JUDGMENT S.J. Hyder J. One Ramjanam Singh was a tenant of about 30,76 acress of land situated in Bhandari P.S. Mahiganwa, in the district of Palamau. His onluy son Faujdar Singh died during his life time. Faujdar Singh was married to Nagbali Kuer. When Ramjanam Singh died in the year 1944 he left behind his widow, Dhanraj Kuer and Nagbali Kuer as his only heirs. Ramjanam Singh had two daughters also. One of these daughter died issueless during the life-time of Ramjanam Singh. The other daughter is Pranjit Kuer who was married to one Rambriksh of village Sibandih in the district of Palamau. At the time of death of Ramjanam Singh, Nagbali Kuer was a minor. Ramjanam Singh had also a step-brother named Bhagwan Singh. This Bhagwan Singh made attempts to grab the property left behind by Ramjanam Singh Dhanraj Kuer acting on her own behalf and as guardian of daughter in law Nagbali Kuer executed a Sale Deed in the year 1945 in favour of the brothers of the plaintiff/respondent Dharamdeo Singh and Alakhdeo Singh. Plaintiff/respondent had a 4th brother whose name was Nawzadih Singh. The quondam Zamindar filed a suit for arrears of rent against Dharamdeo Singh and Alakhdeo Singh and obtained a decree. In execution of the said money decree, the land in dispute which has an area of about 3.76 acres was sold at a court auction and was purchased by the plaintiff/respondent who obtained possession in pursuance of the said auction sale on August. 22.1951. On June 7.1962. Nagbali Kuer purported to transfer her half share in the estate of Ramjanam Singh in favour of the defendant appellant by means of a registered sale deed. On July.31.1962, the plaintiff/respondent and his three brothers and defendant/appellant executed a Sulehnama. By means of this document plaintiff/respondent and his brothers gave up their claim in respect of the land in dispute in favour of the defendant/appellant in the present relinquished all his rights under the sale Deed dated June 7.1963. In respect of the remaining portion of the land which originally belonged to Ramjanam Singh. There is no controversy between the parties with regard to the facts stated above. 2. Plaintiff/respondent thereafter commenced the suit in the court of Munsif Palamau at Daltonganj on 1-7-1965. In respect of the remaining portion of the land which originally belonged to Ramjanam Singh. There is no controversy between the parties with regard to the facts stated above. 2. Plaintiff/respondent thereafter commenced the suit in the court of Munsif Palamau at Daltonganj on 1-7-1965. It was inter alia contended by him that Sulehnama dated July 31.1962 had been obtained from him by the defendant/appellant by means of coercion and threats and was not binding upon him. In the plaint the facts stated in the first paragraph of the judgment were recited. According to the Plaintiff/respondent. Dhanraj Kuer feared danger to her life and property on account of the misdeeds of Bhagwan Singh who was falsely laying claim to the left behind by Ramjanam Singh. It was alleged that faced with this situation Dhanraj Kuer had no other alternative left but to execute a sale deed of the entire land left behind by Ramjanam Singh in favour of the plaintiffs brothers Dharmadeo Singh and Alakhdeo Singh. Plaintiff/respondent contended that sulehnama dated July 31.1962 had not been acted upon and was in consequence a dead letter. He accordingly claimed relief for declaration of his title and sought confirmation of his possession over three acres and odd of the disputed land. In the alternative he prayed that possession of the land in dispute may be given back to him. 3. The suit was contested by the defendant/appellant. It was asserted by him that Nagbali Kuer being admittedly a minor her share could not have been transferred by her mother-in-law Dhanraj Kuer. It was averred by defendant appellant that Nagbali Kuer had a subsisting title to the extent of half in the lands left behind by Ramjanam Singh and she had rightly executed a sale deed of the same in favour of the defendant/appellant on June 7.1962. It was denied by the defendant/appellant and that any threats was held out by him in obtaining the Sulehnama dated July 31.1962. He further asserted that the compromise deed July 31.1962 was binding between the parties inter so. Certain other pleas were also raised by the defendant appellant which I do not consider necessary to recount. 4. Both the courts below have come to a concurrent finding that no coercion or threat was exercised by the defendant appellant in obtaining the document dated July 31, 1962. Certain other pleas were also raised by the defendant appellant which I do not consider necessary to recount. 4. Both the courts below have come to a concurrent finding that no coercion or threat was exercised by the defendant appellant in obtaining the document dated July 31, 1962. It has been held that the parties to the said document executed the same with their free will without any pressure. It has been held by the two courts that the sale deed executed by Dhanraj Kuer in favour of Alakhdeo Singh and Dharmadeo Singh on December.6.1945, was a valid document. They have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff/respondent acquired good title to the land in dispute by virtue of the court auction held in execution of the decree for arrears of rent. They have also held that plaintiff respondent and his brothers have been in possession of the land in-dispute from December.6.1945. According to the said courts the compromise deed dated July.31.1962, was without consideration and not legally enforceable. The consequence is that although plaintiff respondent lost the case so far him exercise of undue influence in obtaining the documents dated July 31.1962 was concerned, he has succeeded in obtaining the reliefs prayed for. The correctness of the findings recorded by the court below has been challenged before me in this Second Appeal. 