JUDGMENT N. D. Ojha, J. 1. THE petitioner was appointed permanent Assistant Registrar of the Agra University by a resolution of the Executive Council of the University dated 28th May, 1971. By a subsequent resolution dated 16th February, 1972 the Executive Council appointed the petitioner as Deputy Registrar. A representation under Section 35 of the Agra University Act was made by one Sanat Kumar to the Chancellor against the appointment of the petitioner as Deputy Registrar. After calling for the comments from the University and explanation from the petitioner the Chancellor by his order dated 22nd June, 1972, set aside the appointment of the petitioner as Deputy Registrar. THE Chancellor took the view that the Deputy Registrar and Assistant Registrar fall within the purview of the term "clerical staff" of the University and in view of Statute 6 of the Statutes framed under the Agra University Act, 1926 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) it was the Registrar and not the Executive Council of the University who could make appointment of the "clerical staff." He further held that the resolution of the Executive Council appointing the petitioner as Deputy Registrar was also invalid because the Executive Council did not invite the advice of the Finance Committee as contemplated by Section 18 (1-A) of the Act. THE appointment of the petitioner was found to be irregular by the Chancellor also on the ground that the Executive Council had not awaited the financial report of the Reorganisation Committee of the University. THE petitioner challenged this order of the Chancellor in this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4838 of 1972. A learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petition on 14th May, 1973. Aggrieved by that order the petitioner preferred Special Appeal No. 170 of 1973. A Division Bench of this Court dismissed the special appeal on 3rd September, 1973. 2. THEREAFTER another representation was made by Sanat Kumar to Chancellor against the appointment of the petitioner as an Assistant Registrar by the Executive Council by its resolution dated 28th May, 1971, mentioned above. The Chancellor again called for the comments of the University and the explanation of the petitioner and allowed this representation also by his order dated 22nd December, 1973. The petitioner's appointment as Assistant Registrar was set aside. The Chancellor again called for the comments of the University and the explanation of the petitioner and allowed this representation also by his order dated 22nd December, 1973. The petitioner's appointment as Assistant Registrar was set aside. The Chancellor reiterated his earlier view that the post of an Assistant Registrar came within the purview of "clerical staff" and appointment on this post could be made not by the Executive Council but by the Registrar and that since advice from the Finance Committee had not been taken by the Executive Council before appointing the petitioner as Assistant Registrar the appointment was illegal having been really made against a non-existent post. The Chancellor relied on the decision of this Court in the aforesaid Special Appeal No. 170 of 1973 mentioned above. On 29th December, 1973, the Registrar of the University passed a consequential order reverting the petitioner as Private Secretary to the Vice-Chancellor. It is these two orders which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. This writ petition came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court which was of the view that the decision in Special Appeal No. 170 of 1973 mentioned above required reconsideration and by an order dated 16th February, 19/8, referred the writ petition for decision by a larger Bench. It is thus that this writ petition has come up before this Bench. 3. IT was urged by counsel for the petitioner that neither the post of the Assistant Registrar nor the post of the Deputy Registrar fell within the purview of the terra "clerical staff" and that Statute 6 of the Statutes was consequently inapplicable. IT has not been asserted before us that even if the post of the Deputy Registrar came within the purview of the term "clerical staff" the post of the Assistant Registrar would stand on a different footing. IT is as such not disputed that either both posts would fall within the term "clerical staff" or none of them will fall within the said term. IT is as such not disputed that either both posts would fall within the term "clerical staff" or none of them will fall within the said term. The question which, therefore, arises for consideration is as to whether the post of an Assistant Registrar can be said to fall within the purview of the term "clerical staff" used in Statute 6 of Chapter X of the Statutes of the Agra University which reads : " The Registrar may, subject to the previous approval of the Vice-Chancellor, appoint, suspend, dismiss or otherwise punish the clerical staff and inferior servants of the University Office excluding the Confidential Section : Provided that in every case action taken in the exercise of such power shall be reported to the Executive Council and any person adversely affected may appeal to the Executive Council within one month. " 4. BEFORE dealing with this question, however, we consider it necessary to dispose of certain technical pleas raised by counsel for the petitioner. It was pointed out that on 22nd December, 1973, when the Chancellor allowed the representation of Sanat Kumar the Act had already been repealed by the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Ordinance, 1973, which was promulgated on 12th June, 1973, and came into force on 18th June, 1973, in pursuance of the relevant notification issued under sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Ordinance. This Ordinance was replaced by the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act 1973 which came into force on 2nd September, 1973. The aforesaid Ordinance and the Act shall hereinafter be referred to as the Ordinance and the 1973 Act respectively. On its basis it was urged that since on the date when the Chancellor passed the impugned order the Act including Section 35 under which the representation of Sanat Kumar had been made stood repealed no representation in the eye of law remained pending before the Chancellor which could be decided by the impugned order. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. Before considering the decided cases on the point it would be useful to refer to Section 6 (e) and Section 24 of the U. P. General Clauses Act. They read " 6. