Judgment :- The above revision is filed questioning the correctness of the order of the IX Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, made in I.A.No.7646 of 1982 is O.S.No.9499 of 1981 on 22nd February, 1984. 2. The short facts of the case are as foIlows:The respondent is the landlord with respect to the land bearing No. 181 L (New No. 235). Royapettah High Road Madras-14. The petitioner is the tenant under the respondent paying a monthly rent of Rs 325. The landlady filed O.S. No. 9499 of 1981 against the petitioner seeking their ejectment from the suit property and also claiming damages at Rs. 1,200 for the past and damages for the future at Rs. 600 per mensem. Pending disposal of the suit, an affidavit was filed by one of the partners of the petitioner-firm under section 9 (1) of the Madras City Tenents’ Protection Act seeking purchase of the property which is in his possession. Another Interlocutory application I.A.No. 7645 of 1982 in O.S. No. 9499 of 1981 was filed by one of the partners of the petitioner-firm seeking con-donation of the delay of 55 days under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in filing the petition under S. 9 of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, contending that the petitioner is in possession of the property bearing door No 235, Royapettah High Road, Madras-14 measuring 1424 sq., it., situate in R.S. No. 1137. What was leased out to the petitioner was only a vacant land and the petitioner has put up constructions over the land and completed the same in the year 1954 which bears Door No. 235, Royapettah High Road, Madras-14. Though the original lease expired on 30th September, 1974, the same was renewed subsequently by enhancing the rate of rent to Rs. 326 per month from 1st November, 1974. It was further averred in the affidavit filed by one of the partners of the petitioner firm, who was the defendant in the suit, that he "has already taken out an application under section 9 for a direction to sell the land to the defendant. The summons was served in the above suit on 20th January, 1982. I am not well versed with Court procedure. As the hearing of the suit was on 6th March, 1982, I contacted my counsel on 19th March, 1982. The summons was served in the above suit on 20th January, 1982. I am not well versed with Court procedure. As the hearing of the suit was on 6th March, 1982, I contacted my counsel on 19th March, 1982. Of course my counsel told me that I have to take out an application under section 2 within 30 days from the date of the service of summons. In fact I instructed my counsel to prepare petition for that purpose. Immediately I had to leave for my business tour of Belgium and Mysore. Unfortunately, I was held up in my business tour and I returned to Madras only in the third week of March, 1982. But I could not contact my counsel immediately as I had jaundice and I was advised bed rest for four weeks. Only now I am able to contact my counsel and signed the affidavit Now there is a delay of 55 days which is neither wilful nor wanton due to the above circumstances." 3. A counter was filed by the landlady respondent herein opposing the petition for condonation of delay, Several points were raised regarding the maintainability of the petition and she contended that the tenant is not entitled to seek the benefits under the Act. Inter alia, it was contended by the landlady that the petition has not been filed by the tenant-petitioner within thirty days to purchase the land as enjoined under the Act, and therefore the petitioner is not entitled to seek benefits under the Act. It was further contended that the right of the yetilioner to purchase the land has been lost by efflux of time under section 9 (1) of the Act, and section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the petitioner. The other several allegations in the affidavit that the petitioner went for his business tour, etc., were denied, 4. The Court below dismissed the petition to condone the delay holding that the petition is not maintainable, since it is filed beyond time. It is against the dismissal of the petition, the above revision is filed by the tenant. 5. The other several allegations in the affidavit that the petitioner went for his business tour, etc., were denied, 4. The Court below dismissed the petition to condone the delay holding that the petition is not maintainable, since it is filed beyond time. It is against the dismissal of the petition, the above revision is filed by the tenant. 5. The question that requires consideration in this revision is, whether the petition to condone the delay in filing the petition under section 9 of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act is maintainable and if so, whether such a petition to condone the delay can be filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 6. Under section 9 (1) (a) (i) of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1922. as amended, any tenant who is entitled to compensation under section 3, and against whom a suit in ejectment has been instituted by the landlord, may, within one month after the service on him of summons, apply to this Court for an order that the landlord shall be directed to sell for a price to be fixed by the Court, the whole or part of, the extent of land specified In the application. For a person to claim the benefits under section 9(1) (a) (i) of the Act, he must be a tenant as defined in the Act, be must be entitled to compensation under section 3 of the Act and against such person ejectment proceedings should have deen instituted bythe landlord. In such a case the tenant within one month after the service on him of the suit summons apply to the Court for an order that the landlord shall be directed to sell so much of the land under his possession for his convenient enjoyment for a price to be fixed by the Court 7. The entire scheme of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act. 1922, as amended is to afford protection to a tenant who has constructed a building on another’s land with the fond hope that he would not be evicted. The entire scheme of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act. 1922, as amended is to afford protection to a tenant who has constructed a building on another’s land with the fond hope that he would not be evicted. When once it is found that the person in occupation is a tenant and his tenancy is governed by the provisions of the City Tenants Protection Act at the relevant point of time, the mere increase in the rents subsequently does not necessarily create a new tenancy as to deprive the tenant of the benefits under the Act. The legislative intent behind the conferring of right on the tenant to purchase the land, if he is the tenant at the relevant point of time is to make the tenant the owner of the land since he has put up the superstructure of his own over the land. But in case the tenant is not the owner of the superstructure on the date when the suit is filed, the application by the tenant to purchase the land is incompetent and consequently the tenant will not be entitled to any relief under section 9 of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act In so far as the instant case is concerned the right to purchase the land is claimed by the tenant and even though the contention of the landlady is that the petitioner is not the tenant, from the avermenrs made in the affidavit and the counter-affidavit, it is represented that even after the termination of the tenancy, the petitioner is the tenant and he could not be denied the right of protection under the Act. In so far as the instant case is concerned, an ejectment suit has been instituted by the landlady against the petitioner and the summons of the suit have been served on the tenant. But the tenant has not taken out an application as required under section 9 (1) of the Act, within one month after the service on him of the suit summons, seeking a direction from the Court to the landlady to sell the land to the tenant. It is at this stage relevant to note certain dates. The suit O.S. No 9499 of 1981 was filed against the petitioner on 15th December, 1981. Summons were served on the defendant on 20th January, 1982. It is at this stage relevant to note certain dates. The suit O.S. No 9499 of 1981 was filed against the petitioner on 15th December, 1981. Summons were served on the defendant on 20th January, 1982. 