D. N. JHA, J. ( 1 ) CRIMINAL Misc. Application No. 361 of 1984 has been moved on behalf of Surya Bux Singh, Radhey Shyam Singh and Ram Bux Singh praying that one months time be allowed to deposit the fine imposed on them in Criminal Appeal No. 682 of 1977. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this application are that these three applicants along with Ram Lakhan had been convicted by the Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Pratapgarh, in Sessions Trial No. 83 of 1973, They preferred Criminal Appeal No. 682 of 1977 against the said judgment and order and this Court pronounced the operative part of the order on 21-11-1983 for reasons to follow subsequently. The judgment thereafter was delivered giving reasons on 13-12-1983. The relevant operative part so far as the present applicants are concerned is as under : -"the fine imposed shall be deposited within a month of the date of order failing which the three appellants, Radhey Shyam, Surya Bux Singh and Ram Bux Singh shall be taken into custody to serve out the sentences. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pratapgarh, will send compliance report within six weeks. " ( 3 ) IT appears from the record that special leave petition was preferred by the applicants against the judgment and order passed by this Court but the same was dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court on 2-4-1984. On 15-2-1984 an application had been moved before this Court praying that the applicants be allowed to deposit the amount of fine in 12 equal instalments. This application was numbered as Criminal Misc. Application No. 100 of 1984. It came up for orders on 16-2-1984 and the Division Bench was pleased to dismiss the application by observing that the case has already been decided and time has been mentioned in the judgment. There is no scope for acceptance of the prayer made in the application. ( 4 ) THE applicants still did not deposit the amount before the trial court but moved Criminal Misc. Application No. 126 of 1984 oh 13-2-1984 with a similar prayer and for extension of time to deposit fine which was dismissed for want of prosecution on 5-4-1984. This is how this third application has now been moved with a prayer for extension of time to deposit the fine. ( 5 ) WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties. This is how this third application has now been moved with a prayer for extension of time to deposit the fine. ( 5 ) WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the applicants argued that Suraj Bux Singh and Radhey Shyam moved an application on 11-4-1984 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Pratapgarh, to deposit the fine imposed on them in Criminal Appeal No. 682 of 1977 by the High Court and the learned Judge only observed that time allowed by the Honble Court had already expired, hence the amount of fine could not be accepted unless the High Court extends the time to deposit the fine. Ram Bux Singh was not an applicant in that application because he had not been able to arrange for the money. It may be mentioned that each of the applicants had to deposit Rs. 2000/- imposed as fine by this Court. The learned counsel vehemently argued that the learned Sessions Judge was bound to accept the money in spite of time having expired. In support of his contention he placed reliance on S. 68 of the Penal Code. The section reads as under : -"68. The imprisonment, which is imposed in default of payment of a fine, shall terminate whenever that fine is either paid or levied by process of law. " the argument of the learned counsel for the applicants is that as soon as the money is offered by a convict the imprisonment shall stand terminated and the payment of fine cannot be refused by the Court. In support of his contention he placed reliance on a single Judge decision of this Court in Shambhu Dayal v. State, 1979 All LJ 822. We are unable to subscribe to the submission. In the instant case the convictions of the applicants were under Ss. 307/34 and 325/34, I. P. C. Their sentences were altered under Ss. 307/34, I. P. C. to the imprisonment already undergone and a fine of Rs. 1000/- to be paid by each of the applicants. In default of payment of fine they were directed to undergo R. I. for 18 months. Likewise their sentence under Ss. 325/34, I. P. C. was altered to the imprisonment already undergone and a fine of Rs. 307/34, I. P. C. to the imprisonment already undergone and a fine of Rs. 1000/- to be paid by each of the applicants. In default of payment of fine they were directed to undergo R. I. for 18 months. Likewise their sentence under Ss. 325/34, I. P. C. was altered to the imprisonment already undergone and a fine of Rs. 1000/- to be paid by each of the applicants and in default of payment of fine they were to undergo R. I. for 18 months. It was further ordered that the fine imposed shall be deposited within one month of the date of the order failing which the applicants were to be taken into custody to serve out the sentences. In fact the very word "imprisonment" means "putting in prison". ( 7 ) THE Penal Code or the Cr. P. C. does not define the expression "imprisonment", but it is clear from S. 418, Cr. P. C. that when an accused is sentenced to imprisonment, the court passing the sentence shall forthwith forward him, along with the warrant, to the jail in which he is to be confined. It is noticeable that according to the proviso to S. 418 (1), Cr. P. C. where a sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the court is passed, the