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. Before considering the decided cases on the point it would be useful to refer to Section 6 (e) and Section 24 of the U. P. General Clauses Act. They read " 6. Effect of repeal.-Where any Uttar Pradesh Act repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- (e) affect any remedy, or any investigation or legal proceeding commenced before the repealing Act shall have come into operation in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such remedy may be enforced and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be continued and concluded, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed." "24. Continuation of appointments, notifications, orders, etc., issued under enactment repealed and re-enacted. Where any enactment is repealed and re-enacted by an Uttar Pradesh Act, with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any appointment, or statutory instrument or form, made or issued under the repealed enactment shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any appointment, or statutory instrument or form made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted." In State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, AIR 1955 SC 84 it was held at page 88 : " Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out when there is repeal of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new law." The cruicial question which, in cases of repeal and re-enactment, arises for consideration is whether the repealing Act manifests an intention to destroy what is contained in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. In Indira Sohan Lal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, AIR 1956 SC 77 the view taken in the case of Mohar Singh (supra) was reiterated and on the language of sub-section (3) of Section 58 of Central Act 31, 1950, it was held that the said sub-section purported to indicate the effect of repeal both in negative and positive terms and that the said provision may well be taken to be self-contained and indicative of the intention to exclude the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. 5. IN Kalawati Devi v. INcome Tax Commissioner, AIR 1968 SC 162 the question which came up for consideration was whether on account of the repeal of the INcome Tax Act, 1922 and re-enactment of the INcome Tax Act, 1961, the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act were attracted or not. It was pointed out with reference to Section 297 (2) of the 1961 Act that by providing for so many matters mentioned therein, some in accord with what would have been the result under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and some contrary to what would have been the result under Section 6, Parliament has clearly evidenced an intention to the contrary. 6. IN INcome Tax Officer, Mangalore v. Damodar, AIR 1969 SC 408 the observations made in the case of Kalawati Devi (supra) were explained and interpreted. 6. IN INcome Tax Officer, Mangalore v. Damodar, AIR 1969 SC 408 the observations made in the case of Kalawati Devi (supra) were explained and interpreted. It was pointed out that the ratio of the decision in that case was that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will not apply in respect of these matters where Parliament had clearly expressed its intention to the contrary by making detailed provisions for similar matters mentioned in that section. In Baliah v. Rangachari, AIR 1969 SC 701 after referring to the earlier decisions in the cases of Kalawati Devi and Damodar it was pointed out that the Parliament had not made any detailed provision for the institution of the prosecutions in respect of the proceedings which were pending at the commencement of 1961 Act and that it, therefore, followed that the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act were applicable in the present case and the prosecution of the applicant under Section 52 of the 1922 Act was legally valid. Referring to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act it was held ;- " The principle of this section is that unless a different intention appears in the repealing Act, any legal proceeding can be instituted and continued in respect of any matter pending under the repealed Act as if that Act was in force at the time of repeal. In other words whenever there is a repeal of an enactment the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says a different intention appears in the repealing statute. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act but only for the purposes of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The question is not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act therefore will be applicable unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. The question is not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act therefore will be applicable unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new statute and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. In other words, the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is a simultaneous re-enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new statute." 7. IN view of the clear language contained in Sections 6 (e) and 24 of the U. P. General Clauses Act and the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above it is apparent that the representation which had been filed in the instant case by Sanat Kumar under section 35 of the Act prior to the Commencement of the Ordinance and the 1973 Act was to be decided by the Chancellor as if the repealing Ordinance or the 1973 Act had not been passed unless a different intention is shown in any of the provisions of either the Ordinance or the 1973 Act. 8. COUNSEL for the petitioner has in this connection brought to our notice the provisions of Section 74 of the 1973 Act. Having carefully gone through the provisions contained therein we find it difficult to take the view that they contain any such intention which may have the effect of abrogating the applicability of Section 6 (e) of the U. P. General Clauses Act. Reliance was placed by Counsel for the petitioner on State v. Jagamander Das, 1954 SC 683 where it was held :- " When a Statute is repealed or comes to an automatic end by efflux of time, no prosecution for acts done during the continuance of the repealed or expired Act can be commenced after the date of its repeal or expiry because that would amount to the enforcement of a repealed or a dead Act. In case of repeal of statutes this rule stands modified by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. In case of repeal of statutes this rule stands modified by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. An expiring Act however is not governed by the rule enunciated in that section." This case is apparently distinguishable.