D. P. Wadhwa,j. ( 1 ) IN the judgment under appeal learned single judge has referred to relevant files of MCD and the Delhi Police regarding the grant of licences for running the guest house and has noted the fact that no licences have been granted to the Mehtas. But, the Mehtas have a grievance that these files did not constitute any evidence and no reliance could be placed on the same. I have examined the record of the suit and I find that full opportunity was granted to the parties to inspect these files and in fact after inspection of the files an affidavit was filed by Hardayal Singh Mehta (appellant ). The appellants have attacked the finding of the learned single judge that the approach to her residence is from the same staircase. The guest house being more or less a -public place the staircase must be used at all odd hours. The use of the premises as guest house by people who are addicted to liquor also cannot be ruled out . It is stated that there is no evidence to support this finding. A further attack is that the learned single judge could not take into account the fact that there were no licences to run the guest house in as much as the suit was based on the tort of private nuisance. On merits also it is contended that there was no ground to grant the interim relief. ( 2 ) I do not think there is anything wrong in the observations of the learned single judge. A judge is supposed to know the facts and realities of life. Under S. 114 of the Evidence Act, the court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the comon course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. The illustrations mentioned in this section are not exhaustive and other presumptions of a simiar kind can be made. A judge will know the attenant circumstances of running a guest house. ( 3 ) THE question that arises for consideration is : Is it reasonable that the plaintiff should have put up with the interference alleged in the suit ? The illustrations mentioned in this section are not exhaustive and other presumptions of a simiar kind can be made. A judge will know the attenant circumstances of running a guest house. ( 3 ) THE question that arises for consideration is : Is it reasonable that the plaintiff should have put up with the interference alleged in the suit ? The learned single judge summarised the various types of nuisance complained of in para 6 of his judgment. I will not give any credence to the plea of the Mehtas that Nirmala Devi has brought this suit mala fide only after her request to become a partner in the guest house was refused by them. ( 4 ) CLERK and Lindsell on Torts have defined nuisance as under :- "the essence of nuisance is a condition or activity which unduly interferes with the use or enjoyment of land. In common parlance, stenches and smoke and a variety of different things may amount to a nuisance in fact but whether they are actionable as the tort of nuisance will depend upon a variety of considerations and a balancing of conflicting interests. An actionable nuisance is incapable of exact definition,. . . . . . Nuisance is an act or omission which is an interference with, disturbance of or annoyance to a person in the exercise of enjoyment of (a) right belonging to him as a member of the public, when it is a public nuisance, or (b) his ownership or occupation of land or of some easement, profit, or other right used or enjoyed in connection with land, when it is a private nuisance". ( 5 ) THIS commentry, while dealing with question of private nuisance, says that a private nuisance may be and usually is caused by a person doing on his own land something which he is lawfully entitled to do. His conduct only becomes a nuisance when consequences of his acts are not confined to his own land but extend to the land of his neighbour by unduly interfering with his neighbour in the comfortable and convenient enjoyment of his land. Nuisance of this kind are varied but to be actionable, however, the nuisance must be such as to be a real interference with the comfort or convenience of living according to the standards of an average man. Nuisance of this kind are varied but to be actionable, however, the nuisance must be such as to be a real interference with the comfort or convenience of living according to the standards of an average man. The character of the neighbourhood will also have to be seen. Thus, to constitute the tort of private nuisance the defendant s act must interfere with the plaintiff s use and enjoyment of his land, the interference being unreasonable. The interference may be caused by a variety of different types of invasion : by vibrations, flooding, electricity, fire, smell, noise, dust and sewage : (see Baker on Tort ). What is an unreasonable interference is often a vexed question to decide. In Thompson-Schwah v. Costaki (1956) 1 All ER 652), even an offensive sight was held to be an actionable nuisance. In this case, taking the facts from the head-note, the plaintiff was residing together with his family in a residential street in London and the adjoining house was used by the defendants for purposes of prostitution, their practice being to solicit men in nearby streets and to bring them to the house. The plaintiff brought an action to restrain the defendants from using the house for the purpose of prostitution and successfully obtained an interlocutory injunction. It was held that the plaintiff had shown a sufficient cause for an interlocutary injunction, in that, the activities of the defendants constituted a sensible interference with the comfortable and convenient enjoyment of the plaintiffs residence, having regard to the usages of civilized society and to the character of the neighbourhood. Lord Evershed, M. R. , in the course of the judgment observed that,-The case made for the plaintiffs shows to my mind at least a sufficient prime facia case to this effect, that the activities being conducted at No. 12, Chesterfield