JUDGMENT K. N. Misra 1. THIS writ petition in the nature of Habeas Corpus, is directed against the detention order dated 25th December, 1983 passed by the District Magistrate, Lucknow under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 and against the order dated 31st December, 1983 passed by the State Government confirming the said order of the District Magistrate, Lucknow. The petitioner has also challenged the order of the State Government rejecting the representation of the petitioner which was submitted by him against the detention order under the provisions of National Security Act, 1980 (for short 'the Act'). 2. PETITIONER is under trial in connection which several criminal cases registered against him. He was arrested on 2-10-1983 and was lodged in jail. On 25th December, 1983 this petitioner was served with the order of detention dated 25-12-83 passed by the District Magistrate, Lucknow by the Prison Authorities, along with this grounds of detention. The followings are the grounds of detention (i) That on 15-7-1982 In the night at 945 P. M. the petitioner had abused and accosted Mukesh Kumar and had fired at him with his fire-arm (Khata), as a consequence of which Mukesh Kumar sustained injuries on his thigh. Mukesh Kumar is brother-in-law of Ratnakar Devedi and at the time of the incident he had gone to his residence at 244, Motinagar, Lucknow, to drop Ratnakar's wife there. The incident was witnessed by Ratnakar Devedi, his wife and one Sri R. C. Srivastava and an FIR was lodged at 22.10 (1010 P. M.) at Police Station Naka (Crime No. 362, u/sec. 307 IPC). A charge-sheet was submitted in the case against the petitioner and the case is now pending in Court. (ii) That on 27-7-1982 at about 10 or 10*30 A.M. complainant Anuruddha Kumar, employee of Saket Filling Centre, Chinhat, Lucknow, was going from the Petrol Pump along with Kunwar Krishna Devedi riding on Hero Majestic Motor Cycle to his employer's residence Sri L. C. Gupta of Mahanagar carrying in a bag a sum of Rs. 16,742.00 kept in the diggi of the vehicle. At some distance from the petrol pump two persons were standing on the left side of the road, one of whom threw a hand- granade at them which hit Kunwar Krishna Devedi on his leg and he fell down from the vehicle. 16,742.00 kept in the diggi of the vehicle. At some distance from the petrol pump two persons were standing on the left side of the road, one of whom threw a hand- granade at them which hit Kunwar Krishna Devedi on his leg and he fell down from the vehicle. Both these persons had fire arms (Kattas) in their bands. They took out the cash from the diggi of the vehicle and threatened the complainant that if he will try to run away, he will be shot dead. At the distance of about 20 paces a Scooter was parked on which those persons drove away along with the cash An FIR was lodged (Crime No. 251, u/sec. 394 IPC) of this incident the same day on 27-9-1982 at 13 30 at Police Station, Chinhat, District Lucknow. During investigation petitioner was found to have participated in the crime and a charge sheet was submitted against the petitioner and the case is pending in the court. (iii) That on 15-9-1983 in the night at 830 P. M. complainant Sheo Shankar Lal along with his fattier and brother Pyare lal was sitting at his betel shop on Seth Ramdas Road. Three persons came to his shop and after taking betels they took out 400 rupees from the drawer and when resisted, one of them fired with his fire-arm and the other threw a band- granade injuring the complainant and ran away with the booty towards Saket Palli. There they entered the shop of general merchandise (Parchoon) of Neelam Kesherwani and took the cash from the shop. On being sesisted they fired at Neelam Kesherwani and injured him. Thereafter at some distance they way laid a lady and snatched golden ear-rings and silver chain and ran towards Harijan Basti. In front of the shop a country made pistol and a cartridge were dropped. A report of the incident was lodged at Police Station Hazratganj (Crime No. 1014, u/secs. 394/397 IPC) on 15-9-1983 at 21-50. During investigation petitioner was found to have participated in the crime and a charge sheet was submitted and the case is now pending in the Court. A report of the incident was lodged at Police Station Hazratganj (Crime No. 1014, u/secs. 394/397 IPC) on 15-9-1983 at 21-50. During investigation petitioner was found to have participated in the crime and a charge sheet was submitted and the case is now pending in the Court. (iv) On 2-10-1983 S. I. M. L. Khan along with other police personnels on getting some information regarding commission of crime relating to Crime No. 1064, reached B. H. M. Park (Begum Hazrat Mahal Park), at 11 A, M. and there he was informed through an informant that the petitioner will be coming from the side of Tulsi Cinema. The police party went in hiding in the park and waited for the petitioner who reached the place from the side of the telephone exchange; and that when he reached the place, the police personnels stopped him. The petitioner, however, took to his heals and in an attempt to evade his arrest, he fired at the police party in order to kill them from his fire-arm which he had kept in his waist. No one was, however, injured and the petitioner was arrested and an FIR was lodged at Police Station Hazratganj, Lucknow of this incident on 2-10-1983 at 1205 hours (Crime No. 1068, under Section 307 IPC) and Crime No. 1069, under Section 25 Arms the Act It is mentioned in the grounds that the petitioner obtained bail order from court for his release in cases registered against him under Crime No. 1068, under Section 307 IPC and Crime No. 1069, under Section 25, Arms Act, and that the petitioner was trying to obtain bail in other cases as well (Crime No. 1014, u/Sec. 394 IPC). The petitioner is in jail, but on his release, he will again be indulging in activities prejudicial 'to the maintenance of the public order, and thereby will disturb the maintenance of public order. 