JUDGMENT A. N. Varma, J. 1. THIS petition assails the validity of an order dated January 23, 1984 passed by Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Mussoorie, whereby the petitioners have been asked to stop forthwith the construction work of a building in regard to which the petitioners' plans had been sanctioned by the Municipal Board by an order dated August 31, 1982. The impugned order states that the State Government has, in the exercise of its powers, under Section 34 (1-B) of U. P. Municipalities Act, directed that the construction work of all the multi-storyed buildings at Mussoorie be stopped forthwith and consequently the above directions were being issued to the petitioners. 2. THE principal contention of the petitioners was that the State Government has, in fact and in law, issued no such directions for orders under Section 34 (1-B). Consequently the impugned order which proceeds on the premise that such an order has been issued by the State Government is liable to be quashed. The petitioner no. 1 is a private limited company duly registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office in New Delhi. Petitioner no. 2 is a Director and shareholder of tbe petitioner no. 1 company. On April 10, 1982, the petitioner submitted a building plan to the Building Engineer, Municipal Board, Mussoorie, for the construction of a hotel-cum-recreation complex in the compound of the premises known as 'Lauriston Estate'. Subsequently, the petitioners submitted a revised plan for sanction on July 27, 1982. In the application for the sanction of the revised plan it was asserted that the petitioners proposed to build a holiday home and club house for their Company and that the previous plans submitted by them be treated as cancelled. On August 28, 1982, the Municipal Engineer submitted his report and, on the same day, the Officer In-charge forwarded the report of the District Magistrate who was then acting as the Administrator of the Municipal Board. It appears that on September 28, 1982, the Administrator asked for some more details in regard to the revised building plans submitted by the petitioner which were furnished by the petitioners. Thereupon on August 30, 1982, the Municipal Engineer submitted another report which was signed by the Officer In-charge. Finally on August 31, 1982, the Administrator granted the sanction to the revised building plans submitted by the petitioners. 3. Thereupon on August 30, 1982, the Municipal Engineer submitted another report which was signed by the Officer In-charge. Finally on August 31, 1982, the Administrator granted the sanction to the revised building plans submitted by the petitioners. 3. IT may be stated at this point that the building which the petitioner proposed to construct was to comprise six storyes. A perusal of the building plan indicates that building which was proposed to be constructed by the petitioners was to comprise of several composite residential flats consisting of drawing-cum-dining room, bed room, toilet, pantry and balcony etc. on each of the storyes. 4. THE petitioners state that armed with the sanction granted by the Administrator and after complying with the other necessary formalities they entered into an agreement with a building contractor Messrs K. R. Builders (P) Ltd., through their sister concern Messrs Mohan Investment and Properties Ltd. New Delhi who are acting as promoters. THE petitioners then got the existing structures standing over the building site demolished and by the time the aforesaid order was served on the petitioners they had already completed three storyes and the fourth storey was near completion. It is said that these building operations bad gone on for almost 18 months since the sanction was accorded when the impugned order was served upon the petitioners. In between it is alleged that the engineers of the Municipal Board had been inspecting the building site the construction work without any objection. It is further asserted by the petitioners that in the process they have already invested more than Rs. 30,00,000/- on the project. The petitioners contended that their building plans having been sanctioned as far back as August 31, 1982 and the petitioners having started the construction pursuant thereto without any objection, the respondents have no power to restrain them from going ahead with the building operations. 5. THIS petition was filed on February 9, 1984 till which date it appears that the petitioners were not given copies of the Government orders stated to have been issued under section 34 (1-B). After the admission of the petition on March 2, 1984 two counter affidavits were filed, (i) on behalf of the State Government and (ii) on behalf of the Municipal Board, Mussoorie. After the admission of the petition on March 2, 1984 two counter affidavits were filed, (i) on behalf of the State Government and (ii) on behalf of the Municipal Board, Mussoorie. Along with these affidavits various orders issued by the State Government from time to time have been filed The respondents, however, pointed out two orders, one dated April 16, 1982 and the other dated December 29, 1983 as the orders which, according to them, have been issued by the State Government under Section 34 (1-B). 6. THE petitioners have made four submissions in regard to the aforesaid orders. THEse are (i) the orders not having been published in the official gazette or in the manner prescribed by Section 8-A of the Act, could not be legally treated as orders issued by the State Government under Section 34 (1-B) (2) ; (ii) sanction having been granted to the petitioners by the Administrator, there remained nothing further to be executed or done by the Municipal Board and consequently the power contemplated under Section 34 (1-B) was not available to the State Government in the facts and circumstances of the present case ; (iii) neither the order dated April 16, 1982 nor that dated December 29, 1983, expressly or by necessary implication prohibits the construction work undertaken by the petitioners in pursuance of the sanction granted to them and the Executive Officer has illegally assumed the existence of such an order of State Government ; (iv) the orders relied on by the respondents not having been expressed to have been issued in the name of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh cannot be validly treated as orders issued by the State Government under Section 34 (1-B). Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the opinion that the petition is entitled to succeed on the third submission mentioned above. We, however, find no merit in the other contentions. 7. WE will take up the third point first. For appreciating this point it will be convenient to extract here Section 34 (1-B) of the Act. We, however, find no merit in the other contentions. 7. WE will take up the third point first. For appreciating this point it will be convenient to extract here Section 34 (1-B) of the Act. It provides :- "(1-B) The State Government may, of its own motion or on report or complaint received by order prohibit the execution or further execution of a resolution or order passed or made under this or any other enactment by a board or a committee of a board or a joint committee or any officer or servant of a board or of a joint committee, if in its opinion such resolution or order is prejudicial to the public interest, or has been passed or made in abuse of powers or in flagrant breach of any provision of any law for the time being in force, and may prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order." 8. A bare perusal of the provisions clearly discloses that occasion for the exercise of powers under it arises when ; - (i) there is in existence some resolution or order of the Board. (ii) The State Government is of the opinion that such a resolution or order is prejudicial to the public interest or has been passed or made in abuse of powers or in flagrant breach of any provision of any law for the time being in force. The power exercisable under the provision is one of prohibiting the execution or further execution of a resolution or an order of the Board as well as of prohibiting the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order. This being the true scope and nature of the power exercisable under Section 34 (1-B), we find that the order dated April 16, 1982 cannot by any stretch be regarded as one passed under Section 34 (1-B). It lacks all the essential elements of an order under that provision. The building plan in question was sanctioned on August 31, 1982, i. e., after the passing of the order dated April 16, 1982. The occasion to prohibit the execution or further execution of the order dated August 31, 1982 could arise only after August 31, 1982. It lacks all the essential elements of an order under that provision. The building plan in question was sanctioned on August 31, 1982, i. e., after the passing of the order dated April 16, 1982. The occasion to prohibit the execution or further execution of the order dated August 31, 1982 could arise only after August 31, 1982. The order dated April 16, 1982 could not, therefore, be treated as one passed under Section 34 (1-B) vis-a-vis the petitioner's building plan. We are fortified in the view we are taking by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Mahadeo Prasad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1949 All. 56 the rational of which is fully applicable to the present case even though the said decision was rendered in the context of the provisions of Section 34 as they stood then. The scope of Section 34 as it stood then was, in substance, the same as of Section 34 (1-B). The Division Bench held that the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate under Section 34 to pass an order arises only when the Board passes a resolution or makes an order. It was observed that an order passed under section 34 at a time when the Board has neither passed any resolution nor made any order under Section 180 permitting certain constructions and alterations in a building is premature and without jurisdiction. The ratio is fully applicable to the present situation. Indeed the learned Standing Counsel very fairly conceded in view of this Division Bench decision that the order dated April 16, 1982 cannot be treated as one passed under Section 34 (1-B) vis-a-vis the petitioners. 9. FURTHER the order dated April 16, 1982 does not even profess to prohibit the execution or further execution of any resolution or order sanctioning any building plan. Nor does it prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance of a resolution or order of the Board. It simply prohibits generally the grant of sanction of multistoryed buildings and calls upon the Board to cancel such sanction as may have already been granted in that behalf. Nor does it prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance of a resolution or order of the Board. It simply prohibits generally the grant of sanction of multistoryed buildings and calls upon the Board to cancel such sanction as may have already been granted in that behalf. Whether or not the State Government has such powers elsewhere under this Act or any other enactment, Section 34, at any rate, does not contemplate any such powers, and it is on this provision alone that the respondent's counsel sought to justify the impugned order. We are, however, clearly of the opinion that the order does not fall within the four corners of Section 34 (1-B). 10. THE order dated December 29, 1983 too does not fall within the purview of Section 34 (1-B). THE order begins by reciting that several colonizers of Delhi have invaded Mussoorie and that they are constructing multistorey buildings in breach of the bye-laws of the Municipal Board. THEse buildings are prejudicially affecting the scenic beauty of Mussoorie. By an order dated April 18, 1982 the Government had asked the Municipal Board not to accord permission for the construction of multi-storyed buildings and that the permission already granted should be cancelled. It had further required the Municipal Board to find out the effect which these multistoryed buildings shall have on the local population of the town. This is alt that has been stated in the first paragraph of the order. In the second paragraph of the order, it is stated that the allegations appearing in certain newspapers in this connection were got investigated by the Government and it has been found that in many cases sanction has been accorded for the construction of multi-storyed buildings in breach or disregard of the bye-laws. The order then proceeds to point out to the District Magistrate the various provisions of the U. P. Municipalities Act and the bye-laws of the Municipal Board of Mussoorie under which the Board could take action against persons to whom sanction may have been accorded in breach of the bye-laws. The order suggests the various remedies avilable to the Board against such builders who may have constructed buildings in pursuance of sanction granted in contravention of the buildings bye-laws. 11. The order suggests the various remedies avilable to the Board against such builders who may have constructed buildings in pursuance of sanction granted in contravention of the buildings bye-laws. 11. IN the last paragraph of this order upon which considerable stress was laid by counsel for the respondents, it is recited that the Government has taken a decision that the cases in which building plans have been sanctioned by the Administrator instead of the Prescribed Authority should be considered carefully after taking legal advice and if any legal proceedings are pending before court in regard to such multi-storyed buildings, effective steps should be taken in the same to prevent any illegal activities which might be going on in the case of such buildings and the Government be informed of the action taken in this behalf. 