State Of U. P. v. Amar Nath Bhargava — 1984 DIGILAW 441 (ALL)

JUDGMENT E. N. Misra, J. 1. THIS first appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 19-12-1968 passed by the Civil Judge, Mohanlal ganj, Lucknow, in Regular Suit No. 126 of 1966. 2. BRIEFLY stated, the facts of the case are as follows ;- Amar Nath Bhargava the plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 23,500/ with pendentelite and future interest against the defendant-appellant with the allegations that he was given a contract by defendant No. 2, the Superintending Engineer, 6-Circle Irrigation Works, Lucknow on 5th August, 1957 for the construction of the bridge on river Loni near village Hasnapur, Tehsil Mohanlal ganj, District Lucknow. This work was to be completed by 31-3-58 and in pursuance of the said contract the plaintiff started work and various foundation wells' were sunk in December, 1957 and January, 1958 but further progress could not be made and was considerably delayed due to the apathy of the departmental officers who did not carry out the required testing, despite repeated request till February, 1958. The departmental engineers conducted testing of the wells in February, 1958 and asked the plaintiff to sink two pier wells further by 7 feet each, which work was in addition to the work stipulated in the contract. However, the plaintiff on being asked to do that work, completed it within a fortnight of the instructions issued in that behalf. Since for the aforesaid reasons the work could not be completed within the stipulated period of the contract, for which the fault lay on the department, and, as such, the plaintiff applied for extension of time upto 15th June, 1958 which was granted. In spite of extension of time further progress in the work could not possibly be made because the departmental engineers failed to give the required instructions for the plugging and sealing of the wells The last pier well was allowed to be sealed as late as 20th April, 1956 despite plaintiff's request. In these circumstances it almost became an impossibility to complete the work by 15th June, 1958. In these circumstances it almost became an impossibility to complete the work by 15th June, 1958. The plaintiff, however, made all efforts and after plugging the wells the massonary work of the pier was completed by the plaintiff as quickly as by 4th May, 1958 and immediately, he also prepared the centring and shuttering of the bearing slab and requested the department to supply to him the requisite bearing plates, for which the department had already placed orders with some Firm, but in spite of repeated request, the bearing plates were not supplied to the plaintiff and so the further progress in the work was held- up. The plaintiff, in these circumstances, again applied on 7th May, 1958 for further extension of time upto 28th February, 1959. No reply to it was, however, received from the defendants, and, as such, a reminder was sent on 13th June, 1958 in addition to personal approaches made by him to the concerned authorities but they remained indifferent. The plaintiff was, therefore, compelled to give final reminder on 23-7-1958 as he could not remain in suspense to maintain labour and establishment indifinitely. To the utter surprise of the plaintiff defendant No. 4 Sri Radhey Shyam, who was then Superintending Engineer, served a notice dated 4th November, 1958 through the Executive Engineer (defendant No. 3) rescinding the contract and imposing a penalty of 10% over the estimated costs of the work. The plaintiff, further averred in paragraph 12 of the plaint that he had applied for extension of time upto 28th February, 1959 and was ready to complete the work on the contractual rates by that time if the extension was granted after the contract was rescinded it was given to another Contractor on higher rates and extra time of six months was also granted to him. The plaintiff thus averred that the rescinding of his contract was not bonafide. The plaintiff claimed that after accounting of the running payment made to him from time to time during the course of work a balance of Rs. 16,000/- is still due to him which he claimed along with the interest by way of damages at the rate of Rs. 6% due to him upto the date of the filing of the suit. The plaintiff thus claims Rs. 16,000/- plus Rs. 7500, - as interest-total being Rs. 23,500/-. 16,000/- is still due to him which he claimed along with the interest by way of damages at the rate of Rs. 6% due to him upto the date of the filing of the suit. The plaintiff thus claims Rs. 16,000/- plus Rs. 7500, - as interest-total being Rs. 23,500/-. The plaintiff has averred in the plaint that he has made several representations to the Chief Engineer and to the Superintending Engineer besides personal interview in the matter granted by the Chief Engineer, which will be referred to hereinafter. Since the State Government rejected the claim of the plaintiff which was intimated to the plaintiff by the letter dated 1-10-1963 (Annexure 3), and, as such, the plaintiff had no alternative but to file the present suit for recovery of the aforesaid amount after serving notices dated 26th July, 1965 under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure. This