JUDGMENT 1. - All the above special appeals are directed against the same judgment of learned Single Judge dated January 16, 1984 as such all these special appeals are also disposed of by one single order. 2. Almost identical pleas have been taken by all the petitioner-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the petitioners) in these cases, but to appreciate the controversy raised in these cases, we would refer to the pleadings of Ismail Khan Special Appeal No. 64/1984. 3. The case of the petitioners is that they were Managers of the Primary Agriculture Credit Co-operative Societies (in short PACS) Bharatpur District. They were holding these posts on substantive basis and were permanent employees. The Managing Director Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., Bharatpur passed an order under Rule 17 of Krishi Rin Datri Sahakari Samitiyonke Vyawasthapakon Ke Chayan, Niyukti Avam Sewa Niyam, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1977) compulsorily retiring the petitioners from the post of Manager. The order issued in the case of Ismail Khan is reproduced as under: dk;kZy; nh Hkjriqj lSaV~y dksvkijsVsfo cSad fy0 Hkjriqj dzekad@_.k@293                                                                 fnukad 14&7&83 ( 8&7&83 ) Jh bZLekbZy [kka O;oLFkkid] xzke lsok lgdkjh lfefr fy0] }kjk lgk;d vf/k'kk"kh vf/kdkjh] ia0 lfefr] uxjA fo"k; %& vfuok;Z lsok fuo`fr ckcrA fnukad 8&7&83 dh desVh dh cSBd gqbZA ftl cSBd esa vkidk ekeyk izLrqr gqvkA desVh esa ;g fu.kZ; fy;k x;k fd O;oLFkkid lsok fu;e 1977 ds fu;e 17 ds vUrxZr vkidh vfuok;Z lsok fuo`fr djnh tkosA vr% desVh ds fu.kZ; fnukad 8&7&83 dh vuqikyuk esa vkidkas fnukad 8&7&83 ds e/;kUg i'pkr~ lsok ls fuo`r fd;k x;k gSA A similar kind of order has been issued in respect of the petitioners. All the petitioners challenged their orders of compulsory retirement and the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions as such the petitioners have filed these special appeals. 4. An objection was raised before the learned Single Judge and also before us that the Central Co-operative Bank Limited, Bharatpur, was not an authority or instrumentality of the State and do not come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution and as such no writ petition is maintainable against the Bank. Learned Single Judge in this regard after making reference to Raj. Coop. Dairy Fed. Learned Single Judge in this regard after making reference to Raj. Coop. Dairy Fed. Ltd. Jaipur v. Maauhar Lal Sharma ( 1983 RLR 558 ) , Apex Court in Ramana v. International Airport Authority ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) , May Hasia v. Khalid ( AIR 1981 SC 487 ) , Som Prakash v. Union of India ( AIR 1981 SC 212 ) , field that the Central Co-operative Bank Bharatpur was an instrumentality of the State for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and a writ petition can be entertained against them. We are in agreement with the view taken by the Darned Single Judge and hold that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Coop. Bank is under the control of the Government and its financial resources are also controlled and contributed mostly by the Government and the officers employed in the Bank are amenable to the control and jurisdiction of the Government and the Registrar, Co-operative Societies. 5. The next objection raised in these cases by the learned Advocate General was that the petitioners had an alternative remedy of filing a revision before the State Government or the Registrar. Co-operative Societies as contemplated under section 128 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 and the petitioners having not availed of such alternative opportunity. were not entitled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge had repelled such objection raised on behalf of the respondents and in our view also, no such objection can be maintainable on behalf of the respondents. In these cases the legal validity of the relevant rules has been challenged by the petitioners and the State Government or the Registrar are not competent to decide the constitutionality legal validity of the Rule in exercise of their powers under section 128 and as such it was futile on the part of the petitioners to file any revision under section 128 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 6. After disposing all the above preliminary objections raised on behalf of the learned Advocate General we shall now consider the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 7. It was submitted by Mr. 6. After disposing all the above preliminary objections raised on behalf of the learned Advocate General we shall now consider the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 7. It was submitted by Mr. Pathak on behalf of the petitioners that the Rules of 1977 had no statutory force and the Managing Director had no power to retire the petitioners compulsorily by invoking