- Firstly, the instant one is not a case where the provisions of any Act came to an end by efflux of time. Secondly, in the case of Jagamander Das no prosecution under the Defence of India Act prior to its expiry on 30th September, 1946 had been initiated and no legal proceeding was pending which could be saved by the General Clauses Act. In the instant case as seen above the representation made by Sanat Kumar was of a date prior to the repeal of the Act and was pending when the new Act came into force. Indeed before the commencement of the Ordinance or the 1973 Act not only the representation of Sanat Kumar had been filed but even notice had already been issued by the Chancellor on 7th August, 1972, requiring the petitioner to give his explanation which shows that the Chancellor had even taken cognizance of the representation of Sanat Kumar. 9. RELIANCE was also placed by counsel for the petitioner on Qudarat Ullah v. Bareilly Municipality, AIR 1974 SC 396 . This case also is clearly distinguishable. That was a case where the question of applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act came up for consideration after the repeal of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, and the enactment of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Unlike the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, the Agra University Act, 1926, was not a temporary Act. Unlike the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, the Agra University Act, 1926, was not a temporary Act. Moreover, in the case of Qudrat Ullah (supra) it was also pointed out that even if it was assumed that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies, Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, on which reliance was placed had the effect of casting a procedural disability and not creating a substantive cause of action and that consequently the argument of any right in the defendant vested under Section 3 of the aforesaid Act being taken away did not hold good nor was there any foundation for the contention that the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, was being applied retrospectively. It would, however be useful to point out that in the case of Qudrat Ullah also it was reiterated in paragraph 18 that the consequences of a repeal provided for under Section 6 of the U. P. General Clauses Act shall apply unless a contrary intention appears from the repealing statute and that in case a contrary intention so appears from the repealing statute that shall prevail. 10. IN view of the foregoing discussion and in view of the fact that there is nothing either in the Ordinance or in the 1973 Act to indicate a contrary intention, we are of opinion that the provisions of Section 6 (e) of the U. P. General Clauses Act were applicable on the repeal of the Act and the representation filed by Sanat Kumar under the Act had to be decided by the Chancellor as if the repealing Act had not come into force and it is not possible to accept the submission made to the contrary by counsel for the petitioner. It was then urged by counsel for the petitioner that from a report of the officiating Registrar dated 30th April, 1971, made to the Vice-Chancellor which had been attached as Annexure 5 to the explanation of the petitioner sent to the Chancellor against the representation of Sanat Kumar it appeared that the officiating Registrar had made a suggestion that the petitioner who had gained considerable experience of the litigation work may be asked to takeover the charge of the new cell of 'legal affairs' with immediate effect and the 'research unit' should also be placed under him. It was urged that the said report indicated that the officiating Registrar was of the view that the petitioner deserved to be appointed as Assistant Registrar and consequently the appointment made by the Executive Council should be deemed to be in substantial compliance of Statute 6. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. Firstly, in that report what was stated was that since the petitioner was working as Private Secretary to the Vice-Chancellor, the grade of which post was at par with the grade of an Assistant Registrar, the status of the petitioner had been raised to that of an Assistant Registrar and that in view of his experience he may be asked to takeover the charge of the new cell of 'legal affairs' as also of the 'research unit'. There is nothing in the said report submitted by the officiating Registrar to the Vice-Chancellor so as to treat it as a recommendation to the Executive Council to appoint the petitioner as an Assistant Registrar. Secondly, even if there was any such recommendation it would not be a case of substantial compliance of Statute 6 which specifically contemplates that the appointments to the posts of 'clerical staff' were to be made by the Registrar. Recommendation cannot be treated at par with an order of appointment. 11. IT was then urged relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Nayagarh Co-op. Central Bank v. Narayan Rath, AIR 1977 SC 112 that since the Registrar had not raised any objection to the appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Registrar by the Executive Council he would be deemed to have acquiesced in his appointment and could not pass the impugned order dated 29th December 1973. We find it difficult to agree with this submission for several reasons. We find it difficult to agree with this submission for several reasons. The facts of the case of Narayan Rath (supra) were that appointment of Narayan Rath as Secretary of a cooperative bank was made in a meeting over which the Registrar of Cooperative Societies had himself presided. After thirteen years of the said appointment the Registrar issued an order disapproving the appointment of Narayan Rath as Secretary, in pursuance whereof his services were terminated. IT was held that since the meeting in which the appointment of Narayan Rath had been made was presided over by the Registrar himself and he allowed Narayan Rath to work as Secretary for more than thirteen years, it was not open to the Registrar to set aside his appointment after having acquiesced in it and after having, for all practical purposes, accepted the appointment as valid. Such are not the facts of the instant case. Here in the matter of appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Registrar by the Executive Council the Registrar of the Agra University cannot be said to have performed the same role as the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies had done in presiding over the meeting in which Narayan Rath had been appointed as Secretary of the Bank. Moreover, shortly after his appointment as Assistant Registrar the petitioner was appointed as Deputy Registrar and both these appointments were challenged before the Chancellor by Sanat Kumar. Further, the order dated 29th December, 1973, had not been passed by the Registrar on his own but had been passed as a consequence of the order dated 22nd December, 1973, passed by the Chancellor on the representation of Sanat Kumar. 