JUDGMENT P.S. Mishra, J. This case has got a chequered career of being referred to a Division Bench by an order dated 12.12.1980 and returned for healing by the Bench of a single Judge, as the Division Bench, hearing the appeal found that the matter is not such al to be decided by a Division Bench. It has, accordingly, fallen to my lot for deciding the controversy and the questions involved. 2. The plaintiff is the appellant. The trial Court decreed the suit. The court of appeal below haying found, however, that the plaintiff has got no title to the lands described in Schedule ‘A’ of the plaint bas reversed the trial court's decree and dismissed the suit. 3. The plaintiff's suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession or in the alternative for recovery of possession in respect of the suit lands described in schedule ‘A’ of the carries the following allegations of fact- The plaintiff was Naik Ghatwal of Budhraisa Ghat and, accordingly be held Ghatwali tenure recorded in his name in the cadastral survey Khewat no. 4 of Mauza Budhraisai. The suit lands formed a part f Abad Malik land and according to the plaintiff, were in his Khas cultivating possession. In short the suit lands comprised the plaintiff’s Ghatwali tenure. The plaintiff, however, was appointed as Excise Inspector in the year 1944 which caused relinquishing of Ghatwal service by him. One Jotia Munda, a cousin of the plaintiff was appointed Naik Ghatwal in his place, Although Jotia Munda assumed the Ghatwali rights, but he did not take possession upon the suit lands and he agreed to allow the plaintiff to his possession upon the suit lands. Jotia Munda died in the year 1947. Karan Singh Munda alias, Bhagirath Manki, another cousin of the plaintiff, was appointed Naik Ghatwal in or about the year 1947. He also never took possession of the suit land and the plaintiff continued in possession. The plaintiff, thus, continued in possession of the suit land notwithstanding the appointment of Jotia Munda as Maik Ghatwal in the year 1944, end after his death appointment of Karan Singh Munda alias Bhagirath Manki as the Naik Ghatwal in or about the year 1947. Ghatwali tenure vested in the State of Bihar in July, 1956. On the date of vesting the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land. Ghatwali tenure vested in the State of Bihar in July, 1956. On the date of vesting the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land. Karan Singh Munda died in the year 1956 leaving behind his widow and a son. According to the plantiff, although the suit lands were in his possession, during the revisional survey, they were recorded in the names of Khagendra Munda and Uday Shanker Munda, both sons of Karan Singh Munda. The record of right so prepared was published in the year 1964. Khagendra Munda and Udai Shanker Munda and other defendants, on the basis of the said record of right, threatened to dispossess the plaintiff. The plaintiff accordingly, filed Title suit no. 38/35 of 1969/73 in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Jamshedpur, seeking declaration of title and confirmation of possession. During the pendency of the suit, a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was started, vide Miscellaneous Case no. 526 of 1972, which was decided against the plaintiff on 28.7.1973. The plaintiff, thus, also sought the alternative relief of recovery of possession. The defendants, although filed two sets of written statement, one by defendant no. 1, namely, the widow of Karan Singh Munda and another by Uday Shanker Munda and Kapildeo Singh Monda, the two sons of Karan Singh Munds, alleged dial the plaintiff has got no right, title or interest; they denied that there had been any consent or agreement under which Jotia Munda allowed the plaintiff to continue in possession; they asserted that the plaintiff relinquished not only the office of Naik Ghatwal but also possession of the suit lands, which formed the Ghatwal tenure. They further alleged that Jotia Munda came in possession after becoming the Naik Ghatwal and after Jotia Munda’s death his son Gopal Munda functioned as Naik Ghatwal. Gopal Munda died in the year 1947 and Karan Singh Munda was appointed Naik Ghatwal Karan Singh Munda came in possession of the suit land in the said capacity. The plaintiff resisted Karan Singh Monda and several cases were fought by him resisting the appointment of Karan Singh Monda as the Naik Ghatwal. He however, lost all these proceedings, including one in which he claimed appointment of his son Mohitosh Singh Manki as Naik Ghatwal. Karan Singh Munda, who held Ghatwali tenure, was in actual physical possession of the suit land in his own right. He however, lost all these proceedings, including one in which he claimed appointment of his son Mohitosh Singh Manki as Naik Ghatwal. Karan Singh Munda, who held Ghatwali tenure, was in actual physical possession of the suit land in his own right. After the death of Karan Singh Munda, the defendants came in possession of the suit land as his heirs and legal representatives. They were in possession of the same on the date of vesting and they were so found in possession during the revisional survey. 