powers under Rule 17 of these Rules. In this regard it was submitted that Section 148 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act empowers the State Government to make Rules to carry out the purpose of this Act. The State Government in exercise of the aforesaid powers has framed the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred to the Rules of 1966). Under sub-rule (1) of Rule 41 of these Rules it has been provided that the conditions of service of the employees of the Societies shall be specified by the Registrar. It is submitted that the Rules of 1977 have been framed by the Registrar, which according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, was not competent to do so under the above provision of sub-rule (1) of Rule 41. It was submitted that under section 148 only State Government was empowered to make rules and the power could not be further delegated to the Registrar by the State Government. It was argued that the State Government itself was a delegated functionary and it could not further sub-delegate its powers to the Registrar for laying down the condition of service of the employees of the societies. It was also submitted by Mr. Pathak that the learned Single Judge wrongly decided this point against the petitioners by placing reliance on the decision of Apex Court in the Railway Board v. P.R. Sundramniyam: 1978 (1) SLR 276 . It was submitted that in the above case the validity of Rule 157 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code was in question. The Indian Railway Establishment Code is framed by the President of India Under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Rule 157 of the Code authorised the Railway Board to have full powers to make rules of general application in respect of non-gazetted railway servants under their control. The Indian Railway Establishment Code is framed by the President of India Under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Rule 157 of the Code authorised the Railway Board to have full powers to make rules of general application in respect of non-gazetted railway servants under their control. The President of India while acting under Article 309 of the Constitution is not a delegate of the Legislature, the President of India himself exercises legislative power while acting under Article 309 of Constitution and in such circumstances the position of Rule 157 of the Railway Establishment Code stands on a different footing altogether than the case of Rule 41 of the Rules of 1966. We find no force in the above contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. Section 147 (2) of the Act provides as under: "The Government may, by notification in the Official Gazettee, direct that all or any of the powers exerciseable by it under this Act or the Rules may be exercisable by the Registrar or such other officer and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the Notifications". Sub-Section (2) as reproduced above was inserted vide section 11 of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the Amendment Act) published in Rajasthan Gazette part IV-A dated February 13, 1976 and having come into force from the date of Ordinance issued earlier on August 23, 1975. Under the above provision the Government has been authorised that all or any of its powers exerciseable under the Act or the Rules may be exercised by the Registrar. Admittedly, the impugned Rules of 1977 have been framed by the Registrar after the aforesaid sub-section (2) was inserted in Section 147 of the Act. Mr. Pathak, learned counsel for the petitioners, then contended that even after the insertion of sub-section (2) in section 147, the Government was bound to issue a notification in the official gazettee directing that its powers would be exerciseable by the Registrar. It was submitted that no such notification was ever issued by the Government after the insertion of sub- section(2) and as such the Registrar was not competent to frame the Rules of 1977. It was submitted that no such notification was ever issued by the Government after the insertion of sub- section(2) and as such the Registrar was not competent to frame the Rules of 1977. We granted an opportunity to the learned Advocate General to show whether any Notification had been issued under sub-section (2) of Section 147, but the learned Advocate General frankly submitted that no such Notification had been issued. Learned Advocate General however, submitted that under section 149, of the Act it was provided that all Rules made under this Act shall be laid as soon as may be before the House of State Legislature and the Rajasthan Corporative Societies Rules, 1966 framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 143 of the Act, have been laid before the State Legislature as required under section 149 of the Act. It is submitted that Rule 41 of the Rules of 1966 clearly laid down that the conditions of service of the employees of the societies shall be as specified by the Registrar and in view of the above provision already contained in the Rules, there was no further necessity of issuing any notification under sub-section (2) of Section 147 of the Act. It was argued by the learned Advocate General that a provision already contained in Rule 41 of the Rules of 1966 was itself more than a notification and even if no notification was issued under sub-section (2) of Section 147 the Rules of 1977 framed by the Registrar in exercise of the powers conferred on him by Rule 41 of the Rules of 1966 cannot be held to be invalid. We see force in the above contention of the learned Advocate General. 