JUDGMENT 1. - As stated by it in its representation. Annexure 1, dated March 4, 1977, to the Central Government the petitioner is a partnership firm carrying on the business of making and selling of oriental rugs; carpets in the name and style of M/s. Ess Dee Carpet Enterprises at Jaipur, Rajasthan. All the three factories owned by the petitioner are situate at Jaipur, to wit, at (i) Kama House, Bramha Marg, Jaipur, (ii) Ghate Gate Nawab-ka-chauraha, Jaipur and (iii) Jalupura, Rasta Topkhana Hajuri, near Masjid, Jaipur. It appears that the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Jaipur (RPFC) sent a communication (Annexure 12) dated December 1, 1976, to the petitioner, stating that since the petitioner's establishment is a factory engaged in textile industry specified in schedule 1 of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for short, the Act) employing 50 employees, the Act applies to the factory of the petitioner "provisionally with effect from April 30, 1975", and therefore, the petitioner is required to implement the various provisions of the Act. The petitioner was advised, inter alia, to deduct provident fund contribution at the rate of 8% from the wages of its employees and to, deposit the same, alongwith the employer's matching contribution and other dues under the Act with the State Bank of India in the account specified in Annexure 12. 2. The petitioner made a representation (Annexure 1), dated, March 4, 1977 to the Central Government, purporting to do so under section 19-A of the Act, complaining that the RPFC Jaipur, had wrongly applied the Act to its factory because carpet making does not fall within the ambit of textile industry as specified in Schedule I of the Act. The Central Government partly allowed the representation in as much as, vide order (Annexure 2), dated, February 2, 1978, it remanded the case to the RPFC Jaipur, for deciding the case afresh after holding enquiry under section 7-A of the Act and giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard and producing its documentary evidence. 3. During the enquiry under section 7-A of the Act, the petitioner's authorised representative, D. N. Bhatia and the petitioner's lawyer. K. L. Saxena, appeared before the RPFC Jaipur from time to time. They also made a written representation, dated. 3. During the enquiry under section 7-A of the Act, the petitioner's authorised representative, D. N. Bhatia and the petitioner's lawyer. K. L. Saxena, appeared before the RPFC Jaipur from time to time. They also made a written representation, dated. September 12, 1978, stating that three factories of the petitioner could not be clubbed together for computing the number of employees employed by the petitioner and that if the three factories were to be treated as separate units, the number of employees employed in each factory was less than 20 at all material times. They repeated their contention that carpet making is not an "industry" specified as such in schedule I of the Act, and that therefore none of the factories of the petitioner can possibly he covered by the Act. 4. In his order, (Annexure 3), dated, July 27, 1979 the RPFC Jaipur held that the industrial activity of making carpets falls under entry "Textiles" as given and explained in Schedule I of the Act and therefore the Act applies to the factory of the petitioner. The RPFC rejected the other allegation of the petitioner regarding the three factories being separate and independent units, stating that the petitioner's authorised representative and its lawyer had not pressed that objection before him. Consequently, the petitioner was directed to deposit the contributions and other dues recoverable from him within a period of seven days from the date of the receipt of that order by him. He was also notified that if he did not make the required deposit, the RPFC will be left with no other alternative except to make the assessment of the amount of contributions etc. at his own end in accordance with the provisions of section 7-A of the Act. 5. The petitioner did not comply with the order, Annexure 3, mentioned above. The RPFC had therefore to issue notice, dated, August 6, 1980 under section 7-A of the Act for assessment of the amount of contribution and other dues payable by the petitioner under the Act. Instead of entering appearance before the RPFC in response to the said notice, the petitioner sent a written communication dated, September 24, 1980, informing the RPFC that the petitioner had made a representation to the Central Government under section 19-A against the order, Annexure 3, and requesting that proceedings for the determination of the amount of contribution etc. Instead of entering appearance before the RPFC in response to the said notice, the petitioner sent a written communication dated, September 24, 1980, informing the RPFC that the petitioner had made a representation to the Central Government under section 19-A against the order, Annexure 3, and requesting that proceedings for the determination of the amount of contribution etc. under section 7-A be stayed pending decision on the S said representation. The RPFC replied requesting the petitioner to cooperate and enter appearance for determination of the amount under section 7-A and adjourned the proceedings a number of times, awaiting appearance by the petitioner. Eventually on February 2, 1981 the RPFC determined that a sum of Rs. 78927.50 was payable by the petitioner as provident fund dues for the period from May, 1975 to June 1980. He passed an order (Annexure 9) that if the amount was not deposited by the petitioner within 10 days of the receipt of notice in that behalf, the same shall be realised as arrears of land revenue under section 8 of the Act. This notice was followed by another one (Annexure 10), dated, August 4, 1981, for the determination of the amount of contribution etc. payable by the petitioner for the period July, 1980 to June, 1981. 