An order of discharge in a case under Section 303/201/34 passed by the Addl. Deputy Commissioner on 26.6.78 has brought the State of Meghalaya before this court by invoking Rule 22 (2) of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Garo Hills District (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) and/ or Rule 4 of the Assam High Court Order, 1948, and/or Article 227 of the Constitution of India. A preliminary objec­tion has been raised by Shri Choudhury for the opposite parties on the question of maintainability of the petition. He contends that under Rule 22 (2) of the Rules revisional power can be invoked only against any sentence. To this effect is the decision of this court in Criminal Revision No. 144/72 Thoking Momin vs. Vaiking Sangma disposed of on 25.5.73. This position has not been disputed before me by learned Public Prosecutor, Meg­halaya. He, however, first submits that Rule 4 of the Assam High Court Order, 1948 has conferred jurisdiction on this court to entertain the petition. A reference to that order shows that this court was clothed with all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as was being exercised by the High Court in Calcutta, or by the Governor of Assam exercising the function of the High Court. So, to enable the petitioner to take recourse to this provision to approach this court, it has to be shown that the power was being exercised, when the aforesaid, order was passed, either by the High Court in Calcutta or by the Governor of Assam. To that effect however nothing has been placed before me. As the power of Governor was traceable to Rule 22 (2) of the Rules, as submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor, invocation of the revisional power in the present case is not permissible because of the aforesaid decision of this Court. 2. It is therefore next contended by the learned counsel that Article 227 gives ample jurisdiction to this court to examine the matter at hand. That this article has conferred power of judicial superintendence also is not disputed before me, and rightly. Reference may be made in this connection to a decision of this court in Civil Revision No. 14/73 Gerela Koch vs. Dom Koch, disposed of on 27.6.73. That this article has conferred power of judicial superintendence also is not disputed before me, and rightly. Reference may be made in this connection to a decision of this court in Civil Revision No. 14/73 Gerela Koch vs. Dom Koch, disposed of on 27.6.73. As to the ambit of this power, the learned Public Prosecutor refers to Trimbak vs. Ramchandra, AIR 1977 SC 1222 , in para 3 of which it is stated that when an order of a tribunal is violative of the fundamental basic principles of justice and fairplay or where a patent error in procedure or in law has crept in or where the order passed results in manifest injustice, power under Article 227 can be invoked. Shri Choudhury however contends that this power cannot be so exercised as to circumvent a provision of law. He relies on Jagir Singh vs. Ranbir Singh, AIR 1919 SC 381, a case in which it was suggested that the High Court was appro­ached under Article 227 of the Constitution against a revisional order of the Sessions Judge. Reference was made in this context to Section 397 (3) Cr. P. C. which has stated that a second approach to a revisional court is barred. It was then stated that as, the statute banned exercise of revisional power by the High Court, it would require "very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution, since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law". So, it is not the ratio of this decision, that power in Article 227 cannot be used in any circumstances even in such a situation. As in the Rules there is no provision for revision against an order of the present nature, an aggrieved party, and that too the State, which represents the larger interest of the society in such a matter, cannot be left without a remedy. A right without a remedy is, as has been stated, like a writ in the water. As there is no specific bar in the Rules to entertain such a matter, it cannot be said, in any case, that the power under Article 227 is being exercised in contravention of any provision of the Rules. If a provision exists, it is submitted that power under Article 227 may not be invoked because of the alternative remedy. As there is no specific bar in the Rules to entertain such a matter, it cannot be said, in any case, that the power under Article 227 is being exercised in contravention of any provision of the Rules. If a provision exists, it is submitted that power under Article 227 may not be invoked because of the alternative remedy. If such a remedy does not exist, it is contended that the power of judicial superintendence may not be exercised because it would then circumvent the statutory provision. In what situation then, power could' be exercised under Article 227? Would the above thinking not make Article 227 nugatory? 3. Because of all the above, I would think that an order of discharge can be questioned under Article 227 of the Consti­tution. It may be pointed out here that as the impugned order was passed by the Addl. Deputy Commissioner, Rule 21 of the Rules is out of hand, as it allows appeal against the decision of Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner. The availability of the power however does not mean that it would be exercised lightly or in a cavalier fashion. It has to be used in exceptional circum­stances and for the ends of justice. Here again it cannot be confined merely to want of jurisdiction, as is submitted by Shri Choudhury, because, as stated in Trimbak case (supra) this power can be unsheathed when the order passed suffers from patent error of law or results in manifest injustice or when the same is in violation of fundamental basic principles of justice. 4. It is well known that a discharge can be ordered only f when the court is satisfied that there is no prima-facie case; or to put it differently, if the evidence were to stand un-rebutted even then no conviction would follow. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the learned trial court has discharged by placing reliance mainly on the post mortem report. I have peru­sed the same and on the basis of the findings recorded therein it cannot be said conclusively that the case at hand was one of suicide. The doctor who had done the autopsy has himself failed to give definite opinion in this regard. I am, therefore, satis­fied that discharge on the basis of the post mortem report was an apparent error of record. The doctor who had done the autopsy has himself failed to give definite opinion in this regard. I am, therefore, satis­fied that discharge on the basis of the post mortem report was an apparent error of record. It, however, appears, as pointed out by Shri Choudhury, which is not controverted by the learned Public Prosecutor, that in so far as the opposite perties No. 3 and 4 are concerned, there is the solitary statement of one Emeladul Haque that the dead body of Anowar was taken to a ring well and there these opposite parties were called. On the basis of this statement alone, it cannot even be held prima-facie that opposite parties 3 and 4 had any part to play in causing the death of Anowar or in shielding the offenders. 5. The petition is therefore partly allowed. The impugned order is set aside, but only as regards opposite parties No. 1 and 2. The two other opposite parties, namely Sofatullah Sheikh and Mominran Bibi will remain discharged.