Judgment 1. This Civil Revision has been at the instance of landlord and arises out of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. This petition is directed against an order by which the Court below has refused to resort to S.14 of the Act holding that the general procedure of hearing and trial as embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure would apply. The Court below has also accepted the written statement, filed by the tenant-defendant. Both the grounds given by the Court below are being assailed before me by the landlord-petitioner. 3. Before I deal with the case, I would like to state few facts which would be essential for determining the question canvassed before me. The Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1983 has been brought in force on and from 1-4-1981 by virtue of S.1(3) of the Act except S.28 which came into force on the enactment of the Act. This Act was preceded by an Ordinance known as Bihar Ordinance, 63 of 82 and received assent of the Governor on 3-11-1982 and published in the Bihar Gazette on the next day. 4. The instant suit has been brought on the cause of action i.e. default, material deterioration of the building by negligence of the tenant, as also on the ground of personal necessity. Before the promulgation of the Ordinance, on 16-7-1982 the suit was fixed for ex parte hearing rejecting the petition of the tenant to file written statement. On 13-8-1982 the defendant filed a petition for recalling the ex parte hearing of the suit and on 24-1-1983 after the promulgation of the Ordinance, the plaintiff filed a petition that the suit should be heard ex parte and the same prayer seems to have been repeated in another petition. The written statement, however, has been filed on 14-2-1983. The written statement was accepted by the Court below by recalling the previous order fixing the case for ex parte hearing on payment of certain cost by the defendant, which cost the tenant-defendant seem to have deposited. 5. The plaintiff, it appears, canvassed that since there is a prayer for eviction on the ground of personal necessity the procedure engrafted under S.14 of the Act would be applicable, more so for the reason, the suit was instituted after 1-4-1981. 5. The plaintiff, it appears, canvassed that since there is a prayer for eviction on the ground of personal necessity the procedure engrafted under S.14 of the Act would be applicable, more so for the reason, the suit was instituted after 1-4-1981. It may be remembered that the Act has been brought into force on and from 1-4-1981. The plaintiff seems to have insisted in the Court below that the latter should adopt the procedure laid down under S.14(4) of the Act which, inter alia, provides that the tenant if he wants to contest the eviction from the premises, on being served with summons, he shall not be permitted to do so unless he files affidavit stating grounds on which he seeks to make such said section. If leave is not sought for, it would be deemed that the tenant admits the claim of the landlord and that the landlord should be entitled to eviction on the ground of personal necessity. It has in this context the question of acceptance of the written statement arose in the Court below. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contends that the Act having come into force from 1-4-1981, the procedure adopted by the Court below, so far as the cause of action of personal necessity is concerned, is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction for being in breach of the provision of S.14(4) and other allied sub-sections of the said section. He further contended that it is not a case where the written statement was filed prior to 4-11-1982, the date when the Ordinance saw the light of the day but on a subsequent day i.e. on 14-2-1983 and, therefore, the defendant ought to have filed an affidavit seeking leave to contest the ground of personal necessity and the Court should have taken all consequential steps envisaged under S.14(4), (5) and (6) of the Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, acceptance of the written statement in the year 1983 without resorting to the procedure, engrafted under S.14, should be cancelled and quashed and the suit should be decreed ex parte on deemed admission of the personal necessity of the landlord. 7. Mr. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, acceptance of the written statement in the year 1983 without resorting to the procedure, engrafted under S.14, should be cancelled and quashed and the suit should be decreed ex parte on deemed admission of the personal necessity of the landlord. 7. Mr. Dhrub Narain Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant-opposite party on the other hand strongly contended that the procedure under S.14 of the Act is wholly inapplicable to the present case because the suit is basically a suit under S.11(1)(b) and (d) of the Act. The prayer for personal necessity as envisaged under S.11(c) has been casually referred in one of the paragraphs of the plaint. In para 15 of the plaint, in the paragraph where the cause of action has been disclosed the cause of action enumerated (a) default in the payment of rent, (b) damage caused to the house as well as wilful waste but there is no reference of personal necessity. He also drew my attention to the prayer portion of the plaint where apart from the decree for eviction, arrears of rent, damages to the property have been sought. He further submitted that on consideration of the entire plaint nothing can be spelt out as to what is the requirement and how does the question of requirement at all arise. From all these facts, learned counsel submits the suit is basically not a suit for personal necessity. Learned counsel ultimately contended that the suit being a composite suit and since some of the causes of action could not be tried under S.14 of the Act, the case could be tried under the regular procedure envisaged under the Code of Civil Procedure. It was also submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the opposite party that S.14 being a procedural law cannot be retrospective and as a matter of fact in some cases the procedure cannot be complied with retrospectively even though it is true that the Act itself is retrospective from 1-4-1981. The learned counsel illustrated his point that there could be many cases where before the Ordinance saw the light of the day stages envisaged under S.14(4), (5) and (6) might have already elapsed, there may be some cases where the suit is at final stage of argument. The learned counsel illustrated his point that there could be many cases where before the Ordinance saw the light of the day stages envisaged under S.14(4), (5) and (6) might have already elapsed, there may be some cases where the suit is at final stage of argument. He, therefore, submitted that it is permissible in law that substantive provisions in a statute may be retrospective but the procedural part of the statute can still be prospective, even though the statute is silent about it. He contends that in the instant case summonses were served long before through the procedure envisaged under the Code of Civil Procedure and not as envisaged under S.14(4) of the Act and the suit itself was fixed for hearing ex parte prior to the Ordinance being published in the Gazette. He, therefore, contended that the cause of action for eviction on the ground of personal necessity in