6. Meanwhile, the petitioner had made a representation (Annexure 4), dated October 8, 1979 to the Central Government under section 19-A of the Act against the order (Annexure 3), dated, July 27, 1979, passed by the RPFC and not complied with by the petitioner. as mentioned above. The Central Government, acting through one of its authorised officer (Legal Adviser), passed a speaking order (Annexure 5), dated, May 4, 1981, rejecting the said representation and affirming the order passed by the RPFC on July 27, 1979. 7. Aggrieved by the orders and notices contained in Annexure 3, Annexure 5, Annexure 9, Annexure 10, and Annexure 12, mentioned above, the petitioner filed the present petition on September 8, 1981, for a writ of certiorari for bringing up the record and quashing these notices and orders. The petitioner also prayed for a declaration that his factory is not governed by the Act and that section 7-A of the Act is void being allegedly violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 8. The petitioner also prayed for a declaration that his factory is not governed by the Act and that section 7-A of the Act is void being allegedly violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 8. The Union of India and the RPFC Jaipur contested this writ petition and filed a detailed reply, with supportive affidavit, in answer to it. 9. Mr. P. D. Bhargava. learned counsel for the petitioner besides raising some subsidiary points, concentrated his arguments in support of his main-contention that the manufacture of oriental carpets, in which the three factories of the petitioner at Jaipur are engaged, does not fall within the ambit of, textile industry" as specified and explained in Schedule I of the Act, and that therefore the petitioner is not liable to deposit any provident fund contribution or other dues payable or recoverable under the Act. He referred in this connection to section 1, sub-section 3 of the Act which lays down inter alia that the Act applies to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any industry specified in schedule 1 and in which twenty or more persons are employed. The relevant entry in Schedule 1 reads as under: Textiles made wholly or in part of cotton or wool or jute or silk whether natural or artificial ........................... In this Schedule, without prejudice to the ordinary meaning of expressions used therein ...... .......... the expression "textiles" includes products of carding, spinning, weaving, finishing and dyeing yarn and fabrics, printing, knitting and embroidering. Mr. Bhargava's argument, in a nut-shell, is that an oriental carpet is not handwoven but, as he put it, it is hand-knotted, and that since the explanation of "textile", as reproduced above, does not specify the products of "knotting" as distinguished from "weaving", in the context of explaining the meaning of the expression "textile" the Legislature intended according to Mr. Bhargava, to exclude oriental carpets (rugs from the category of "textiles" as specified in schedule I of the Act. This argument, in my opinion, is not convincing at all, for Mr. Bhargava completely ignored the fact that in the manufacture of an oriental carpet, besides "hand-knitting," the process of weaving is as basic and essential a factor as in any other woven textile. The weaves or the binding systems vary, and the varieties determine the character of a woven fabric. Bhargava completely ignored the fact that in the manufacture of an oriental carpet, besides "hand-knitting," the process of weaving is as basic and essential a factor as in any other woven textile. The weaves or the binding systems vary, and the varieties determine the character of a woven fabric. As explained by the authors of Encyclopaedia Britannica (Volume 23, 1971- Edition, pages 343-345) besides the three "basic weaves or binding systems" of tabby, twill and satin, there is another binding system called the "complex binding system". One of the complex binding system is called the "pile-weave." Pile weaves have a ground fabric plus an extra set of yarns woven or tied into the ground and projecting from it as cut ends or loops. A great range of textures is included in this binding system, from terrypile toweling and corduroy to silk velvets and oriental carpets. The Encyclopaedia (ibid) clearly states as under: Hand knotted Oriental and Scandinavian rugs are constructed on a tabby-weave ground, with each row of knots followed by tightly beaten-in- wefts. The pile of fine Oriental rugs may contain as many as 160 knots per inch, the pile thus completely obscuring the knots in the rugs foundation. 10. If we refer to "Technique and Design" of making and oriental carpet/ rug by knotted-pile technique as given in Encyclopaedia Britannice (Volume 4, 1971 Edition, Pages 953-54 and Volume 19, pages 713-715) it will be seen that instead of two sets of threads (warp and weft) as in a traditional cloth-weave there are three sets of threads involved in a knotted pile fabric, to wit, warp, weft and pile. A length of pile yarn (usually 2" in length) is knotted around every two warp threads the full width of the loom. As each row is finished, two weft threads are put in, one in the shed formed between the front and back halves of the chain. and a second in an alternate shed forced when the weaver pulls the back-half of the chain temporarily in front of the front half. The weft is then forced down into place by a heavy fork or beater. According to the Encyclopeadia Britannica (ibid) this interlocking of warp and weft with the tuft forms the weave of the carpet. 