suit was presented on 20th September, 1966 and on removal of the defects pointed put by the Munsarim of the Court, the suit was ordered to be registered on 24th September, 1966. Defendants 1 to 3 contested the suit by filing the written statement. The defendants refuted the allegations in respect of the recession of contract to be not bona- fide. It was also alleged that the plaintiff did not make his application to the Superintending Engineer for extension of time and defendant No. 4 was, therefore, fully competent to rescind the contract. It was further pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation and the alleged acknowledge meat mentioned in para 24 did not amount to acknowledgement of the liability and could not have the effect of extending time for filing the present suit. It was further pleaded that the department had given full co-operation but in spite of it the plaintiff could not finish the work in time inspite of the fact that time was extended upto 15th June, 1958 from 31st March, 1958 within which it was to be completed. 3. IT was further pleaded that the additional work done by the plaintiff was in accordance with the terms of the contract bond and was covered by the condition No. 21 of the said bond. IT was also pleaded that supply off bearing plates was not responsibility of the defendant and the plaintiff himself quoted the rate of copper bearing plates at Rs. 8/- per square feet. IT was also pleaded that supply off bearing plates was not responsibility of the defendant and the plaintiff himself quoted the rate of copper bearing plates at Rs. 8/- per square feet. The order, however, for bearing plates was placed for the facility of the plaintiff. The suit proceeded exparte against the defendant No. 4, who was Superintending Engineer at the relevant time in the department. 4. UPON the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed ;- 1.Whether the completion of the bridge before 15-6-1958 was rendered an impossibility by the department engineer of the defendant No. 1 ? 2.Whether the further progress of the work became impossible as alleged in para 7 of the plaint ? 3.Whether the rescission of the contract by the defendant No. 4 was illegal as alleged in para 11 of the plaint and not bona -fide as alleged in para 12 of the plaint ? 4.Whether the sum of Rs. 16,000/- is still due to the plaintiff against defendants as alleged in para 13 of the plaint ? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to Rs. 7, 500/- as interest by way of damages against the defendants ? 6.Whether the plaintiffs' claim is within time as alleged in para 24 of the plaint ? 7.Whether the claim of the plaintiff is barred by time ? 8.Whether the plaintiff applied to the Chief Engineer for extension of time ? 9.To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? The trial court on the issues Nos. 6 and 7 which relate to question of limitation, answered the question of limitation in favour of the plaintiff. The answer on issue No. 1 is recorded in the negative against the plaintiff by holding that it is not proved that the liability to supply bearing plates was that of the department. The finding recorded on issue No. 3, is that the recession of the contract was made when the application for extension of the time was pending and that the contract could have been rescinded only after refusal by the State to grant the extension of time. It has, however, been held that if the contract cannot be held to be a mala- fide act as alleged in para 12 of the plaint because there is nothing worth the name to hold that the recession of the contract was not bona- fide. It has, however, been held that if the contract cannot be held to be a mala- fide act as alleged in para 12 of the plaint because there is nothing worth the name to hold that the recession of the contract was not bona- fide. So far as finding on issue No. 4 is concerned the trial court has held that the plaintiff is entitled to get Rs. 9304.93 instead of Rs. 16,000/- as claimed by him. The notice under Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure, could not be held to be invalid merely because various works on which the amount was claimed were not specifically mentioned in the notice. A finding on issue No. 5 has been recorded in the negative against the plaintiff holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to any interest on the amount claimed because no notice of demand contemplated under Section (?) of the Contract Act was given by the plaintiff and that it is not a fit case to award interest In view of the totality of the circumstances of the case. 5. AGGRIEVED by this judgment and decree dated 19-12-1966 the State Government preferred this first appeal. The plaintiff-respondent also filed cross-objection claiming that the trial court on the facts and circumstances of the case ought to have decreed the suit of the plaintiff in to and further decree for Rs. 23,500/- ought to have been passed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent with costs throughout. 6. WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length and have perused the judgment, the pleadings and the evidence on record. The foremost crucial question which crops up for consideration in this appeal is whether the present suit was filed within limitation or not. As per pleading contained in paragraph 10 of the plaint, it is admitted that the contract was rescinded on 4-11-1958 and a penalty of 10% over the estimated cost of the work was imposed on the plaintiff. Therefore, the cause of action for filing the suit for recovery of amount due to the plaintiff for the work done by him till the date of recession of the contract accrued to the plaintiff on the said date. The suit, therefore, could be filed by the plaintiff within three years from the said date after serving notice under Section 80, CPC. The suit, therefore, could be filed by the plaintiff within three years from the said date after serving notice under Section 80, CPC. The requisite period of notice of 60 days is to be excluded. The plaintiff, therefore, could file suit by 4th of January, 1961. Thus the suit which was filed on 20th and was registered on 24th September, 1966 was apparently filed beyond time. 7. LEERNED counsel for the plaintiff-respondent urged that the finding recorded by the trial court holding the suit to be within limitation is absolutely correct and in support of that finding, it was urged that the cause of action for filing the present suit accrued to the plaintiff finally on 1-10-1983 when a letter from the executive Engineer dated 1-10-1963 (Ext. 10) was received by the plaintiff intimating that the representation made by the plaintiff has been rejected by the Government and that the order passed by the Superintending Engineer forfeiting the security has been upheld being a correct order. Learned counsel further urged that in various letters exchanged between the parties there was an acknowledgement of the liability and of jural relationship of debtor and creditor. Thus the suit was within limitation from the date of such acknowledgment. 8. IN this connection learned counsel referred to the representation dated 22-11-1958 which the plaintiff had made to the Chief Engineer urging that the action of defendant No. 4 the then Superintending Engineer was uncalled for and a request was made for wiping off penalty and regarding payment of his dues. The Chief Engineer by his letter dated 27th December, 1958 (Ex. 6) informed the plaintiff that the matter was under investigation and the result would be communicated to him later on. To the reminder sent by the plaintiff on 25th December, 1958 (Ex. 17), a similar reply was received by him from the Chief Engineer under his letter dated 13th January, 1959 (Ex. 7). Learned counsel pointed out that the plaintiff waited for several months in the hope that he would be paid the amount which will be found payable to him for the work done by him, but when nothing was heard from the defendants, the plaintiff had sent a telegram (Bx, 19) on 6th May, 1959, to the Chief Engineer which was replied on 16th May, 1959 (Ex. nil), informing that the matter was still under investigation. nil), informing that the matter was still under investigation. Learned counsel also referred to reminders dated 20th July, 1959 and 8th of September, 1959 and also pointed out that the plaintiff had met the Chief Engineer on 16th May, 1960 and had explained the entire case to him. The Chief Engineer had asked the plaintiff to supply him the copies of all the letters and reminders sent to the Executive Engineer and so all that correspondence was sent by the plaintiff to the Chief Engineer on 23-5-60. After waiting for sometime the reminder was sent on 13th January, 1961 and in reply to it Chief Engineer wrote to the plaintiff on 4th of February, 1961 that he should personally meet Superintending Engineer (Defendant No. 4) as necessary instructions for the settlement of the case were issued to him. Learned counsel pointed out that nowhere in the aforesaid correspondence the Chief Engineer or the Superintending Engineer denied the claim of the plaintiff, nor the liability to make payment to the plaintiff by the department IN respect of the work which was done by him prior to the date of recession of the contract was denied. Learned counsel thus contended that the aforesaid correspondence would indicate that the jural relationship of debtor and creditor was thus impliedly accepted by the defendants. He pointed out that on 5th of October, 1961 a sum of Rs. 2142.50 P. was sanctioned by the Chief Engineer for the aforesaid extra work done by the plaintiff regarding sinking of two pier wells further by 7 feet each and the Chief Engineer also assured the plaintiff that he had recommended to the Government for waiving the penalty imposed by the Superintending Engineer. Learned counsel urged that to the utter surprise of the plaintiff, the plaintiff was informed through letter dated 1st October, 1963 (Ext. 30) issued by the Executive Engineer that the Government has rejected the representation of the plaintiff and that the order passed by the Superintending Engineer forfeiting the security was correct. It was thus urged by the learned counsel that the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff for filing the present suit when his claim was finally rejected by the Government, which was intimated to the plaintiff by letter dated 1st October, 1963 (Ex. 30). It was thus urged by