3. The petitioner is in jail, but on his release, he will again be indulging in activities prejudicial 'to the maintenance of the public order, and thereby will disturb the maintenance of public order. 3. IN the counter affidavit filed by the District Magistrate, Lucknow it is stated that the impugned detention order was passed by him after applying his mind to the facts of the case and on the basis of the material (copies of which have been supplied to the petitioner along with grounds of detention) and also after he felt satisfied that the detention of the petitioner was essential in order to prevent the petitioner from indulging again in the activities prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. 4. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner challenged the detention order and urged that the grounds on which the detention order has been passed, do not make out the case for detaining the petitioner under sub-section (2; of Section 3 of the Act. His contention was that the ground so taken, at the most relate to the maintenance of "law and order" and the same cannot be taken to effect the "Public order". It was submitted that the grounds relate to incidents affecting individuals and the same would at the most, be said to relate to matters relating to law and order and not affecting the "Public order." He pointed out that in the incident mentioned in ground No. 1, petitioner is said to have fired at Mukesh Kumar and injured him in the night of 15-7-1982. LEARNED counsel contended that the petitioner was got involved in the case on account of enmity. The said incident, according to him, cannot be taken to affect the public order at all. It being an act against the individual cannot be said to have disturbed the maintenance of the public order, and, as such, this ground which has been taken into consideration by the District Magistrate in passing the impugned detention order, is misconceived and irrelevant. The order of detention based on this ground is altogether invalid. LEARNED counsel contended that if one of the grounds on which the detention of the petitioner was based, fails, the detention order would vitiate and being invalid, deserves to be quashed. The order of detention based on this ground is altogether invalid. LEARNED counsel contended that if one of the grounds on which the detention of the petitioner was based, fails, the detention order would vitiate and being invalid, deserves to be quashed. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner, placed reliance upon a decision reported in Dwarka Prasad Sahu v. State of Bihar, AIR 1975 SC 134 , wherein, it has been held that *'if there is one principle more firmly established than any other in this field of jurisprudence it is that even if one of the grounds or reasons which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is non-existent or misconceived or irrelevant, the order of detention would be invalid and it would not avail the detaining authority to contend that the other grounds or reasons are good and do not suffer from any such infirmity, because it can never be predicated to what extent the bad grounds or reasons operated on the mind of the detaining authority or whether the detention order would have been made at all if the bad ground or reason were excluded and the good grounds or reasons alone were before the detaining authority." 5. IN the present case we have perused the FIR relating to incident of ground No. 1, produced before us. The petitioner has urged that he was falsely involved in this case on account of enmity with the complainant. So that as it may, since we cannot in these proceedings, enter into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made against the petitioner we refrain from commenting on it. From the perusal of the FIR we find that if it was a case of involvement of the petitioner on account of some previous acquaintence and enmity between the parties it is expected that the father's name or at least the residence of the petitioner must have been known to the complainant and the same must have been mentioned in the FIR. We are, therefore, not impressed with the aforesaid argument. We are, therefore, not impressed with the aforesaid argument. There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down in Kishori Mohan Bera v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1972 SC 1749 wherein it has been held : "One act may affect individuals in which case it would be said to affect law and order while another act though of a similar kind may have such an impact that it would disturb the even tempo of the life of the community in which case it would be said to affect public order, the test being not the kind but the potentiality of the act in question." One act may affect although individuals involved in the case, but if the potentiality of the act in question is such as to disturb the tempo of life of the persons in the locality, it would be said to affect the public order. Every criminal incident of theft, robbery, dacoity and murder etc. affects individuals, but if its impact disturbs the even tempo of life of the community, it would necessarily affect public order. 