K.S. SIDHU, J. — This writ petition is directed against the award, dated, March 23, 1983, by the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur, declaring that the retrenchment of 138 workmen of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter called the Corporation) by the Corporation is illegal and invalid and directing the General Manager of the Corporation to reinstate all of them in service with back wages. 2. The facts, material for our purpose, may be shortly stated here. The Corporation was established and constituted under the Rajasthan Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, for the purpose of providing adequate and efficient transport services in the State of Rajasthan. In order to provide some amenities to the travelling public, the Corporation found it necessary to construct passenger sheds, bus stands and other buildings. To start with, the Corporation sanctioned the posts of one over-seer, two draft men, two mistries, one upper division clerk and one lower division typist. In due course, as the work expanded, the Corporation borrowed the services of some officers of the rank of Executive Engineer and Assistant Engineer from the State Government to serve with it on deputation. Some workmen were appointed on "work-charged" basis. They were employed on regular basis in 1978, when, it is said, the building activity, and the work of repairs and maintenance had touched the peak. 3. In 1980, the Corporation appointed a Committee to study ways and means of increasing its income and reducing its expenditure. This had become necessary because the Corporation was running into losses year after year. The Committee found that, among others, the Civil Engineering Department of the Corporation had grown flabby and that as many as 165 workmen were surplus. In its meeting held on April 27, 1982, the Corporation resolved that barring a few persons holding the nuclear posts, all the remaining workmen be retrenched. In compliance with the said resolution the Works Manager (Civil) / Executive Engineer (Civil retrenched 38 workmen out of a total of 169. belonging to the Civil Engineering Department with effect from June 1. 1982. The trade-union of the workmen raised an industrial dispute about this order of retrenchment. The State Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur for adjudication in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). belonging to the Civil Engineering Department with effect from June 1. 1982. The trade-union of the workmen raised an industrial dispute about this order of retrenchment. The State Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur for adjudication in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). The reference was made in these terms : Whether the retrenchment of 139 (sic) workmen by the General Manager of the Corporation is legally proper and valid ? If not, what relief the workmen are entitled to ? 4. After hearing both sides and recording their evidence, the Tribunal made the award in favour of workmen, directing the Corporation to reinstate them in service with back wages. The Tribunal recorded its finding as under : (a) The Works Manager (Civil) who passed the impugned order of retrenchment on June 1, 1982, was not the appointing authority in respect of the workmen concerned at the material time, and as such he was not competent to pass the impugned order. (b) The Corporation did not comply with the condition precedent to retrenchment as contained in clauses (a) and (b) of section 25-F of the Act, inasmuch wages in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation had not been paid at or before the time of retrenchment. 5. The Corporation has fifed this writ petition challenging the validity of the award made by the Tribunal on the ground that both the findings of the Tribunal, mentioned above, are completely baseless and perverse. Regarding the finding at (a), Mr. Ranga Rajan, learned counsel for the Corporation referred to the resolution (Annexure 1-A) dated. April 27, 1982. which had been produced before the Tribunal, and he argued that had the Tribunal considered this important piece of evidence, it would lave definitely come to the conclusion that the impugned order of retrenchment had been passed by the Works Manager (Civil) in compliance with the decision of the Corporation arrived at the apex level in its meeting held on April 27, 1982. He submitted in this context that even assuming that the appointing authority in the case of the workmen concerned was the Executive Engineer (Civil) and that the Works Manager (Civil) who passed the impugned order was not competent to exercise the powers of the Executive Engineer (Civil), and further assuming that the latter was not a subordinate authority under the former, the resolution. Annexure 1-A, would clearly show that the order of retrenchment, dated, June 1, 1982 was nothing but an action by way of implementation of the decision taken by the Corporation, vide resolution Annexure 1-A. Counsel cited Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway vs. K. Subramoniam(1). a Division Bench Judgment of the Kerala High Court which seems to support his contention. 6. I need not however express any opinion on the merits of the aforementioned argument of Mr. Rangrajan, for I am firmly of the view that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to engage itself in the enquiry as to who had retrenched the workmen concerned, and whether he was competent to do so or not. The order of reference made by the Government does not leave any scope for construction of the terms of reference by the Tribunal. The terms are stated in clear and unambiguous language. It will be recalled that the only point of dispute which was referred by the State Government to the Tribunal for adjudication is whether the retrenchment of the workmen by the General Manager of the Corporation is legal and valid. It is thus not open to the Tribunal to construe this order and say that the Government has impliedly called upon him to adjudicate as to whether the Works Manager (Civil) had retrenched the workmen and if so whether he was competent to do it. It is now well settled (see. for example, Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. Vs. Calcutta Electric Supply Workers Union (2) that in construing the terms of reference and in determining the scope and nature of the points referred to the Tribunal, the Court must look at the order of reference itself; because it is the subject matter, as contained in the order, with which the Tribunal can deal, and not with anything else. Section 10. Section 10. sub-section 4 of the Act lays down inter alia that where the order of reference has specified the point or points of dispute for adjudication the tribunal shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto. 7. The order of reference implies that, during the course of conciliation proceedings the workmen did not question the fact that they had been retrenched by the General Manager and that he had the requisite power and authority to do so. In any case, the Tribunal gets its jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the point or points of dispute referred to it, and in that sense, the parameters of its jurisdiction are defined in the order of reference and it must confine itself within those parameters. The Tribunal is not free to enlarge the scope of the France by reading into it matters which are not incidental to the point or points referred. