Judgment :- This civil revision petition is filed by the respondents in I.A.No.662 of 1979 in unnumbered appeal C.F.R.No. 3729 of 1979, the plaintiff in the suit O.S.No.165 of 1972, on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Erode, challenging the legality and correctness of the order of the District Judge of Erode, passed in the above application. The facts of the case are briefly as follows: The civil revision petitioner as plaintiff filed the suit O.S.No.165 of 1972 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Erode, for partition of his half share in the suit property. Miss. Effic (Eupersis) Parker, the sister of the petitioner herein, is the sole defendant in the suit. She filed a written statement in the suit claiming absolute title on the basis of a will, dated 4th August, 1950, executed by her mother and on the basis of another document, dated 27th March, 1951, viz. a gift deed, executed in her favour by her mother. Subsequently she remained ex parte. Thereafter a preliminary ex parte decree was passed on 25th October, 1976 for partition and possession of a half share in the suit property in favour of the petitioner herein. One Lalitha, claiming herself to be the power of attorney agent of the defendant, the respondent herein, filed an application l.A.No.662 of 1979, after a period of 2 years, 6 months and 2 days, for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, under section 5 of the Limitation Act. She also filed another application I.A.No.4 of 1980 for permission to file the appeal as a representative-in-interest under section 151, C.P.C. as person aggrieved. Both these applications were dismissed by the learned District Judge, by means of a common order, dated 24th September, 1980. As against this order two revision petitions have been filed by the respondent herein, viz. C.R.P.No.1297 of 1981 against I.A.No.4 of 1980 - Lalitha .. Petitioner v. S.J.Parker .. Respondent, and C.R.P.No. 4741 of 1981 against l.A.No.662 of 1979 - Miss.Fffic Parker by Power Agent Lalitha .. Petitioner v. S.J.Parker ..Respondent. As against this order two revision petitions have been filed by the respondent herein, viz. C.R.P.No.1297 of 1981 against I.A.No.4 of 1980 - Lalitha .. Petitioner v. S.J.Parker .. Respondent, and C.R.P.No. 4741 of 1981 against l.A.No.662 of 1979 - Miss.Fffic Parker by Power Agent Lalitha .. Petitioner v. S.J.Parker ..Respondent. Both these revisions were disposed of by Mohan, J. as per the order dated 14th December, 1982 by which, the order of the learned District Judge was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the District Court, for deciding the following questions: "(1) Whether the revision petitioner has proved that there was sufficient cause for condonation of the long dealy; (2) Even if there was no sufficient cause for condonation of the delay for I.A.No. 662 of 1979 being allowed, if really she had knowledge of the decree only in April, 1979, as is contended by her, whether she could not be allowed to prosecute the appeal as a third party." Mohan, J. made it clear that the said Lalitha is not a representative-in-interest because she is merely an agreement-holder and that the finding that Fx.A-1 is a true and valid document is not disputed. After remand the learned District Judge after taking evidence allowed l.A.No.662 of 1979 and dismissed I.A.No.4 of 1980. The above revision is filed against the order allowing l.A.No.662 of 1972, by the plaintiff. 3. Mr.N.Sivamani, learned Counsel for the civil revision petitioner, raised the following contention in support of his argument that the order of the learned District Judge is not sustainable in law: 1. The respondent Lalitha cannot maintain the application since she has no interest in the property in question and as such she cannot maintain the appeal; 2. Even assuming the respondent is an agreement-holder she cannot be said to be a person aggrieved who is entitled to file the appeal; 3. The respondent cannot file an appeal as an agent since the principal herself had withdrawn from contest and allowed a decree to be passed; 4. I.A.No.662 of 1979, filed by the respondent to condone the delay in filing an appeal to set aside the ex parte decree based on the certified copy of the judgment and decree in O.S.No.165 of 1972 obtained by one Srinivasan, was not maintainable. 5. I.A.No.662 of 1979, filed by the respondent to condone the delay in filing an appeal to set aside the ex parte decree based on the certified copy of the judgment and decree in O.S.No.165 of 1972 obtained by one Srinivasan, was not maintainable. 5. The conclusion of the Court below, on the facts of the case, is perverse and amounts to wrongful exercise of jurisdiction and the same will have to be set aside." 4. The first contention of the civil revision petitioner is that the respondent can continue the proceedings by way of an appeal under Order 22, rule 10, C.P.C. only if there is an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of the proceedings, but in this case there is no such creation or devolution of an interest in favour of the respondent. In support of the contention that the document Ex.A-1, termed as a sale agreement and power attorney, does not create an interest in the immovable property so as to enable the respondent to file an appeal, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the case reported in Ayyasami Pillai v. Subbaraya Pillai, (1983)2 M.L.J.340= 96 L.W.261 where Natarajan, J. held that the provision for reconveyance in a sale deed does not create an interest in the immovable property. The learned Judge while considering whether the provision for such a right will offend the rule against perpetuity observed that such a right not being one for immovable property cannot offend the rule against perpetuity. In the case reported in V.Narasimha