JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - The petitioners 1 and 2 are both engaged in the business of purchasing paddy and manufacturing and selling rice within the limits of Jasrana in the town area of Mainpuri. The town area of Mainpuri has been declared by the State Government under the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Adhiniyam') as the principal market yard of the market area of Mainpuri while Jasrana has been notified by the State Government under the Adhiniyam as a sub-market yard of Mainpuri. By means of this petition, the petitioners have challenged the imposition and levy of market fee on them by the Mandi Samiti on the ground that the market fee being realised by the Bandi Samiti from the traders does not bear any relation to the services being rendered by the mandi Samiti, It is contended by them that the respondent Mandi Samiti is. in fact. not. rendering any service to the petitioners or others within the sub-market yard of Jasrana and consequently it is not entitled to recover market fee from them. 2. Having heard learned counsel for the parties. we find no merit in the above contention. In the counter-affidavit which has been filed on behalf of the respondent Mandi Samiti it has been asserted that while it has collected so far a sum of Rs. 1.88.227.00 as market-fee on the transactions of sale and purchase made within the sub-market yard of Jasrana. it has spent a sum of Rs. 80.417.00 on the various services being rendered to the traders within the market yard in question. It is stated in the counter-affidavit that the Mandi Samiti has made provision for supply of drinking water to the purchasers, sellers, traders and others engaged in the business of transactions of sale and purchase of specified agricultural produce within the sub-market yard. It is also providing lighting facilities by arranging for petromax at the purchasing centre, besides providing shieves for washing the agricultural produce brought within the market yard for sale. In addition, tents and shelters have been provided by the Mandi Samiti. On the purchase of these various items, the Mandi Samiti claims to have spent a sum of Rs. 50.000.00. Further. In addition, tents and shelters have been provided by the Mandi Samiti. On the purchase of these various items, the Mandi Samiti claims to have spent a sum of Rs. 50.000.00. Further. the Mandi Samiti has constructed link roads and culverts and placed kharanja on these link roads which connect the sub-market yard with the main road through which the agricultural produce and other articles are brought within the sub-market yard for the transaction of sale and purchase. It is claimed that prior to the construction of the link road by the Mandi Samiti, the arrivals of agricultural produce in the sub-market yards used to be only around 5,000 quintals per year. As a result of the construction of the roads, however, the arrivals have gone up to 49.000 quintals. Mandi Samiti has further resolved to purchase land for "construction of sub -market yard at Jasarana for which land has already been selected and proposals submitted to the Government on 24-9-1976 for the acquisition of 4.41 acres of land. A provision of a sum of Rs. 1.35,000.0( has been made in its budget for the purpose of acquisition of that land. It is stated that the matter has been finalised and the land is going to be acquired very soon for the construction of a new market complex in the sub-market yard. 3. The break-up of various items of expenditure mentioned above has been disclosed in annexures I and 2 to the counter-affidavit. 4. For the petitioners it was vehemently contended that the amount spent by the respondent Mandi Samiti over I the construction of approach roads and culverts could not be taken into consideration in adjudging the validity of' the market fee inasmuch as the constructions fell outside the sub-market yard. Relying on 'a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Messrs, Janata Rice and General Mills v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti. Haldawani rendered on 28-1-1983. learned counsel submitted that i, is only the amount spent over raising of constructions in the particular market yard or sub-market yard in which market fee is being imposed which can be legitimately taken into account. Any amount which may have been spent over construction falling outside the market yard or sub-market yard has to he ignored and cannot be pleaded in justification of a market fee being levied within the market yard or sub-market yard. 5. Any amount which may have been spent over construction falling outside the market yard or sub-market yard has to he ignored and cannot be pleaded in justification of a market fee being levied within the market yard or sub-market yard. 5. We are unable to accept the above contention. In the case of Janta Rice and General Mills (supra) the Division Bench was considering the validity of a market fee which was challenged on the ground that there was no element of quid pro quo between the market-fee being realised by the Mandi Samiti and the services being rendered by it within that market yard. The respondent mandi Samiti sought to justify the imposition by referring to an item of expenditure said to have been incurred by it over the construction of another marketing centre at Mainpuri which. though fell within the market area in question. was beyond the limits of the market yard or sub-market yard of Bhogaon within which the market-fee in question was being realised. The Division Bench held that such an expenditure could not he validly pleaded in justification of the fee as it was not relatable to any amenities being provided within the market yard or sub-market yard. The market yard at Mainpuri was far removed from Bhogaon. It was further observed that from the provisions of the Act and the principles laid down in the case of Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1980 SC 1008 . it was clear that an amount spent over raising of constructions beyond the market yard or sub-market yard within which the market fee was being levied could not in law be taken into account. The Division Bench itself. however, hastened to make an exception in the case of construction of approach roads. etc., as was pointed out in Kewal Krishan Puri's case (supra). 