12. THE above is the entire purport of the order. Significantly the State Government itself has not issued any prohibitory orders or directions. It simply asks the Board to take appropriate action, though the State Government was itself authorised under Section 34 (1-B) to issue positive prohibitory orders and directions, of course, if it fairly and reasonably forms an opinion that any particular resolution or order passed or made by the Board is prejudicial to the public interest or has been passed or made in abuse of powers or in flagrant breach of any provision of any law. THE order dated December 29, 1983 was read in extenso by counsel for the respondents but they were unable to point out anything which might be in the nature of a prohibitory direction such as is contemplated under Section 34 (1-B). Even the last paragraph of the order does not contain any such direction as has been assumed by the Executive Officer. The Executive Officer was, therefore, clearly in error in issuing the impugned order dated January 23, 1984 on the erroneous premises that the State Government had issued prohibitory directions under Section 34 (1-B). 13. LEARNED counsel for the respondent Municipal Board, however, placed strong reliance on a letter dated February 15, 1984 issued by the Joint Secretary of the Local Self Government Department to the District Magistrate, Dehradun. 13. LEARNED counsel for the respondent Municipal Board, however, placed strong reliance on a letter dated February 15, 1984 issued by the Joint Secretary of the Local Self Government Department to the District Magistrate, Dehradun. In this letter, the Joint Secretary states that the Government Orders dated April 16, 1982 and December 29, 1983 referred to hereinabove were issued by the State Government in the interest of general public under Section 34 (1-B). 14. WE are unable to agree. This letter does not advance the case of the respondents any further. While it may be assumed that this letter confirms that the orders dated April 16, 1982 and December 29, 1983 were issued under the authority of the Government so as to dispel any doubt as regards whether or not these orders could be treated as issued by the State Government, it cannot by a mere declaration bring these orders within the purview of Section 34 (1-B). If these orders do not legally fall within the abmit of Section 34 (1-B) a subsequent simple declaration made on behalf of the Government in that behalf cannot confer on them the status or incidence of an order properly issued under that provision. Learned counsel for the State Government as well as Municipal Board vehemently contended that the sanction granted to the petitioners contravened the building bye-laws and consequently this Court should not interfere with the impugad action of the Municipal Board. It was also contended that the sanction was obtained by the petitioners on misrepresentation of facts and that the officials of the Municipal Board had colluded with the petitioners. It was urged that in this view also this Court ought not to quash the impugned order even if it is of the opinion that the Executive Officer had issued the impugned order on the erroneous premise that there were orders of the State Government under Section 34 (1-B). 15. WE find no merit in either of the two contentions. It was urged that in this view also this Court ought not to quash the impugned order even if it is of the opinion that the Executive Officer had issued the impugned order on the erroneous premise that there were orders of the State Government under Section 34 (1-B). 15. WE find no merit in either of the two contentions. As Administrator of the Municipal Board, the District Magistrate was undoubtedly empowered to consider the petitioners' application for sanction of the building plan in view of the powers conferred upon him under Section 10-AA (a) of the U. P. Municipalities Act which provides that all powers, functions and duties of the Board, its President and Committees shall be vested in and be exercised, performed and discharged by an officer appointed in that behalf by the State Government. The District Magistrate was undoubtedly an officer appointed by the State Government to exercise these powers of the Board and its committees. The impugned sanction granted by the Administrator cannot, therefore, be treated as non est or wholly void which might be ignored by this Court. The question whether the sanction was granted in breach of any bye-laws is, however, quite another matter. If the sanction granted by the Administrator is contrary to any building bye-laws, the Municipal Board may take appropriate action available to it in law for the cancellation or modification of the sanction and we are informed that such an action has already been initiated by the Municipal Board by means of a notice dated February 4, 1984 issued by the Executive Officer to the petitioners a true copy of which has been annexed to the counter affidavit of Sohan Singh Rawat on behalf of the Municipal Board. WE are further informed that a civil suit has also been instituted by the petitioners challenging the validity of that notice and that suit is still pending. 