Street are not only open, but they are notorious and such as force themselves on the sense of sight at least of the residents in N. 13. The perambulations of the prostitutes and of their customers is something which is obvious, which is blatant, and which as I think the first plaintiff has shown prima facie to constitute not a mere hurt of his sensibilities as a fastidious man, but so as to constitute a sensible interference with comfortable and convenient enjoyment of his residence where live with him his wife, his son and his servants. It appears to me, therefore, that for the purposes which we are concerned, viz. , the protection of the plaintiffs right pending a trial, there was ample justification for the judge, using his discretion, to grant an injunction. The exact extent and character of the alleged nuisance will be judged when oral evidence is given, and it will then no doubt be possible to form a closer view of the interference and inconvenience than appears from the written word in an affidavit". Romer, L. J. , agreeing with the observations of Lord Evershed, M. R. , said, "as Lord Evershed, M. R. , said one of them at all events-indeed I think both of them have young sons living there and their wives, and one of them has three young servants. One can well imagine the effect of what is going on in the house almost next door in one case and exactly next door in the other is likely to have on the minds of these young people. One can imagine also the feelings of visitors who come to the house, or are invited to the houses, and all sorts of other considerations inevitably arise from the user to which the defendants have openly been putting the house to which they have resorted. ( 6 ) IN another case, Laws v. Floringles Ltd. (1981) 1 All ER 659), an injunction was sought against opening a sex shop. The locality was an area which included residential accommodation in some streets and restaurants, snack bars, food stores and so forth in others. There were a major railway terminal and a bus garage in the vicinity. The plaintiff sought an injunction and damages against the defendants and also moved an application for an interlocutory injunction pending trial. The locality was an area which included residential accommodation in some streets and restaurants, snack bars, food stores and so forth in others. There were a major railway terminal and a bus garage in the vicinity. The plaintiff sought an injunction and damages against the defendants and also moved an application for an interlocutory injunction pending trial. It was held that it was the established law that cases of nuiance were not confined to cases where there was some physical emanation of adamaging kind from the defendant s premises which had occurred or was reasonably feared but extended to cases where the use made by the defendant of his property was such that, while not necessarily involving a breach of the criminal law, it was such an affront to the reasonable susceptibilities of ordinary men and women that the fact of its being carried on in such a way that its nature was apparent to neighbours and visitors constituted an interference with the reasonable domestic enjoyment of their property. The possibility of the sex shop attracting undesirable and potentially dangerous customers and its becoming a plague spot which would be a source of infection in the neighbourhood could not be ruled out. It was said that the fact that however discreetly conducted, the business would in fact be the sale of hard pornography and would be a business deeply repugnant to the reasonable sensibilities of most ordinary men and women could not be disregarded. The court examined the question of balance of convenience, and granted injunction as prayed. ( 7 ) ADMITTEDLY, the activity of running of a guest house in the premises is unlawful inasmuch as no licence either under she Delhi Municipal Corp. Act or the Delhi Police Act has been obtained in the absence of which it is an offence to run a guest house. It is therefore not necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Municipal Act or the Police Act or the Regulations framed there-under with regard to the running of a guest/lodging house. Act or the Delhi Police Act has been obtained in the absence of which it is an offence to run a guest house. It is therefore not necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Municipal Act or the Police Act or the Regulations framed there-under with regard to the running of a guest/lodging house. When asked as to how the guest house could be run by the Mehtas in the absence of a licence, it was submitted, particularly with reference to the Municipal Act, that the Act merely envisages a daily fine if there is no licence, and that a writ petition had been filed for grant of a licence under the Delhi Police Act. This is really a bold submission. During the course of the hearing of the appeal, it was noticed that a C. W. No. 2128/1983 (Paul Guest House v. Commissioner of Police, had been filed by the Mehtas and was fixed before us. The hearing in appeal concluded on 12. 12. 83 and the writ petition was listed for 13. 12. 