Judgment S. J. Hyder, J. One Ramjanam Singh was a tenant of about 30.76 acres of land situated in Bhandari, P.S. Mahiganwa, in the district of Palamau. His only son Faujdar Singh died during his life time. Faujdar Singh was married to Nagbali Kuer. When ramjanam Singh died in the year 1944 he left behind his widow, Dhanraj Kuer, and nagbali Kuer as his only heirs. Rmjanam Singh had two daughters also. One of these daughters died issueless during the life time of Ramjanam Singh. The other daughter is Pranjit Kuer, who was married to one Rambriksh of village sibandh in the district of Palamau. At the time of death of Ramjanam Singh. Nagbali Kure was a minor. Ram Janam Singh had also a step-brother, named, Bhagwan Singh. This Bhagwan Singh made attempts to grab the property left behind by Ramjanam Singh. Dhanraj Kure acting on her own behalf and as guardian of her daughter-in-law, Nagbali Kuer, executed a sale Deed in the year 1945 in favour of the brothers of the Plaintiff/respondent, Dharamdeo Singh and Alakhdeo Singh. Plaintiff/respondent had a 4th brother whose name was Nawzadin Singh. The quonndum Zamindar filed a suit for arrears of rent against Dhramdeo Singh and Alakhdeo and obtained a decree, In execution of the said money decree, the land in dispute which has an area of about 3.76 acres was sold at a Court auction and was purchased by the plaintiff/respondent who obtained possession in pursuance of the said auction-sale on August, 22, 1951. On June, 7, 1962, Nagbali Kure purported to transfer her half share in the estate of Ram janam Singh in favour of the defendant/appellant by means of a registered sale deed. On July, 31, 1962, the plaintiff respondent and his three brothers and defendant/appellant executed a Sulehanama. By means of this document, Plaintiff/respondent and his brothers gave up their claim in respect of the land in dispute in favour of the defendant/appellant in the present Second Appeal, where as, defendant/appellant relinquished all his rights under the Sale Deed dated June 7, 1962 in respect of the remaining portion of the land which originally belonged to Ramjanam Singh. There is not controversy between the parties with regard to the facts stated above. 2. Plaintiff/respondent, thereafter, commenced the suit in the court of Munsif, Palamau at Daltonganj on 1.7.1965. There is not controversy between the parties with regard to the facts stated above. 2. Plaintiff/respondent, thereafter, commenced the suit in the court of Munsif, Palamau at Daltonganj on 1.7.1965. It was inter alia contended by him that Sulehnama dated July, 31, 1962 had been obtained from him by the defendant/appellant by means of coercion and threats and was not binding upon him. In the plaint the facts stated in the first paragraph of the judgment were recited. According to the Plaintiff/respondent, Dhanraj Kuer feared danger to her life and property on account of the misdeeds of Bhagwan Singh who was falsely laying claim to the land left behind by Ramjanam Singh. It was alleged that faced with this situation, Dhanraj Kuer had no other alternative left, but to execute a Sale deed of the entire land left behind by Ramjanam Singh in favour of the plaintiffs’ brothers Dharmdeo Singh and Alakhdeo singh. Plaintiff/respondent contended that Sulehnama dated July 31, 1962 had not been acted upon and was in consequence a dead letter. He accordingly claimed relief for declaration of his title and sought confirmation of his possession over three acres and odd of the disputed land. In the alternative, he prayed that possession of the land in dispute may be given back to him. 3. The suit was contested by the defendant/appellant. It was asserted by him that Nagbali Kuer being admittedly a minor, her share could not have been transferred by her mother-in-law Dhanraj Kuer. It was averred by defendant/appellant that Nagbali Kuer had a subsisting title to the extent of half in the lands left behind by Ramjanam Singh and she had rightly executed a sale deed of the same in favour of defendanr/appellant on June 7, 1962. It was denied by the defendant/appellant that any threat was held out by him in obtaining the Sulehnama dated July 31, 1962. He further asserted that the compromise deed dated July 31, 1962 was binding between the parties interse. Certain other pleas were also raised by the defendant/appellant which I do not consider necessary to recount. 4. Both the courts below have come to a concurrent finding that no coercion or threat was exercised by the defendant/appellant in obtaining the document dated July 31, 1962. It has been held that the same with their free will without any pressure. Certain other pleas were also raised by the defendant/appellant which I do not consider necessary to recount. 4. Both the courts below have come to a concurrent finding that no coercion or threat was exercised by the defendant/appellant in obtaining the document dated July 31, 1962. It has been held that the same with their free will without any pressure. It has been held by the two courts that the sale deed executed by Dhanraj Kuer in favour of Alakhdeo Singh and Dharmdeo Singh on December, 6, 1945, was a valid document. They have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff/respondent acquired good title to the land in dispute by virtue of the court auction held in execution of the decree for arrears of rent. They have also held that Plaintiff/respondent and his brothers have been in possession of the land in-dispute from December, 6, 1945. According to the said courts the compromise deed dated July, 31, 1962, was without consideration the case so far his exercise of under influence in obtaining the document dated July, 31, 1962 was concerned, he has succeeded in obtaining the reliefs prayed for. The correctness of the finding recorded by the court below have been challenged before me in this Second Appeal. 