12. COUNSEL for the petitioner then urged that the Executive Council is the chief executive body of the University and it has absolute power to make appointments of the officers and employees of the University and the fact that Statute 6 conferred power on the Registrar to make appointments of the clerical staff does not take away the power of the Executive Council to do so even if it was accepted that the post of the Assistant Registrar fell within the purview of the term 'clerical staff'. We find it difficult to agree with this submission either. Section 18 of the Act deals with the powers and duties of the Executive Council. We find it difficult to agree with this submission either. Section 18 of the Act deals with the powers and duties of the Executive Council. Clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 18, which is relevant, reads ;- "18. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the Statutes, the Executive Council shall have the following powers and duties, namely- (f) save as otherwise provided for by this Act and the Statutes, to appoint the officers, teachers of the University and other servants of the University, to define their duties and the conditions of their service and to provide for the filling of temporary vacancies in their posts; Even on a plain reading of clause (f) of Section 18 (1) referred to above it is apparent that the power of the Executive Council to make appointments referred to therein is hemmed in by the clause 'save as otherwise provided for by this Act and the Statutes'. Consequently clause (f) itself contemplates that the Executive Council had the power to make appointments referred to therein unless otherwise provided for either by some other provision of the Act or by the Statutes. If the Statutes make a provision conferring power of appointment on some authority or officer other than the Executive Council the power of the Executive Council in this regard would be subject to the provisions contained in the Statutes. Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that Statute 6 of Chapter X of the Statutes of the University as is apparent from the endorsement below the word 'Administration' in the beginning of Chapter X was made under Section 26 (c) of the Act. On its basis it was urged that since Section 26 (c) of the Act reads 'the appointment, powers and duties of the officers of the University'. Statute 6 was beyond the power conferred in this behalf by section 26 (c) of the Act inasmuch as the same did not make provision for appointment, powers and duties of the 'officers of the University' but made provision in regard to 'clerical staff and inferior servants' of the University. According to counsel for the petitioner statute 6 would have been valid only if it made provision in regard to the 'officers of the University'. According to counsel for the petitioner statute 6 would have been valid only if it made provision in regard to the 'officers of the University'. Even though a dispute has been raised as to whether Assistant Registrar falls within the purview of the term 'clerical staff' or is an 'officer of the University' it has not been contended by either party that the term 'inferior servants of the University' used in Statute 6 will include an officer referred to in Section 26 (c) of the Act. We are, however, not inclined to accept the submission made by counsel for the petitioner that simply because in the beginning of Chapter X the heading "Statutes made under Section 26 (c) of the Act" occurs after the word 'Administration' Statute 6 is to be treated beyond the power of framing Statutes conferred by Section 26 of the Act. The various clauses from (a) onwards of Sec 26 of the Act are not exhaustive as is apparent from the opening words of Section 26 which reads "Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Statutes may provide for any matter relating to the University and shall in particular provide for the following:" Section 26 gives the power to frame Statutes "for any matter relating to the University". It is settled law that if the source of power can be traced from a statutory provision the mere fact that the source of power has been misquoted will not invalidate the exercise of power. 13. AT this very place one more technical objection raised on behalf of the respondents may be dealt with. It was urged that since the Chancellor had passed the impugned order relying on the decision of a Division Bench of this court in Special Appeal No. 170 of 1973 it cannot be said that he had committed any manifest error of law. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. In Abdul Saeed v. State of U. P., 1968 AWR 398 a similar argument was raised and was repelled. It was held : "The flaw in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that the error is not required to be apparent to the authority which has committed the error or made an order. It may be that the view taken seemed justified on the strength of the decisions placed before the consolidation authorities. It was held : "The flaw in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that the error is not required to be apparent to the authority which has committed the error or made an order. It may be that the view taken seemed justified on the strength of the decisions placed before the consolidation authorities. Nevertheless, if that view appears clearly erroneous when the matter is placed before this court, the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked. It is only this Court which could, in fact, correct such an error as the Consolidation Authorities could not correct it even if the error in the view taken had been apparent to them. The authorities may be correct in following an erroneous decision, but this court has the jurisdiction and, indeed, the duty to rectify the error resulting from the erroneous view which was followed if the error in that view is patent." We are inclined, with respect, to agree with the view taken in this case. Further the basis for referring a case to a larger Bench has always been that it is felt by the Court that a decision taken by it earlier required reconsideration. 