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1984 DIGILAW 448 (ALL)

Ram Khelawan v. Dilau

1984-06-07

KAUSHAL KISHORE

body1984
JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, Member- In this reference dated 1-9-1982 the learned Additional Commissioner Faizabad Division, Faizabad, recommended that the judgment of the learned trial court dated 20-9-1981 may be set aside and the case be remanded for hearing and deciding the same on merits and in accordance with law. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 3. It is a case of cancellation of patta in favour of Mst. Dilau given in 1965. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that this particular lease of 1965 was invalid and the revisionist and another person were given patta for half of the disputed plot each subsequently and by rejection or the application under Section 198 (4) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, he felt aggrieved. The learned trial court rejected the application on two grounds. First was that the application was time-barred and the second was that the proceedings were barred by Section 49 of the UPCH Act. The revisionist/complainant had applied under Section 198 (4) of the Act on 9-8-1979 and the learned Additional Commissioner has rightly observed that with the amendment by Act XXX of 1975 the limitation became 5 years from 19-8-1975 in the case of lease executed earlier to this date plainly, the learned trial court failed to exercise jurisdiction on a lame excuse. 4. As for the other ground, the learned trial court found that the asami patta of Mst. Dilau was admitted during chakbandi and she was so recorded and even the appeal under Section 11 (l)of the U.P.C.H. Act failed. The learned trial court held that after being held final in chakbandi these rights could not be taken away and lease could not be cancelled. The learned Additional Commissioner relying on the ruling reported in 1977 RD 408 , that the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of the lease, held that no bar under Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act operate in the proceedings under Section 198 (4) of the Act. 5. In the ruling cited, it was held that - "The Act creates a self-contained code creating rights and indicating the manner of settlement of dispute. No other authority has jurisdiction to read judicata matters covered thereby. 5. In the ruling cited, it was held that - "The Act creates a self-contained code creating rights and indicating the manner of settlement of dispute. No other authority has jurisdiction to read judicata matters covered thereby. The consolidation authorities have to recognise and respect the action of Land Management Committee or order of the Collector or Board of Revenue, if any. They cannot go behind them." No doubt the consolidation court based its decision of title on the validity of the patta and any subsequent adjudication upon the validity of lease may require the finding of consolidation court to change. But this possible consequence cannot deprive the revenue court of its specific jurisdiction under Section 198(4) of the Act. The principle in the above cited ruling in Simmilesh Kumar v. Gaon Sabha and Others, is applicable both before and after the consolidation proceedings and the proceedings under Section 198 (4) of the Act started after the consolidation proceedings would not be barred under Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act. 6. In case a patta is cancelled after the consolidation proceedings, being found irregular under Section 198(4), it will be another question to decide whether the adjudication of title by the consolidation authorities on the basis of lease being valid, will act as bar under Section (4) of the U.P.C.H. Act against any rival claim based on that lease being cancelled subsequent to the consolidation proceedings. But this question is outside the scope of the present consideration and can be decided on its own merits when the occasion arises. So far as the present revision petition is concerned the law is clear and the learned trial court need not hesitate in deciding the case on its merits, irrespective of titles decided by the consolidation court. One thing is certain that the consolidation court had no jurisdiction to examine the validity of a lease in the sense of its being regular or otherwise, and any such examination carried out would have been of no value. 7. In view of the above position, the order dated 20-10-1981 has to be set aside. Accordingly, the reference is accepted, the order dated 20-10-1981 is set aside and the case is remanded to the learned trial court to hear and decide the same on merits in accordance with law.