the instant case could not be tried under the provisions of S.14 of the Act. 8. This Court in the case of Lalan Kishore Saran V/s. Tara Chand Agrawal 1984 BBCJ 396 had occasion to consider the scope of S.14 of the Act where it was laid down: where a suit is presented for eviction on the grounds other than personal necessity the plaintiff should file two suits instead of one suit. The plaintiff may be allowed to file two plaints even together and they may proceed one after the other. In the said case it was further held if one suit containing all the causes of action is filed, the claim based on S.11(1)(c)(e) should be investigated by special procedure under S.14 of the Act and separate ordinary regular trial with respect to other causes of action. It also held that provisions of O.2 R.2, C.P.C. will not be applicable nor the second suit will attract the principles of res judicata although the relief would be common, but the issues in the two suits will be clearly different. This will be followed by two decrees and the losing party shall not have any right of appeal from the decree relating to ground of personal necessity. 9. This will be followed by two decrees and the losing party shall not have any right of appeal from the decree relating to ground of personal necessity. 9. No decided cases have been brought to my notice by either of the party as to what would be the course in a single suit filed by the landlord on several grounds including the ground of personal necessity and the said suit has been instituted on a date prior to the assent and publication of the Ordinance, and the suit proceeded up to a certain stage. The decision in Lallan Kishore Saran (supra) do not throw any light on this basic question which falls for decision in this case. It only throws some light that in the event the Act is applicable and a single suit with all the causes of action have been instituted the suit should be split up; the cause of action of personal necessity to be tried under S.14 and other causes of action to be tried in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the general law. Before this question could arise in this case, I am called upon to decide whether S.14 procedure could at all be applicable in the instant case. 10. In my opinion there may be a situation where the procedure is not possible of compliance. A person while instituting a suit say on 1-5-1981, could have no knowledge about a legislation, laying down the new procedure. He filed a suit for eviction reciting the grounds and restoring to the procedure as envisaged under the general law. This procedure being unknown at that point to the litigant and to the Court, the suit could not have proceeded according to the special procedure. It is true that the Act has been made retrospective from 1-4-1981. To my mind it appears that it has been so done in order to survive the cases instituted for eviction of tenant as also to give the tenant some protection of the substantive provisions of the enactment. It is true that the Act has been made retrospective from 1-4-1981. To my mind it appears that it has been so done in order to survive the cases instituted for eviction of tenant as also to give the tenant some protection of the substantive provisions of the enactment. If the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is accepted then all suits which have been instituted prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance that is 5-11-1982 have to be scraped and the suit should proceed according to the special procedure prescribed and all written statements to be withdrawn from the record and the defendants should be asked to obtain leave and proceed according to the S.14(4) (5) and (6) of the Act. I think the answer to the question posed before me is clear from the provisions of S.14(4) itself. The said sub-section starts with the sentences : "The tenant on whom summons is duly served (whether by ordinary mail or by registered post) shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the ground on which he seeks to make such contest and obtains leave from the Court.........." The stage of the applicability of S.14(4) is attracted when the summonses are served on the tenant under this provision. If the summonses have been served after the Act was assented to and notified the procedure laid down under S.14(4) would automatically be attracted and the case shall proceed from that stage in accordance with the subsequent provisions of the said section. Therefore, when were the summonses served is the key question, as to the applicability of S.14 of the Act. If summonses were served prior to the assent and publication of the Ordinance and the time for appearance has expired special procedure would not apply even though the Act is retrospective and brought in to force from a prior date. As such if the summonses have been served and the date of appearance has expired prior to the publication and assent of the Ordinance, I am of the opinion the special procedure laid down under S.14 cannot be made applicable, as it is not possible of compliance. 11 In the instant case the summonses were served and the defendant appeared on 16-7-1982 long before the publication of the Ordinance. 11 In the instant case the summonses were served and the defendant appeared on 16-7-1982 long before the publication of the Ordinance. In my view, therefore, the Court below was wholly justified in not resorting to the provisions of S.14 of the Act and has rightly accepted the written statement. I need not decide further question whether the suit should be split up into two suits as the said question arises only when special procedure is adopted for a part of the cause of action. The composite causes of action in the instant case have to be tried under the general procedure. I would observe that this case must be concluded as expeditiously as possible because one of the grounds of eviction is personal necessity as well. The legislature have made themselves clear that in cases of personal necessity the case should be disposed of with extreme quickness, therefore a summary procedure has been provided for trying such cause of action. The plaintiff landlord in the instant case is entitled to the said benefit, even though the suit is being tried under the procedure laid down under the Code. 12. I direct that this suit must be disposed of within one year from the date of the receipt of this judgment and no party should be given unnecessary adjournments. If the tenant fails to co-operate and pray for adjournments which appear to be unreasonable. It should be refused. The case should proceed day to day. 13. After the judgment was delivered, learned counsel for the landlord stood up and stated probably because of the deteriorating condition of the building, it has been pulled down. No material has been placed before me in support of the said statement. Learned counsel, however, wanted me to note down his statement in the judgment. If it is true that the house do not exist any more, the suit for eviction becomes infructuous as there could be no eviction from a non-existent house. It is also made clear, the suit, in that event would continue so far as the prayer of damages and for arrears of rent are concerned that has to be disposed of in accordance with law. 14. In the result, the Civil Revision fails. The order of the Court below is confirmed but with the observations aforesaid there will be no order as to costs.