5. Before entering into the merits of this second appeal a preliminary submission against the decree appealed against may be the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit itself was barred by limitation. In order to appreciate this submission certain additional facts may be stated here. 6. The plaint was originally presented in the court of Munsif Palamau at Daltonganj on July 1.1965. By an order dated May 7.1968 the learned Munsif came to the conclusion that the suit was not maintainable as he had no jurisdiction to try the same. He accordingly directed that the plaint may be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the appropriate court. The plaintiff respondent thereupon applied for return of the plaint and no order directing the return of the plaint was passed on May 27.1968. The plaint was presented before the learned Subordinate Judge, Palamau on 1.6.1968. 7. He accordingly directed that the plaint may be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the appropriate court. The plaintiff respondent thereupon applied for return of the plaint and no order directing the return of the plaint was passed on May 27.1968. The plaint was presented before the learned Subordinate Judge, Palamau on 1.6.1968. 7. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant appellant that the suit impugning the validity of the compromise deed dated July 31.1962 could only be instituted within three years from that date, He submitted that date of the presentation of the plaint before the Subordinate Judge is relevant for computation of time and the period during which the suit remained pending in the court of Munsif should be ignored. It was further pointed out by the learned counsel that in the compromise deed itself the valuation of the land is mentioned as 5500/- and the plaintiff/respondent had valued the suit only at a sum of Rs. 2000/- in the court of Munsif which was a gross understatement. According to the learned counsel the plaintiff cannot avail of the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act, he was not prosecuting the suit before the Munsif court bonafide. In support of the learned counsel had relied on a decision in the case of Ramchandra Singh vs. Bibi Khadai Jatul Kubra. The submission of he learned counsel, however suffers from an error. The compromise deed dated July 3.1962, was in respect of the entire plots measuring 30 acres and odd, the valuation of all these plots which was taken into account, Then it was stated in the document dated July 31.1962 that the subject matter of the compromise was of a value of 5500/-. In the instant case, we are however concerned with an area of 3 acres and odd only, As to what was the value of the area is not clear from the compromise deed. Plaintiff-respondent might have bonafide thought that he was within his rights in valuing the suit plot at Rs. 2000/-. It cannot therefore be said that institution of the suit in the court of the Munsif was not bonafide. The preliminary submission urged on behalf of the defendant appellant is therefore overruled. 8. The substantial question however is with regard to the compromise deed dated July 31.1962. 2000/-. It cannot therefore be said that institution of the suit in the court of the Munsif was not bonafide. The preliminary submission urged on behalf of the defendant appellant is therefore overruled. 8. The substantial question however is with regard to the compromise deed dated July 31.1962. In the said document the facts concerning the property left behind by Ramjanam Singh are clearly stated. As already pointed out the two courts have concurrently found that the said document was executed by the parties out of their own free will without any force undue influence or coercion. The two courts below have however examined the correctness of the claim of the defendant appellant and have come to the conclusion that Nagballi Kuer had no right to execute the sale deed dated June 7.1962. It was in this view of the matter that the courts below came to the conclusion that the compromise deed dated July 31.1962 was without consideration and have decreed the suit of the plaintiff respondent. 9. The law in connection with agreements entered into on the supposition of the subsistence of a doubtful right is not in doubted has been settled by a long series of decisions. It has always been held that an agreement of this nature is binding upon the parties. The existence of a doubtful right itself is considered to be a good consideration for such an agreement, what then is the meaning which is to be given to the expression “doubtful right”? 10. The two courts below appear to have laboured under the delusion that this expression is equivalent to the existence of an actual right. According to their reasoning is only such right which actually exists is capable of being resolved by means of a compromise. This approach is wholly incorrect and cannot be sustained. Of course right can only be on one side and when a court proceeds to decide about the existence of the right it has to find either in favour of the plaintiff or against the defendant. However the word ‘right’ is prefixed with the word ‘doubtful’. It cannot be said that existence of doubtful right has been concluded by an agreement unless such right is actually found in favour of the person in whose favour it is ultimately adjudged. However the word ‘right’ is prefixed with the word ‘doubtful’. It cannot be said that existence of doubtful right has been concluded by an agreement unless such right is actually found in favour of the person in whose favour it is ultimately adjudged. Avoidance of litigation which is always uncertain and a time consuming is itself a consideration for the recognition given under an agreement to a doubtful right. In my opinion the courts below have approached the case from a totally incorrect stand point. They have first proceeded to investigate title of Nagbali Kuer and have arrived at the conclusion that the transfer of the defendant appellant had no legally enforceable right and as such the transfer of the land in question was invalid. A division Bench of this Court in Jagdam Sahai. Vrs. Roopnarain Mahto2 following the dictum in Con-Vs-Con has been quoted with approval :– ‘An agreement entered into upon a supposition of right or of a doubtful right though it afterwards comes out that the right was on the other side shall be