the learned counsel that the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff for filing the present suit when his claim was finally rejected by the Government, which was intimated to the plaintiff by letter dated 1st October, 1963 (Ex. 30). He further contended that from the correspondence referred to above it is crystal clear that at no stage prior to 1st October, 1963, Government denied liability of making payment to the contractor and from time to time in letters addressed to the plaintiff he was assured that the Government was considering the claim of the plaintiff set out in his representation. Learned counsel contended that for saving limitation, the acknowledgment of the liability in the manner stated above was enough. It was not necessary that any specified amount to be due should have been accepted by the debtor for payment to the creditor. In law it is enough if the jural relationship of creditor and debtor is even impliedly established, which would be taken to have been established, as the defendant did not expressly disclaimed the liability of payment of the claim which was submitted in the representation by the plaintiff. Prior to 1-10-1963 the plaintiff was always given to understand that his claim was under investigation and consideration. It was further contended that since no final bill was prepared, after adjusting the running payments made during the subsistence of the contract, the cause of action for filing the suit, would be taken to have accrued to the plaintiff on 1-10-1963 when the claim petition was ultimately refused and that at any rate the period of limitation stood extended by the acknowledgment of the liability in the manner aforesaid. 9. LEARNED counsel for the defendant-appellant urged that in none of the letters addressed to the plaintiff the acknowledgement of the liability with regard to the claim put forth by the plaintiff was accepted nor the jural relationship of debtor and creditor was expressly or impliedly accepted by the defendants. LEARNED counsel further urged that the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff for filing the present suit on 4-11-1958 when the contract was rescinded. Referring to letter dated 27th December, 1958 Ex. 6, it was urged that this letter was written to the plaintiff acknowledging the letter dated 22nd of November, 1958 (Ex. LEARNED counsel further urged that the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff for filing the present suit on 4-11-1958 when the contract was rescinded. Referring to letter dated 27th December, 1958 Ex. 6, it was urged that this letter was written to the plaintiff acknowledging the letter dated 22nd of November, 1958 (Ex. 17) which was written by the plaintiff to the Chief Engineer with the prayer that the levy of 10% penalty by the Superintending Engineer should be waived and the claims for losses sustained should be judiciously and sympathetically considered and that the pending bills and claim for extra job done should be expeditiously settled, and that the entire amount due to him should be paid latest within a month's time. 10. LEARNED counsel further pointed out that the aforesaid (Ex. 6) is a communication regarding the receipt of the letter dated 22-11-1958 sent by the plaintiff. It was a clyclostyled letter acknowledging the receipt of the said letter and by it, it cannot be construed that the jural relationship of debtor and creditor was accepted as has been urged by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. The subsequent letter dated 13th January, 1959 (Ex. 7) sent to the plaintiff is also an acknowledgment of his letter dated 25th December, 1958 and it was mentioned therein that the case is under investigation and the decision taken will be intimated to the plaintiff very shortly. LEARNED counsel urged that by this letter also no inference can be drawn that the liability to make payment was accepted by the department or that it would amount to acceptances, expressly or impliedly of the jural relationship of debtor and creditor. Referring to Ex. 8, learned Standing Counsel pointed out that vide order dated 17th April, 1961, Superintending Engineer accepted the claim of the petitioner in respect of item Nos. 7, 12 and 15 referred to therein and directed that the same be settled and intimation with regard to it be sent to his office. The plaintiff, vide letter dated 4th February, 1961 (Ext. 9), was informed by the Executive Engineer about it. The plaintiff was accordingly, paid a sum of Rs. 2142.f 0 in October, 1961 which was sanctioned by the Chief Engineer. In reply to the argument raised on behalf of the appellant, to the effect that the letter dated 1-10-1963 (Ext. The plaintiff, vide letter dated 4th February, 1961 (Ext. 9), was informed by the Executive Engineer about it. The plaintiff was accordingly, paid a sum of Rs. 2142.f 0 in October, 1961 which was sanctioned by the Chief Engineer. In reply to the argument raised on behalf of the appellant, to the effect that the letter dated 1-10-1963 (Ext. 30) amounts to acknowledgement of the liability and jural relationship of debtor and creditor, it was. urged by the learned Standing Counsel that by the said letter plaintiff was informed about the decision of the Government