14. NOW we come back to the question as to whether Assistant Registrar can be said to fall within the purview of the term 'clerical staff' used in Statute 6. In this connection it would be useful to point out that no definition of the term 'clerical staff' in the 1926 Act or in the Statutes framed there under has been brought to our notice. Since the term 'clerical staff' has not been defined the interpretation to be put to this term is apparently not free from difficulty. Certainly it is not possible to take the view that there is any provision either in the Act or in the Statutes framed there under on the basis of which it may be said that Assistant Registrar falls within the term 'clerical staff'. At this place it may also be pointed out that even the term 'administrative staff' has not been defined either by the Act or by the Statutes. At this place it may also be pointed out that even the term 'administrative staff' has not been defined either by the Act or by the Statutes. The Division Bench which decided Special Appeal No. 170 of 1973 on 3rd September 1973, has pointed out that normally the distinction between these two categories of staff, namely, 'administrative staff' and 'clerical staff", is dependant upon the nature of the functions and duties appertaining to the posts in question. It was further pointed out that in the writ petition giving rise to the aforesaid special appeal there was not even a whisper as to what are the powers, duties and functions of the posts of Deputy Registrar and Assistant Registrar of the University. In the instant case, however, the position is different. Annexure 6 to the writ petition is copy of the comments of the petitioner to the representation made by Sanat Kumar. It gives a list of Assistant Registrars appointed in the Agra University right from the year 1928, shortly after the commencement of the Act, and further indicates that appointment to the post of Assistant Registrar has never been made by the Registrar but has consistently been made by the Executive Council. It also refers to the Hand-book of the University showing the post of Assistant Registrars under the heading "The Administrative Staff". It also refers to the Annual Budgets of the University placing the post of Assistant Registrars under the heading of Administrative Staff. 15. AN application dated 29th August, 1975, was filed in this writ petition along with an affidavit supporting the facts stated in the application. It also contains three ANnexures. ANnexure 1 is copy of a representation dated 3rd June, 1975, made by the petitioner to the Chancellor for review of his order dated 22nd June, 1972, whereby the petitioner's appointment as Deputy Registrar had been set aside. ANnexure 2 is a copy of the comments of the Registrar of the University to the aforesaid representation whereas ANnexure 3 is a copy of the Vice-Chancellor's letter forwarding the aforesaid representation to the Chancellor. The prayer contained in this application was that the facts stated therein along with ANnexures 1, 2 and 3 annexed to the accompanying affidavit may form part of the writ petition. This application was allowed on 31st October, 1975. The prayer contained in this application was that the facts stated therein along with ANnexures 1, 2 and 3 annexed to the accompanying affidavit may form part of the writ petition. This application was allowed on 31st October, 1975. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the affidavit accompanying the aforesaid application make a reference to the comments of the Registrar dated 6th June, 1975, on the representation of the petitioner dated 3rd June, 1975, and the forwarding letter of the Vice-Chancellor dated 12/14th June, 1975, respectively whereas parapraph 10 thereof reads as follows ; "10. That the essential facts which have been admitted by the University and as stated in the representation of the petitioner to the learned Chancellor are summarised as below : (i) That Chapter VIII of the First Statutes of the Agra University Hand-book at Item No. 6 regarding the Examinations Forms prescribed that the Vice-Chancellor will deal with the matter itself or would authorise any officer of the University to exercise his powers in this regard subject to any directions which he might have given. Ever since the First Statutes were made it is the Assistant Registrar/Deputy Registrar which have been assigned the aforesaid power by the Vice-Chancellor. This shows that the category of the Assistant Registrar and Deputy Registrar is not the clerical staff of the University but the officers of the University. Failing which they come within the category of "other servants of the University"-Administrative Staff of the University. (ii) The University itself wrote to the learned Chancellor in the Registrar's letter No. 23164 dated 7-2-1959 that the Deputy Registrars and the Assistant Registrars have been treated as Officers of the University. (iii) The Deputy Registrar/Assistant Registrars are members in many committees and sub-committees, and, therefore, they participate in deciding policies and other administrative affairs of the University. (iv) The Deputy Registrars/Assistant Registrars are empowered to exercise many powers otherwise vested with the Vice-Chancellor and to do other functions which cannot be regarded as clerical work". One more fact was stated in the aforesaid representation which reads ; "The Assistant Registrars/Deputy Registrars have been empowered since long to make entries in the Character Rolls of the Clerical Staff and inferior staff of the department under their control." 16. A counter-affidavit to the aforesaid affidavit was filed by the Registrar of the Agra University. Paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of this counter-affidavit are relevant. A counter-affidavit to the aforesaid affidavit was filed by the Registrar of the Agra University. Paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of this counter-affidavit are relevant. They read : "11. That the contents of paragraph 8 of the affidavit are admitted. It is submitted that the contents of my comments dated June 6, 1975, submitted to the Vice-Chancellor on the representation of the petitioner-applicant are based on the records of the University and are correct. 