JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - Having heard counsel for the appellant at some length, I am of opinion that the finding recorded by the lower appellate court that the respondent alone was the conclusive tenant in possession of the shop in question is essentially a finding of fact based on appraisal of evidence including certain admissions made by the appellant himself. As such the said finding cannot be challenged in a second Appeal. 2. It was urged by counsel for the appellant that in view of the further observation made by the lower appellate court that possession of the appellant on different occasions, if any, was only permissive, no decree for injunction could be passed against a licensee in possession. The respondent has put in appearance and filed a caveat. It has been brought to my notice by counsel for the respondent that proceeding under section 145 Cr.P.C. had also been initiated in respect of the shop in question and were decided in favour of the respondent. A copy of the order in these proceedings has been produced before me which indicates that it was held by the City Magistrate that on 31st January, 1978 and within two months prior to that date the respondent was in actual possession over the shop in question. By the same order the appellant had been restrained from interfering with the possession of the respondent till he was successful in obtaining a decision in his favour from a competent court The suit for injunction in the instant case was, I am informed, filed sometime in December, 1978. It is thus apparent that on the date of the suit the appellant was not in possession over the shop in question and even if it may be accepted that on some earlier occasion he was in permissive possession over the shop in question it will serve no purpose. It is thus apparent that on the date of the suit the appellant was not in possession over the shop in question and even if it may be accepted that on some earlier occasion he was in permissive possession over the shop in question it will serve no purpose. On the finding that the respondent alone was the tenant in possession of the shop in question and in view of the circumstance that on the date of the institution of the suit the appellant was not in possession over the shop in question a decree for injunction could certainly be passed restraining the appellant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff-respondent The mere fact that at some point of time prior to the institution of the suit the appellant may have been in permissive possession could not confer any title on him to defeat the suit injunction. 3. In the result, I find no merit in this Second Appeal. It is accordingly dismissed under Order 41 rule 11, C.P.C.