accused may be confined in such place as the court may direct. So, the concept of "imprisonment" implies "putting into prison or other place of custody. " ( 8 ) THE sentence of imprisonment is to commence from the time when the sentence is passed unless there is some lawful reason for ordering it to commence from some future period. ( 9 ) SECTION 424, Cr. P. C. lays down the effect of non-payment of fine immediately upon pronouncement of the order of payment of fine or in default thereof to undergo imprisonment. According to cl. (1) of S. 424 Cr. P. C. when the fine is not paid forthwith, the court may order payment in full, on or before a date not more than 30 days from the date of the order. In other words, the court is competent to direct that a payment may be made on or before a specific date which should not be more than 30 days beyond the date of the order. In other words, the court is competent to direct that a payment may be made on or before a specific date which should not be more than 30 days beyond the date of the order. Clause (b) provides that if such postponement of fine is ordered, the court may suspend the execution of the sentence of imprisonment, release the offender on execution of a bond with or without sureties conditioned for his appearance before a court on the date on or before such payment of fine is to be made. The consequence is that when the court grants the concession against nonpayment of fine forthwith, the concession is not to extend beyond 30 days and is to be conditioned with the requirement for the convict to appear in the court on the date, if not earlier, on which the payment of fine is to be made. The clause then goes on to say that if the fine is not realised before such date, the court may direct the sentence of imprisonment to be carried into effect at once. The upshot is that where a date is specified for payment of fine, the only procedure required to be followed is that on non-payment of fine by the date fixed, the court has to direct that the sentence of imprisonment be carried into effect at once; in other words, the convict has to be taken into custody at once and to be confined into prison. ( 10 ) THE law goes so far as to lay down that even when an offender has been imprisoned, in default of payment of fine, and has undergone the whole of such imprisonment in default, the court may for special circumstances to be recorded in writing, issue warrant for levy of fine, vide Proviso to S. 421 (1) Cr. P. C. It has been held in the case of Paras Nath v. State, 1969 Cri LJ 350 : ( AIR 1969 All 116 ) that undergoing of imprisonment, awarded in default of payment of fine does not operate as a discharge or satisfaction of the fine which may, nevertheless, be levied in the manner prescribed by S. 386 (1), Cr. P. C. of 1898 corresponding to present S. 421, Cr. P. C. of 1898 corresponding to present S. 421, Cr. P. C. ( 11 ) THESE provisions of law negative any contention that a convict, who has made default in payment of fine, in terms of the specific orders passed by the court, is at liberty to deposit the fine as and when he pleases. Even the provisions of General Rules (Criminal) 1957, governing the subordinate court, do not recognise any such liberty. R. 76 says that when the amount of fine is not paid at once into court, it may allow the person, liable to make the payment, to make the payment within a period to be fixed by it. It goes on to say that when a person is undergoing imprisonment, in default of payment of fine, the officer-in-charge of jail may receive the payment and thereupon complete the execution of warrant as provided by law. R. 80 says that every court, on receiving a payment on behalf of a person, who is in jail in default of payment of fine, shall at once inform the Officer-in-charge of the jail. ( 12 ) THE cumulative examination of these provisions of law leaves no manner of doubt that in the first instance the person sentenced to pay a fine must deposit the fine forthwith, but may be permitted to deposit it after some time in the discretion of the court. Even in that event, he must deposit the amount before the period specifically fixed by the court and if he does not do so, he immediately incurs the liability of being sent to prison. It would be the duty of the court to arrest him and confine him into the prison. Only when such confinement in the prison has commenced that the accused can have a legal right to deposit the amount, whereupon S. 68 I. P. C. would come into operation and his imprisonment would terminate. It may be that in a particular case an instant imprisonment may terminate immediately on deposit of the amount because the law recognizes, in the Proviso to S. 418 (1), Cr. P. C. an imprisonment even till the rising of the court signifying that confinement may be made within the court premises at the discretion of the court. It may be that in a particular case an instant imprisonment may terminate immediately on deposit of the amount because the law recognizes, in the Proviso to S. 418 (1), Cr. P. C. an imprisonment even till the rising of the court signifying that confinement may be made within the court premises at the discretion of the court. ( 13 ) LEARNED counsel for the applicants has not been able to show any law, except the learned single Judge decision in the case of Shambhu Dayal v. State, (1979 All LJ 822) (supra) that a convict has a right to deposit the amount of fine as and when he is inclined to do so. The settled law is that an act must be performed in the manner prescribed