Judgment :- The plaintIff is the appellant. The suit out of which this second appeal arises was filed by her for a declaration that her dismissal from service by the respondent is arbitrary, illegal and void and for a mandatory injunction directing the respondent to reinstate the plaintiff-appellant into service. The plaintiff was employed in St. Dominies Anglo Indian Girls High School run by the defendant. She was having indifferent health and often had to apply for leave and on this account there was esttangement of feelings between her and the Headmistress of the institution who made some untenable charges against her and appointed one Sr Hyachintha of St. Helens Girls High School as Eaquiry Officer. According to the plaint averments, the said enquiry officer conducted the enquiry but no opportunity was given to the plaintiff to cross-examine the witnesses and on the basis of that report the services of the plaintiff were terminated on 27th April, 1978. According to the plaintiff, the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated for want of jurisdiction and is against law and principles of natural justice. It is in these circumstances that she filed the suit for the reliefs stated above. 2. The suit was resisted by the respondent-school on the ground that the order of dismissal is correct as the enquiry was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural, justice. The defendant denied the allegation that no opportunity was given to the plaintiff for cross-examining the witnesses. 3. The trial Judge held that the defendant, respondent has contravented the provisions of II of Article 68-A of the Code of Regulations for Anglo Indian Schools (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations) and decreed the suit as prayed for. On appeal, the learned appellate Judge reversed that finding and stated that the provisions of Article 68-A are not attracted and that Article 119 of the Regulatoins alone will apply and in the end, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff has filed this second appeal. 4. While admitting the second appeal, a learned Judge of this Court has formulatted the following substantial question of law: 1. Whether the lower appellate Court erred in law with reference to interpretation of Art. 68-A of the Code of Regulations for Anglo-Indian Schools? and 2. The plaintiff has filed this second appeal. 4. While admitting the second appeal, a learned Judge of this Court has formulatted the following substantial question of law: 1. Whether the lower appellate Court erred in law with reference to interpretation of Art. 68-A of the Code of Regulations for Anglo-Indian Schools? and 2. Whether the lower Appellate Court omitted to take note of the fact that there was lack of opportunity to the appellant to cross-examine the witnesses during the course of enquiry? 5. Dealing with the second question of law first, I must at once point out that the allegation that the appellant was not given an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses during enquriy is not well-founded, for in the proceedings of the Enquiry Officer marked as Exhibit B-3, it is found that the plaintiff was given enough opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer, it is seen, has directed the plaintiff to cross-exami-ne the witnesses and in fact the plaintiff has - cross-examined them also. Opportunity was given to the plaintiff to examine her own witnesses also. To say that no opportunity was given to the plaintiff to examine the witnesses, is not correct. The learned appellate Judge has dealt with this question and it is wrong to say that the appellate Court has not taken note of this question, That disposes of the second point of law. 6. The first point of law requires consideration. It is admitted that the services of the plaintiff are governed by a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant, evidenced by Exhibit B-2. Execution of Exhibit B-2 is also admitted. The trial Court relying on Article 68-A of the Regulations was of the view that there is a violation of the Regulations as neither the Inspector of Anglo-Indian Schools no any Officer deputed for that purpose, has enquired into the charges framed against the plaintiff. Article 68-A of the Regulation runs thus: "If the Headmaster or any other teacher of a school is found to be negligent in the discharge of his duties or is found to have committed any irregularity, the Director shall, after due enquiry declare him unfit to be a Headmaster or a teacher for a specified period or permanently as circumstances of the case warrant. Such declaration shall not be made until the teacher or Headmaster has been informed in writing of the charges against him and full enquiry has been made either by the Inspector of Anglo-Indian Schools or any other officer deputed by the Director for the purpose, provided that this procedure need not be followed in cases where the teacher or Headmaster has been convicted by a competent Court". A careful reading of Article 68-A would show that it would be attracted in the case of any Headmaster or any teacher being found negligent in the discharge of his duties or found to have committed any irregularity. In such cases, the Direstor shall after due enquiry, declare the Headmaster or the teacher unfit to be a Headmaster or teacher for a specified period or permanently as the circumstances of the case warrant. It is only when such a declaration is to be made that Article 68-A is to be resorted to. But this case appears to be one covered by Article 119 of the Regulations which runs thus: "In recognised schools every paid teacher shall be engaged under a written agreement with the management terminable on either side with three months notice or three months salary in lieu of. The agreement shall be in the form prescribed in Appendix 48. (Proviso omitted) Now, a reading of clause 7 (ii) of Appendix 48 would show that the school authorities shall have the power in terminate the services of a teacher when he a becomes a permanent member of the staff (a) without notice for any or for all of the following reasons: Wilful neglect of duty; serious misconduct; gross insubordination; mental unfitness; suspension or cancellation of teachers certificate by the Director of Public Instruction under Code of Regulations for Anglo-Indian Schools, and (b) With three months notice or three months salary in lieu thereof for the following reasons: Incompetence, retrenchment, physical unfitness or any other good cause. (Provise omitted) A reading of both Articles 119 and 68-A together would show that the provisions of Article 68-A would be attracted only in the case where a declaration has to be made that a Headmaster or a teacher is unfit to be a Headmaster or a teacher and the Headmaster or teacher is found to be negligent in in the discharge of duties, or found to have committed any irregularity. In this case, a reading to Ex. B-2 will show that the wording in Clause 7 of Appendix 48 has been extracted and the plaintiff has signed in Exhibit B-2. Therefore, the lower appellate Court was right in coming to the conclusion that Article 119 of the Regulations alone applied and not Article 68-A. 7. It is contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that a suit for declaration would not lie. This is a case where the services of the plaintiff under the management of the defendant-school is governed by the contract, Exhibit B-2. In such circumstances, only a suit for damages would lie. in my opinion, the relief as sought for by the plaintiff including the relief of mandatory injunction to reinstate her into service indirectly amounts to specific performance of contract for personal service. Such a declaration is not permissible under the law of specific reliefs. But in the case of a servant of the State or local authorities or statutary bodies. Courts have declared in appropriate cases the dismissal to be invalid if the dismissal is contrary to rules of natural justice or if the dismissal is in violation of the provisions of the statute. But dismissal of what is described as pure contract of master and servant is not declared to be a nullity, however, wrongful or illegal it may be. For the foregoing reasons, this second appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.