4. Although the controversy has many aspects and most of them have been resolved by the judgments of the courts below, it is relevant to point out that the suit which was ultimately decided by the Additional Subordinate Judge, Jamshedpur held in favour of the plaintiff that he has got valid title to the suit land and that he is entitled to recovery of possession, but in the appeal preferred against his judgment and decree by the defendants, the First Additional District Judge of Singhbhum at Chaibasa, who has decided the appeal has found that the plaintiff’s possession of the land in dispute after his removal from the post of Naik Ghatwal, was permissive possession and on the basis of his finding, that the plaintiff has got no title to the land in the suit, he has held that the plaintiff is not entitled to recovery of possession or to any other relief. 5. Mr. Kameshwar Prasad, learned counsel, appearing for the appellant, has contended that the learned Additional District Judge having come to the conclusion that the plaintiff has been coming in possession of the suit land from before his relinquishment of the office of Naik Ghatwal and remained in possession till he was dispossessed by the proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has committed error of law in not granting to him a decree of declaration of title by adverse possession. He has questioned the validity of the finding in this regard recorded by the learned Additional District Judge, where he has said that the plaintiff’s possession during the time of Jotia Munda was nothing more than a permissive possession and as such the plaintiff can claim the land in his own right only after the death of Jotia Mundia, which took place in or about the year 1946-47 and since the tenure vested in July, 1956 in the State, the plaintiff did not complete 12 years of possession adverse to the Naik Ghatwal’s title. He has submitted that the learned Additional District Judge has not appreciated the pleadings in accordance with law, inasmuch as on the facts pleaded it cannot be said that no title by adverse possession has been claimed by the plaintiff. 6. Mr. P.K. Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, has however, contested the submissions made by Mr. Prasad by pointing out the peculiar characteristic of the Ghatwali tenures and showing vesting of title to the suit land in Jotia Munda by virtue of his appointment as Naik Ghatwal in place or the plaintiff and after Jotia Munda's death in Karan Singh Munda, who was appointed as Naik Ghatwal in his place; Mr. Sinha has emphasised further that the plaintiff asserted title and sought declaration to that effect followed by confirmation of possession and/or recovery of possession without specifically pleading any where that be bad acquired title by adverse possession and since he did not do so, the plaintiff cannot base his case now on adverse possession to deny the benefits accruing to the Naik Ghatwal duly appointed in accordance with law and alter the death of Karan Singh Munda, his heirs end legal representatives who inherited the said right. 7. I shall treat this question with some more care because Mr. Sinha, in course of his argument, has taken me through the contents of certain documents, showing that the plaintiff insisted that none else but his son should be appointed Naik Ghatwal and in course of such proceedings orders were made in respect of the suit land as well. The documents, to which Mr. Sinha, in course of his argument, has taken me through the contents of certain documents, showing that the plaintiff insisted that none else but his son should be appointed Naik Ghatwal and in course of such proceedings orders were made in respect of the suit land as well. The documents, to which Mr. Sinha has drawn my attention, are Exhibits D, D/1, D/3, G and I. These documents, do show that the plaintiff's resistence to the appointment or Karan Singh Munda as Naik Ghatwal failed find be also failed in his attempt to get his son Mohitosh Singh Manki appointed al Naik Ghatwal. These documents further show that the Ghatwali included in it the properties attached to the said office. 8. Although they do not connect the suit land with the Ghitwali tenure referred to in these documents, yet Mr. Sinha is right in suggesting that the suit land is covered by it, as the plaintiff himself has admitted that be came in possession of the suit land in the capacity of the Naik Ghatwal. But these documents go no further. They do not show, whether after Jotia Munda's appointment as Naik Ghatwal, the plaintiff was dispossessed and the suit lands were banded over to him. They do not also show that Karan Singh Munda on his appointment as Naik Ghatwal assumed possession of the suit lands. 9. The learned Additional District Judge has recorded a finding of fact on the basis of the evidence on the record -that the plaintiff continued in possession of the suit land even after his relinquishing the office of Naik Ghatwal and remained in possession till he was dispossessed by the proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The finding of possession of the plaintiff upon the suit land is final and conclusive. The case, therefore, has to be decided on the footing that on the date of vesting of the Ghatwali Tenure in the State the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land. 10. In Kumar Satya Narain Singh Vrs. Raja Satya Naranjan Chakravarti and others it has been said - “... ... ... In the minor senses of the word," ghatwal" can hardly be said to connote a tenure at all. 10. In Kumar Satya Narain Singh Vrs. Raja Satya Naranjan Chakravarti and others it has been said - “... ... ... In the minor senses of the word," ghatwal" can hardly be said to connote a tenure at all. A Jaghir, assigned for the support and remuneration of a ghatwal, may be no more than wakes in kind, arising from the use of a plot of land customarily in the occupation