8. It is no doubt, true that sub-section (2) of Section 147 was inserted by Amendment Act on February 13, 1976. and thereafter no notification was issued empowering the Registrar to exercise the powers conferred on the Government, but rule 41 of the Rules of 1966 which were already framed by the Government in exercise of powers conferred under section 148 of the Act and having already laid before the Legislature. and thereafter no notification was issued empowering the Registrar to exercise the powers conferred on the Government, but rule 41 of the Rules of 1966 which were already framed by the Government in exercise of powers conferred under section 148 of the Act and having already laid before the Legislature. the Registrar was competent to frame the Rules of 1977 laying down the conditions of service of the employees of the Societies and such Rules cannot be held to be invalid simply on the ground that no fresh notification was issued after the insertion of sub-section (2) of section 147 of the Act and prior to the framing of the Rules of 1977. Rule 41 of the Rules of 1966 already provided that the conditions of service of the employees of the Societies shall be as specified by the Registrar and as such it was a sufficient notice to all concerned that the Government had delegated its powers to the Registrar in the matter of laying down the conditions of service of the employees of the societies. Thus, we find no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Rules of 1977 should be struck down as the Registrar had no power to frame such Rules. 9. It was next contended by Mr. Pathak that even if the Rules of 1977 are held to be statutory rules and were framed by the Registrar in exercise of the powers conferred under rule 41 of the Rules of 1966, at least Rule 17 of the Rules of 1977, under which, the petitioners have been retired compulsorily, should be declared invalid, being arbitrary and against principles of natural justice. In order to appreciate the argument made by Mr. In order to appreciate the argument made by Mr. Pathak it would be proper to reproduce amended rule 17 as it stood at the relevant time: 17- vuq'kklukRed dk;Zokgh O;oLFkkid }kjk vuq'kklu Hkax djus] vkKk dk mYya?ku djus] lrks"kizn dk;Z u djus] vFkok ;Fks"V dkj.k gkus ij fuEu izdkj n.M fn;k tk ldsxkA ( 1 ) rkM+uk] fuUnk psrkouh nsuk] ( 2 ) okf"kZd osru o`f) ,d ;k ,d ls vf/kd fcuk lafpr izHkko ls jksdukA ( 3 ) ,d ;k ,d ls vf/kd okf"kZd osru o`f) lafpr izHkko ls jksduk] ( 4 ) fiNyh lasok, QksjfQV djuk] lsok ls eqDr djuk] vFkok cj[kkLr djukA mijksDr of.kZr n.M cSad ds izcU/k lapkyd egksn; }kjk fn;s tk ldsaxs] ijUrq dzekad 1] 2 o 3 ij of.kZr n.M cSad ds vf/k'kk"kh vf/kdkjh }kjk fn;k tk ldsxkA n.M nsus ls iwoZ nks"kh O;fDr ls fyf[kr esa mRrj ekaxk tkosxkA vkjksiksa dks lquokbZ ds le; nLrkost vFkok vU; xokg izek.k izLrqr djus] O;fDrxr lquokbZ ds volj fn;s tkosaxsaA ,sls volj nsus ds i'pkr~ gh fu.kZ; fy;k tkosxkA dzekad 1 ls 3 rd n.M nsus ds fy, mijksDr iz.kkyh viukbZ tkuk vko';d ugh gksxkA fdUrq nks"kh O;fDr ls fyf[kr esa nks"kksa ds laca/k esa mRrj izkIr djrs gh fu.kZ; fy;k tkosxkA vf/k'kk"kh vf/kdkjh ds vkns'k dh vihy izcU/k lapkyd dks dh tk ldsxh rFkk izcaU/k laapkyd ds fu.kZ; ds fo:) vihy [k.Mh; la;qDr jftLV~j dks dh tk ldsxhA vihy vkns'k tkjh djus ds 60 fnol ds vUnj fd;k tkuk vfuok;Z gksxkA [k.Mh; la;qDr jftLV~kj ds fu.kZ; ds fo:) iqujh{k.k ( fjohtu ) jftLV~kj vFkok muds }kjk vf/kd`r vf/kdkjh ds le{k izLrqr dh tk ldsxhA mijksDr fu;e esa vU; dqN ckrs gksrs gq, Hkh ;fn fdlh O;oLFkkid dk dk;Z xr rhu o"kksZa esa yxkrkj fu/kkZfjr y{;ksa ds 80 izfr'kr ls de jgsxk rks ,sls O;oLFkkid dh lsok,sa cSad dk izcU/k lapkyu fuEu vfuok;Z lsok fuo`r lfefr dh flQkfj'k ij fcuk uksfVl ds lekIr dj ldsxk( ( 1 ) izcU/k lapkyd ( 2 ) vf/k'kk"kh vf/kdkjh ( 3 ) lacaf/kr lgk;d jftLV~kjA It was submitted by Mr. Pathak that though the compulsory retirement has been included in rule 17 but is contained under the head, Disciplinary proceedings. It does not provide for any inquiry or opportunity of hearing or even show cause before passing the order of compulsory retirement. Pathak that though the compulsory retirement has been included in rule 17 but is contained under the head, Disciplinary proceedings. It does not provide for any inquiry or opportunity