that the security of the Contractor was rightly forfeited by the Superintending Engineer, and, as such, this letter cannot be treated to be an acknowledgement of the liability regarding payment of the claim of the plaintiff; nor it can be construed to be an acknowledgement of the jural relationship of debtor and creditor by any stretch of imagination. The plaintiffs suit, therefore, cannot be taken to be within limitation on the basis of said letter; nor a cause of action can be said to have been accrued to him for filing the present suit on the said date. 11. WE have gone through the correspondence referred to above very carefully and, in our opinion, the said letter addressed by the Department to the plaintiff cannot be construed to be an acknowledgement of liability regarding payment of claim put forth by him nor these letters can afford a basis for arriving at a finding that the jural relationship of debtor and creditor was accepted expressly or impliedly. By letter dated 1-10-1963 (Ex. 30) the plaintiff was intimated by the Executive Engineer that the decision taken by the Government forfeiting the security of the plaintiff was a correct order and this letter cannot be construed to be an acknowledgement of the liability to make payment of the claim put forth by the plaintiff. 12. THE suit could be treated to be within limitation if the defendants can be said to have either expressly or impliedly acknowledged the liability by any instrument or writing written after 20th July, 1963 i. e. three years plus sixty days' period of notice under section 80, Code of Civil Procedure prior to the presentation of the suit. All the aforesaid letters, except letter dated 1-10-1963 (Ex 30) are of the prior date. All the aforesaid letters, except letter dated 1-10-1963 (Ex 30) are of the prior date. As already observed above the letter dated 1-10-1963 cannot be construed to be a letter of acknowledgement of liability nor it can be construed to be an acceptance of jural relationship of debtor and creditor expressly or impliedly. THE trial court has thus erred in holding the suit to be within limitation by mis-construing the evidence on record. It is well settled that once the cause of action accrues for filing the suit the period of limitation will be counted from that date. It can, however, be extended by acknowledgement of the liability. THE acknowledgement of the liability will not give a fresh cause of action for filing the suit. It can save the suit from being barred by time. Reference may be made to the decision of Shapoor Fredoom Maza v. Durga Prosad Chamaria, AIR 1961 SC 1236 , wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court held :- "Acknowledgement as prescribed by Section 19 merely renews debt; it does not create a new right of action. It is a mere acknowledgement of the liability in respect of the right in question; it need not be accompanied by a promise to pay either expressly or even by Implication. The statement on which a plea of acknowledgement is based must relate to a present subsisting liability though the exact nature or the specific character of the said liability may not be indicated in words. Words used in the acknowledgement must, however, indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor, and it must appear that the statement is made with the intention to admit such jural relationship. Such intention can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission, and need not be expressed in words. If the statement is fairly clear then the intention to admit jural relationship may be implied from it. In construing words used in the statements made in writing on which a plea of acknowledgement rests oral evidence has been expressly excluded but surrounding circumstances can always be considered." Similar view is expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Lakshmiratan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Aluuminium Corporation of India Ltd., 1971 SC 1482 13. In construing words used in the statements made in writing on which a plea of acknowledgement rests oral evidence has been expressly excluded but surrounding circumstances can always be considered." Similar view is expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Lakshmiratan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Aluuminium Corporation of India Ltd., 1971 SC 1482 13. IN the present case as has already been observed above, the defendants have not acknowledged the liability to make payment of the claim set out in the representation which was submitted by the plaintiff after the recession of the contract, nor from the correspondence addressed to the plaintiff it can be inferred that the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor was accepted and we cannot construe from the words used in the letter that the defendants had intention to admit any such jural relationship. It is also relevant to mention that after the recession of the contract the plaintiff was paid certain amount which was found due to him for the extra work which he had done. Rest of the claim was not accepted. This payment made in the month of October, 1961 and so even from the date of such payment the suit of the plaintiff filed in Sep ember, 1966, is clearly time