of the ghatwal for the time being and in such a case personal service by the employee and personal selection and appointment by the employer may well be in every case essential incidents of the relationship. Incompetence and misconduct on the part of the employee may be cause for removal of the ghatwal and resumption of his holding……….” Mr. Sinha has also referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Tikait Hargobind Prasad Singh vrs. Sm. Phaldani Kumari. I am not referring to the law decided in the said case because I find no paralel in the facts and law in issue before me and the facts and law in issue in the said case. 11. I have referred to the said judgment although not essential for deciding the question before me because Mr. Sinha has been insistent that the removal of the plaintiff being not in dispute since the personal service cease the wages in kind, namely, possession of the suit land for appropriation of its produce automatically ceased with the plaintiff's, removal from the office of Nark Ghatwal. But cessation of the plaintiff's right to bold the land in the capacity of the Naik Ghatwal is one thing and its actually affecting possession and the plaintiff's going out of the suit land is another thing. There is, no doubt, some confusion whether Jotia Munda volunteered his services to work as Naik Ghatwal until the plaintiff returned from Excise service and/or his son inherited the said office or by his appointment the plaintiff’s appointment stood terminated, but even if the case advanced by the defendants is accepted that with Jotia Munda’s appointment the plaintiff’s appointment terminated, unless it is further shown that the plaintiff was disposed and/or he delivered possession of the suit land to Jotia Munda, it cannot be said that the plaintiff ceased to possess the suit land. Once this part of the plaintiff’s case is accepted, what follows from this is obvious. Once this part of the plaintiff’s case is accepted, what follows from this is obvious. Notwithstanding Jotia Munda’s title to possess the suit land, the plaintiff enjoyed possession as if the land belonged to him. Incidents of adverse possession started with Jotia Munda's appointment as Naik Ghatwal and his becoming entitled to possession, Since there is a mention or Jotia Munda agreeing to allow the plaintiff to continue in possession, it will be inaccurate to say that plaintiff's possession during Jotia Munda's tenure was a permissive possession. So far Karan Singh Munda is concerned, it is obvious that after his appointment as Naik Ghatwal, although he became entitled to possession he could not get possession of the suit land and the plaintiff continued in possession. That the plaintiff had no title and his contest to get his son appointed as the Naik Ghatwal and his unsuccessfully objecting to Karan Singh Munda’s appointment as the Naik Gharwal clearly go to show that his holding the suit lands without any title, whatsoever, was a fact known to all concerned. No process, it appears; was taken out to dispossess the plaintiff. Karan Singh Munda never took any action to assume possession of the suit land. Since Karan Singh Munda never came in possession, the defendants, as his hairs and legal representatives, could undoubtedly, not be in possession on or before the date of vesting in the year 1956. 12. Ghatwali interest, being an intermediary interest (and this position is not in dispute before me), vested in the State of Bihar except the lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes in khas possession of the intermediary. Since the Ghatwal, namely, Karan Singh Munda was not in Khas possession on the date of vesting, the prescription under section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, did not protect his right to hold the suit land as a tenant under the State. 13. Mr. Sinha has drawn my attention to a Judgment of this Court in Gauri Shankar Tiwary vrs. Maharani Durgeshwari Sahi and others. The principle applied in the said case, however, doe not appear to help the respondents. In Suraj Ahir vrs. 13. Mr. Sinha has drawn my attention to a Judgment of this Court in Gauri Shankar Tiwary vrs. Maharani Durgeshwari Sahi and others. The principle applied in the said case, however, doe not appear to help the respondents. In Suraj Ahir vrs. Prithinath Singh, it has been held that the land cannot be deemed to be settled with the outgoint intermediaries by the State in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, if on the date of vesting the ex intermediary it not in khas possession either by cultivating such lands himself with his own stock or by his own servants or by hired labour or with hired stock, such intermediaries loose their right to recover possession form the persons even if they were trespassers on their estate on its vesting in the State by virtue of section 3 and/or 4 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. Assuming that on the date of vesting the plaintiff-appellant was still a trespasser because he has not yet perfected his title by adverse possession and for this purpose (inculding the plaintiffs possession during tile Ghatwali tenure of Jotia Munda) no right remained after the vesting in the year 1956 with Karan Singh Munda to recover possession of the suit land from the plaintiff. Gauri Shankar Tiwari's case (Supra) says that" Where a tenant is in possession of orchard land, the Zamindar landlord can be said to be in khas possession of it within Section 2(k) read with Section 6 (1)(b) of the Land Reforms Act, and if he is in khas