of hearing or even show cause before passing the order of compulsory retirement. In all other public services, a notice of three months or pay for the notice period is always provided but no such provision has been made under Rule 17. The compulsory retirement can only be made in public interest, but under the proviso to Rule 17 no public interest has been contemplated. It was also argued that the managers of the PACS have no coercive power with them to recover loans from the members. All the coercive powers for making recoveries of the loans are contained in Section 117, 74 and 75 of the Act. Even when the orders are made directing recovery of the loans, the execution of such orders remains in the hands of Registrar. The powers of the Registrar have been delegated to the Executive Officer of the Central Co-operative Bank and to the Assistant Registrar. Thus, even at the execution stage it is not the PACS Manager but the Recovery Officer appointed by the Assistant Registrar or the Executive Officer of the Bank can also take coercive measure for recovering the loans. The Recovery Officer so appointed is normally not a person below the rank of an Inspector of the society. Thus, Manager of PACS has no authority, no statutory powers except to issue a demand notice to the member concerned and in case such member does not deposit the sum demanded, the Manager can only refer the matter to the Executive Officer or Assistant Registrar concerned. It has also been contended that in Co-operative sector there are huge bunglings by the high ups amongst the Officials and Non-Officials and in large number of cases loans are actually not disbursed and a moiety of such disbursed loan are devoured up by high placed officials and non-officials and consequently the members, who have not actually received a large proportion of the loans, become incapable of repaving the loans on demand. It is thus submitted that it is highly unjust and arbitrary to put the entire responsibility on the Managers of the PACS who are the lowest and the lowliest in the heirarchy of the Co-operative sector. It is thus submitted that it is highly unjust and arbitrary to put the entire responsibility on the Managers of the PACS who are the lowest and the lowliest in the heirarchy of the Co-operative sector. The proviso to Rule 17, which provides for the compulsory retirement does not contemplate the appreciation of the facts and circumstances of each individual manager. It also does not provide that it would be incumbent upon the authorities to compulsorily retire all the PACS managers, who do not fulfil the target of recovery of loans to the extent of 80 per cent in the preceding years and this gives an arbitrary and unbridled power to the authorities to pick and choose the managers according to their own liking. It is submitted that the petitioners have given examples of a number of managers, who have been retained in service and not retired compulsorily, even though their record of recovery of the loans was worst than the petitioners. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that in para 16 clause (m) of the writ petition, it was pleaded that practically all the managers of the district of Bharatpur and even all over the entire Rajasthan had not achieved 80 percent of the targets. Few of the names of such managers of Bharatpur District were mentioned. who have not achieved what to speak of 80 per cent but even half thereof and have not achieved targets even upto 10 percent and yet they had been retained in service: (1) Shri Bliairon Singh, Thakar Gram Sewa Sahkari Samiti Ltd., Panchayat Samiti, Nagar, (Recovery 0%) (2) Shri Bhanwar Singh Gram Seva Sahkari Samiti Khedla and Matraee, Panchayat Samiti. Nagar, Recovery (0%). (3) Shri Jal Singh Upkeejasla Gram Sewa Sahkari Samiti Panchayat Samiti, Nagar (Recovery 1%). (4) Shri Nanno Ram-Nagar Gram Seva Sahkari Samiti, Panchayat Samiti, Nagar (Recovery 5%) (5) Shri Dariyab Singh-Siyalpur Gram Sewa Sahkari Samiti Nagar, (Recovery 1%) It is thus submitted that the compulsory retirement of the petitioners was discriminatory and hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. The Managing Director, Bharatpur Central Co-operative Bank, respondent No.3 in reply to the aforesaid allegations made in writ petition, stated that the contents of' sub-para (m) of para No. 16 of the writ petition were absolutely wrong and denied. The Managing Director, Bharatpur Central Co-operative Bank, respondent No.3 in reply to the aforesaid allegations made in writ petition, stated that the contents of' sub-para (m) of para No. 16 of the writ petition were absolutely wrong and denied. The correct position of persons named in this para will go to prove that their performance had been better than the petitioner as was clear from Annexure-R. Thus, there was no breach of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 11. Though, in the reply the space after