Judgment :- SHANMUKHAM, J. 1. This appeal is directed againt the order of Mohan, J. in W.P. 4468 of 1975. 2. The appellant is Southern Railway Employees Co-operative Credit Society Ltd., Trichi, the petitioner in W.P. 4468 of 1975. The first respondent is one of the employees of the appellant and second respondent is Additional Commissioner for Workmens Compensation. The first respondent preferred T.N.S.E. Application No. 33 of 1974 against the appellant herein before the second respondent. That was an appeal petition filed by the first respondent under S. 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act complaining that the termination of his service by the appellant with effect from 10-6- 1974 is unlawful. The second respondent accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the appellant retiring the first respondent from 30-6-1974. It is this order of the second respondent that was assailed in W.P. 4480 of 1975. 3. The relief claimed by the appellant in the writ petition was sought so be sustained on two principal grounds. The foremost is that the first respondent came forward with T.G. Rajabather v. The Southern Railway Employees Co-operative Credit Society Ltd., rep. by its Committee of Management and the Secretary, Trichi and another 1 for issue of a writ of Mandamus directing the appellant herein to continue the first respondent in service till the first respondent completed the age of 60 years, that the said writ petition was dismissed by Ismail, J. (as he then was) on 27-6-1974, and that as the first respondent allowed the said order to become final because he did not prefer an appeal, he was debarred from making any claim under Sec. 41(2) of Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act before the second respondent. The other ground of attack depended upon the construction of bye-law 49(b) of the bye-laws of the appellants society. It is therefore necessary to refer to bye-law 49(b):— “The method of recruitment of the conditions of service including sanctioning of gratuity, leave, medical relief, etc., and the authority competent to fix, revise or regulate the scales of pay and allowance, of paid officers and servants of the society and the procedure to be followed in the disposal of disciplinary cases against them shall be governed by the special bye-laws relating to service conditions of the Societys staff. In all staff matters. In all staff matters. Railway Rules will be followed by the Board of Directors as far as possible,” It is common ground, the parties are not governed by the special bye-law 5(ii) which came to be registered only on 26-6-1976 and has no relevance to the present case. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that what is really conveyed by by-law 49(b) is that the method of recruitment, the conditions of service (including sanctioning of gratuity, leave, medical relief, etc.) and the authority competent to fix, revise or regulate the scales of pay and allowance of paid officers and servants of the Society and the procedure to he followed in the disposal of disciplinary eases against them shall be governed by the special bye-law relating to service conditions of the societys staff, that when such bye-laws are framed by the Society it shall as fat as possible be guided by the Railway Rules and that where there is no bye-law rooching the age of recruitment of its servants, the appellant has a right to retire its servant at a reasonable age and it is not necessarily bound to follow the railway rules. It is useful to notice that under the Railway rules then in force, the age of retirement of the staff holding a post like the first respondent is 60 years. Per contra, the argument on behalf of the first respondent is that in the absence of any specific bye-law in the bye-laws of the Society, the Society is bound by the corresponding rules found in the Railway Rules and therefore, the first respondent is entitled to be in service till he completed the age of 60 years. This submission on the part of the first respondent was accepted by the learned Judge and so, he dismissed the writ petition. 4. In our opinion, the learned counsel for the appellant is well founded in his submission that the learned single Judge had not considered the efficacy and binding force of the order passed in W.P. 1809 of 1974. vis-a-vis the first respondent, though the said writ petition was dismissed in limine by the said eminent Judge. 4. In our opinion, the learned counsel for the appellant is well founded in his submission that the learned single Judge had not considered the efficacy and binding force of the order passed in W.P. 1809 of 1974. vis-a-vis the first respondent, though the said writ petition was dismissed in limine by the said eminent Judge. We must also point out with due respect to the learned single Judge, whose order is appealed against, that though he made passing reference to the order in W.P. 1809 of 1974, there is no discussion at all as to how the said order in W.P. 1809 of 1974 would not remain an effective fetter on the first respondent in his seeking the same relief that was claimed in W.P. 1809 of 1974 subsequently in any forum. We therefore focus our attention on the effect of the order in W.P. 1809 of 1974. 