16. IN view of the facts stated above, we do not consider it proper that we should express any concluded opinion on whether or not the sanction granted to the petitioners contravenes any building bye-laws and further whether the same has been obtained by the petitioners by misrepresentation of facts. Sufficient to say that on the material on record it is not possible for this Court to give any concluded finding on these issues. Sufficient to say that on the material on record it is not possible for this Court to give any concluded finding on these issues. We, therefore, refrain from expressing any opinion on these issues, particularly when they are pending consideration before the civil court. The scope of this petition is much narrower, namely, whether or not the impugned order restraining the petitioners from proceeding with the construction of the building is founded on a patent misconception that the State Government has prohibited the construction of the building in question under Section 34 (1-B) of the Act. 17. IN this view, we are not pronouncing on other issues raised by respondents' counsel, and it will be open to the respondents to take such action in regard to the sanction granted to the petitioners and the building which is being constructed in pursuance thereof as may be available to them in law and to that extent this judgment shall not stand in the way of the respondents. 18. WE may now dispose of the remaining points urged on behalf of the petitioners. So far as the first question, namely, whether the orders dated April 16, 1982 and December 29, 1983 are liable to be ignored not having been published in the official gazette is concerned, we find no merit in the same. Section 8-A itself states that in the Chapter in question unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context 'order' means an order published in the official gazette or in the manner prescribed. Section 8-A was brought on the statute book by means of the U. P. Municipalities (Amendment) Act, 1953 (U. P. Act No. Vll of 1953) along with several other provisions inserted in the Act with regard to municipal elections. The object of the Amending Act states that the proposed changes in the Act became necessary with a view to adoption of adult suffrage and the abolition of the system of communal electorate by the Constitution. The various amendments which were introduced along with Section 8-A all pertained to the conduct of elections of the Municipal Boards on the same lines as in the case of State Legislatures. These various provisions relating to elections by their very nature required notification in the Gazette or in the manner prescribed so that the people at large are made aware of the various steps in the conduct of elections. These various provisions relating to elections by their very nature required notification in the Gazette or in the manner prescribed so that the people at large are made aware of the various steps in the conduct of elections. (For example, see Sections 11-A, 11-B, 11-C, 12-H and so on). There is, however, nothing in the context of Section 34 (1-B) in a case where the prohibition is intended to be against a particular individual or individuals which might require any general notification through the Gazette or otherwise. In such a context, in our opinion, the definition of the term 'order' under Section 8-A (e) would not apply. The context excludes adoption of the definition of the term 'order'. We next turn to the second submission. Learned counsel placed reliance on two decisions, namely, Municipal Board Kannauj v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1971 SC 2147 at page 2149, Harpal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1977 Alld. 302 neither of which has any application to the facts of the present case. In both these cases the position was that the resolution or the order of the Board was of a nature that it did not require any execution or further execution nor any action to be taken in pursuance thereof. In each case it was held that the resolution or the order had already been carried into effect. However, in the present case we find that though the sanction had been granted to the petitioners, construction work in pursuance thereof was still continuing and consequently the same could be lawfully prohibited in view of the following provisions occurring in Section 34 (1-B). "and may prohibit the doing or continuance by any person of any act in pursuance of or under cover of such resolution or order." 19. THESE words are of very wide amplitude and clearly cover a case where some action has still to be taken by a third party in pursuance of or under cover of a resolution or order of the Board. We, therefore, reject the second submission also. 20. THE fourth contention is equally devoid of any merit. It is true that the impugned orders have not been expressed to have been issued in the name of the Governor. We, therefore, reject the second submission also. 20. THE fourth contention is equally devoid of any merit. It is true that the impugned orders have not been expressed to have been issued in the name of the Governor. However, both the language of the orders themselves aswell as the assertions made in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government, it is apparent that the said orders have been issued by the Statement. In paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit of Paras Math filed on behalf of the State Government it has been categorically stated that the impugned orders have been issued at the instance of the Hon'ble Minister for Housing and Urban Development. Further, the orders clearly state that they have been issued under instructions of the Government by the Joint Secretary of the concerned department. It cannot, therefore, be seriously disputed that the said orders have been issued by the State Government. The net result of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, is that the impugned order dt. January 22, 1984 issued by the Executive Officer Municipal Board, Mussorie, is liable to be quashed on the ground that the same has been passed on the erroneous premise that the Government has restrained further construction of multistoryed buildings. We wish, however, to make it absolutely clear that this judgment and order shall not preclude the State Government from taking any fresh action under Section 34 (1-B) in regard to the sanction granted to the petitioners subject, of course, to the limitations of that provision. Nor does this judgment preclude the Municipal Board from taking such action as may be available to it under the law in regard to the sanction in question. 21. IN the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated January 23, 1984 issued by the Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Mussoorie, is hereby quashed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.