scindia (AIR 1976 SC. (See Ram Manohar v. State of Bihar, AIR. 1966 SC 735). 12. In Udhay Singh v. M. R. Scindia (AIR 1976 SC. 744), the Supreme Court observed: that "according to the cardinal canon of interpretation, a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import and it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context, in isolation, and although a pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or substraction of words, or change of its apparent grammatical sense". 13. In Siddik Mohammed Shafi v. Mt. Saran and others (AIR. 1930 PC. 57), it was observed that "where a claim has been never made in the defence presented, no amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward". This observation was approved by the Supreme Court in Bhagat Singh v. Jaswant Singh (AIR. 1966 SC. 1861). It is well settled that no evidence can be looked into by the Court for which there is no foundation in the pleadings., (See Nirod Baran Banerjee v. Dy. Commissioner, AIR. 1980 SC. 1109). 14. In Dhool Singh v. Bardhu Bai (AIR. 1974 Rajasthan 90), while considering the irrevocability of licence under S.60, it was observed that the question of irrevocability of licence under S.60(b) was a mixed question of law and fact as the necessary conditions about the irrevocability of the licence existed or not have to be proved, and it was. therefore, necessary for the defendant to have pleaded the necessary facts in his written statement and to have a proper issue framed. It was also held that in the absence of such plea or issue the courts below were in error in holding that the licence was irrevocable. In the light of the above discussion and findings, this appeal has no merit and the same is hereby dismissed. No costs, in the circumstances.