5. It is convenient to advert to the arguments advanced by Mr. R.S. Venkatachari, learned counsel for the first respondent. The learned counsel propounded a novel proposition of law and that is, the principle of the res judicata will have no operation as regards pure question of law. In this case, the learned counsel pointed out that the view of Ismail, J. (as he then was) in W.P. 1809 of 1974 it no more good law and indeed the judgment of one of as in C.R.P. 290 of 1975 in which the appellant himself is the petitioner supports the respondents contention. In view of the approach we propose to make, it is unnecessary to look in close quarters the judgment in C.R.P. 290 of 1975. As a matter of fact, we proceed on the assumption that the view of the earned Judge expressed in W.P. 1809 of 1974 is no longer good law. In support of the above contention, the learned counsel for the first respondent brought to our notice Rakkayya v. Venkatanarastmha 1, Narayana v. Subramania 2, Alimunnissa Choudhuran v. Shama Charan Roy, 3 and Municipal Committee v. Punjab4 and Govinda Reddi v. Pattabhi Rama 5. We must straightway point out that none of these decisions is an authority for the above proposition of law propounded by the learned counsel for the first respondent. In Rakkiyva v. Venkatanarasinha 1, Mr. We must straightway point out that none of these decisions is an authority for the above proposition of law propounded by the learned counsel for the first respondent. In Rakkiyva v. Venkatanarasinha 1, Mr. Abdur Rahim, J. had ruled that the appearance of the pleader on the date whan the suit came in for disposal was an apearance of the defendint within the meaning of R. 3, Order 17, C P. Code and that it makes no difference that the pleader asks for further time in order to get proper instructions in as much as it was not a case in which the pleader had no instructions and that the proper remedy of the defendant was byway of an appeal against the decree and not by an application under Order 9. Rule 13, C.P. Code. In Alumunnissa Choudhurani v. Shama Charan Roy 3 the principle settled is that— “The case must be decided upon the law as It stood when judgment was pronounced, and that the plaintiff could recover the larger sum for interest; the decision in the previous suit would not be res judicata. The subsequent suit having been brought on a fresh cause of action no question as to the construction of the Kabuliat had arisen and the law since the decision of the former suit had been determined by judicial decision to be otherwise than what it was formerly regarded to be”. The facts in that case are: in a previous suit for rent against a permanent tenure holder in a permanently settled area, following the then ruling of the High Court, it was held that the plaintiff could recover interest on the arrears only at the rate of 12 per cent per annum as Sec. 67 of the Bengal Tenancy Act controlled S. 179 of the Act and was a bar to the plaintiffs recovering at the higher rate mentioned in the Kabuliat and that the said High Court ruling was subsequently overruled by a Full Bench. The same principle was laid down by Venkatarama Aiyar, J. in Govinda Reddi v. Pattabi Rama 5 and he has observed that— “A decision turning on the construction of a document should not be held to be ‘ res judicata ’ in respect of a cause of action which arises subsequent to that decision” So too the Full Bench of this Court in Narayana v. Subramania 2, laid down thus: “The principle of res Judicata is to be confined only to matters which actually existed at the time of former decision. The decision therefore as to matters existing at the date of former suit for rent for a particular year, even though erroneous, is res judicata in respect of those matters in a suit for rent for subsequent years. But the rule does not apply to a suit for rent as to certain areas in respect of which no claim was and could be made in the former suit. 6. The same principle is reiterated in Avetonnissa Bibi v. Amiad Ali 1 where a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has stated that— “A decision, however, erroneous it may be, on a question of law, may not operate as res judicata only in cases where the causes of action are different, but in all other cases it must operate as res judicata between the parties.” Again, a learned Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in R.D. Saxena v. State Industrial Court 2 has held that— “It is, therefore, clear that if the plea could have been taken by the petitioner when he filed the initial petition for the relief, which he seeks now, the principles of constructive res judicata will be attracted. But as it is clear that this plea was not available to the petitioner at that time, the question of application of the principle does not arise.” The Supreme Court in Agra Electric Supply Co, Ltd. v. Alladin 3 found as a matter of fact that— “The instant references and the award passed by the Labour Court were made in circumstances different from what prevailed on the previous occasion, a principle such as res judicata.” and therefore negatived the plea of res judicata . These decisions cited by the learned counsel for the first respondent do not support the contention put forward by him. 7. These decisions cited by the learned counsel for the first respondent do not support the contention put forward by him. 7. In Muni Committe v. Punjab 1 the facts are that in a previous suit, the High Court struck down the Punjab Cattle Fairs (Regulation) Act, 1968 as unconstitutional on the ground of vaguness on the assumption that the validity of the Act was liable to ba adjudged bv ths test of due proofs of law. But later, the supreme Court in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras 2. held that the doctrine of due process His no once in our Constitution. Subsequently, the Act was amended. Thereafter, in the writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners therein contended that the former decision of the High Court operated as res judicata notwithstanding the amendment. It is on those facts, the Suorene Court held that the decision in the former case does not operate as res judicata even in favour of the petitioners in that case and that its effect was only that the Act was in law non-existent so long as there was no definition of the expression ‘cattle fair.’ in the Act and that the said defect had been remedied by the Amending Act. We may straight way point out that the said decision will have no application to the case on hand, because in the instant case, we are not concerned with the validity of an enactment before or after amendment, but on the other hand, the first responde nts right to retire at a particular age was the sole issue that fell for consideration both in W.P. 1809 of 1974 and also in the present proceeding commenced in W.P. 4468 of 1975. Even the Full Bench of this Court referred to supra had pointed out that as long as the cause of action is the same, the former decision though erroneous will operate as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding brought by the same defeated party. 8. Pandurang v. M.R.T. Nagpur , 3 is equally of no importance to the contesting respondent. For, in that case, the Facts are; The High Court remanded the matter to Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur, following the decision of that High Court in Satubai v. Chandu 4 . 8. Pandurang v. M.R.T. Nagpur , 3 is equally of no importance to the contesting respondent. For, in that case, the Facts are; The High Court remanded the matter to Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur, following the decision of that High Court in Satubai v. Chandu 4 . On remand the Tribunal simply followed the said case in Salubai v. Chandu , 1 and held that the application was tenable and the claim of the applicant will be allowed to the extent indicated by S. 38(4) (a) proviso 1 of the Tenancy Act The said order of the High Court was again challenged in the said Hish Court It is relevant to notice that in the meanwhile, the decision in Salubai v. Chandu 4 was reversed by the Full Bench of that Court in Smt. Radhabai v. State of Maharashtra 5 . It was thereafter the subsequent petition challenging the revised order of the Tribunal was filed in the High Court of Bombay. It was on those facts, a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court held: “The earlier remand order could not be treated as res judicata for the purpose of the present writ petition because the order of remand was unrelated to facts of the case and was only made because of the erroneous view of tenability of application by virtue of S. 38(7) as expressed in the overruled decision. Therefore, since the tenant was covered under S. 3(7) application to evict him was not maintainable as declared by the Full Bench case referred to above.” We are at a loss to understand as to how the above ratio will support the present contention of the learned course for the first respondent. For, the same matter is being agitated once over in the High Court and the order in the earlier application was not allowed to become final as in the instant case. 9. It is worth while to notice the following observations of the Supreme Court in Daryao v. State of U.P. 6 “The binding character of judgment pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the rule of law; and the rule of law obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the constitution lays so much emphasis. As Halsbury has observed ‘subject to appeal and to being amended or set aside a judgment is conclusive as between the parties and their parties and is conclusive evidence against all the world of its existence, date and legal consequences. Similar is the statement of the law in Corpus Juris—‘The doctrine of estoppel by judgment does not rest on any superior authority of the court rendering the judgment, and a judgment of one court is a bar to an action between the same parties for the same cause in the same Court or in another court, whether the latter has concurrent or other Jurisdiction. The rule is subject to the limitation and the judgment in the former action must have been rendered by a court or tribunal of competent Jurisdiction. It is, however, essential that there should have been a judicial determination of rights in controversy with a final decision thereon.” Again, at page 1463, the learned Jodga observed—“Thus, on general consideration of public policy there seems to be no reason why the real of res judicata should be treated as inadmissible or irrelevant in dealing with petitions filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It is true that the general rule can be invoked only in cases where a dispute between the parties has been referred to a court of competent jurisdiction, there has been a contest between the parties before the court, a fair opportunity has been given to both of them to prove their case, and at the end the court has pronounced its judgment or decision. Such a decision pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction is binding between the parties unless it is modified or reversed by adopting a procedure prescribed by the Constitution.” In Halsburys Laws of England,, 3rd Bdn. Volume 15, paragraph 357 it is propounded as follows— “The doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine applicable only to records; it is a fundamental doctrine of all courts that there must be an end of litigation.” Again, in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. Volume 15, paragraph 357 it is propounded as follows— “The doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine applicable only to records; it is a fundamental doctrine of all courts that there must be an end of litigation.” Again, in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 34, page 743, it is observed:— “ Res Judicata is a rule of universal law pervading every well regulated system of jurisprudence and is put upon two grounds, embodied in various maxims of the common law, the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation interest republico ut sit finis litium ; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause nemo debat lis vexari pro cadon cause .” 