for its performance, it cannot be performed in any other manner. It is equally settled that a criminal court is not competent to alter or review its judgment or final order except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error as laid down in S. 362, Cr. P. C. It follows that no powers can be exercised incidentally to undo the bar provided by S. 362, Cr. P. C. ( 14 ) SECTION 427, Cr. P. C. provides for an exception to the general rule that sentences commence to run from the time of their being passed. The fine awarded to an applicant is in fact a form of punishment. The Penal Code sanctions either a term of imprisonment, or a fine, or both. In the instant case the sentence of fine was awarded because no substantial term of imprisonment under the two penal provisions had been awarded. It may be mentioned that the purpose of awarding imprisonment in default of payment of fine is in fact to induce the convict to pay his fine rather than to suffer imprisonment. The scope of such a sentence has to be found in S. 64 I. P. C. In Shambhu Dayal v. State (supra) V. N. Varma, J. (as he then was) has observed :-"that time is, however, not dead-end of the matter. The scope of such a sentence has to be found in S. 64 I. P. C. In Shambhu Dayal v. State (supra) V. N. Varma, J. (as he then was) has observed :-"that time is, however, not dead-end of the matter. To say that thereafter the accused cannot be permitted to pay the fine imposed upon him and he must, therefore, go to jail would not be correct as that would run counter to what is mentioned in S. 68, I. P. C. " the learned Judge after quoting S. 68 further observed : -"this means that it is open to the accused to pay fine a at any time he likes to pay and the moment he pays it his imprisonment in default of payment of fine would stand terminated. If his imprisonment will stand terminated after payment of fine then what can stop him from paying the fine before he is sent to Jail. Therefore, if the applicant paid the fine even though late the court should not have ignored that payment and taken the applicant in custody. Once the applicant had paid the fine, the imprisonment which had been imposed upon him, in default of payment of that fine should have been taken to have terminated. "we do not find ourselves in agreement with the observations made by Varma, J. The reading of S. 68 clearly indicate that it is the termination of the imprisonment which takes place on a convict depositing the fine. A term of imprisonment can terminate provided it has come into existence. A time limit fixed by a court is dead-end for the convict to deposit the money. If the observation of Varma J. is to be accepted then in our opinion the imposition of imprisonment in default of payment of fine would be reduced to redundancy. The Court in order to enable a convict to deposit fine gives him time but, it is not the intention of the Court to allow a convict to go scot-free if he fails to deposit the amount within the stipulated period. If the interpretation applied by Varma J. is to be accepted then it would be open to an accused to loiter about for years without depositing the fine or undergoing the imprisonment awarded in default of payment of fine. In our opinion such a construction cannot be given to a penal statute. If the interpretation applied by Varma J. is to be accepted then it would be open to an accused to loiter about for years without depositing the fine or undergoing the imprisonment awarded in default of payment of fine. In our opinion such a construction cannot be given to a penal statute. The statute should be construed in a manner to carry out the intention of the Legislature. The object and reason for awarding imprisonment in default of payment of fine is to prevent a convict from making default. Each word and phrase of the statute has to be construed in the light of general purpose of the Act itself. A bare mechanical interpretation of the words devoid of "concept of purpose" will reduce most of the legislation to futility. It is a celebrated rule, well established, that the intention of the Legislature must be found by reading statute as a whole. It would not be out of place to mention that for proper enforcement of various provisions of law it is common knowledge that absolute liability is imposed and acts without mens rea are made punishable. In the instant case the applicants were aware of the quantum of fine and also the time within which they were directed to deposit it. The applicants in the first instance tried to seek permission to deposit the amount of fine in instalments. Though this permission was refused still the applicants did not take steps to deposit the fine. ( 15 ) THE submission of the learned counsel that penal statute should be construed in favour of the accused and, therefore, no purpose would be served by sending the applicants to jail and time be extended permitting them to deposit the same. It is no doubt true that in construing a penal statute it is cardinal principle that in case of doubt, the construction favourable to the subject should be preferred but these rules do not in any way affect the fundamental principles of interpretation, namely, that the primary test with respect to language employed in the statute has to be examined and when the words are clear and plain the Court is bound to accept the express intention of the Legislature. In Maxwells Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Ed. In Maxwells Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Ed. page 262 it