83 when it was adjourned but it was noted therein that an order had been passed under the Delhi Police Act rejecting Ihe application of the Paul Guest House for a licence to run a guest/lodging house in the premises in question. ( 8 ) THE appellants argue that the learned single judge has heavily relied upon the fact that they do not have any licence to run a guest house, and this is the sole basis for single judge to pass the order of injunction. It is contended that existence or non-existence of a licence is not a relevent consideration to determine whether there is an actionable nuisance. Such a nuisance may exist even if there is a licence to run the guest house. I do not think that the learned single judge solely considered the factum of absence of a licence. He analysed various acts of nuisance complained of by Nirmala Devi in his judgement. To my mind, absence of a statutory licence which entails prosecution may certainly he a relevent consideration for grant of injunction or otherwise when the question of balance of convenience is considered. He analysed various acts of nuisance complained of by Nirmala Devi in his judgement. To my mind, absence of a statutory licence which entails prosecution may certainly he a relevent consideration for grant of injunction or otherwise when the question of balance of convenience is considered. The question whether in a suit the plaintiff can ask the authorities to do their statutory duty is not before us in this appeal though in the suit one of the prayers of Nirmala Devi is that the MCD and the Delhi Police be directed to prohibit and stop the running of the unauthorised guest house in and for issuence of a mandatory injunction complelling them to perform their duties. It is also not material if the running of a guest house is a residential user in law if its running causes a nuisance to the plaintiff in the enjoyment of her property. It was also argued by the appellants that by passing the order of injunction, the learned single judge has appropriated to himself the jurisdiction vested in the authorities, i. e. , the Commissioner of Police and the Commissioner, MCD. I do not think that it is so. The learned judge has found a prima facie case in favour of Nirmala Devi and also took into consideration the circumstances that the running of the guest house was unlawful. The finding would be the same even if the fact of absence of licence is not taken into account. ( 9 ) NIRMALA Devi contends that the area is predominantly residential though there are commercial activities as well. The Mehtas contend otherwise. This question will have to be gone into in detail during the course of the trial. Suffice to say that the Mehtas or the owners of flat No. 1373 have not been able to controvert the allegation of the plaintiff that the flat was earlier being used for residential purpose only, though for some time it remained locked as well As noticed above, the MCD in its w/s supports her stand. ( 10 ) THE plaintiff also relied upon the provisions of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act , 1956, in support of her contention against the running of a guest house in the premises and in the area on the ground of the applicability of the Act. ( 10 ) THE plaintiff also relied upon the provisions of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act , 1956, in support of her contention against the running of a guest house in the premises and in the area on the ground of the applicability of the Act. Counsel for Nirmala Devi relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in K. R. Sheney v. Udini Municipality ( AIR 1974 SC 2177 ). This judgement deals with powers of a statutory authority and the right of an individual to enforce its obligations and it may not therefore be quite relevant at this stage. Moreover, the High Court was exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution against which order the appeal was filed in the Supreme Court after obtaining special leave to appeal. Dealing with a contention that if there was any breach of a statutory duty an individual would not be entitled to any relief without an injury, the court held that the breach of a statutory duty created for the benefit of an individual or a class was a tortious act. Anyone who suffered special damage therefrom was entitled to recover damages. ( 11 ) THE acts which Nirmala Devi complains of are not fanciful. They can be attendant to the activities of a guest house. It is not a small guest house. There are about 25 rooms in it with a capacity of 40 persons. This she has said on affidavit and there is no denial of the same. A bald assertion of the Mehtas that no nuisance has been caused is not enough. The guest house runs 24 hours and all types of people visit it at all hours. It is located near the Inter State Bus Terminus. She has complained that some time visitors are drunk and use filthy and vulgar language. Drinking and singing goes on in the guest house. She also complains of noise. She is using her flat for residence. The staircase is common which is used by her and her family members and so also by lodgers and visitors of the guest house, who are strangers. No ordinary and reasonable man living with his family can put up with such activities and cannot certainly have a quiet and peaceful living in his house. The staircase is common which is used by her and her family members and so also by lodgers and visitors of the guest house, who are strangers. No ordinary and reasonable man living with his family can put up with such activities and cannot certainly have a quiet and peaceful living in his house. Merely because a small room is used by her son who is a Chartered Accountant will not entitle the Mehtas to run a guest house in the adjoining flat. I am not saying that every commercial user would be a nuisance. It denends upon the activity being carried on. After giving careful thought to the whole matter, I think, the learned single judge was right in his view. The injunction has to be absolute and unqualified. The right of Nirmala Devi to enjoy her property cannot be put in jeopardy during the pendency of the suit. She has made out a prima facie case. ( 12 ) IT would have been more appropriate for the Mehtas to make a submission to the court that they would not run the guest house till they were granted licence by the authorities and to defer consideration of the applications filed by Nirmala Devi till such time as a licence was granted. Their attitude, however, appears to be one of defiance of law which the court cannot countenance. Appeal dismissed. ( 13 ) I agree that the appeal should be dismissed, but I would like to dispel appellants main contention by a different line of reasoning. Appellants are