Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff in O.S. 154 of 1982, District Munsifs Court, Ponneri, is the petitioner in this civil revision petition. In that suit, the petitioner, who claimed to have been appointed as the power of attorney agent of Visalashi on 3rd December, 1970 in whose favour an agreement of sale, dated 23rd November, 1970 was stated to have been executed by the deceased defendant Gangadhara Mudaliar pursuant to which possession of item 1 of the properties was also delivered to her, prayed for the relief of permanent injunction restraining Gangadhra Mudaliar from interfering with the petitioners possession and enjoyment of item 1 of the suit properties. In his written statement, Gangadhara Mudaliar, among others, disputed the claim of the petitioner on the ground that no enforceable rights were available to Visalakshmi under the agreement, dated 23rd November, 1970, that no power of attorney as claimed by the petitioner was executed in his favour on 3rd December, 1970 and that in any event Visalakshi must be deemed to have abandoned whatever rights she had under the agreement with reference to item 1 of the plaint properties. A further plea was also raised by him that the petitioner was not entitled to the protection under S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, as he had no possession at all. Subsequent to the filing of the written statement, Gangadhara Mudaliar died and his legal representatives were brought on record. The respondent herein, who is one of his daughters, was impleaded on 27th July, 1682 as the eighth defendant in the suit. 2. In I.A. 529 of 1984, the respondent herein prayed for permission to file an additional written statement. In the affidavit in support of that application, the respondent, after referring to how she was impleaded as one of the legal representatives of her father deceased Gangadhara Mudaliar, stated that when she went through certain old papers she came across a document, dated 4th November, 1971, under which Visalakshi bad given up whatever rights she had under the agreement of sale, dated 23rd November, 1970 in favour her deceased father and that she should be permitted to file an additional written statement setting out this plea. The petitioner herein, while disputing that Visalakshi had given up her rights under the agreement, opposed the application for permission to file an additional written statement on the ground that the document had been got up and that the application was belated and further that if the respondent was permitted to file an additioral written statement, prejudice would be caused to the petitioner. 3. The learned District Munsif, Ponneri, was of the view that the respondent herein was merely attempting to raise in the additional written statement another plea, the truth and validity of which can be investigated in the course of the trial of the suit, and granted permission to the respondent to file the additional written statement setting out the plea that Visalakshi had given up her rights under document dated 4th November, 1971, executed by her in favour of the deceased Gangadhara Mudaliar and, therefore, the suit instituted by the petitioner is not maintainable. It is the coirectness of this order that is challenged in this civil revision petition. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner first contended that no case at all for permitting the respondent to file an additional written statement has been made out, as no reasons had been given by the respondent herein for her not having put forth earlier the plea sought to be raised in the additional written statement. Reliance in this connection was placed by learned counsel for the petitioner upon the decision in Nanjan v. Selai . 1 On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that in the affidavit filed by the respondent in support of the application praying for permission to file an additional written statement, the circumstances under which the plea incorporated in the additional written statement could not be raised earlier had been clearly set out and that the petitioner has not in any manner disputed that and, therefore, the petitioner cannot be heard to contend that no reasons had been given by the respondent for not having raised this plea earlier. 5. It is seen from the affidavit filed by the respondent in support of I.A. 529 of 1984, that she came across the agreement executed by Visalakshi in favour of her deceased father surrendering or giving up her rights under the agreement, dated 23rd November, 1970 after the death of her father while going through some papers in the house. 5. It is seen from the affidavit filed by the respondent in support of I.A. 529 of 1984, that she came across the agreement executed by Visalakshi in favour of her deceased father surrendering or giving up her rights under the agreement, dated 23rd November, 1970 after the death of her father while going through some papers in the house. The circumstances, which, according to the respondent led to the discovery of the document dated 4th November, 1971, executed by Visalakshi surrendering whatever rights she had under the agreement dated 23rd November, 1970 have not been disputed at all by the petitioner in his counter. Under those circumstances, it must be held that the respondent had set out sufficient and acceptable reasons as to why the document dated 4th November, 1971, had been omitted to be mentioned in the original written statement as to justify her action in raising a plea based on that document by means of an additional written statement. In view of this, the decision in Nanjan v. Selai, 1 relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot in any manner assist the petitioner. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the respondent being only a legal representative of the deceased defendant in the suit cannot be permitted to put forward or urge a case different from that which bad already been pleaded by her deceased father, and, therefore, the court below was in error in having permitted the respondent to set out a new case by means of an additional written statement. Strong reliance in this cnnection was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner upon the decisions in Muhammad v. Ummanaikani, 2 and J.C. Chatterjee v. S.K. Tandon 3 . Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that inviting attention to O. 22, R. 4(2), C P.C., the respondent, by the plea raised in the additional written statement, was not projecting any personal claim or right or hers, but was urging a defence appropriate to her character as a legal representative of the deceased Gangadhara Mudaliar, which defence could have been raised by the deceased himself. Attention in this connecion was drawn to the decision in Senchurama Naidu v. Annapurani Ammal 4. 7. Attention in this connecion was drawn to the decision in Senchurama Naidu v. Annapurani Ammal 4. 