barred. The letter dated 1-10-1963 (Ex. 30) cannot be construed to be an acknowledgement of liability nor it can give any fresh cause of action to the plaintiff for filing the present suit. 14. LEARNED counsel for the appellant referring to a decision in M. L Dalmia and Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1963 Calcutta 277, urged that limitation of filing the suit in the matter relating to contract will accrue from the submission of the final bill after certification of completion of the work. The period of limitation for filing the suit will run from the date of intimation by the Government of the amount allowed on the bill or about the rejection of the bill wholly or partly. There is no dispute with regard to the proposition of law laid down in the said decision. But in the present case as already observed above, the work was not completed by the plaintiff-respondent, and the contract was rescinded as the plaintiff failed to complete the work within the stipulated period. There is no dispute with regard to the proposition of law laid down in the said decision. But in the present case as already observed above, the work was not completed by the plaintiff-respondent, and the contract was rescinded as the plaintiff failed to complete the work within the stipulated period. The plaintiff's representation was considered by the then Chief Engineer and he had sanctioned payment only in respect of three items of the work done by the plaintiff and the rest of the claim in the respect of items of the work was not approved. The said sanctioned payment was made to the plaintiff-respondent on 5th October, 1961. The plaintiff respondent, therefore, even on the strength of the aforesaid decision should have proceeded to file the suit in respect of the rest of the claim for which payment was not made in the month of October, 1961 giving notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus the aforesaid referred decision of the Calcutta High Court cannot be of any assistance to the plaintiff-respondent in the present case. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent had also referred to exhibit 24 which is note of comments dated 30th September, 1961 submitted by Sri Atar Singh, Personal Assistant (S) for Chief Engineer (ID) to the Secretary, Irrigation Department, Uttar Pradesh, on the representation of the plaintiff-respondent. He has made recommendation soliciting orders of Government for the waiver of the penalty imposed on the Contractor while rescinding contract. Learned counsel pointed out that according to said note of comments the fault did not lie on the part of Contractor who could have completed the work within the time requested for by him and with the estimated cost. Instead, the remaining work was given to another party, namely, M/s. Pioneer Construction Private Ltd. after negotiation who completed the work by 19-8-1959 at an extra cost of Rs. 10006/-. Instead, the remaining work was given to another party, namely, M/s. Pioneer Construction Private Ltd. after negotiation who completed the work by 19-8-1959 at an extra cost of Rs. 10006/-. Learned counsel pointed out that in the said note it is specifically mentioned that a careful examination shows that it is a very bad case for the Department and in case the Contractor chooses to go to the Court of law the department would probably not fair well." He also referred to the recommendation made in the end of the notes, which reads "In such circumstances, the case is submitted to the Government for their orders with the recommendation that the maximum penalty imposed on the Contractor by the Superintending Engineer should be waived and the loss of Rs. 100006/- due to excess expenditure may be condoned. Necessary orders of the Government may kindly be obtained and communicated to this office at the early date." The Government did not agree to it and vide Ext. 30, the contractor was intimated accordingly on 1-10-1963. 15. REFERRING to said document Ext. 24, learned counsel had urged that the said note of comments the validity of the claim of the plaintiff was accepted and thus it would amount to an acknowledgement of the liability and, as such, the suit was well within limitation. We are unable to accept this contention as well. Firstly, because the said note of comments being an internal departmental communication and not addressed to the plaintiff, would not amount to an acknowledgement of the liability by the State Government, the defendant No. 1; and secondly, the said note of comments cannot be taken to be an admission on the part of the defendants about the jural relationship between the parties of the debtor and creditor. This is not the case of the plaintiff that the officer who is author of the said note of comments, was the sanctioning authority regarding payment of the work done by the Contractor nor he was authorised by competent authority in that behalf, and, as such, even if in the comments submitted to the Government a recommendation was made in favour of the plaintiff with regard to the waiver of penalty on the Contractor by expressing an opinion that it is a very bad case for the department and in case the Contractor chooses to go to Court of law the department would probably