30 days as required under S. 9 (1) of the Act expired on 19th February, 1982. The suit was posted for hearing on 6th March, 1982. On 15th April, 1982, a petition under S. 9 (1) of the Act to purchase the land was filed, and on the same day I A. No. 7646 of 1982 was filed seeking condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The reason given by the peti-tioner for not filing the petition in time as required under the Act was that he was not well-versed with the Court procedure and since he had gone on business tour to Belgium and Mysore he could not file the application in time. The trial Court disbelieved the con-tention of the petitioner and dismissed the petition. 8. Learned Advocate-General, who appeared on behalf of the petitioner, rested his arguments on two points. Firstly a petition under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay is maintainable in a case where the tenant has not filed a petition within thirty days under S 9 (1) of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act. Secondly, it was contended that there is sufficient cause shown in the affidavit for not filing the petition in time as required under S. 9 (1) of the Act and the dismissal of the petition by the trial Court is contrary to law and erroneous on the facts of the case. In so far as the first contention is concerned, the learned Advocate General relied on a decision of V. Ramaswami, J., reported in Govindaswami v. Bhoopalan, 1 and of Kailasam, J., as he then was, reported in Angaiyaraja v. Alaguraja, 2and contends that a petition under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is maintainable to condone the delay under S. 9 (1) of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act. Learned Advocate-General has also brought to my notice a decision reported in Manga Ram v. Delhi Municipality 3 . That was a case arising under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Learned Advocate-General has also brought to my notice a decision reported in Manga Ram v. Delhi Municipality 3 . That was a case arising under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On the basis of this decision, learned Advocate-General contended that where a petition under S. 9 (1) of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act has not been filed in time by the tenant and if the tenant is satisfactorily able to prove the delay in not filing the petition within time as required under the Act, each days delay can be condomed under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision has observed as follows: "There is no important departure made by the Limitation Act, 1963 in so far as the provision contained in section 29. subsection (2) is concerned. Since under the Limitation Act, 1963, section 5 is specifically made applicable by S. 29, sub-section (2), it can be availed of for the purpose of extending the period of Limitation prescribed by a special or local law if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the application within the period of limitation. It is only if the special or local law expressly excludes the applicability of section 5 that it would stand displaced In view of the desision of the Supreme Court and the decisions of our Court mentioned supra, I have to hold that a petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not barred to seek condonation of the delay in filing the petition under section 9 (1) of the City Tenants Protection Act. The contention of the learned Advocate General that a petition can be filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay in filing a petition under S. 9 (1) of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, is well-founded and sustainable. 9. The other question now remains whether the petitioner has placed relevant materials before the Court to come to the conclusion that the delay of 55 days in filing the petition under section 9 (1) of the Act, has to be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 9. The other question now remains whether the petitioner has placed relevant materials before the Court to come to the conclusion that the delay of 55 days in filing the petition under section 9 (1) of the Act, has to be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The petitioner in his affidavit states that he contacted his counsel and the counsel told him that he has to take out an application under section 9 within thirty days from the date of service of the summons. The petitioner instructed his counsel to prepare such a petition. But the counsel to whom instruction have been given, has not been examined nor the petitioner himself was examined before the trial Court to prove as to how he was prevented from filing the petition within time as required under section 9 (1) of the Act. The petitioner has not gone the witness box nor has he proved or satisfactorily explained as to when he left Madras for business tour to Belgium and Mysore and when and on what day or date he returned in March, 1982 from such tour. The petitioner has also not satisfactorily explained that after the receipt of summons on 20th January, 1982. why he was keeping silent for such a long time in not filing the petition under section 9 (1) of the Act. Though the petitioner has averred that he was suffering from jaundice, it is not mentioned in the affidavit as to where and under whom he was undergoing treatment. No medical certificate has been filed in Court or marked as an exhibit nor do I find any such medical certificate in the same bundle of the Court showing that the petitioner was suffering from jaundice. A reading of this affidavit filed by the petitioner clearly shows that there are no bona fides in the petition and the petitioner has not satisfactorily proved that the delay in filing the petition was not intentional, but due to reasons beyond bis control. No evidence of any sort was adduced or placed before the trial Court to come to the conclusion that the petitioner had sufficient cause in not filing the petition under section 9 (1) of the Act within thirty days from the date of receipt of suit summons. No evidence of any sort was adduced or placed before the trial Court to come to the conclusion that the petitioner had sufficient cause in not filing the petition under section 9 (1) of the Act within thirty days from the date of receipt of suit summons. The trial Court has gone into this aspect and has rightly come to the conclusion that the petitioner has not established that there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 55 days. I am of the view that it is on this ground the order of the trial Court has to be sustained, that there is no flaw in law committed by the trial Court to warrant interference in this revision and that this revision has to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.