11. and a second in an alternate shed forced when the weaver pulls the back-half of the chain temporarily in front of the front half. The weft is then forced down into place by a heavy fork or beater. According to the Encyclopeadia Britannica (ibid) this interlocking of warp and weft with the tuft forms the weave of the carpet. 11. The petitioner brought before me in the court one of his craftsmen and a loom to give demonstration of the production method in practice in the factory of the petitioner. The production method of the petitioner is similar to the weaving of traditional oriental carpets as explained above. 12. Mr. Bhargava then referred to the definition of "textile" as given in the Industrial (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, wherein "carpet" is specifically included in the definition of textile. He argued that if the intention had been to include "carpet" in the explanation of, textile" as given in the Act with which we are concerned in the instant case the Legislature would have included the ward carpet in the explanation reproduced above and that its non-inclusion indicates that carpet is not textile for the purposes of the Act. This argument is unconvincing. The explanation uses language which is all embracing and thus takes in carpets also. There was no need to single out carpets for special mention in the explanation. 13. Similarly, reference by Mr. Bhargava to correspondence between the petitioner on one side, and the Textile Commissioner Bombay and All India Handicrafts Board. New Delhi, on the other and to their opinion that carpet making does not fall within the purview of textile industry are not helpful for a decision of this case. Such opinion, given in entirely a different context, is not relevant for our present purpose. 14. For all these reasons, I find myself in agreement with the opinion of the RPFC and the Central Government to the effect that the process of weaving is as essential a factor in the making or an oriental carpet as in any other woven textile. The process of knotting which also goes into the making of an oriental carpet is in addition to weaving. By using both the processes, the craftsman produces an oriental carpet which combines the advantages of a woven textile with those of an animal fleece. The process of knotting which also goes into the making of an oriental carpet is in addition to weaving. By using both the processes, the craftsman produces an oriental carpet which combines the advantages of a woven textile with those of an animal fleece. Oriental carpet is also therefore the product of weaving yarn, and, in that sense, it is "textile" within the ambit of the entry in Schedule I reproduced above. 15. Before closing discussion on this point, reference may also be made to a few rulings to show that the word "textile" in its ordinary meaning is wide enough to include carpets, both hand woven as well as machine made. In (1) Perrits & Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (1979) 1 Supreme Court Cases 82 , the Supreme Court held that "dryer felts" are woven fabrics. Their Lordships further observed that whatever be the mode of weaving employed and whatever use the woven fabric may be put to, it would be "textile" in ordinary parlance. 16. Another case reported in (2) Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (1980) 4 Supreme Court Cases 71 may be usefully cited here. One of the questions for decision in that case was whether "rayon tyre cord fabric" falls with the expression "rayon fabrics" in item 18 of the Schedule to the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954. The Board of Revenue held that rayon tyre cord fabric is not rayon fabric because the weft in the fabric plays the subsidiary role of holding the cord in place before the process of tyre manufacturing is commenced. The argument that prevailed with the Board of Revenue was somewhat similar to the argument raised in the instant case to the effect that weft in a carpet plays an insignificant role. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the Board and instead held that rayon tyre cord fabric is rayon fabric. 17. Last, but not the least, it must be borne in mind that we are not dealing here with a taxation statute, but an enactment made by Parliament to provide for provident funds to employees in factories and other establishments. Obviously, the Act is a social security measure enabling a worker to get certain benefits on retirement, and for his dependents in the case of his early death. Obviously, the Act is a social security measure enabling a worker to get certain benefits on retirement, and for his dependents in the case of his early death. In the present day industrial and labour jurisprudence, the employer's share towards contribution to the provident fund of the worker is in the nature of deferred payment of a part of the wages of the worker. It cannot by any means he described as partaking the nature of a tax and has never been considered to be so. Mr. Bhargava's argument that the Act is a taking statute and should therefore be construed strictly in favour of the petitioner does not hold any water and must therefore fail. 18. To sum up therefore, the carpet-making industry of the petitioner is an industry engaged in the manufacture of textiles within the coverage of the Act. 19. Turning now to the two subsidiary contentions raised by Mr. Bhargava I may first refer to the submission that the employees of the