Judgment Ramanujam, J.: The appellant herein entered service as Sub-Inspector of Police on 1-12-1962. He was later promoted as Deputy Inspector of Police on 3.2.1974. On 14.3.74 a charge memo was issued to him relating to certain delinquencies between 16-9-1971 and 6-2-1972, while the appellant was Sub-Inspector of Police at Manapparai. After receipt of a written explanation. the first oral enquiry was started on 30-4-1974 by one L.R.Nagaswami, Deputy Superintendent of Police. A supplemental charge memo was issued on 6.6.1974. While the enquiry was proceeding, the appellant was promoted as Inspector of Police on 5.8.1974. The oral enquiry, which was originally undertaken by L.R.Nagaswamy, was continued by one Thirumalai Nambi Deputy Superintendent of Police, Manapparai and that was continued till September 1975, when the enquiry was concluded. The minutes were drawn up by one L.R.Natarajan, Deputy Superintendent of Police. Manapparai, who did not conduct an oral enquiry at any stage. Based on the said minutes,- the appellant was issued a show cause notice by the D.I.G.Tirunel-veli on 12th July, 1976. The appellant made his representations to the effect that the D.S.P., who held the enquiry, did not draw up the minutes and therefore the entire disciplinary proceedings stood vitiated. This objection was upheld and the Inspector General of Police ordered Tirumalai Nambi to draw up a fresh minutes, who completed the enquiry. In pursuance of the said direction, Tirumalai Nambi drew up a fresh minutes on 28.3.1977. It was an exact reproduction of the earlier one drawn by L.R.Natarajan. Based on the said minutes dated 28.3.1977, a show cause notice was issued and the appellant made his representations on 18-4-1977. Thereafter D.I.G. (Food Cell), who is the disciplinary authority, passed final orders on 19-5-1977 enonerating the appellant of the charges framed against him. Thereafter on 25-9-1977 a show cause notice under rule 15-A of the Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeals) Rules, was issued by the second respondent herein to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. The appellant sought a copy of the rules and the detailed order passed by the D.I.G. exonerating him from the charges levelled against him. The appellant was supplied with the copy of the rules as well as the order of D.I.G. on 7.12.1977. The appellant sought a copy of the rules and the detailed order passed by the D.I.G. exonerating him from the charges levelled against him. The appellant was supplied with the copy of the rules as well as the order of D.I.G. on 7.12.1977. At this stage, the appellant filed a Writ Petition No.236 of 1978 seeking a writ of prohibition restraining the second respondent from passing an order under rule 15-A referred to above. The said writ petition came to be dismissed by Mohan, J. and the present writ appeal is filed questioning the correctness of the order of Mohan, J. 2. In this writ appeal, Mr.V.P.Raman, the learned counsel for the appellant has raised very many contentions. But we feel it unnecessary to deal with all the contentions raised by him. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant argued in detail that the second respondent being an appellate authority, against the order passed by D.I.G. (Food Cell), who has chosen to exonerate the appellant from all charges, cannot exercise the power of review and impose the punishment of dismissal from service as proposed by him. According to the learned Counsel, the power of review can be exercised only if the appellate authority is subordinate to the Head of the Department. It is not disputed that in this case the second respondent. Inspector General of Police, is the appellate authority over the orders passed by the D.I.G. (Food Cell), who has passed the final order exonerating the appellant from all the charges levelled against him. The question is whether in these circumstances, the second respondent can invoke the power under rule 15-A of the Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. Inspector General of Police, is the appellate authority over the orders passed by the D.I.G. (Food Cell), who has passed the final order exonerating the appellant from all the charges levelled against him. The question is whether in these circumstances, the second respondent can invoke the power under rule 15-A of the Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. Rule 15-A, which was in force at the relevant time is as follows: “15-A (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules: (i) the State Government or (ii) the Head of the Department directly under the State Government in case of a Government servant serving in a department or office, under the control of such Head of the Department or; (iii) the appellate authority, within six months from the date of the order proposed to be reviewed: or (iv) any other authority, specified in this behalf of the State Government by a General or Special order, and within such time as may be prescribed in such general or special order may, at any time; either on their or its own motion or otherwise, call for the records and inquire and review any order made under these rules, after consultation with the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, where such consultation