Annexure-R 2/3 is lying blank but it appears that the respondent N. 3 had annexed Annexure-R 2/3 in support of their contention. However, a perusal of Annex-R-2/3 shows that it does not contain the name of Bhairon Singh, Bhanwar Singh, Jai Singh, Nanoo Ram and Dariyab Singh for whom specific allegations were made in the writ petition. Even a perusal of Annexure R 2/3 shows that apart from the petitioner Ismail Khan the other 7 managers named therein had not completed the target of 80 per cent and were almost in the same position as that of Ismail Khan. On the other hand, it was argued by the learned Advocate General that it was wrong on the part of the petitioners to contend that the managers had no power under the Rules and were helpless. Another employee Pooran Singh posted in place of the petitioner had recovered 40 per cent of the due amount and had further made advances to the extent of Rs. 53,000/- approximately in Samla-kalan society where the performance of the petitioner was dismal. It was further argued that Rule 17 being result oriented served a public interest and therefore, cannot be said to be unreasonable or against the principle of social justice. Further Bharatpur was not a famine affected area. The recovery made by the petitioner being 10 per cent and the record of the petitioner being so poor that he had no case whatsoever on merits. The respondent Bank had no ill will or prejudice against the petitioners and the orders had been passed in public interest. The Managing Director has been empowered under the Rules to terminate the services of the petitioners on the recommendations of the committee consisting of the Managing Director, Executive Officer and the Assistant Registrar, and the entire procedure has been followed both in letter and spirit. The Managing Director has been empowered under the Rules to terminate the services of the petitioners on the recommendations of the committee consisting of the Managing Director, Executive Officer and the Assistant Registrar, and the entire procedure has been followed both in letter and spirit. The action has been taken not to give punishment to the petitioners but in order to protect the interest of public finance institutions and in the larger interest of the society. 12. There is a sharp controversy between the petitioners and the respondent Bank regarding the disbursement of loans. the recoveries made by the petitioners of such loans, the power vesting in the managers to take coercive measures for recovery of the loans and it is not only difficult but beyond our scope in the exercise of writ jurisdiction to decide these disputed questions of fact. However, the admitted facts of the case are that there are nearly 5000 PACS managers in various Gram Sewa Sahkari Samities in the entire State of Rajasthan. Payment of salary and allowances to the managers of the PACS is made from the managers salary fund maintained at the level of Central Co-operative Banks in the District. The Manager's salary fund is created by rateable contribution from our of the margin of 2% profit gained by the Gram Sewa Sahkari Samities by advancing loans to its members out of which 1.50% (now changed to 1%) with effect from July 1, 1979) is contributed towards the said funds. The Central Co-operative Banks at the district level also contributed a part of its profit on loaning towards this fund. The Apex Bank also contributed a part of its profits on loan towards this fund. The Cadre Authority arranges for the recruitments of the managers PACS and thereafter the appointment order is issued by the Chief Manager of the Central Co-operative Bank in the name of Cadre Authority. The Managers appointed are by the Cadre Authority and their transfers outside the District are also made by the Cadre Authority. The wages of managers of PACS are paid from the funds created in favour of Cadre Authority in the name of Vyawasthapak Vetan purse. These managers discharge the duties as a Manager of the PACS, as Loan Recovery Clerk, as a Secretary of the Committee, as a Cashier, and other allied functions. The wages of managers of PACS are paid from the funds created in favour of Cadre Authority in the name of Vyawasthapak Vetan purse. These managers discharge the duties as a Manager of the PACS, as Loan Recovery Clerk, as a Secretary of the Committee, as a Cashier, and other allied functions. Certain demands were raised by Rajasthan Rajya Sahkari Samitian Vyaswasthapaks Union in respect of-betterment and upliftment of the service conditions of PACS managers. After failure of conciliation proceedings the State Government had referred 11 demands for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal gave an award on April 22, 1980, dealing with the 11 demands in detail. It was held by the Tribunal that the Cadre Authority was an Industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. The Tribunal in the aforesaid award had found that the managers