binding and the right shall not prevail against the agreement of the parties for the right must always be on one side or the other and therefore the compromise of a doubtful right is sufficient foundation of an agreement. “In Jagdam Sahai’s case (Supra) the Division Bench of this Court has reviewed a large number of cases in which the same proposition has been upheld. A full Bench of this Court in Harihar Prasad vs. Kesho Pradsad4 has followed the above proposition. Mullick J. Speaking for the court approved of the dictum of the House of Lords in Stapiltion vrs. Stapiltion5 and observed that an agreement entered into upon a supposition of a right or of a doubtful right shall be binding on the parties. In order to make the position beyond doubt Mullick J. further observed that the compromise of a doubtful right is a sufficient foundation for an agreement. “Cases bearing on this question can be multiplied but I do not think it necessary to do so. 11. Irrespective of the question as to whether Nagbali Kuer could transfer her shall in favour of the defendant appellant the existence of sale deed executed by her on June 7.1962 is not in doubt. “Cases bearing on this question can be multiplied but I do not think it necessary to do so. 11. Irrespective of the question as to whether Nagbali Kuer could transfer her shall in favour of the defendant appellant the existence of sale deed executed by her on June 7.1962 is not in doubt. The sale deed has been given effect to though in a restricted form in the compromise deed dated July 3.1962 which is now sought to be avoided by the plaintiff respondent. It should also not be forgotten that by means of the compromise the defendant appellant agreed to forego his rights in 27 acres of land which came to be recognized in the exclusive possession of the plaintiff respondent and his brothers. The forbearance on the part of the defendant appellant to forego the said land or of an interest on the said land was in itself a consideration which was sufficient to sustain compromise dated July 31, 1962. 12. Learned counsel for the defendant appellant submitted before me that the findings on the question of legal necessity is the sale deed executed by Smt. Dhanraj Kuer in favour of the brothers of the plaintiff respondent is incorrect in law. He forcefully argued that Smt. Nagbali Kuer had a subsisting right title and interest to the extent of one half in the land left behind by Ramjanam Singh. In the view of the matter which I have taken above, I do not propose to enter into these questions. In my opinion the compromise dated July 31, 1962 was the settlement of a doubtful right and the disputed land under the said compromise had been allotted to the defendant/appellant. Plaintiff respondent and his brothers had specifically relinquished all right, title and interest in the said land. For the reasons stated above, it is wholly unnecessary to investigate and decide on which side the right actually lay. Defendant appellant's plea based on the compromise deed dated July 31.1962, should have been sustained by the courts below. 13. On behalf of the plaintiff respondent it has been argued that in paragraph 12 of the plaint it has been specifically pleaded that the plaintiff respondent did not part with possession of the land in dispute and the said compromise remained ineffective. It is significant that no issue on this plea was pressed before the trial court. 13. On behalf of the plaintiff respondent it has been argued that in paragraph 12 of the plaint it has been specifically pleaded that the plaintiff respondent did not part with possession of the land in dispute and the said compromise remained ineffective. It is significant that no issue on this plea was pressed before the trial court. There is no whisper about it in the jut1gments recorded by the two courts below. However, it is pressed before me that the possession of the plaintiff respondent has been upheld by the two courts below and that the finding on the question of possession is a finding of fact. Learned counsel submits that it is not open for me while hearing a second appeal to upset the said finding. I have carefully considered the submission of the learned counsel and have also examined the judgments recorded by the two courts below. It is evident from perusal of the said judgments that two courts have been concerned with the possession of the plaintiff respondent and his brothers from 1945 on wards. The examination of the possession of the plaintiff respondent and his brothers has been done with a view to uphold the title of the plaintiff to the land in dispute and to arrive at a conclusion as to whether they had completed their adverse possession before the execution of the sale deed by Nagbali Kuer in favour of the defendant appellant. The inferior courts have not addressed themselves to the question of binding out as to whether effect was given to the compromise deed dated July 31. 1962. Defendant appellant in his testimony has specially averred that be was in possession of the land in dispute and that such possession was not of a superficial character. He has further stated that he is paying rent in respect of the said land which has not been considered by the courts below. They had not taken into account the judgment in the mutation proceeding or the rent receipts filed by the defendant appellant. 14. For the reasons stated above I am of the view that the judgment and decree recorded by the courts below suffer from error of law and must therefore be set aside. 15. The result is that this second Appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. 14. For the reasons stated above I am of the view that the judgment and decree recorded by the courts below suffer from error of law and must therefore be set aside. 15. The result is that this second Appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgment and decree of the courts below passed in Title Appeal No. 22/74 dated 15.4.1976 affirming the decree passed by the Additional Subordinate Judge Palamau on 8.6.1974 in Title Suit No. 19/68 are here by set aside. The plaintiff' suit is dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.