12. That the contents of paragraph 9 of the affidavit are admitted. It is submitted that the contents of the letter of the Vice-Chancellor dated June 12/14, 1975, addressed to the Chancellor are based on the records of the University and are correct. 13. That the contents of paragraph 10 of the affidavit are admitted. It may be submitted that the petitioner prior to his appointment as Assistant Registrar was drawing a salary of Rs. 490/- per month in the grade Rs. 300-800 and continued to draw the same salary in the same grade on 28-5-1971 (date of the appointment as Assistant Registrar) and thereafter. Hence the question of any financial implication being involved in the appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Registrar (Legal Affairs) did not arise at all. It is further submitted that the University in its revised budget had made a provision for the salary of the petitioner-applicant as Assistant Registrar (Legal Affairs) with effect from 18-4-1971 i. e. prior to the appointment of the petitioner-applicant." Shri B. D. Agarwala, counsel for the Agra University who has appeared for the Chancellor also, has stated before us that the facts stated in the aforesaid counter-affidavit of the Registrar of the Agra University are borne out by the records of the University and may be accepted in preference to the facts stated in the original counter-affidavit. He has made a further statement that it is not disputed that character roll entries used to be made by the Assistant Registrars in regard to officials of the department under their control. 17. He has made a further statement that it is not disputed that character roll entries used to be made by the Assistant Registrars in regard to officials of the department under their control. 17. IN K. P. Varghese v. INcome Tax Officer, Ernakulam, AIR 1981 SC 1922 it has been held ;- " These two circulars of the Central Board of Direct taxes are, as we shall presently point out, binding on the Tax Department in administering or executing the provision enacted in sub-section (2) but quite apart from their binding character, they are clearly in the nature of contemporanea expositio furnishing legitimate aid in the construction of sub-section (2). The rule of construction by reference to contemporanea expositio is a well established rule for interpreting a statute by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority, though it must give way where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. This rule has been succinctly and felicituously expressed in Crawford on Statutory Construction (1940 ed.) where it is stated in para 219 that "administrative construction (i. e. contemporaneous construction placed by administrative or executive Officers charged with executing a statute) generally should be clearly wrong before it is overturned; such a construction, commonly referred to as practical construction, although non-controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable weight; it is highly persuasive." The validity of this rule was also recognised in Baleshwar Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Dass, 1908 ILR 35 Cal. 701 where Mookerjee, J. stated the rule in these terms : " It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that courts in construing a statute will give much weight to the interpretation put upon it, at the time of its enactment and since, by those whose duty it has been to construe, execute and apply it" and this statement of the rule was quoted with approval by this Court in Deshbandhu Gupta and Co. v. Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd., (1979) 4 SCC 565 : AIR 1979 SC 1049 . It is clear from these two circulars that the Central Board of Direct Taxes, which is the highest authority entrusted with the execution of the provisions of the Act, understood sub-section (2) as limited to cases where the consideration for the transfer has been understated by the assessee and this must be regarded as a strong circumstance supporting the construction which we are placing on that sub-section." 18. IN Maxwell on INterpretation of Statutes Eleventh Edition the same principle has been stated at pages 296-297 in the following terms :- " It is obvious that the language of a statute must be understood in the sense in which it was understood when it was passed, and those who lived at or near the time when it was passed may reasonably be supposed to be better acquainted than their descendants with the circumstances to which it had relation, as well as with the sense then attached to legislative expressions. Moreover, the long acquiescence of the legislature in the interpretation put upon its enactment by notorious practice may, perhaps, be regarded as some sanction and approval of it. It often becomes, therefore, material to inquire what has been done under an Act, this being of more or less cogency, according to circumstances, in determining the meaning given by contemporaneous exposition." In view of what has been pointed out above the contemporaneous construction placed by the authorities and officers concerned of the Agra University charged with executing the provisions of the Act is entitled to considerable weight in interpreting the provisions of the Act for finding out as to whether the post of an Assistant Registrar fell within the purview of the clerical staff. They are in the nature of contemporance expositio and furnish legitimate aid in the construction of the provisions of the Act. As seen above on the admitted facts appointments of the post of an Assistant Registrar have from the very inception been made by the Executive Council. Further the post of the Assistant Registrar has been shown falling within the category of the 'Administrative Staff' in various documents of the University already referred to above. The nature of the duties of an Assistant Registrar as admitted in the counter-affidavit of the Registrar quoted above as also in the statement of the counsel for the respondents referred to above are mainly of supervisory nature even though an Assistant Registrar incidentally or for a fraction of the time has also to perform some clerical work. The nature of the duties of an Assistant Registrar as admitted in the counter-affidavit of the Registrar quoted above as also in the statement of the counsel for the respondents referred to above are mainly of supervisory nature even though an Assistant Registrar incidentally or for a fraction of the time has also to perform some clerical work. In Anand Bazar Patrika v. Its Workmen, 1969 (2) LLJ 670 it was held ;- " The principle which should be followed in deciding the question whether a person is employed in a supervisory capacity or on clerical work is that if a person is mainly doing supervisory work but incidentally or for a fraction of the time also does some clerical work, it would have to be held that he is employed in supervisory capacity, and conversely if the main work done is of clerical nature, the mere fact that some supervisory duties are also carried out incidentally or as a small fraction of the work done by him will not convert his employment as a clerk into one in supervisory capacity." 