JUDGMENT K. N. Goyal, J. 1. THIS is a tenant's writ petition directed against the order of eviction passed on an application of landlady, opposite party No. 3, under Section 21 (1) (b) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The Prescribed Authority, and on appeal the learned Additional District Judge, held have that the building was in a dilapidated condition and required to be demolished and that the other requirements of Rule 17 of the Rules made under the Act were also satisfied in the case. As such the petitioner has lost in both the courts below. 2. WHEN the petition was presented before Hon'ble D. N. Jha, J. it was admitted and at the same time it was directed that in view of conflicting authorities, the matter shall be listed for hearing before a Division Bench at an early date. The conflicting authorities referred to in the order dated 19-10-1983 were on the question whether the fourth proviso to Section 21 (1) was applicable to an application under Section 21 (1) (b) as well or was it confined only to applications under Section 21 (1) (a). It is in these circumstances that the petition has come up before us for hearing. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner Sri M. A Siddiqui at some length. 3. THE first question that is canvassed by the learned counsel is that the language of the fourth proviso to Section 21 (1) does not refer to any application being under clause (a) or clause (b). Literally interpreted, it applies to all applications under Section 21 (1) except in cases covered by the Explanations. In support of his contention he has referred to a decision of Hon'ble D. M. Chandra Shekhar, J. (as he then was) reported in Jagan Nath Prasad v. District Judge, Gonda, 1977 LLJ 381. In this decision there is no discussion or express decision as to whether the said proviso should apply to applications under clause (b) as well or not. THE judgment shows that the application in that case was both under clause (a) and under clause (b) of Section 21 (1). For it is mentioned in the second paragraph of the judgment that the application was made also on the ground that the landlords required the premises for their own occupation. THE judgment shows that the application in that case was both under clause (a) and under clause (b) of Section 21 (1). For it is mentioned in the second paragraph of the judgment that the application was made also on the ground that the landlords required the premises for their own occupation. This judgment is based on an assumption that the fourth proviso did apply, apart from the circumstance that the application was covered by both the clauses. As such, it is of no assistance to us in determining the controversy before us. On the other hand, we find that in four other single Judge decisions, namely, Jhandu Singh v. District Judge, 1977 AWC 174 (K. N. Seth, J.), Rajesh Dayal v. District Judge, 1977 UP RCC 270 (Mahavir Singh, J.), Bhola Shanker v. Vth Addl. District Judge, 1980 ALJ 585 (A. N. Varma, J.) and Jalil Ahmad v. 1st Addl. District Judge, Faizabad, 1982 AWC 677 (S. C. Mathur, J.), it has been held that the Fourth proviso is confined only to applications under clause (a) and is not applicable to applications under clause (b) of Section 21 (1). 4. LEARNED counsel has further contended that according to the well known principles of statutory construction where the language of a provision is clear, the question of its reasonableness should not be considered and the Court should not try to supply any omissions, which, according to it, have been inadvertently left uncovered by the legislature or to correct any assumed mistakes therein. It is, however, well settled that every provision of a statute must be interpreted in the light of the context and also in the light of its legislative history. The principle of contextual interpretation is well settled. The question involved in the present case is whether there should be any comparison of hardships in a case where the landlord approaches the Prescribed Authority with an application not on the ground of the building being required for his occupation, but on the ground that the building is in a dilapidated condition, and, as such, it is required for demolition and reconstruction. Where the landlord is not required to prove his need at all, there can be no question of any "hardship" to him by rejection of his application. Where the landlord is not required to prove his need at all, there can be no question of any "hardship" to him by rejection of his application. The contention of the learned counsel that "need" and "hardship" are different concepts, cannot be accepted in the form put forward before us. Of course, it is true that even though the landlord may prove his need, the Court must further consider whether on balance of hardships his prayer for eviction should be granted. In other words, the question in such cases arises whether the need of the landlord, though genuine, is more pressing than the need of the tenant. It cannot, thus, be said that need and hardship are totally independent of each other. The considerations of need and hardship can, it is quite obvious, apply only in respect of applications under clause (a) and not in respect of applications under clause (b), which are based only on the ground of the condition of the building. The need to demolish dilapidated buildings is a social necessity. It is not in the interest of the society itself that dilapidated buildings should be allowed to continue and endanger life and safety, not only of the inmates, but also of persons who may visit the building or may pass along the thoroughfare adjoining the building. The question of importing the comparison of hardships on an application under clause (b) cannot possibly arise, considering the context and also the legislative history as noticed by brother A. N. Varma, J. in Bhola Shanker's case (supra). We are clearly of the opinion that the Fourth proviso was intended to cover only cases which were dealt with by Rule 16 and not to cases which were covered by Rule 17. A perusal of the two rules clearly shows