6. IN Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1982 SC 1143 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has drawn distinction between "Public order" and "law and order". IN para 13 of the report it is observed : "The true distinction between the areas of ''public order" and "law and order" lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of "law and order" and "public order" is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. IN one case it might affect specific individuals only and, therefore, touch the problem of law and order while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order." IN aforesaid decision, after considering the facts of the case, it was observed ; "The prejudicial activities of the detenu leading to public disorder, as revealed in the grounds of detention, consist of a consistent course of criminal record. Although the criminal activities of the detenu in the past pertained mostly to breaches of law and order, they have now taken a turn for the worse. From the facts alleged it appears that the detenu has taken to a life of crime and become a notorious character. His main activities are theft, robbery and snatching of ornaments by the use of knives and fire-arms. The area of operation is limited to South Delhi, such as Greater Kailash, Kalkaji and Lajpat Nagar. A perusal of the FIR shows that the petitioner is a person of desperate and dangerous character. This is not a case of a single activity directed against a single individual. There have been a series of criminal activities on the part of the detenu and his associates during a span of four years which have made him a menace to the society." In these circumstances the detention order was upheld. 7. IN the present case, the petitioner, in ground No. 1, is said to have used fire-arms in the incident, and, as such it cannot be said that it can have no effect on the minds of people living in the locality. Such incident where tire-arms are used, generally cause a fright and panic in the minds of the persons living in the locality and thereby causing disturbance in the even tempo of peaceful living of the residents in that locality. The ground No. 1, therefore, cannot be said to be baseless or irrelevant and it can not vitiate the subjective satisfaction of the authority passing the impugned order. 8. IN Sushil Kumar v. State of U.P., 1982 CrLJ 1992 , the Division Bench of this court held that "if a person is alleged to be in company of those who were armed with bombs, revolvers etc. and attacks passers by on a public street or If a person is armed with knives of a prohibited blade and goes about with an unlicenced pistol and extracts money from passers by his actions are bound to produce panic in the locality as a whole. Such actions are not only concerned with a question of 'Law and Order' but they also have an effect on the "public order" as judicially interpreted." In the present case the facts stated in the grounds quoted above, considered in totality are of the nature affecting the "Public order". Such actions are not only concerned with a question of 'Law and Order' but they also have an effect on the "public order" as judicially interpreted." In the present case the facts stated in the grounds quoted above, considered in totality are of the nature affecting the "Public order". The petitioner is said to have been involved in inflicting fire-arm injuries, in committing of robberies, looting shop-keepers and causing injuries to them with fire-arms and hand-granades. He Is alleged to be moving In the company of persons armed with bombs and revolvers and committing heinus crimes. Learned counsel had, however, urged that all the cases which have been registered against the petitioner are altogether false and he has been falsely implicated by the police merely on the statement of accomplice and interested persons. Be that as it may, in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, filed against the detention order, this court cannot examine the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made against the petitioner. All that the court can consider in such cases, is whether there was sufficient ground to justify the order of detention. This court does not function as an appellate authority and is not called upon to decide the correctness of the allegations made against the petitioner - See Sushil Kumar v. State of U. P., 1982 CrLJ 1992 (Alld.). 9. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner in the end had urged that the facts alleged in the grounds of detention did not furnish sufficient nexus for forming subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and further that they were vague, irrelevant, or lacking in particulars. This contention cannot be accepted. We have perused the aforesaid grounds of detention very carefully and in our opinion, the grounds furnished were neither vague nor Irrelevant; nor lacking in particulars, and, as such, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority to which it reached in passing the detention order, cannot be said to have been vitiated by the consideration of any irrelevant material. Thus the impugned detention order is quite legal and proper and calls for no interference. 10. IN this view of the matter we see no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.