19. THERE is yet another circumstance which in our opinion is of significance. Even though the authorities and the officers charged with various duties under the Act have been consistently treating an Assistant Registrar as falling within the category of administrative staff and dealing with him in that manner for nearly 45 years neither the State Legislature nor the Chancellor intervened to provide that an Assistant Registrar fell within the purview of clerical staff and not Administrative staff. It is thus a case in which the State Legislature and the Chancellor seem to have agreed with the interpretation put upon the relevant provisions of the Act and the Statutes framed there under by the authorities concerned in regard to the nature of the post of an Assistant Registrar. 20. THERE is yet another vital circumstance which constitutes clear evidence of what the legislature has thought about the nature of the post of an Assistant Registrar. The dates on which the Ordinance and the 1973 Act came into force have already been stated above. The date of the judgment of this Court in Special Appeal No. 170 of 1973 holding that an Assistant Registrar fell within the category of clerical staff is dated 3rd September, 1973. The dates on which the Ordinance and the 1973 Act came into force have already been stated above. The date of the judgment of this Court in Special Appeal No. 170 of 1973 holding that an Assistant Registrar fell within the category of clerical staff is dated 3rd September, 1973. Shortly after the said judgment the State Legislature enacted the Uttar Pradesh State Universities (Re-enactment and Amendment) Act, 1974 (U. P. Act No. 29 of 1974) whereby an amendment was made in sub-section (2) of Sec. 17 of the 1973 Act. Before this amendment the relevant part of sub-section (2) of Section 17 read ; " (2) when any such service is created the persons then serving on the posts of Registrars, Deputy Registrars and Assistant Registrars, if confirmed before May 14, 1973, shall be absorbed in the service finally........." By the aforesaid amendment the word "administrative" was inserted after the words "when any such service is created the persons then serving on the" and before the words "posts of Registrars, Deputy Registrars and Assistant Registrars." It may be pointed out that May 14, 1973, occurring in subsection (2) of Section 17 is a date prior to the commencement of the Ordinance Act was still in force. In this context the use of the word "then" in subsection (2) of Section 17 of the Act assumes significance and it indicates that the State Legislature has been of the view that the post of even an Assistant Registrar under the Agra University Act, 1926, was an administrative post. The close sequence of the introduction of the word "administrative" in Section 17 (2) of the 1973 Act with the judgment of this Court in Special Appeal No. 170 of 1973 dated 3rd September, 1973, indicates that the amendment aforesaid was necessitated on account of the decision of this Court that the posts of Deputy Registrar and Assistant Registrar fell within the purview of the clerical staff. We have already pointed out that under the Agra University Act the position as to whether the post of an Assistant Registrar fell within the purview of clerical staff or the administrative staff was not clear but was ambiguous. In T. Manickam and Co. We have already pointed out that under the Agra University Act the position as to whether the post of an Assistant Registrar fell within the purview of clerical staff or the administrative staff was not clear but was ambiguous. In T. Manickam and Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1977 SC 518 it was held that an amendment which is by way of clarification of an earlier ambiguous provision can be useful aid in construing the earlier provision even though such amendment is not given retrospective effect. 21. IN Vice-Chancellor, Gorakhpur University v. Sheo Shanker Singh, Special Appeal No. 46 of 1975 decided on 10th March, 1975, a Division Bench of this Court held : - " So far as the Registrar's office is concerned the categories specified are clerical, technical, vocational and inferior staff. The Assistant Registrar cannot be said to be included in any of these categories. It appears that the Assistant Registrars are in the category of administrative staff." 22. IN Ahmed Hussain v. Aligarh University, Writ Petition no. 358 of 1970 the petitioner was a person who had been appointed on probation as Assistant Registrar. One of the questions which arose for consideration was whether a writ petition was maintainable by an employee of University which is a Statutory body on the ground that his services had been terminated or he had been reduced in rank in violation of the provisions of the Regulations framed by the University. The question was referred to a Full Bench and was decided by it on 24th August, 1973. It is true that the question as to what was the nature of the post held by an Assistant Registrar did not squarely come up for consideration before the Full Bench but in the body of the judgment there is an observation that "the petitioner is a member of the administrative staff." In view of the foregoing discussion we are of opinion that the post of an Assistant Registrar falls within the purview of the term "administrative staff" and not within the purview of the term "clerical staff" and find it difficult to agree with the view taken by a Division Bench of this court in Special Appeal No. 170 of 1973 mentioned above. 23. 