6. It is thus apparent that even according to the Division Bench amounts spent towards construction of approach roads. etc. could be taken into consideration in determining whether the element of quid pro quo is present. 7. The above controversy, however. etc., as was pointed out in Kewal Krishan Puri's case (supra). 6. It is thus apparent that even according to the Division Bench amounts spent towards construction of approach roads. etc. could be taken into consideration in determining whether the element of quid pro quo is present. 7. The above controversy, however. need not detain us further as 'even in the case of Kewal Krishan Puri, AIR 1980 SC 1008 (supra) the Supreme court itself ruled that an expenditure over construction of approach roads and even culverts and bridges within a 'limited limit' with a view to facilitate trading activities or transactions of purchase and sale within the market yard or sub-market yard was permissible. In the present case the Mandi Samiti has amply demonstrated that the approach road (which connects the market yard with the main road) as well as the culverts constructed by it directly facilitated trading activities taking place within the market and consequently the expenditure incurred over the same falls within the principle of 'expenditure within the limited limit' spelled out by the Supreme Court in Kewal Krishan Puri's case t supra). 8. In this connection. the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in AIR 1983 SC 1246 , must he noticed here as. in our opinion. the same completely revolutionises the thinking on the subject. Their Lordships reviewed the entire existing law on the subject. including their decision in Kewal Krishan Puri's case, AIR 1980 SC 1008 and ruled that the traditional view that there must he an actual quid pro quo for the fee has undergone a sea of change subsequent to the decision in Kewal Krishan Puri's case. The Supreme Court observed that the co-relationship between the levy and services rendered/expected is one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude and that all that is necessary to he proved is that there should he a reasonable co-relationship between the levy of the fee and the services rendered. There is no generic difference, between a tax and a fee. Both are compulsory executions of money by public authorities. A levy in the nature of fee does not cease to he so merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it. There is no generic difference, between a tax and a fee. Both are compulsory executions of money by public authorities. A levy in the nature of fee does not cease to he so merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it. nor is it a postulate of a fee that it must have a direct relation to the actual service rendered by the authority to each individual who obtains the benefit of the service. 9. Following the dictum of the Supreme Court in the case of Sreenivasa General Traders, AIR 1983 SC 1246 (supra) we hold that the respondent Mandi Samiti has satisfactorily proved that there is reasonable co-relationship between the levy of the fee and the services being rendered by it. The approach roads and the culverts constructed by the respondent Mandi Samiti have been of direct use and benefit to the trading community at large engaged in the business of purchase and sale within the sub-market yard of Jasrana as the same connect the sub-market yard with the main road. Indeed. the respondent Mandi Samiti have successfully demonstrated that the volume of business has gone up many-fold since the construction of the approach roads. The benefit to the traders through these approach roads and culverts is direct and immediate. It is not remote or incidental. The amount spent over the roads and culverts thus can be taken into consideration in judging the validity of the imposition. 10. 'Even if, therefore, we exclude the amount set apart by the respondent Mandi Samiti for acquiring land for the construction of a marketing complex, the amounts spent by the respondents over other services are sufficient to justify the impost in question. The amount spent over the construction of approach roads, culverts and placing Kharanjas on the link roads itself works out to more than Rs. 3,00,000/- (vide annexure 2 to the counter-affidavit) which is far more than the amount collected by the Mandi Samiti as marked-fee. 11. In this view, it is not necessary to consider in detail another submission of the petitioners, namely, that the amount set apart by the respondents for acquisition of land for the construction of a marketing complex within the sub -market Yard cannot be taken into consideration. 11. In this view, it is not necessary to consider in detail another submission of the petitioners, namely, that the amount set apart by the respondents for acquisition of land for the construction of a marketing complex within the sub -market Yard cannot be taken into consideration. In support of this contention, learned counsel mainly relied upon certain observations made by the Division Bench in Janta Rice and General Mills case (supra). The Division Bench rejected the claim of the Mandi Samiti in regard to a proposal to acquire land and the money which was proposed to be spent in connection therewith on the short ground that sufficient particulars had not been placed before the Court. In the present case, however, we find that the respondent Mandi Samiti has discharged that burden. It has made concrete assertions in support of its claim in this behalf and we are satisfied that upon the facts of the present case the amount ear -marked by the respondent Samiti for acquisition of the land in question can be taken into consideration in judging the validity of the imposition. 12. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. The interim orders are hereby vacated.