10. Again, the decision in Union of India v. Nanak Singh 1 , deals with the efficacy of the order passed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. On the following facts— “Appellant had filed a writ petition challenging termination of his temporary services on grounds of infringement of Art. 311 and the competence of authority ordering termination. Petition was dismissed in appeal, without however any decision on competency of the officer issuing termination order. Appellant filed a suit for declaration that his services were terminated by an authority lower in rank than the competent authority and as such be should be deemed to be in service.” It was held that the suit was barred by res Judicata and the judgment in the previous case operated by express decision as res judicata . It was further pointed out by the Supreme Court as follows— “Provisions of S. 11, C.P.C. are not exclusive with respect to an earlier decision operating as res Judicata between the same parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular suit, and on the general principle of res Judicata , any previous decision on a matter in controversy decided after full contest or after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a court competent to decide it, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. It is not necessary that the Court deciding the matter formerly should be competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit should have the same subject matter. It is not necessary that the Court deciding the matter formerly should be competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit should have the same subject matter. There is no good reason to preclude such decisions on matters in controversy in writ proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in subsequent regular suits on the same matters in controversy between the same parties and thus to give limited effect to the principle of the finality of decisions after full contest.” 11. The two other decisions, viz, Workmen v. Straw Board Mfg. Co. 1, and Roshank Singh v. Union of India 2 cited by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent only support the view we have taken. In the first decision, the Supreme Court has laid down the law thus— “It is now well-established that although the entire Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to industrial adjudication, the principles of res judicata laid down under S. 11, C.P. Code, are applicable wherever possible for very good reasons. But it is the matter directly and substantially in issue in each case which is of material relevance in determining the question of res judicata in an industrial matter. The reasons for the decision in connection with the adjudication of the principal issue cannot be considered as the decision itself to attract the plea of res judicata . The earlier question at issue must be relevant and germane in determining the question of res judicata in the subsequent proceeding. The real character of the controversy between the parties is the determining factor and in the complex and manifold human relations between labour and capital giving rise to diverse kinds of ruptures of varying nuances no castiron rule can be laid down. Some distinction, of whatever shade or magnitude, may have to be borne in mind in the application of the principles of res judicata in industrial adjudication in contra-distinction of civil proceedings. Some distinction, of whatever shade or magnitude, may have to be borne in mind in the application of the principles of res judicata in industrial adjudication in contra-distinction of civil proceedings. Extremely technical considerations, usually invoked in civil proceedings, may not be allowed to outweigh substantial justice to the parties in an industrial adjudication.” In the second decision, the Supreme Court has settled the principle of law thus: “If the petition is dismissed in limine but with a speaking order which order itself indicates that the petition was dismissed on merits the absence of notice to other side by itself would not be sufficient to negative the plea of res judicata in a subsequent petition in respect of the same cause of action. However, while negativing the contention on the facts of the case this Court reaffirmed that if the petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order then such a dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judicata.” 