7. It is seen from paragraph 4 of the written statement already filed by the deceased Gangadhara Mudaliar that he had raised therein the plea that the petitioner has no enforceable rights on the basis of the agreement, dated 23rd November, 1970. Again, in paragraph 8 of the written statement a defence that Visalakshi has no subsisting rights under the agreement and that she must be deemed to have abandoned whatever rights she had thereunder has been set out. The plea regarding the unenforceability of the rights under the agreement, dated 23rd November, 1970 either at the instance of Visalakshi or at the instance of her power of attorney agent, the petitioner herein, has thus been clearly and specifically raised even in the original written statement. Indeed, paragraph 8 of the written statement has set out absence of subsisting rights under the agreement in Visalakshi as a ground for the non-enforceability of the rights under the agreement and an abandonment of rights by her has also been referred to. The plea sought to be raised by the respondent in her additional written statement was nothing but an elaboration of and amplification of the plea already raised by the deceased father of the respondent in his written statement. In other words, the respondent would merely reiterate the non-enforceability of the rights under the agreement of sale, dated 23rd November, 1970 either by Visalakshi or by her power of attorney agent, the petitioner herein, on the ground of the execution of a document, dated 4th November, 1971, by Visalakshi giving up her rights under the agreement. This plea is thus not a new plea raised by the respondent in opposition to the claims made by the petitioner in his plaint nor can it be considered to be one projecting some personal right of the respondent. To put it differently, the respondent is seeking permission to raise a plea which was open to the deceased defendant himself. 8. Muhammad v. Ummanaikani, 1 relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not in any manner help the petitioner, as in that case, it was found that the legal representative wanted to put forth and urge his own claims contrary to the stand taken by the deceased. 8. Muhammad v. Ummanaikani, 1 relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not in any manner help the petitioner, as in that case, it was found that the legal representative wanted to put forth and urge his own claims contrary to the stand taken by the deceased. As stated earlier, in this case, the attempt of the respondent is not to project her own independent and separate rights, but only to elborate a defence which had already been taken by her deceased father in the written statement with reference to the non-enforceability of the rights under the agreement of sale, dated 23rd November, 1970 in favour of Visalakshi, on the ground that there had been a release of rights by her under a document, dated 4th November, 1971. The decision of the Supreme Court in J.C. Chatterjee v. S.K. Tandon 2 far from supporting the contention of the petitioner, reinforces the stand taken by the respondent. It is pointed out in paragraph 11 of the judgment that under O. 22, R. 4(2), C.P.C., any person impleaded as the legal representative may make any defence appropriate to his character as the legal representative and that would include pleas and contentions which the deceased could have urged, excepting those which were personal to the deceased. In this case, as seen already, the defence sought to be raised in the additional written statement was one which was available to the deceased himself and that was not personal either to the deceased or even to the legal representatives and there could therefore be no objection to the respondent being permitted to put forth such a defence. In view of this, the second contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is unacceptable. 9. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended relying upon O. 6 Rr. In view of this, the second contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is unacceptable. 9. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended relying upon O. 6 Rr. 7 and 17, and O. 8, R. 9, C.P.C., that if at all the respondent could be permitted to raise the plea with reference to the non-enforceability of the rights under the agreement, dated 23rd November, 1970, on account of the giving up of such rights by Visalakshi under another document, dated 4th November, 1971, it could only by praying for and obtaining an amendment of the written statement, as O. 8, R. 9 and O. 6, R. 7, C.P.C., are both subject to O. 6, R. 17, C.P.C., Support for this contention was sought to be drawn from decisions reported in Shiva Kumar Singh v. Kari Singh , 3 and T.B. Dayashankar v. M.N. Kaluram. 4 On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that there was no question of the respondent raising any new ground of claim or raising an allegation inconsistent with the previous pleading and, therefore, O. 6, R. 7, C.P.C. would not apply and the matter would, therefore, be governed by O. 8, R. 9, C.P.C. and not by O. 6. R. 17. C.P.C. Earlier, it has been noticed as to how the non-enforceability of the rights by Visalakshi pursuant to the agreement of sale, dated 23rd November, 1970 has been set out as a defence in the original written statement filed by the deceased father of the respondent and how the respondent was merely attempting to put forth by way of elaboration and amplification, the very same plea of non-enforceability by reason of the execution of a document by Visalakshi on 4th November, 1971. There is, therefore no question of the respondent raising any new ground of claim or putting forth inconsistent with the pleading already filed by the deceased defendant and under those circumstances, O. 6, R. 7, C.P.C. does not stand attracted at all. Under the first part of O. 8, R. 9 C.P.C., after the filing of the written statement, no other pleading shall be presented except a defence and if any other matter had to be raised by pleading, it has to be done only with the leave of court. Under the first part of O. 8, R. 9 C.P.C., after the filing of the written statement, no other pleading shall be presented except a defence and if any other matter had to be raised by pleading, it has to be done only with the leave of court. No doubt, under the latter part of O. 8, R. 9, C.P.C., the matter is left to the court to require a written statement or an additional written statement from any of the parties and also to fix a time for filing the same. There is thus no fetter on the power of court in requiring a written statement or an additional written statement from any of the parties at any time. But if the party wants to file an additional written statement, under O. 8, R. 9, C.P.C. he has to obtain the leave of court, as without it, no pleading subsequent to the written statement can be presented into court. O. 6. R. 17, C.P.C., enables the court to allow allow either party to alter or amend the pleading at any stage of the proceeding, but such amendments shall be made as may be necessary to determine the real controversy between the parties. This power of court is not in any manner curtailed or circumscribed by the other provisions occurring in O. 6 or O. 7 or even O. 8, C.P.C. Besides, in this case, it has already been noticed that there is no attempt on the part of the respondent to raise a new ground or set out facts inconsistent with the written statement already filed by the deceased father of the respondent and, therefore, there was no question of the respondent being obliged to seek an amendment of the written statement under O. 6, R. 17, C.P.C., with a view to set up a new ground or put forth an inconsistent plea as contemplated under O. 6, R. 7, C.P.C. In this view, the last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner also cannot be accepted. Under those circumstances, no case for interfering with the order of the Court below in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under S. 115. C.P.C., is made out. Consequently, the civil revision petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.