5. Before entering into the merits of this second appealed against may be noted. It has been pressed upon me by the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit itself was barred by limitation. In order to appreciate this submission, certain additional facts may be stated here. 6. The plaint was originally presented in the court of Munsif, Palamau at Daltonfanj, on July 1, 1965. By an order dated May 7, 1968, the learned Munsif came to the conclusion that the suit was not maintainable as he had no jurisdiction to try the same. He accordingly directed that the plaint may be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the appropriate court. The plaintiff/respondent thereupon applied for return of the plaint and an order directing the return of the plaint was passed on May 27, 1968. The plaint was presented before the learned subordinate Judge, Palamau, on 1.6.1968. 7. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant that the suit impugning the validity of the compromise deed dated July 31, 1962, could only be instituted within three years from that date. The plaint was presented before the learned subordinate Judge, Palamau, on 1.6.1968. 7. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant that the suit impugning the validity of the compromise deed dated July 31, 1962, could only be instituted within three years from that date. He submitted that date of the presentation of the plaint before the Subordinate Judge is relevant for computation of time and the period during which the suit remained pending in the court of Munsif should be ignored. It was further pointed out by the learned counsel that in compromise deed itself the valuation of the land is mentioned as Rs. 5500/- and the plaintiff/respondent had valued the suit only at a sum of Rs. 2000/- in the court of Munsif which was a gross understatement. According to the learned counsel, the plaintiff cannot avail of the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act, as he was not prosecuting the suit before the court of Munsif bonafide. In support of this, learned counsel has relied on a decision in the case of Ramchandra Singh vs. Bibi Khadal Jatul Kubra 1. The submission of the learned compromise deed dated July 31, 1962, was in respect of the entire plots measuring 30 acres and odd. The valuation of all these plots which was taken into account when it was stated in the document dated July 31, 1962 the subject matter of the compromise was of a value of Rs. 5500/- In the instant case, we are, however, concerned with an area of 3 acres and odd only. As to what was the value of the area is not clear from the compromise deed. Plaintiff/respondent might have bonafide thought that he was within his rights in valuing the suit plot at Rs. 2000/- It cannot, therefore, be said that institution of the suit in the Court of the Munisf was not bonafide. The preliminary submission urged on behalf of the defendant/appellant is, therefore, overrule. 8. The substantial question, however, is with regard to the compromise deed dated July 31, 1962. In the said document the facts concerning the property left behind by Ramjanam Singh are clearly stated. As already pointed out, the two courts have concurrently found that the said document was executed by the parties out of their own free will, without any force, undue influence or coercion. In the said document the facts concerning the property left behind by Ramjanam Singh are clearly stated. As already pointed out, the two courts have concurrently found that the said document was executed by the parties out of their own free will, without any force, undue influence or coercion. The two court below, have however, examined the correctness of the claim of the defendant/appellant and have come to the conclusion that Nagbali Kuer had no right to execute the sale deed dated June 7, 1962. It was in this view of the matter, that the courts below came to the conclusion that the compromise deed dated July 31, 1962 was without consideration and have decreed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent. 9. That law in connection with agreement entered into on the supposition of the existence of a doubtful right is not in doubt and has been settled by a long series of decisions. It has always been held that an agreement of this nature is binding upon the parties. The existence of a doubtful right itself is considered to be a good consideration for such an agreement. What then is the meaning which is to be given to the expression “doubtful right”? 10. The two court below appear to have laboured under the delusion that this expression is equivalent to their reasoning only such right which actually exists is capable of being resolved by means of a compromise. This approach is wholly incorrect and cannot be sustained. Of course, right can only be on one side and when a court proceeds to decide about the existence of that right, it has to find either in favour of the plaintiff or against the defendant. However, the word right, is prefixed with the word “doubtful”. It cannot be said that existence of doubtful right has been concluded by an agreement unless such right is actually found in favour it is ultimately adjudged. Avoidance of litigation which is always uncertain and a time consuming is itself a consideration for the recognition give under an agreement to a doubtful right. In my opinion, the consideration for the recognition give under an agreement to a doubtful right. In my opinion, the courts below have approached the case from a totally incorrect stand point. Avoidance of litigation which is always uncertain and a time consuming is itself a consideration for the recognition give under an agreement to a doubtful right. In my opinion, the consideration for the recognition give under an agreement to a doubtful right. In my opinion, the courts below have approached the case from a totally incorrect stand point. They have first proceeded to investigate title of the conclusion that the transfer or of the defendant/appellant had no legally enforceable right and as such the transfer of the land in question was invalid. A Division Bench