Rap v. K.Yalla- manda, (1958)2 An.W.R.291= A.I.R.1960 A.P.32 it has been held that an agreement of sale by itself does not create an interest in immovable property but where the party has been put in possession of the suit property under an agreement of sale it must be held that there is sufficient creation of interest in his favour so as to attract the terms of Order 22, rule 10, C.P.C. It is contended that possession- was not given as per Fx.A-1 and hence there is no creation of interest in favour of the respondent so as to enable her to proceed under Order 22, rule 10, C.P.C. Rut in this case by Ex.A-1, respondent is entitled to carry on the litigation even if the interest created in Ex.A-1 does not amount to an interest in immovable property. The learned District Judge only allowed I.A.No.662 of 1979 filed by the respondent, in the name of the defendant represented by the power of attorney agent. The Application I.A.No.4 of 1980 for granting leave to the respondent to file an appeal was dismissed. Hence there is no force in the first contention of the civil revision petitioner. 5. The second contention on the part of the civil revision petitioner is that even assuming the respondent is an agreement-holder, yet she cannot be said to be a person aggrieved who is entitled to file an appeal. Paragraph 2 of Ex.A-1 which provides for an execution of a sale deed if the litigation is unduly prolonged on a demand by the agreement-holder is referred to in support of the contention that unless the respondent got a sale deed executed in her favour she has no manner of right to continue the litigation by way of filing the appeal. It is also pointed out that the respondent has not alleged any collusion between the petitioner herein and the original owner. In the absence of such an allegation the respondent cannot be said to be a person aggrieved who is entitled to file an appeal. But in this case the lower Court excused the delay in filing the appeal as power of attorney agent on behalf of her principal. The lower court dismissed the application I.A.No.4 of 1980 filed as the representative-in-interest. 6. The third contention raised on behalf of the civil revision petitioner is that the respondent as an agent cannot undo what the principal had done by withdrawing from the contest. In support of this contention, reliance is placed upon the case reported in 34 Indian Cases 866 where it has been held that an agent cannot file an appeal if the principal had withdrawn from contest. Put in this case the defendant only left the suit to be decreed ex parte and the defendant can as well file an appeal against the decree and as such the respondent as power of attorney agent can also file an appeal. The defendant in the suit had not done anything Which may restrain the power agent from filing an appeal. Such a contention is possible only if the defendant had agreed to a course of action and there is no such agreement in this case. The defendant in the suit had not done anything Which may restrain the power agent from filing an appeal. Such a contention is possible only if the defendant had agreed to a course of action and there is no such agreement in this case. The case reported in Gobind Ram and another v. Badri Narain, (1920) 55 I.C.881= 5 Pat.L.J.256 is relied upon in support of the proposition that a person who is a stranger to a suit and is not a party to the decree therein, but whose name is brought on the record after the decree is passed on the ground that he is the real owner of the property in dispute has no right of appeal against the decree. Rut in the above judgment the learned Judge observed as follows: "Parties have sometimes been added as defendants after decree under Order 1, rule 10(2) but the correct procedure in such cases was referred to in Mihir Lal v. Imtiaz Ali, I.L.R. (1896) 18 A.332= (1896) A.W.N.91 where the right of appeal was denied. The present application concerns only the right of appeal and although I feel that the matter is not altogether free from doubt I think the application should be refused, and the memorandum of appeal is rejected." Since the matter is left undecided, the above case cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that the subsequent assignee of a right cannot prosecute the appeal. However, in this case the respondent is permitted to proceed with the appeal only as a power of attorney agent of the defendant. 7. The fourth contention raised on behalf of the civil revision petitioner relates to one of procedure. It is contended that since the certified copies of the judgment and decree of the suit produced by the respondent were obtained in a copy application made by one Srinivasan, a third party, the respondent is not entitled to make use of the said certified copies for filing an application to excuse the delay. Put Order 41, rule I, C.P.C. only provides for the certified copy of the judgment and decree to be filed along with the appeal and it does not lay down that the certified copy should be obtained only by the person who prefers the appeal. Put Order 41, rule I, C.P.C. only provides for the certified copy of the judgment and decree to be filed along with the appeal and it does not lay down that the certified copy should be obtained only by the person who prefers the appeal. In the case reported in Union of India v. T.G.Tobacco Merchant, A.I.R.1966 M.P.52 a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held following an earlier judgment of the same court reported in Purshotham Narayan v. Suganchand Panna-lal, A.I.R.1964 M.P.27 that it is immaterial who obtained the certified copies. Hence this contention raised on behalf of the civil revision petitioner also will have to be negatived. 