JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - This is a defendants second appeal arising out of a suit for possession over two rooms of house No. 666 old Katra, Allahabad. This house is the residential house of the plaintiff respondents. Their case was that the house of the appellant bad become dilapidated and on his request the two rooms in question were permitted to be occupied by him as a licencee to enable him to repair his own house. According to the plaintiff-respondents the appellant, however did not keep his promise and since the two rooms were not vacated by him in spite of a request being made in this behalf the suit giving rise to this second appeal had to be instituted. The suit was contested by the appellant on the ground that he was not a licencee but was a lessee of the two rooms. On a consideration of the evidence produced by the parties the trial court accepted the case of the plaintiff respondents and decreed the suit. An appeal preferred by the defendant against the decree of the trial court has been dismissed by the lower appellate court and the findings recorded by the trial court have been affirmed. 2. Even before the second appeal was preferred in this court the plaintiff-respondents had filed a caveat. This appeal came up for hearing under order 41 Rule 11 CPC on 8th May, 1984 and one of the arguments advanced by counsel for the appellant was that certain document hied by the plaintiff-respondents per List 112-C after the parties had closed their evidence were accepted by the trial court and relied on even though neither those documents were proved nor was any opportunity given to the appellant to adduce evidence in rebuttal. Since caveat had already been filed as stated above counsel for the parties were given 48 hrs. time to file affidavits giving correct facts in this behalf. Both the parties have filed their affidavits. 3. Since caveat had already been filed as stated above counsel for the parties were given 48 hrs. time to file affidavits giving correct facts in this behalf. Both the parties have filed their affidavits. 3. Having heard counsel for the parties I am of opinion that the finding concurrently recorded by the two courts below that the appellant was only a licencee of the two rooms in question on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents as asserted by them and that these two rooms had not been let out to him is essentially a finding of fact based on appraisals of evidence and in my opinion on this finding no substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal. Both the courts below have believed the witnesses produced on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents and disbelieved the witnesses produced on behalf of the appellant. The pita as to whether these witnesses were rightly believed or disbelieved cannot certainly be raised in a second appeal. 4. What was vehemently urged by counsel for the appellant, however, was that the courts below have acted illegally in placing reliance on the documents filed along with List 112-C mentioned above. I find it difficult to agree with this submission either. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the Plaintiff-respondents the order passed on the application for admitting the aforesaid documents has been quoted and us perusal indicates that these documents were accepted in evidence on payment of costs and the appellant was granted opportunity to file documents in rebuttal it further indicates that the costs awarded by the trial court for accepting those documents had been paid by the plaintiff-respondents and that the appellant notwithstanding time being granted in this behalf did not produce any evidence in rebuttal. It further appears that some of the documents which were filed along with List 112-C were public documents and did not require proof. They could, therefore, certainly be relied on by the courts below in the absence of any evidence in rebuttal. It is true that some of those documents were private documents also and do not seem to have been proved. In my opinion, however the decree passed by the courts below does not, on the facts of the instant case, deserve to be set aside on this ground alone. It is true that some of those documents were private documents also and do not seem to have been proved. In my opinion, however the decree passed by the courts below does not, on the facts of the instant case, deserve to be set aside on this ground alone. In this connection reference may be made to Section 167 of the Evidence Act which reads : "167, No New trial for improper admission or rejection of evidence. The improper admission or rejection of evidence shall not be ground itself for a new trial or reversal of any decision in any case, it shall appear to the court before which such objection is raised that, independently of the evidence objected to and admitted, there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision, or that if the rejected evidence had been received, it ought not to have varied of the decision." It appears that DW 3 Ashok Kumar, while in the witness box, stated that at the time when the plaintiff-respondents permitted the appellant to occupy the two rooms in question he had gone to the appellants house to purchase some leather and it was in that connection that he heard the talks which took place between the parties. According to him the agreement orally arrived at between the parties at that time was to let out the two rooms to the appellant on Rs. 36/- per month as rent and that six months rent was paid in advance. Three grounds have been given by the courts below for disbelieving the statement of DW 3 Ashok Kumar. The first ground was that the assertion made by him that six months rent was paid in advance by the appellant in his presence was a case not even pleaded by the defendant in his written statement. The second around was that this witness was a chance witness and the third ground was based on the documents filed along with List 112-C indicating that the shop of the plaintiff-respondents where leather was sold was situate in a different locality and consequently there was no occasion for the said witness to have gone to the plaintiff-respondents, residential house to purchase leather. Out of these documents as already pointed out above some are public documents from the Sales Tax department indicating that the shop of the plaintiff-respondents was situate in different mohalla. Out of these documents as already pointed out above some are public documents from the Sales Tax department indicating that the shop of the plaintiff-respondents was situate in different mohalla. These documents of course could be relied on for disbelieving DW 3 Ashok Kumars statement mentioned above. The other documents filed along with paper no 112-C were rent receipts in respect of the shop where the plaintiff-respondents were carrying on their business of selling leather. Even if these receipts are ignored I am of opinion that in view of the fact that DW 3 Ashok Kumar has been disbelieved on several other cogent reasons also no interference is called for on this technical ground in view of what has been provided for in Section 167 of the Evidence Act. 5. In view of the foregoing discussion I am of opinion that there is no merit in this second appeal. It is accordingly dismissed and the interim order of stay is vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.