of this court in Jagdam Sahai Vs. Roopnarain Mahto 2 following the dictum in Con Vs. Con 3 has been quoted with approval :-“An agreement entered into upon a supposition of right or of a doubtful right, though it after words comes out that the right was on the other side, shall be binding and the right shall not prevail against the agreement of the parties; for the right must always be on one side or the other and, therefore the compromise of a doubtful right is sufficient foundation of an agreement.” In Jagdam Sahai’s case (Supra), the Division Bench of this Court has reviewed a large number of cases in which the same proposition has been upheld. A full Bench of this Court in Harihar Prasad vs. Kesho Prasad 4 has followed the above proposition. Mullick, J. speaking for the court approved of the dictum of the House of Lords in Stapilton Vs. Stapilton 5 and observed that ‘an agreement entered into upon a supposition of a right or of a doubtful right shall be binding on the parties.’ In order to make the position beyond doubt. Mullick, J, further observed that the compromise of a doubtful right is a sufficient foundation for an agreement.’ Cases bearing on this question can be multiplied, but I do not think it necessary to do so. 11. Irrespective of the question as to whether Nagbali Kuer could transfer her share in favour of the defendant/appellant, the existence of sale deed executed by her on June 7, 1962, is not in doubt. The sale Deed has given effect to, though in a restricted form, in the compromise deed dated July 31, 62 which is now sought to be avoided by the plaintiff/respondent. The sale Deed has given effect to, though in a restricted form, in the compromise deed dated July 31, 62 which is now sought to be avoided by the plaintiff/respondent. It should also not be forgotten that by means of the compromise, the defendant/appellant agreed to forego his rights in 27 acres of land which came to be recognised in the exclusive possession of the plaintiff/respondent and his brothers. The forbearance on the said land, was in itself a consideration which was sufficient to sustain the compromise dated July 31, 1962. 12. Learned counsel for the defendant/appellant submitted before me that the findings on the question of legal necessity for the sale deed executed the sale deed executed by Smt. Dhanraj Kuer in favour of the brothers of the plaintiff/respondent is incorrect in law. He forcefully argued that Smt. Nagbali Kuer had a subsisting right, title and interest to the extent of extent of one half in the land left behind by Ramjanam Singh. In he view of the matter which I have taken above, I do not propose to enter into these questions. In my opinion, the compromise dated July 31, 1962, was the settlement of a doubtful right and the disputed land under the said compromise had been allotted to the defendant/appellant. Plaintiff/respondent and his brothers had specifically relinquished all right, title and interest in the said land. For the reasons stated above, it is wholly unnecessary to investigate and decide on which side the right actually lay. Defendant/appellant’s plea based on the compromise deed dated July 31, 1962, should have been sustained by the courts below. 13. On behalf of the plaintiff/respondent, it has been argued that in paragraph 12 of the plaint, it has been specifically pleaded that the plaintiff/respondent did not part with possession of the land in dispute and the said compromise remained ineffective. It is significant that no issue on this plea was pressed before the trial court. There is no whisper about it in the judgment recorded by the two courts below. However, it is pressed before me that the possession of the plaintiff/respondent has been upheld by the two court below and that the finding on the question of possession is a finding of fact. Learned counsel submits that it is not open for me while hearing a second appeal to upset the said finding. However, it is pressed before me that the possession of the plaintiff/respondent has been upheld by the two court below and that the finding on the question of possession is a finding of fact. Learned counsel submits that it is not open for me while hearing a second appeal to upset the said finding. I have carefully considered the submission of the learned counsel and have also examined the judgment recorded by the two courts below. It is evident from perusal of the said judgment that two courts have been concerned with the possession of the plaintiff/respondent and his brothers from 1945 onwards. The examination of the possession of the plaintiff/respondent and his brothers has been done with a view to uphold the title of the plaintiff to the land in dispute and to arrive at a conclusion as to whether they had completed their adverse possession before the execution of the sale deed by Nagbali Kuer in favor of the defendant/appellant. The inferior courts have not addresses themselves to the question of finding out as to whether effect was given to the compromise deed date July 31, 1962. Defendant/appellant in his testimony has specifically averred that he was in possession of the land in dispute and that such possession was not of a superficial character. He has further stated that he is paying rent in respect of the said land which has not been considered by the courts below. They had not taken into account the judgment in the mutation proceeding or the rent receipts filed by the defendant/appellant. 14. For the reasons stated above, I am of the view that the judgment and decree recorded by the courts below suffer from error of law and must, therefore, be set aside. 15. The result is that this second Appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgment and decree of the courts below passed in Title Appeal No. 12/74 dated 15.4.1976 affirming the decree passed by the Additional Subordinate Judge, Palamau on 8.6.1974 in Title Suit No. 19/68 are hereby set aside. The plaintiff’s suit is dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.