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. V. Their Workmen (3) the Supreme Court explained the meaning of the words "matters incidental there to" occurring in section 10 (4) of the Act, stating that the dispute referred is the fundamental thing and matters incidental thereto are adjunct to it and that "something incidental therefore cannot cut at the root of the main thing to which it is an adjunct" Now, if the Tribunal were to be allowed to engage itself in the enquiry as to whether the Works Manager, had retrenched the workmen concerned and if so whether he was competent to do so, this would not be an enquiry and adjudication as to matters incidental to the dispute as referred, but it would clearly amount to cutting at the very root of the order of reference which, on the face of it, proceeds on the footing that the order of retrenchment had been made by the General Manager. 8. The matter may also be looked at from another angle. Retrenchment as defined in section 2 (00) of the Act, means "termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatever " The words "termination by the employer "in this definition are important. 8. The matter may also be looked at from another angle. Retrenchment as defined in section 2 (00) of the Act, means "termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatever " The words "termination by the employer "in this definition are important. If the termination of the service of a workman is brought about by a person other than the employer or authorised by the employer, the workman may be entitled to relief by way of a declaration that there is no legal and valid termination and that be still continues in service, but he cannot predicate of such termination as retrenchment and challenge it as invalid on the ground that it contravenes the mandatory provisions of section 25-F The contradiction in the latter course is evident on the face of it. How can a person say in the same breath that he has not been retrenched and also that his retrenchment is invalid and inoperative because provisions of section 25F have not been complied with? 9. For all these reasons, I hold that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the point involved in finding (a) reproduced above. The said finding is quashed for want of jurisdiction in the Tribunal to record it. 10. This brings me to the second finding of the Tribunal to the effect that the Corporation retrenched the workmen concerned without complying with the condition precedent to such retrenchment, as enacted in section 25-F clauses (a) & (b) of the Act. The Tribunal has held on the basis of evidence produced before it that all the workmen stood retrenched with effect from June, 1982, on the basis of separate orders of retrenchment passed in respect of all of them as per model order, Annexure 4. It is common ground between the parties that one months wages in lieu of notice, and retrenchment compensation, had not been paid to any of these workmen at or before the time of retrenchment. It is common ground between the parties that one months wages in lieu of notice, and retrenchment compensation, had not been paid to any of these workmen at or before the time of retrenchment. The case of the employer however is that before passing the order of retrenchment on June 1, 1982, it had already computed the dues payable to each workman in compliance with clauses (a) and (b) of section 25-F, purchased as many bank drafts, in equivalent amounts, payable to them, and thus all that remained to be done was to deliver the bank drafts to the workmen individually along with the order of retrenchment. The Tribunal has held on the basis of evidence produced before it by the employer himself that the bank drafts of 116 out of 138 workmen were sent by registered post for delivery to them at their respective residential addresses available with the employer. Rampal Sharma, one of the officials of the Corporation who handled the job of mailing the drafts by registered post admitted in his deposition before the Tribunal that he was able to mail only 20 drafts on June 1,1982, and that too at about 6 P.M. and that the remaining 96 were mailed on June 2, 1982. He explained that on account of the non-availability of postage stamps on June 1, 96 of the 116 drafts entrusted to him for despatch by registered post could not be mailed before June 2, 1982. Be that as it may, the fact remains that although all the 138 workmen had been retrenched with effect from June 1, 1982, none of them was paid his dues under section 25F that day. The retrenchment was effective throughout the day on June 1, but the Corporation did not care to pay the amount or tender it to any of the workmen that day. While passing the numerous orders of retrenchment, as many as 138 in number, on June 1, it could easily be anticipated that it would not be possible to procure 138 drafts from the bank before the evening hours and that the workmen who were entitled to receive payment simultaneously at, if not before the time of retrenchment will not be receiving such payment on June 1, 1982. The 20 drafts which were mailed on June 1, could not have reached the respective addressees, in the common course of delivery of mail, before June 2, if not later. Similarly, the 96 drafts which were mailed on June 2 could not have reached their destination before June 3 or even later, if it had been decided not to tender these drafts to the workmen personally at the place of their duty, on June 1,1982, as it is submitted at the bar now that it had been so decided to avoid the possibility of disorderly scenes in the premises of the Corporation, the date from which the retrenchment was to take effect should have been and could be easily postponed to synchronize with the date on which the employer was expecting to be able to make the payment of the dues to the workmen concerned The conduct of the employer in this case clearly shows that while ordering the retrenchment to take effect from June 1,1982, the employer was pretty sure that none of the workmen would be receiving the payment of his dues at the time of retrenchment on June 1, and that actual payment would be made not before June 2 or June 3 or even later, when the bank drafts could be reasonably expected to be in the hands of the workmen under the circumstances, the Tribunal was fully justified in holding that the employer had not paid the dues payable under sec. 25-F, clauses (a) and (b) of the Act to these 116 workmen at the time of their retirement on June 1, 1982. 