JUDGMENT K.P. Singh, J.- This writ petition has been directed against the judgment of a learned Member, Board of Revenue dated 26.3.1982 in Revision No. 11-LR/81/82, district Kanpur, between Bhatia Safe Works and Commissioner, Allahabad Division and others. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are, that the Regional Director, Employees State Insurance, had made an ad hoc demand of Rs. 40,662.66 against the petitioner. The Deputy Labour Commissioner and the Regional Director sent the recovery certificate to the Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur for the recovery of the aforesaid amount as land revenue from the petitioner. The Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur without giving any notice to the petitioner attached the plot No. 47-A, Factory Area, Fazalganj, Kanpur, belonging to the petitioner. Auction sale took place on 25.5.80 without any intimation to the petitioner. Sardar Nirmal Singh has purchased the plot for a sum of Rs. 50,000/. According to the petitioner, the value of the property, subject-matter of auction sale, was not less than Rs. 2,50,000/-. On 5.6.1981 the petitioner filed an objection to the Commissioner, Allahabad Division and raised several pleas regarding illegalities in conducting the auction sale, as is evident from Annexure 'I' attached with the writ petition. The Commissioner Allahabad Division confirmed the auction sale without dealing with the objection filed by the petitioner. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the order of confirmation passed by the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, preferred a revision petition, under Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. The grounds of revision-petition are contained in Annexure 2' attached with the writ petition. It appears that the petitioner had not impleaded the auction purchaser, Sardar Nirmal Singh, in the revision petition, but the latter had filed an application for being impleaded and had also prayed for the dismissal of the revision petition. The stand taken by the petitioner before the Revisional Court was that the auction sale in favour of the auction purchaser was not in accordance with law and suffered from several irregularities and illegalities ; hence the auction purchaser was not a necessary or proper party in the revision petition. 3. The revisional court has dismissed the revision petition by its order dated 26.3.1982 on the ground that the auction purchaser was a necessary party and non-impleadment of auction purchaser in the revision petition was fatal to the maintainability of the revision petition. 3. The revisional court has dismissed the revision petition by its order dated 26.3.1982 on the ground that the auction purchaser was a necessary party and non-impleadment of auction purchaser in the revision petition was fatal to the maintainability of the revision petition. Aggrieved by the judgment of the revisional court, the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before me that ordinarily no suit fails for non-joinder of necessary party. It was suggested that if, in the opinion of the revisional authority, the auction purchaser was the necessary party, an opportunity should have been given to the petitioner to implead the auction purchaser. In not doing so, the revisional authority has acted illegally and his order deserves to be quashed. Second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the petitioner could not get the order of confirmation passed by the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, which indicates high-handedness of the part of the Commissioner, Allahabad Division and his office ; hence a great prejudice has occurred to the petitioner. Third contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the auction purchaser paid money by cheque, which was no payment in the eyes of law ; hence the auction sale was bad in law yet it has been confirmed. 5. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that the application for setting aside the auction sale was not accompanied by requisite deposits ; hence it could not be entertained. It has also been suggested that within 30 days of the date of sale, the petitioner did not move the relevant authority ; hence the auction sale was rightly confirmed, in view of the provisions of Sections 172 to 175 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. It was also submitted that mere inadequacy of price was not sufficient to set aside the auction sale ; hence the auction sale was rightly confirmed by the Allahabad Commissioner. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite-party also supported the judgment of the Board of Revenue on the ground that the auction purchaser was a necessary party and non-impleadment of auction purchaser was rightly considered as fatal to the maintainability of the revision petition. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite-party also supported the judgment of the Board of Revenue on the ground that the auction purchaser was a necessary party and non-impleadment of auction purchaser was rightly considered as fatal to the maintainability of the revision petition. He also stressed that the petitioner did not move the relevant authority within 30 days of the date of sale ; hence the petitioner had no remedy against the confirmation of sale in favour of the auction purchaser. 6. In rejoinder, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case ; hence the application moved by the petitioner for setting aside the auction sale was entertain able. Moreover, the revisional authority has not decided the claims of the parties on merits ; hence the impugned judgment should be quashed and the revisional authority be asked to decide the claims of the parties on merits. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the ruling reported in 1974 U.P. Tax Cases, 374. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at a great length and I have noted above the contentions raised by them. To me, it appears that the revisional court has dismissed the petitioner's revision petition only on the ground that the petitioner failed to implead the auction purchaser in the revision petition. It is not in doubt that the revisional court has suo motu powers also to examine the illegalities and irregularities committed by the subordinate authorities. In the present case when the petitioner did not get the copy of the order confirming the auction sale, it appears that the department is a little harsh against the petitioner. In AIR 1975 (Allahabad), 136-Ramakant Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P. and others, a Full bench of this Court has made the following observations while dealing with the revisional powers under Section 145 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act : "Section 45 gives power to the Director of Consolidation to call for and examine the record and thereafter after allowing the parties concerned and opportunity of being heard to make any such order as he may deem fit. It is discretionery with the Director of Consolidation call for the record and to examine it, but the discretion has to be exercised on judicial principles. Consequently, where on perusal of certain material the Director of Consolidation decides to call for the record he cannot ordinarily form a different opinion on being informed that all the necessary parties have not been impleaded or that the application was made beyond time. We can therefore, say that examination of the record should follow the summoning thereof and if on examination of the record it appears necessary to exercise the revisional jurisdiction hearing has to be given to the parties. Where the Director of Consolidation exercises the jurisdiction suo motu no party has the right to make one before him at the first instance, but if the Director of Consolidation intends to interfere with the order he must give a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the persons concerned. In this view of the matter it can be laid down as a safe guiding principle that once the record has been called for it should be examined by the Director of Consolidation to form an opinion whether it is a fit case for the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. This opinion he shall have to form irrespective of whether the application moved by the party was within time or all the necessary parties have not been impleaded or the application is defective. However, where the application is within time and is not at all defective, the party can say that he should be given a hearing before the Director of Consolidation decides not to exercise the revisional jurisdiction. This is the main difference between the exercise of revisional jurisdiction at the instance of a party and the suo motu "exercise of such jurisdiction". 8. This is the main difference between the exercise of revisional jurisdiction at the instance of a party and the suo motu "exercise of such jurisdiction". 8. Since, the revisional court under Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act has also suo motu power to examine the illegalities and irregularities committed by the subordinate authorities, I think that in the present case the revisional court has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law specially when the petitioner was handicapped in not getting the copy of the order complained of and the revisional court had summoned the record and the auction purchaser had also applied to be impleaded in the revision petition yet the revisional court has dismissed the revision petition and not decided the controversies between the parties on merits. 9. The principle underlying the observations made by the Full Bench of this Court regarding revisional powers under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act can be extended to the revisional powers under Section 219 of U.P. Land Revenue Act. Viewed from this angle, I think that the revisional court has not acted legally in dismissing the revision petition on the ground of non-impleadment of auction purchaser in the revision petition and thereby it has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law in not examining the controversies raised on behalf of the petitioner on merits. Reasonable approach, in the circumstances of the present case, should have been to implead the auction purchaser and afford opportunities to the parties to substantiate their claims and thereafter decide the controversies on merits. As the revisional court has failed to adopt correct procedure in the circumstances of the present case, its order deserves to be quashed. 10. I permit the parties to canvass their view points before the revisional court and substantiate their case before the revisional court hereafter. At this stage, I do not consider necessary to deal with the cases cited by the counsel for the parties and to deal with their contentions. 11. 10. I permit the parties to canvass their view points before the revisional court and substantiate their case before the revisional court hereafter. At this stage, I do not consider necessary to deal with the cases cited by the counsel for the parties and to deal with their contentions. 11. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the impugned judgment of the revisional court dated 26.3.1982 is, hereby, quashed and the revisional court is directed to permit the petitioner to implead the auction purchaser in the revision petition and thereafter afford reasonable opportunities to the parties to substantiate their claims and then decide the controversies raised before it strictly in accordance with law. There would be no order as to costs.