23. COMING to the other ground on which the appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Registrar by the Executive Council has been held to be invalid by the Chancellor, namely, that the Finance Committee was not consulted by the Executive Council, we are of opinion that the appointment of the petitioner could not be set aside on this ground either. As seen above a similar view was taken by the Chancellor while setting aside the appointment of the petitioner as Deputy Registrar and his view was upheld by this court in Special Appeal no. 170 of 1973 mentioned above. The aforesaid view is based on Section 18 (1-A) of the Act. Clause (a) of this sub-section is relevant and for the sake of convenience it is being reproduced. It reads :- " A. The executive Council shall appoint a committee (hereinafter called the 'Finance Committee') consisting of five persons from amongst its members out of whom, at least two shall be persons not being in the service of the University or an affiliated college, to advise the Executive Council on matters relating to the administration of the property and funds of the University." 24. UNDER this sub-section the Executive Council is not to consult the Finance Committee but is to take its advice. Unless a contrary intention appears advice is normally not binding. In terms of degrees advice seems to stand on a weaker footing than consultation. Even in regard to consultation it has been held in State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal, AIR 1957 SC 912 with reference to Article 320 (3) (c) of the Constitution that the provision contained therein in regard to consultation with Public Service Commission were not mandatory and non compliance with those provisions did not afford a cause of action to a civil servant in a court of law. In taking this view reliance was placed upon a decision of the Privy Council in Montreal Street Fly Co. v. Normandin, 1917 SC 170 where it was observed as follows :- " .........The question whether provisions in a statute are directory or imperative has very frequently arisen in this country, but it has been said that no general rule can be laid down, and that in every case the object of the statute must be looked at. The cases on the subject will be found collected in Maxwell on Statutes, 5th ed. The cases on the subject will be found collected in Maxwell on Statutes, 5th ed. p. 596 and following pages. When the provisions of statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main objective of the Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them though punishable not affecting the validity of the acts done." In Lala Hazari Mal v. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1961 SC 200 it was held :- " The essence of the rule is that where consultation has to be made during the performance of a public duty and an omission to do so occurs, the action cannot be regarded as altogether void and the direction for consultation may be treated as directory and its neglect, as of no consequence to the result." The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Babu Ram, AIR 1961 SC 751 . 25. APPLYING the aforesaid principles to the facts of the instant case it would be seen that the petitioner had no control over the action of the Executive Council in consulting or not consulting the Finance Committee and consequently the submission made by counsel for the petitioner that the appointment made by the Executive Council could not be set aside merely on the ground that the Finance Committee had not been consulted by the Executive Council before making the appointment has substance. 26. IN holding that the petitioner's appointment as Assistant Registrar by the Executive Council was bad inasmuch as it had not consulted the Finance Committee, the Chancellor has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Special Appeal no. 540 of 1971 V. P. Kapoor v. The University of Roorkee, decided on 19th January, 1972. IN that case a question arose as to whether abolition by the Syndicate of the University of a post which according to the relevant rule could be abolished only after consulting the Academic Council and considering its recommendation was valid or not if it had been abolished without such consultation. IN that case a question arose as to whether abolition by the Syndicate of the University of a post which according to the relevant rule could be abolished only after consulting the Academic Council and considering its recommendation was valid or not if it had been abolished without such consultation. It was held that the abolition of the post was illegal. IN our opinion the facts of that case are distinguishable. There the Academic Council was a body constituted of various set of persons. IN the instant case, however, it would be seen that the Finance Committee is a small body of the Executive Council itself, its members being the members of the Executive Council. The petitioner in his reply to the representation made by Sanat Kumar had pointed out that the post of the Assistant Registrar (Legal Affairs) was created by the Executive Council in its meeting held on 18-4-1971 as a result of the report of the Reorganisation Committee dated 1-4-1971 which was adopted by the Executive Council vide its resolution no. 517 dated 18-4-1971 and that in the above mentioned meeting all the then five members of the Finance Committee were present and, therefore, the Executive Council automatically had an opportunity to seek their advice in the meeting itself. IN our opinion these circumstances clearly distinguish the instant case from the case of V. P. Kapoor (supra). Here it can be said with sufficient amount of justification that the provision of Section 18 (1-A) of the Act about taking the advice of the Finance Committee had been substantially complied with. As regards the view taken by the Chancellor that the appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Registrar was made on a non-existent post suffice it to refer to paragraph 13 of the counter-affidavit of the Registrar already quoted above which makes it clear that there was no impediment in the appointment of the petitioner on this score. In our opinion the appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Registrar could not, therefore, be set aside even on this ground. 27. IN the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order dated 22nd December, 1973, passed by the Chancellor as well as the consequential order dated 29th December, 1973, passed by the Registrar of the Agra University is quashed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.