has been observed : -"it is now recognised that the paramount duty of the judicial interpreter is to put upon the language of the legislature honestly and faithfully, its plain and rational meaning and to promote its objects. " it is said that all penal statutes are to be construed strictly. It only means that the Court must see that the thing charged is an offence within the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain the words. The rule of strict construction requires that the language of the statute should be so construed that no case shall be held to fall within which it does not come within the reasonable interpretation of the statute. The Court had awarded a punishment of fine with a direction that the same should be deposited within a month. The subordinate court, therefore, rightly refused to accept the money. In terms of the judgment of this Court in the event of default of payment of fine the Court had no alternative but to take the applicants into custody and if money was deposited the imprisonment awarded could be ordered to terminate but termination of punishment could not have taken place unless the punishment had actually commenced. The learned Judge instead of taking the applicants into custody by his observation that unless time is extended by the High Court he could not accept the amount amounted indirectly to extension of time to the applicants to obtain necessary orders from the Court. ( 16 ) IN the instant case since the legal proposition was vehemently urged before the Court it became necessary to decide the principles involved, in S. 68, I. P. C. Otherwise the Court had ample power under S. 482, Cr. P. C. to pass an appropriate order in the interest of justice. The learned counsel for the State argued that the applicants were under contempt as they had not carried out the terms of the order passed by this Court and in support of his contention he placed reliance on the case of State v. Gendan Lal Dwivedi, AIR 1953 All 597. In that case the applicant who was Sub Post Master at Bhartana was convicted for offences under S. 409 I. P. C. and S. 55 Indian Post Office Act. In that case the applicant who was Sub Post Master at Bhartana was convicted for offences under S. 409 I. P. C. and S. 55 Indian Post Office Act. He was sentenced to four years R. I. and a fine of Rs. 5000/- under the former count and he was awarded one years R. I. and a fine of Rs. 100/- under the latter provision. His appeal was dismissed and thereafter he filed an application for revision. That was also dismissed on 15-5-1950. On 7-2-1951 he made an application under S. 561a, Cr. P. C. without surrendering himself for all this time. The Court ordered the record of the case to be summoned and after perusal of the record and hearing the applicant the Court made the observation that the accused was out of jail for over a year without any authority. It was in these circumstances that the court held : -"it is the settled practice of this court that a petitioner who has been convicted should surrender himself before he makes an application in revision in this Court. . . . . . The petitioner without any order for bail, has been evading compliance of the order of sentence passed against him. In these circumstances, I am not prepared to hear him. " he was, therefore, not heard. It may be mentioned that in the instant case no substantive imprisonment was awarded to the applicants but they were only awarded fine and in the event of default of payment of fine they were to undergo imprisonment for the period mentioned above. It would, therefore, be harsh in our opinion to condemn the applicants without listening to their grievance. ( 17 ) WE have no hesitation in observing that the submission of the learned counsel for the applicants is devoid of merit and the interpretation placed in Shambhu Dayal v. State (1979 All LJ 822) (supra) cannot be said to lay down a good law. This decision has been relied upon in Criminal Revision No. 106 of 1981, Chingi v. State of U. P. decided on 11-4-1983, and T. N. Govilla v. State, 1980 Luck LJ 246. This decision has been relied upon in Criminal Revision No. 106 of 1981, Chingi v. State of U. P. decided on 11-4-1983, and T. N. Govilla v. State, 1980 Luck LJ 246. It may be mentioned that it is always open for the court to exercise discretion in the light of facts and circumstances emerging in a particular case, but in our opinion S. 68 does not help the case of the applicants in any manner. ( 18 ) THIS Court undoubtedly has discretion, under S. 482, Cr. P. C. to extend time for payment of fine. But, it is equally well-settled that the power under S. 482 Cr. P. C. is to be exercised mainly to prevent the abuse of process of Court and to render justice in the cause. The question is whether the application satisfied these tests. It is clear enough that by not obeying the specific directions of the Court and by postponing the payment, without surrendering into Court, the applicants have abused the process of the Court and have tried to bypass the course of justice. We do not think, therefore, that any discretion may be exercised in favour of the applicants by extending the time prayed for. ( 19 ) THE application is, therefore, rejected, but it is clarified that after the applicants have surrendered themselves in Court to serve out the sentence of imprisonment on default of payment of fine, they will be released as soon as the amount of fine is deposited and their imprisonment, as aforesaid, shall terminate under S. 68, I. P. C. Application dismissed.