not fair well; the same would, in our opinion, not amount to an acknowledgement of the liability made by or on behalf of defendant No. 1 so as to cause fresh period of limitation computable from the aforesaid date i. e. 30th September, 1961 when the said note of comments was submitted to the Secretary, Irrigation Department, Uttar Pradesh. The internal departmental communications are not meant nor those can be construed to be the statement made with the intention to admit jural relationship that of a debtor and creditor between the parties so as to fasten the liability regarding payment of claim put forth by the Contractor. The Departmental note of comments submitted to the Head of Department on the representation made by the Contractor cannot be construed by any stretch of imagination to be a communication addressed to the Contractor. The recommendation made in the comments submitted by some junior officer to the Head of the Department may or may not be accepted by the sanctioning authority or by the Government. The acknowledgement of the liability to pay any debt, as is envisaged by section 19 of the Limitation Act, is to be made by the Principal or by his agent duly authorised in this behalf. No doubt, it is correct to say that the State Government would be bound by the acknowledgement of the liability to pay the amount due to the Contractor, if such acknowledgement is made by the concerned Head of the Department having an authority to take final decision without seeking approval and sanction of the Government in the matter and to sanction and make payment under the contract. But if the final decision in the matter would rest with the Government and the sanctioning authority has to obtain approval and endorsement of the Government then any admission or acknowledgement made even by the Departmental Head will not be binding on the Government and such an acknowledgement will not give rise to fresh cause of action or to fresh limitation; nor the limitation will be computable from the date of such acknowlegement. Thus, any such acknowledgement will not amount in law to be an acknowledgement of the liability as contemplated under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. 16. THE words "agent duly authorised in this behalf" in Section 19 of the Act cannot (?) the authority conferred on the agent to act in entirety on behalf of the Principal and also having authority for making payment and for writing or signing the endorsement on behalf of the Principal. THE general authority to deal with the matter and to scrutinize and submit report to the Head of the Department who is the sanctioning authority and competent to take final decision in the matter, would not be enough. Thus the comments submitted by the Personal Assistant to the Head of the Department for soliciting orders of the Government, even if it contains some recommendation made in favour of the Contractor, would not amount to an acknowledgement by and on behalf of the principal, as contemplated under Section 19 of the Act, because the general authority to deal with recommendation and to submit comments on it to the State Government, is not enough to make such an officer a duly authorised agent in this behalf, so as to make a binding acknowledgement by and on behalf of the Government. It is well settled that the principal will be bound by the acknowledgement of the agent if the agent is duly authorised on that behalf. It is well settled that the principal will be bound by the acknowledgement of the agent if the agent is duly authorised on that behalf. If the officer is not a sanctioning authority, nor he is vested with the authority to take final decision in the matter, then any admission made by such officer in his comments submitted to the superior authority recommending for the waiver of the penalty imposed on the Contractor, would not amount as an admission of any liability to make payment to the Contractor or for the waiver of the penalty imposed on him, nor in law it would amount to be an acknowledgement of the liability by the principal i. e. the State Government, so as to cause fresh period of limitation computable for filing the suit from that date. In the present case, therefore, the aforesaid note of comments (Ex. 24) cannot be treated to be an acknowledgement, so as to extend period of limitation as claimed by the plaintiff-respondent. We, therefore, repel the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent being devoid of merits. 17. AFTER giving our careful consideration to the facts and ?circumstances of the case, we find that the learned trial court erred in holding the suit of the plaintiff-respondent to be within limitation, and, as such, the decree passed by it cannot be sustained. The suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent therefore, fails and deserves to be dismissed. The cross-objection filed by the plaintiff-respondent also deserves to be rejected. 18. IN the result the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree dated 19-12-1968 passed by the Court below is hereby set aside and the suit of the plaintiff-respondent is dismissed with costs through Out. The cross-objection filed by the plaintiff-respondent is also hereby dismissed. Appeal allowed.