possession of it at the time of vesting of his Zamindari in the State, he retains his title to it and can recover possession from the tenant on being dispossessed by him". Obviously this case has got no application on the facts of the instant case and the law laid down in Suraj Ahir’s case gives full support to the appellant’s case. 14. Coming to the question of the plaintiffs claiming title and seeking declaration of title in the suit instead of building up his case on the basis of claim of title by adverse possession. Mr. Sinha has placed reliance on a decision of this court in Sidhi Binayak Nath Mishra and others vrs. 14. Coming to the question of the plaintiffs claiming title and seeking declaration of title in the suit instead of building up his case on the basis of claim of title by adverse possession. Mr. Sinha has placed reliance on a decision of this court in Sidhi Binayak Nath Mishra and others vrs. Ganga Ram Hazam and others in which it has been held that a plaintiff seeking declaration or title cannot seek a decree for recovery of possession on the basis of his prior possession, if the question of title is decided against him. The Division Bench of this Court has taken the said view without the aid or assistance of any Counsel on behalf of the plaintiff respondents. In Nair Service Society Ltd. Vs. K.C. Alexander and others the provisions of sections 8 and 9 of the Specific Relief Act, have been considred and it has been pointed out that the two provisions are not mutually exclusive so that after the period of six months is over it cannot be said that a suit based on prior possession alone is not possible. Section 8 of the Specific Relief Act, does not limit the kinds of suit but only lays down that the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure must be followed. This is different from saying that a suit based on possession alone is incompetent after expiry of six months. The correct position is that if section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, is utilised, the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defendant does not avail him. When, however, the period of 6 months has passed questions of title can be railed by the defendant and if it does so the plaintiff must establish a better title or fail. In other words, the right is only restricted to possession only in a suit under section 9 of the Specified Relief Act, but does not a suit on prior possession with in 12 years and title need not be proved unless the defendant can prove one. In other words, the right is only restricted to possession only in a suit under section 9 of the Specified Relief Act, but does not a suit on prior possession with in 12 years and title need not be proved unless the defendant can prove one. It is obvious that it the law so interpreted by the Supreme Court is applied it entitles the defendants to istitute a suit for declaration of title within 12 years of dispossession A party claiming possession for more than 12 years can come forward and seek declaration that it has acquired title by adverse possession by virtue of being in possession for more than 12 years. The observations in the Patna case, therefore should not be taken as finally setting the question whether the plaintiff, who claims title and fails to prove it, can maintain a suit and claim recovery of possession by virtue of his title by adverse possession or not. In my view, as the provisions in this behalf in the Specific Relief Act are mutually not exclusive but are only enabling provisions in a suit like the one instituted by the plaintiff-appellant, if he has failed to establish his title by virtue of the settlement, that would not preclude him form claming title by virtue of his possession on the date of vesting. 15. There is one more aspect of the question. Admittedly, on the facts as concluded, the defendants were not in possession on the date of vesting. If they were not in khas possession, they acquired no title. Admittedly, as concluded by the courts below, the plaintiff was in possession on that date. Assuming that he was in possession as a trespasser, yet his trespass on that date was on the land belonging to the defendants but the land belonging to the State. A suit based on the claim of possession for recovering the property from the hands of the defendants who snatched possession from the plaintiff pursuant to the order under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall, in my view, be perfectly maintainable. 16. A suit based on the claim of possession for recovering the property from the hands of the defendants who snatched possession from the plaintiff pursuant to the order under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall, in my view, be perfectly maintainable. 16. Since I have found that, the court of appeal below hail committed an error in deciding the issue of title against the appellant, solely on the basis of his finding, that the plaintiff’s possession was permissive during the tenure of Jotia Munda and found further that by virtue of his possession on the date of vesting. The plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the Suit property form the hands of the defendants within 12 years of dispossession by them, I have no hesitation in holding that the learned Additional District Judge has erred in law in dismissing the plaintiff’s suit. 17. In the result this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the court of appeal below are hereby set aside and that of the trial court are restored. There shall be no order as to costs.