were being paid Rs. 250/- per month in the pay scale 250-8-330. It was near about the pay scale of class IV employers of the State Government. But it was not more than the minimum wages prescribed for the unskilled labour by the State Government. The Tribunal had granted a partial relief to the managers regarding their pay scale. The Union had filed a writ petition before this Court which was decided by the learned Single Judge on March 12, 1981 and thereafter the matter had come in special appeal which was decided by a Division Bench of this Court to which I was one of the party. Special Appeal No. 169/1981 filed by the Union was decided by Division Bench of this Court on July 2, 1984 (reported in 1984 RLR 754). It was held in the above case that the Cadre Authority was an Industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was held that a perusal of the entire provisions of the Rules of 1977 left no manner of doubt that the manner in which the Cadre Authority functioned and the activity done by it, was covered within the meaning of Industry, and the special appeal was allowed in part and.the pay scale of Managers of PACS was ordered to be fixed on a higher pay scale than what was allowed by the Industrial Tribunal. We have mentioned all the above facts, because the petitioners in all these appeals, apart from the validity of Rule 17, have also taken ground that the orders terminating their services were in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. It has been alleged on behalf of the petitioners that they are workmen and the order compulsory retirement has resulted in the retrenchment of their services and the same could not have been done without following the provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Admittedly, neither any notice in writing nor any pay in lieu of the notice has been paid at the time of the passing of the impugned order. No compensation at all has been paid to the petitioners. It has also been alleged by the petitioners that the superannuation age as provided in the Rules of 1977 was 55 years and the petitioner (Ismail Khan) was only 32 years old and had completed about 11 years of service. The compulsory retirement made by order dated July 8, 1983, will thus operate very harshly upon the petitioner and such order is clearly against the basic principles of security of tenure of service. The stand taken by the respondent Bank in this regard was that the petitioners were not workmen. They might be the employees of the Cadre authority yet they were Chief Executive Officers of the Society. The learned Advocate General was unable to press that the Cadre Authority was not an Industry. He, however, contended that looking to the nature of duties assigned to the managers under rule 19 of the Rules of 1977, the petitioners were employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity and as such did not fall within the definition of workmen as given under section 2 (e) of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act are not at all applicable in the case. The learned Single Judge in this regard refrained to give any opinion as the controversy was of complex and disputed nature and observed that it would be open to the petitioners to move the Government for making reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and it was expected that if the Government is approached it would refer this dispute to the Labour Court of Industrial Tribunal or any other competent forum, as the case may be. 13. We do not propose to decide the question regarding the vires of Rule 17 of the Rules of 1977, as in our opinion, these appeals are bound to succeed on the question that the petitioners are workmen within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. We have already held in (6) Special Appeal No. 169/81 Rajasthan Rajya Sahkari Samition, Vyawasthapaks Union v. The Judge Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan and another on July 2, 1984, (reported in 1984 RLR 754) , that the Cadre Authority is an Industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and apart from that learned Advocate General also frankly conceded that he was unable to press that Cadre Authority was not an Industry. The State Government itself had referred the demands raised by Rajasthan Rajya Sahkari Samitian Vyawasthapaks Union for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal and the Tribunal had given an award on April 22, 1980. It is no doubt correct that in the above mentioned proceedings the question whether the petitioners were workmen or not was not decided by the Industrial Tribunal or by this court and as such the respondents are free to raise this question but the fact remains that the Government itself had referred the dispute for adjudication under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and had thus treated the PACS managers as workmen. Taking the Cadre Authority as an Industry and the