12. In this in W.P. 1809 of 1974, the first respondent herein sought for issue of a writ of mandamus directing the appellant herein to continue the first respondent in service till he completed the age of 60 years. The learned Judge dismissed tha said petition and the following observation needs special notices:— “In this particular case, admittedly there is no law, apart from bye-law 49(b) referred to above, which imposes any obligation on the first respondent to retain the petitioner in service till he completes the age of 60.” Thus, it is patent, the learned Judge negatived the first respondents claim that he is entitled to serve the appellant till he completed the age of 60 years. No doubt, the present writ petition is brought by the appellant for issue of a writ of certiorari in the nature of a writ order or direction and to quash the order of the second respondent passed in TNSE No. 33 of 1974, dated 7th April, 1975. 13. It is apposite at this stage to notice the facts which obliged the appellant to come forward with W.P. 4468 of 1973. 13. It is apposite at this stage to notice the facts which obliged the appellant to come forward with W.P. 4468 of 1973. After the dismissal of his writ petition No. 1809 of 1974, the first respondent instituted T.N.S.E. No. 33 of 1974 on the file of the second respondent complaining that he had a right to be in the appellants service till he completed the age of 60 years, that therefore the appellants order terminating the service at tha completion of 58th year, would amount to wrongful termination and that therefore he should be reinstated in service. In the counter statement filed by the appellant before the second respondent it is specifically pointed out that ‘the claimant (first respondent) has filed a writ petition in the High Court of Madras in June, 1974, praying for orders for his retention upto the age of 60 which was dismissed by the High Court, which fact has been suppressed by the claimant. In dismissing the petition, the High Court declared that it has repeatedly been held by this Court that the bye-laws of Co-operative Societies are not laws and that they constituted merely contracts between the Society and their members. Therefore, even assuming that the said bye-law 49(b) has imposed an obligation on the Directors of the Society that obligation is not an absolute one. Nonetheless, the second respondent went into the merits and granted the reliefs as claimed by the first respondent. It is this order of the second respondent that was sought to be quashed by the appellant in W.P. 4468 of 1975. 14. The foregoing events indisputably point out that not only the relief claimed but also the cause of action involved in W.P. 4468 of 1975 is identically the same as those that was claimed in W.P. 1809 of 1974. At the risk of repetition, we have to point out that in both the proceedings, the first respondent claimed that he is entitled to be retained in appellants service till he completed the age of 60 years. If so, following the ratio enunciated in the decision cited supra , we hasten to hold that the first respondent is barred under the principle of constructive res judicata when he pursued his remedy before the second respondent in T.N.S.E. 33 of 1974. 15. It is true that the W.P. 1809 of 1974 was dismissed in limine. If so, following the ratio enunciated in the decision cited supra , we hasten to hold that the first respondent is barred under the principle of constructive res judicata when he pursued his remedy before the second respondent in T.N.S.E. 33 of 1974. 15. It is true that the W.P. 1809 of 1974 was dismissed in limine. In our considered opinion, the principle enunciated in the above decisions, particulary Union of India v. Manak Singh 1 will clearly apply to a case where either a writ petition is dismissed in limine or a second appeal at the admission stage. The law enables this Court exercising its extra ordinary original jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, to dismiss in limine any writ petition if the cuttle considers that it was not worthwhile to entertain the petition and to send notice to the opposite parties and also to dismiss the second appeal at the admission stage under the Civil Procedure Code, read with the Appellate Side Rules, if the court should find that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law. It is significant to point out that the aggrieved party—in the instant case the first respondent, has a right of appeal. We have to emphasise that the dismissal of a writ petition even at the stage of admission is certainly binding on the petitioner therein—in this case the first respondent, as long as the order is a speaking one and on merits— Vide Hoshnak Singh v. Union of India 1. Otherwise, there will be no finality to the litigation. 16. The foregoing analysis advises us to hold that by virtue of the decision in W.P. 1809 of 1974, the first respondent is barred under the principle of constructive res judicata to seek the remedy sought for in T.N.S.E. 33 of 1974, on the file of the second respondent and consequently the order passed in hat proceeding should be quashed. 17. We are not therefore considering the contention depending upon the construction of bye-law 49(b). 18. In the result, the writ appeal succeeds. The order made by the learned single Judge in W.P. 4468 of 1975 is set aside and the writ petition will stand allowed as prayed for, but in the peculiar circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 19. 18. In the result, the writ appeal succeeds. The order made by the learned single Judge in W.P. 4468 of 1975 is set aside and the writ petition will stand allowed as prayed for, but in the peculiar circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 19. As we have only followed the decision of the Supreme Court which is on all fours on the facts of this case, the leave sought for is refused.