JUDGMENT S. D. Agarwala, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of consolidation proceedings. 2. The plots in dispute are plots No. 1045 and 1042. These plots were recorded in the basic year as sirdari of the petitioner. Opposite party No. 4 Jatadhari filed an objection under Section 9-A (2) of the Act on the ground that the name of the petitioner was wrongly recorded in the revenue papers, his name be expunged and that the name of Jatadhari be recorded in place of Ram Samujh. During the pendency of the case before the Consolidation Officer on 1-5-1970 an application was made by the petitioner that in case Jatadhari states that the plots in dispute were in his possession and that it was his sirdari, then the case be decided accordingly. It was further stated that Jatadhari had to state the above facts in the temple of Bhaironji Maharaj after wearing yellow dhoti with Gaga Jali in his hand. The effect of this offer was that in case Jatadhari states in the temple of Bhaironji Maharaj that the plots are in his possession and they are his sirdari, then the case be decided accordingly. This offer made by the petitioner was accepted by Jatadhari. Thereafter on 15th May, 1970 Jatadhari took an oath before Bhaironji that the plots in dispute were in his possession and were his sirdari. Since Jatadhari stated before Bhaironji the Consolidation Officer by its order dated 15th May, 1970 decided the case as per the agreement arrived at between the parties. The Consolidation Officer directed that necessary corrections be made in the records by his order, dated 15th May, 1970. Aggrieved by the said decision an appeal was filed before the Settlement Officer Consolidation. The appeal was dismissed on 19th November, 1971. Against the order dated 19-11-1971 a revision was filed in the court of Deputy Director of Consolidation. The revision was also dismissed on 28th September, 1972. The petitioner has now challenged all the three orders passed by the consolidation authorities by means of the present petition. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Against the order dated 19-11-1971 a revision was filed in the court of Deputy Director of Consolidation. The revision was also dismissed on 28th September, 1972. The petitioner has now challenged all the three orders passed by the consolidation authorities by means of the present petition. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the provision for taking special oath which was in existence in the Indian Oath's Act, 1873 has now been deleted and there is no such provision in the Oaths Act, 1969 which came into effect from 26th December, 1969 and as such the consolidation courts could not have decided the case on the basis of special oath. It was further urged that the agreement entered into between the parties was against the public policy and as such is void under Section 23 of the Contract Act. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed before me two Full Bench decisions of this Court where this question has been considered. The first decision cited by the learned counsel is Akbari Begum v. Rahmat Hussain, 1933 ALJ 1127. This is a Full Bench decision of this Court. In this case the question referred was as follows :- "Can the parties to a suit agree, apart from the Indian Oaths Act, that they will abide by the statement of a witness, including one who is a party to the suit and 'can they leave the decision of all points' including costs arising in the case to be according to his statement ?" The Full Bench answered the question in the affirmative holding that apart from Indian Oaths Act it is open to a party to abide by the statement of the witness including one who is a party to a suit. 5. In the next decision which has been relied upon by the respondent is Saheb Ram v. Ram Newaz, AIR 1952 Alld. 882. This also is a Full Bench decision of this Court. 5. In the next decision which has been relied upon by the respondent is Saheb Ram v. Ram Newaz, AIR 1952 Alld. 882. This also is a Full Bench decision of this Court. In this case it was held by Full Bench that where a party offers to be bound by the statement of any of the opposite parties under section 9 of the Indian Oaths Act, he cannot resile from such an offer after the other party has agreed to make such oath, unless there be sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the court for allowing the offerer to resile. 6. So far as the case of Saheb Ram (Supra) is concerned, the question decided in that case does not arise for consideration in the present case. The decision in Akbari Begum (Supra) fully applies to the facts of the present case. It has been held by the Full Bench of this court that even apart from the Indian Oaths Act, if a party agrees to abide by the statement of a party, then it is open to a court to decide the suit according to the said statement. 7. The fact that Indian Oaths Act, 1873 has now been repealed and new Oaths Act, 1969 has come does not change the position of law, namely, that it is always open to a party to agree apart from the Indian Oaths Act to abide by the statement of a particular party. 8. In the circumstances, I am of the view that even though Oaths Act, 1873 has been repealed and the provisions of special oath has been delected in the Oaths Act, 1969, it makes no difference and the ratio in the decision of Akbari Begum (supra) fully applies in the present case. In view of the above, it cannot be said that the court acted illegally in following this procedure. 9. In regard to the second argument of the learned counsel that the agreement was against the public policy. This argument also in my opinion is not substantiated. The agreement made in the instant case was not against any public policy. It has been held in the case of Akbari Begum (supra) that an agreement for special oath is not against public policy. The mere fact that the provisions for special oath has been deleted in the Act of 1873 (? 1969) does not change the position. The agreement made in the instant case was not against any public policy. It has been held in the case of Akbari Begum (supra) that an agreement for special oath is not against public policy. The mere fact that the provisions for special oath has been deleted in the Act of 1873 (? 1969) does not change the position. The provisions of Oaths Act, 1873 only enabled the court to give special oath to a party. This provision has been deleted but that does not mean that it deprives the party to be bound by the statement of other party. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the agreement in the instant case is not against any public policy or void under section 23 of the Contract Act. The second submission of the learned counsel also in my opinion is not substantiated. 10. In view of the above, I do not find any force in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.