large number of PACS Managers as 5100. it can reasonably be one circumstance to hold that the petitioners are workmen. Once it is held that Cadre Authority is an industry, the question arises who are its workmen. It cannot be disputed that Cadre Authority selects no other employees except managers for being appointed in various societies. The Managers of PACS are thus alone workmen in such an industry. Once it is held that Cadre Authority is an industry, the question arises who are its workmen. It cannot be disputed that Cadre Authority selects no other employees except managers for being appointed in various societies. The Managers of PACS are thus alone workmen in such an industry. The salary of the PACS manager have been fixed under Rule 3 of the Rules of 1977 in the following two pay-scales: (i) 250-8-330 (ii) 330-8-380-10-450 It was further provided that all that new appointments shall be made in the first pay scale and the second pay scale would be given by promotion. Though the petitioner, have been given name and label of Manager and the learned Advocate General has tried to assert that they are Chief Executive Officers of the society but it cannot be forgotten that they are paid such low pay scale which is near about the scale of class IV employees of the State Government, and get lesser pay even than the Lower Division Clerks. In the Spl. Appeal referred to above, decided on July 2, 1984, a partial relief has been given to them by determining their pay scale as under : (i) 300-8-340-10-410-15-500. (ii) 355-10-415-15-550-20-570. These Managers have no power to make any appointment of any employee nor have power of administrative control over any employees under them. The petitioners have filed affidavits to show that in most of the-societies, there is no other employee like clerks, peon. salesman or in any other capacity and have specially named the societies-like Gulpara Gram Seva Sahkari Samiti. Rasiya Gram Seva Sahkari Samiti. The respondent Bank in this regard has filed an affidavit of Om Prakash Sharma, Executive Officer. Bharatpur Central Co-operative Bank stating that the Managers of Primary Agriculture Credit Co-operative Society are the Chief Executive Official of the society to which they are posted. They are employees of' Rajasthan Co-operative Credit Institution Cadre Authority It has been further deposed that in some primary credit Co-operative societies where the work is less, the manager is the lone employee who does every work of these societies. His dominant duty is of executive nature and other functions are only ancillary. A peon and the Clerk, Asstt. Manager, Accountant Supervisor, is appointed by the respective society when work is more and the manager gives directions to such clerks. assistant managers. supervisor and peon and supervises their work. His dominant duty is of executive nature and other functions are only ancillary. A peon and the Clerk, Asstt. Manager, Accountant Supervisor, is appointed by the respective society when work is more and the manager gives directions to such clerks. assistant managers. supervisor and peon and supervises their work. Such Managers are ex-officio members of the Executive Committee of the Bank. In Sinkri Gram Seva Sahkari Samiti there are managers and peons. Peons are appointed by almost all agriculture credit Co-operative societies. 14. On the other hand, Shri Siyanand Sharma, Kanhaiya Lal and Jagannath Prasad have filed affidavits in which they have stated that it has been wrongly stated in the affidavit filed by Shri Om Prakash that Managers of the PACS are the Chief Executive Officers of the Society. It has been further stated that the main duties of the managers are writing out and preparing books of accounts e.g. cash book, ledger, receipts for recovery board books, members registers, register describing agricultural land of the members, pass-books and other record of the society. Further the Managers have to procure and sell controlled sugar, cloth and fertilizers to members and to maintain accounts in that connection. It has been further stated that the managers of the PACS are the employees at the lowest level of the Cadre Authority. The Manager is an ex-officio-member of the Executive Committee of the Society but without any voting right. His duty is to prepare minute book and to help the committee in Co-operative procedure and practice. His duty is to carry out the decisions of the executive committee. He has no financial powers or other powers e.g. granting leave. issue directions or to do other supervisory work. Thus in our opinion taking in view the entire functions and duties of the petitioners their number, pay etc. it cannot be held that they are employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity so as to exclude them from the purview of the definition of workmen. It has been laid down as under by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mohan Lal