three factories of the petitioner must be counted factory-wise and not clubbed together for the purpose of determining the question of coverage under the Act. This argument deserves to be rejected out of hand. The petitioner had himself not considered it worthwhile to press this argument before the RPFC in the enquiry under section 7-A of the Act. He cannot therefore be allowed to raise it in the writ petition. It is significant to note that even now in the writ petition, the petitioner has not specifically pleaded that the three factories are independent and separate units. No such plea was raised in the first representation, Annexure 1, dated, March 4, 1977, either. All that the petitioner mentioned in that document that he is carrying on the business of manufacturing carpets/rugs in the name and style of M/s Ess Dee Carpet Enterprises at three places in Jaipur. That means that the petitioner's business at all the three places constitutes an integrated enterprise making carpets at all the three places under the same owner ship and management. The petitioner's is therefore an establishment which consists of three factories in the same town manufacturing one kind of goods under the same ownership and management. The petitioner's establishment has therefore been rightly treated as a single unit. 20. There is also no merit in the petitioner's second subsidiary contention that section 7-A of the Act is unconstitutional. The petitioner's is therefore an establishment which consists of three factories in the same town manufacturing one kind of goods under the same ownership and management. The petitioner's establishment has therefore been rightly treated as a single unit. 20. There is also no merit in the petitioner's second subsidiary contention that section 7-A of the Act is unconstitutional. The section clearly provides for enquiry and consequent opportunity to the affected party of making a representation and of being heard against the proposal to apply the provisions of the Act to his establishment. It was on account of this section that the Central Government entertained the petitioner's representation under section 19-A of the Act complaining that the RPFC had held that his factory is covered by the Act without holding the enquiry as prescribed by section 7-A. It will be recalled that the Central Government allowed the said representation and remanded the case to the RPFC for enquiry under section 7-A and for decision on the question after giving the petitioner an opportunity of adducing documentary evidence and a proper hearing. The petitioner cannot therefore be heard complaining that section 7-A confers on the RPFC an arbitrary and uncanalised power to decide the question of a particular factory under the Act. 21. Moreover, section 19-A of the Act provides further safeguard to a person aggrieved by the decision of the RPFC under section 7-A. Section 19-A does not in terms provide for an appeal or revision from an order under section 7-A. Nonetheless, the language in which the section is couched still allows ample scope to a person aggrieved by an order under section 7-A to carry the matter to the Central Government by raising doubts about the correctness of the view taken by the RPFC in proceedings under section 7-A. The practical result is that section 19-A provides to the aggrieved person a remedy similar in nature to a remedy provided by way of appeal or revision. In (3) Annamalai Mudariar & Bros v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, AIR 1955 Madras 387 , the Madras High Court referred to section 19-A as a section providing specific machinery for the determination of a dispute as to whether certain factory is a factory within the scope of section 1 (3) of the Act. In (3) Annamalai Mudariar & Bros v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, AIR 1955 Madras 387 , the Madras High Court referred to section 19-A as a section providing specific machinery for the determination of a dispute as to whether certain factory is a factory within the scope of section 1 (3) of the Act. A similar view seems to have been taken by the Punjab High Court in (4) Metro Motors Pvt. Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, AIR 1959 Punjab 89 . The contrary view expressed in Bankim Chandra v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, AIR 1958 Patna 314 is with respect, not correct. I cannot think of any valid reason why section 19-A should be given a construction limiting its scope to the making of an application by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner alone for removal of his doubts as to the matters specified in the section, and deprive the employer of the benefit of the salutary provisions of the section for getting his difficulties resolved and doubts removed by recourse to the machinery provided therein. 22. I am thus satisfied that section 7-A of the Act does not in any manner contravene the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. The challenge to its validity therefore fails. 23. It was also contended that the RPFC did not give proper opportunity to the petitioner to represent his case in respect of the enquiry held under section 7-A. In view of the facts of the case as narrated in the beginning of this judgment, it will be clear that this contention is wholly devoid of force. The petitioner was given enough opportunity in that behalf and he presented his case before the RPFC with the help of a lawyer. This contention also therefore fails. 24. In conclusion, this writ petition is wholly groundless and it is therefore dismissed with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 1000/-.Petition dismissed. *******