is necessary and may, (a) confirm, modify or set aside the order, or (b) confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order, or impose any penalty, where no penalty has been imposed; or (c) remit the case to the authority, which made the order or to any other authority, directing such authority to make such further inquiry, as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case; provided that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by any reviewing authority unless the Government servant concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation against the penalty proposed, where it is proposed to impose any of the penalties specified in Clauses (d), (e), (f), (i) and (j ) of rule 2 or to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be reviewed to any of the penalties specified in those clauses, no such penalty shall be imposed except after an inquiry in the manner laid down in sub-rule. (b) of rule 3 and after giving a reasonable opportunity to the Government servant concerned of showing cause against the penalty proposed on the evidence adduced during the inquiry and except after consultation with the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, where such a consultation is necessary: Provided further that no power of review shall be exercised by the Head of the Department, unless; (i) the authority which made the order (in appeal) or (ii) the authority to which an appeal would lie where no appeal has been preferred, is subordinate to him; (2) No proceeding for review shall be commenced until after, (i) the expiry of the period of limitation for an appeal or (ii) the disposal of the appeal, where any such appeal has been preferred. (3) an. application for review shall be dealt with in the (4) same manner as if it were an appeal under these rules.” The power of review under the above rule can be exercised by 4 authorities; (1) The State Government, (2) the Head of the Department; (3) the Appellate authority; and (A) any other authority specified in this behalf by the State Government by a general order or a special order. But the power of review given to the Head of the department is, however, subject to a restriction under the proviso to the rule. The proviso says that no power of review shall be exercised by the Head of the department unless the appellate authority, which had passed the appellate order or the authority to which an appeal would be preferred against the original order is subordinate to him. The second respondent herein is the Head of the Department and he has also happened to be the appellate authority. As the appellate authority in this case is not subordinate to the Head of the Department, the former cannot exercise the power of review under the said proviso. 5. According to the learned Government Pleader, the said proviso can apply only when the Head of the department and the appellate authority are different. But we do not see any reason to limit the operation of the proviso as suggested by the Learned Government Pleader. The proviso is specific and it says that if the authority to which an appeal would lie is not subordinate to the Head of Department, then the latter cannot exercise the power of review. But we do not see any reason to limit the operation of the proviso as suggested by the Learned Government Pleader. The proviso is specific and it says that if the authority to which an appeal would lie is not subordinate to the Head of Department, then the latter cannot exercise the power of review. Admittedly any order passed by the D.I.G. (Food Cell) is appealable to the second respondent, who happens to be the Head of the department. Thus the appellate authority is not sub-ordinate to the Head of the department, both the powers that is the power of Head of the Department and the appellate authority having vested in the same person. In such a case, the proviso prohibits the head of the department from exercising the power of suo motu review. Thus the proviso to rule 15-A stands in the way of the second respondent exercising his suo motu ‘review power under that rule as he happens to be the appellate authority, in the case in which he proposes to exercise the power of suo moto review. Thus the show-cause notice issued by the second respondent proposing to exercise the power of review under rule 15-A of the rules should be taken to be without jurisdiction. It is significant to note that the learned Judge while passing the order under appeal has not considered the scope and ambit of rule 15-A under which the second respondent proposed to exercise his power of review. It appears that this point was not urged before the learned Judge and the same was urged for the first time before us. However having regard to the fact that the point urged is a purely legal point arising out of an interpretation of a statutory provision, we heard both the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Government pleader for the respondents on this point. 6. In the result the order of the learned single Judge is set aside and the appeal is allowed. Writ of Prohibition will issue. There will no order as to costs. 7. We make it clear that in view of our above decision, we are not expressing our opinion on the other points raised in the writ appeal. Appeal allowed.