v. the Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., 1981 Lab. I.C. 806 . "Nicities and sevantics apart, termination by the employer of the service of workmen for any reasons whatsoever would constitute retrenchment except in cases excepted in the section itself. It has been laid down as under by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mohan Lal v. the Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd., 1981 Lab. I.C. 806 . "Nicities and sevantics apart, termination by the employer of the service of workmen for any reasons whatsoever would constitute retrenchment except in cases excepted in the section itself. The excepted or excluded cases are where termination is by way of punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, voluntary retirement of the workmen, retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workmen concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf and termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill health." In the cases before us the termination of the services of the petitioners are neither by way of punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action nor voluntary retirement nor retirement on reaching the age of superannuation nor on the groundse of ontinued health and in this view of the matter termination of the services of the petitioners fall within the meaning of term retrenchment as defined under section 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Once it is held that the petitioners are workmen and termination of their services amounts to retrenchment, the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are bound to apply in these cases and the impugned orders being clearly in violation of Section 25F. such orders have to be declared as ab initio void and illegal. 15. Mr. Advocate General laid much emphasis on the functions and duties assigned to the managers under Rule 19 of the Rules of 1977. such orders have to be declared as ab initio void and illegal. 15. Mr. Advocate General laid much emphasis on the functions and duties assigned to the managers under Rule 19 of the Rules of 1977. He specially referred to the following clauses : ( 9 ) _.k Lohdkj djuk] fofRr; cSad dh Mkoy izkFkZuk i= izLrqr djukA jkf'k izkIr dj forfjr djuk ,oa _.kksa dks le; ij olwy djukA ( 10 ) lapkyd e.My dh Lohd`fr izkIr dj laLFkk dk [kkrk cSad esa [kksyuk rFkk [kkrs dks vkijsV djukA ( 11 ) laLFkk dh vkSj ls nkos djuk] iSjoh djuk] le>kSrk djuk vFkok okil ysukA There can be no manner of doubt that under the above provisions the, Managers have been authorised to sanction loans and to disburse the same and to operate Khatas but as already observed above we have to look to the entire functions and duties assigned to the managers under Rule 19. Taking in view the entire functions and duties as mentioned under Rule 19 and the actual functions and duties discharged by them, we are clearly of the view that the petitioners cannot be held as being employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity. In our view, the main work of the petitioners is to perform clerical duties and the managerial function, if at all, performed by them are purely incidental. 16. In our view, learned Single Judge was not correct in directing the petitioners to raise an industrial dispute and to get it decided by the Labour Tribunal or Industrial Tribunal. The facts under these cases so far as relating to the functions and duties of the managers of the PACS are not in dispute and more so. are to be determined according to the functions and duties contained in Rule 19 of the Rules 1977. 17. There is no bar to determine this question under Article 226 of the Constitution itself and not to drag the low paid employees to unnecessary litigation which may involve huge expenses and delay. The petitioners, who have put in long periods of service and their services being terminated without any notice and without holding any disciplinary inquiry, cannot be further made to remain in the lurch and to seek remedy before the Industrial Tribunal. The petitioners, who have put in long periods of service and their services being terminated without any notice and without holding any disciplinary inquiry, cannot be further made to remain in the lurch and to seek remedy before the Industrial Tribunal. They are already out of employment for more than a year and we did not think it proper to direct the petitioners to get this matter decided by the Industrial Tribunal, and have taken the task of deciding this question ourselves. 18. In the result, all these special appeals are allowed. The judgment of learned Single Judge dated January 16, 1984 is set aside and the impugned orders terminating the services of the petitioners and compulsorily retiring them are hereby quashed, and the petitioners will be reinstated on the post held by them with full back wages. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.Appeals allowed. *******