8. The fifth contention raised on behalf of the civil revision petitioner is that the conclusion arrived at by the court below on the evidence is perverse and the same amounts to wrongful exercise of jurisdiction. The medical certificate Fx.A-4 dated 20th August, 1979, speaks about what had happened in 1976 and even according to this certificate the respondent must be out of danger after some treatment and hence he cannot be confined to bed for a considerable period as contended by the respondent. The conclusion of the Court below based upon the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 and the certificates Fxs.A-4 to A-7 that the respondent was ill and that she was prevented by sufficient cause from filing an application in time is challenged on the ground that Fxs.A-4 to A-7 ought to have been proved by the persons who issued the certificates or who took the x-ray and the same cannot be construed as legal evidence. It is also contended that the non-examination of the persons who prepared Fxs.A-4 to A-7 is fatal to the case and under the circumstances the evidence of R.W.I that the respondent could have taken steps ought to have been accepted. The lower Court on a proper appreciation of the evidence ought to have rejected the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 and the conduct of the lower Court in accepting their evidence amounts to wrongful exercise of jurisdiction. It is also contended that the non-acceptance of the evidence of R.W.1 on the ground that he had not seen the patient is also not proper. The question whether the respondent had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal in time is one of fact. It is also contended that the non-acceptance of the evidence of R.W.1 on the ground that he had not seen the patient is also not proper. The question whether the respondent had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal in time is one of fact. The lower court on an appreciation of the evidence adduced in the case and on a perusal of the documentary evidence came to the conclusion that there was sufficient cause for the respondent for not presenting the appeal in time. The said question is one of fact and the decision of the Court below is based upon a proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence. In the case reported in State of W.B. v. Administrator Howrah Municipality, (1972)2 S.C.R.874= (1972)2 S.C.J.42= A.I.R.1972 S.C.749 the Supreme Court observed that the words sufficient cause should receive a liberal construction so as to evidence substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. Unless the appreciation of the evidence is shown to be perverse, the finding of fact relating to sufficient cause cannot be interfered with. Hence this contention of the civil revision petitioner also will have to be negatived. 9. On the question of maintainability of the revision petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the order of the Court below excusing the delay in the presentation of the appeal amounts to wrongful exercise of jurisdiction which is liable to be set aside in revision. In support of this contention the following decisions are relied upon. In the case reported in P.B.Chougule v. M.N.Jadhav, (1966)1 S.C.J.1= (1966)1 S.C.R.102= A.I.R. 1966 S.C.153 the Supreme Court observed that while exercising the jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact, however, gross they may be or even errors of law, unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself. The tests laid down in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 115, before the High Court exercises its revisional jurisdiction, are, does the alleged misconstruction of the statutory provision have relation to the erroneous assumption of the jurisdiction; or the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity by the Subordinate Judge. It is well-settled that a plea of law concerns the jurisdiction of the Court which tries the proceedings. It is well-settled that a plea of law concerns the jurisdiction of the Court which tries the proceedings. A distinction must be drawn between errors committed by the Subordinate courts in deciding questions of law which have relation to, or are concerned with, questions of jurisdiction of the said Court, and errors of law which have no such relation or connection. It is undesirable and inexpedient to lay down general rule in regard to this position. In the case reported in Bhagavathi Mudaliar v. Subra-maniam, (1968)2 M.L.J.490= 81 L.W.464= A.I.R.1969 Mad.317 a single Judge of this Court held that errors of fact cannot be canvassed in revision, and even errors of law cannot be so canvassed, unless such errors have affected the jurisdiction of the trial Court. Rut when there is a total absence of legal evidence for a finding by the lower Court, it would amount to an exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, justifying interference under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. In the case reported in M.L.Sethi v. R.P.Kapur, (1973)2 S.C.J.543= A.I.R.1972 S.C.2379 the Supreme Court held that an erroneous decision on a question of law decided by the Subordinate Court which has no relation to the question of jurisdiction of that Court cannot be corrected by the High Court in revision under section 115, C.P.C.. Rut in the present case the lower court has given a cogent reasoning for accepting the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 and for not accepting the evidence of R.W.1. The sal! reasoning has not been shown to be perverse. Though the question before the lower Court relates to one of exercise of jurisdiction there is no improper exercise: of jurisdiction in this case. 10. On a consideration of the entire circumstances of the case the conclusion arrived at by the Court below cannot be interfered with in revision and the case will have to be dismissed. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.