running a Guest House which is merely a misnomer for a lodging house. If it was a mere Guest House, i. e. , a place where the appellants Keep guests, it might be a different situation. Admittedly, appellants are running a lodging house which is like a small hotel. ( 14 ) AT the same time, it must be kept in view that a lodging house can be run lawfully after getting the necessary licence and it can also be run despite the prohibition for running the same without a licence as required by the Delhi Municipal Corp Act, 1957 or the Delhi Police Act. We are dealing with a case where the lodging house complained of is being run without any licence. We are dealing with a case where the lodging house complained of is being run without any licence. ( 15 ) THE main contantion of appellants that a lodging house which is prohibited by law cannot be stopped at the instance of neighbour by recourse to the law of nuisance. In other words, the contention is that it is a matter for the authorities under the Municipal Act or the Police Act. ( 16 ) I think that different considerations arise for the application of the law of nuisance when a lodging bouse is run under a licence and when it is not. If an injunction is sought to restrain a lawful activity a strong prime facie case is to be established at the interlocutory stage. Also, grant of an interim injuction without a trial is a serious matter. It seems almost to decree the suit without a trial and, therefore, such an injunction can only be granted especially in a case where the effect is to stop the business on a strong case. ( 17 ) IN my view, if the lodging house was being run under a licence, it would be very difficult to grant an interlocutory injunction. Of course, if the nuisance was established after a trial, the Court could grant the relief of injunction. But, it seems difficult to visualise the grant of an injunction at the interlocutory stage in such a case as applied to a running business. This is the circumstance that has impelled me to append a second judgment in this case. ( 18 ) AS stated in the principal judgment, on the basis of the two English cases cited, i. e. , Thempsonschwan V. Coataki, 1956 (1) All E. R. 652, and Laws V. Floring Place Ltd. (1981) 1, All. E. R. 659, an interlocutory injunction has been granted in respect of a house being used for prostitution and a sex-shop. But this activity can be treated as per se of a type leading to a nuisance to a neighbour especially if a respectable locality is involved. The running of a lodging house is not an unusual occupation in most places. ( 19 ) IN thus context, it is necessary first to refer to S. 417 of Delhi Municipal Corpn. Act 1957 and 15th Entry, Part I, 11th Schedule. The running of a lodging house is not an unusual occupation in most places. ( 19 ) IN thus context, it is necessary first to refer to S. 417 of Delhi Municipal Corpn. Act 1957 and 15th Entry, Part I, 11th Schedule. Thus, the keeping of a lodging house is prohibited if no licence has been obtained. There are provisions in the Act by which the Commissioner can stop an illegal user, but they need not be referred to here. ( 20 ) IF there is a person who is aggrieved by the unauthorised activity of his neighbour, he has a much stronger case than if he is aggrieved by a lawful activity of his neighbour. If the activity is lawful, then he has to show a much stronger case as to why relief should be given. But if the activity is unlawful, then an injunction would be readily granted. ( 21 ) SUPPOSE there is a small factory or manufacturing activity in the neighbourhood, the running of a leather or a flour mill or the repair or manufacture of vehicles, etc. all these can be under a licence or they may be without one. These activities create sound, vibration and other types of disturbances which may well be classified as nuisance. If the activity is permitted by a licence, then the Court may insist that in spite of their nuisance value, these activities cannot be stopped and may regularise them in some other way. But, it is difficult to imagine the business being entirely stopped at the instance of the neighbour. No one can deny that in the very large areas that Delhi covers, there are many activities lawfully carried on by the citizens that can be classified as having nuisance value to a neighbour. However, the Court will not readily grant an injunction to restrain the carrying on of such activities at the interlocutary stage of a Suit. ( 22 ) IF the activity is without a licence, it is per se unlawful and, therefore, any disturbance which can be described as intolerable is likely to lead to the grant of an interim injunction to restrain the carrying on of such activity. ( 23 ) THERE is, therefore, no doubt that a trade carried on with a licence is to be viewed quite differently from a trade carried on without a licence. ( 23 ) THERE is, therefore, no doubt that a trade carried on with a licence is to be viewed quite differently from a trade carried on without a licence. Seen in this light, the complaint of the plaintiffs regarding disturbance to the existance of a common stair-case and the noisy nature of the persons staying at the Guest House as well as other disturbances created as a consequence of customers of the guest House arriving at odd times or being drunk or disorderly, it can be said that there is a prima facie case for injuncting the continuance of the guest House . This especially is necessary in this case, by the existence of the common stair-case and possibly the fact that the two flats are situated in close proximity to each other. So, it is a case in which a prohibitary injunction had to be granted at the interlocutary stage. In as much as the learned Single Judge has thought fit to grant the injunction, I do not think this is a fit case where the discretionary relief already granted to the plaintiffs should be discharged. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.