Judgment This is a revision petition filed by the accused against the Judgment in Criminal Appeal No.428 of 1979, on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, South Arcot at Cuddalore, confirming the conviction under Section 2(1-a)(a), 7(i) read with Section 16(i)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 2. The prosecution case is that on 8.9.1978 at about 7.30 a.m., at Villupuram Trunk Road, the petitioner sold adulterated cow’s milk to the Food Inspector (P.W.1) and on analysis, it was found that the solids-not-fat content was deficient in the sample to the extent of at least 52 per cent. The Food Inspector was examined as P.W.1 and he has given evidence regarding the purchase and taking of sample and the formalities observed for laying the prosecution. The accused admitted the sale, but pleaded not guilty. It was contended on his behalf that there was no sufficient compliance of Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and that there was delay in sending the report. 3. The learned Magistrate, rejected the contention and found the revision petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-. On appeal, the conviction was confirmed, but the sentence alone was reduced to three months rigorous imprisonment. Hence the revision. 4. The first point that was argued on behalf of the accused was that there was delay in the service of notice on the accused. There is no force in this contention. The case was taken up on file on 18.11.1978 and the notice was duly served on 20.11.1978. 19.11.1978 happended to be a Sunday. Therefore, there cannot be said to be any delay at all. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the occurrence was on 8.9.78 and the Section 13(2) notice was served on him on 20.11. 1978. This argument implies that there was a delay of about 2-1/2 months in sending the notice. In cases of this nature, the date of institution of the complaint is the crucial date and not the date of occurrence. The term ‘institution’ has not been defined anywhere in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act or anywhere else. The only analogous provision is found in Section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. The term ‘institution’ has not been defined anywhere in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act or anywhere else. The only analogous provision is found in Section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. Thus, the institution of a case may be one of the three categories mentioned in Section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the term ‘institution’ would mean only the date on which the Court takes cognizance finds support in a ruling reported in Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Sha, (1964)2 S.C.J. 439: (1964) M.L.J.(Crl.) 526: A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1541, wherein it is held that a case is instituted in a Magistrate’s Court only when it is taken cognizance of by the Magistrate on receiving a complaint of facts. The Magistrate is not bound to take cognizance of the offence on a mere complaint of offence. In the instant case, the complaint was instituted only on 18.11.1978. The date of taking the complaint on file is the date of institution. Therefore, it is clear from the records that the instant case was instituted and taken on file only on 18.11.1975, and therefore, I am satisfied that here is no delay at all in serving the notice under Section 13(2) of the said Act. But then, there is a vital error committed by the prosecution in this case. The occurrence was on 8.9.1978 and that is the evidence of P.W.1 also. But, the charge in this case framed by tie learned Magistrate reads that the occurrence took place on 6.9.1978 at 6-00 A.M., at Villupuram. The charge is for possession of adulterated milk on 6.9.1978. Of course, this point has not at all been taken by the revision petitioner throughout. But, this is a matter arising from the records. It may be that ‘6.9.78’ is a mistake for ‘8.9.78’, and it may be stated by the prosecution that it is an error patent on the records. But, the accused is certainly entitled to take advantage of it, when he has been called upon to answer a charge relating to an offence said to have been committed on 6.9.1978. Of course, the charge may even now be amended suitably by the prosecution. But, six years have elapsed and the alleged offence is that the revision petitioner was in possession of some adulterated milk. Of course, the charge may even now be amended suitably by the prosecution. But, six years have elapsed and the alleged offence is that the revision petitioner was in possession of some adulterated milk. Having regard to the facts of the case and the ordeal of trial, appeal and revision undergone by the accused, it will be cruel to remit the case to the trial Court for ire-trial after amending the charge. Therefore, the position is the evidence is not in conformity with the charge, and on this short ground, though it may be a technical one, the order of conviction has to be quashed. So, on this short ground of defect in charge, the revision petitioner succeeds and the petition is allowed and the conviction and sentence are set aside. Fine, if paid, will be refunded to the petitioner.