that Rule 16 is related to applications under clause (a) while Rule 17 is related to applications under clause (b). In the circumstances, the further contention of the learned counsel that in case two views be possible, the interpretation favouring the tenant should be preferred, does not arise for consideration. We are clearly of the view that there is only one view possible, namely, that the Fourth proviso cannot apply to applications under clause (b). In the circumstances, the further contention of the learned counsel that in case two views be possible, the interpretation favouring the tenant should be preferred, does not arise for consideration. We are clearly of the view that there is only one view possible, namely, that the Fourth proviso cannot apply to applications under clause (b). Accordingly the decision in Jagannath Prasad (supra) to the extent it suggests that the said proviso would apply even to applications under clause (b), cannot be considered to be good law and it is accordingly over-ruled. It has further been contended that apart from the application of the Fourth proviso, even the requirements of Rule 17 were not fulfilled in the instant case. Rule 17 refers to four requirements. The first requirement is that the building requires demolition. The contention of the learned counsel that there is a distinction between a building requiring to be demolished and building being required for demolition as laid down in clause (b) of Section 21 (1) is, in our opinion, mere quibbling and cannot be sustained. A rule is a piece of subordinate legislation and it cannot be expected to go beyond the provisions of the Act under which the Rule is made. The first condition mentioned in Rule 17 cannot, thus be said to require something over and above what is required by Section 21 (1) (b). 5. LEARNED counsel has also assailed the finding about the building being in a dilapidated condition and requiring demolition. We have gone through the judgment of the Prescribed Authority, which has been upheld in the appeal, and we find that the Prescribed Authority, after an inspection of the building, has for good reasons clearly held that the building was in a dilapidated condition and could not be set right through repairs. Some parts of the building may not be in as bad a condition as most of the building, but it. cannot be said on this basis that only a minor part was in a dilapidated condition and required to be demolished. The concurrent finding of fact on this point is that a substantial portion of the building is in a dilapidated condition, and this finding does not suffer from any error of law on the basis of which interference under Article 226 of the Constitution could be possible. 6. The concurrent finding of fact on this point is that a substantial portion of the building is in a dilapidated condition, and this finding does not suffer from any error of law on the basis of which interference under Article 226 of the Constitution could be possible. 6. THE other requirements are also clearly mentioned in the order of the Additional District Judge. THE landlady had filed an estimate of the expenditure required on demolition and re-construction. This estimate, by inadvertence, has not been mentioned in the order of the Prescribed Authority. THE Prescribed Authority as well as the Additional District Judge have, however, categorically held that the landlady does have the financial capacity to meet the estimated expenses of demolition and reconstruction. The Prescribed Authority has also referred to a " sanctioned " plan The Additional District Judge has referred to it likewise. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, contended that it was not enough that there should be a sanctioned plan. The Prescribed Authority should itself independently examine whether the plan conforms to the relevant building bye laws or regulations. In support of his contention he has relied on a decision of a learned single Juge reported as Ram Autar v. IInd Additional District Judge Moradabad, 1982 (1) Allahabad Rent Cases, 124 (para-7). This ruling does, no doubt, support learned counsel for the petitioner. We are, however, not inclined to accept the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Of course, where only a site plan has been prepared, but it is still to be sanctioned by the competent authority, then, no doubt, the Prescribed Authority must examine whether the plan conforms to the building bye-laws or regulations. Where, however, the competent authority, under the building bye-laws or regulations, has itself sanctioned the plan, it is not open to the Prescribed Authority or to the appellate Court to sit in judgment over the decision of the said competent authority. The requirement of Rule 17 in this behalf has to be reasonably interpreted, and it cannot be so interpreted as to confer a part of appellate jurisdiction on the Prescribed Authority to sit in judgment over the decision of the local body or other competent authority on which the jurisdiction to examine the building plans has been conferred by the legislature. The view of learned single Judge in Ram Autar (Supra) on this point, is overruled. 7. The view of learned single Judge in Ram Autar (Supra) on this point, is overruled. 7. IN this view of the matter, we find no good ground to interfere with the impugned orders. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. 8. IN the end the learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for time to vacate the premises and offered to give the usual undertaking. If the petitioner gives undertaking within a week before the Additional Registrar, on affidavit, to the effect that the petitioner will vacate the premises and deliver vacant possession to opposite party No. 3, at the expiry of three months, and that he will not transfer possession to anyone else in the meantime, then the order of the Prescribed Authority shall not be executed for a period of three months. IN case no such undertaking is furnished, the order shall be executable forthwith. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.