11. The remaining 22 workmen who were also retrenched with effect from June 1, 1982 were posted at the material time to far-off places like Jodhpur, Kota and Bikaner. The employer did not produce any evidence to prove that the dues payable to these 22 workmen were paid or tendered for payment to them on June 1, 1982 when the order of retrenchment took effect. The best that can be said from the stand point of the Corporation is that it tendered the requisite amounts to some of the out station workmen on June 3 and to a few even later. The retrenchment had already taken place with effect from June 1, 1982. The best that can be said from the stand point of the Corporation is that it tendered the requisite amounts to some of the out station workmen on June 3 and to a few even later. The retrenchment had already taken place with effect from June 1, 1982. There is thus on valid ground for this court to interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal to the effect that the employer had not paid the amounts payable to the workmen concerned under section 25-F, clauses (a) and (b) before or at the time of their retrenchment. 12. Mr Rangrajan argued that the delay of one or two days in the tender of payment of the dues of the workmen is of no consequence in the facts of this case, and that, as laid down by various High Courts and the Supreme Court, all that the Court should see is that the order of retrenchment and payment of the dues under sec 25-F clauses (a) and (b) should be simultaneous and part of the same transaction so that when the workman is told that he is retrenched he receives payment of the dues in accordance with the provisions of section 25-F simultaneously. Counsel further submitted that the question whether payment to a workman and the order of his retrenchment form part of the same transaction would be a question of fact to be decided on the circumstances of each case. 13. Some of the authorities cited by Mr. Rangrajan may be discussed here. The first case cited by him is Straw Board Manufacturing Co Ltd. vs. Govind, (4). This Case deals with interpretation of section 6-E (2) (b) of the United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which is in exactly the same terms as section 33 (2) (b) of the Act Section 33 lays down inter alia that the conditions of services of workmen and certain other things shall remain unchanged under certain circumstances during the pendency of an industrial dispute before the Tribunal Section 33 (2) (b) enacts that during the pendency of the industrial dispute the employer may for any misconduct not connected with the dispute discharge a workman by dismissal or otherwise. The freedom given to the employer by section 33(2) (b) to discharge a workman is not complete inasmuch the proviso appended to it lays down that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed "unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before, which the proceeding for approval of the action taken by the employer". The employer in the cited case before their Lordships passed an order of dismissal. On February 1, 1960 and sent an application for approval to the Tribunal the same day but the application was received by the Tribunal on February 3, 1960 The Tribunal held that the application must be made before dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed this view stating that it is not correct. Instead, their Lordships held that the order of dismissal and the application for approval should be simultaneous, and the simultaneity required should be taken reasonably avoiding the importation of a notion of a split second timing into it. All that is required, according to the Supreme Court, is that the application for approval should be made without delay and it will depend upon the facts of each case whether the application has been made with or without delay. 14. It will be seen that the cited case does not deal with the payment of wages and other dues, but with an application for approval of the action of dismissal. Obviously, an application for approval of the action of dismissal etc, taken by the employer against a workman cannot he made before the action is actually taken. In other words, such application, in the nature of things, cannot be made before the action is actually taken, for till the action is taken there is nothing in existence for which approval may be sought. Of cource, the application must be made immediately after the action is taken and there should be no delay in making it. The ratio of the cited case had no application to the facts of the case in hand, because what we are concerned with here is sec. Of cource, the application must be made immediately after the action is taken and there should be no delay in making it. The ratio of the cited case had no application to the facts of the case in hand, because what we are concerned with here is sec. 25-F which deals with "conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen" and the two conditions precedent to such retrenchment as enacted in section 25-F are that no workmen shall be retrenched until (a) the workman has been given one months notice in writing in advance or has been paid one months wages in lieu of notice, and (b) he has been paid at the time of retrenchment, compensation calculated according to the formula specified therein. On the other hand, section 33 (2) (b) does not require the making of an application for approval as a condition precedent for taking action against a workman by way of a dismissal or discharge for misconduct not connected with the industrial dispute which my be pending at that time. As already explained, the making of an application for approval under section 33 (2) (b), proviso, cannot be conceived of as a condition precedent, for it will have to be an event coming after the dismissal etc of which approval is sought, and not prior to it. 15. Similarly. P.H. Kalayani v. M/s Air France, (5) is a case dealing with the interpretation of section 33 (2) (b), proviso. Following the earlier ruling in the case of Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. discussed above, the Supreme Court held that the proviso contemplates that the three things, mentioned therein, namely, (1) dismissal or discharge, (ii) payment of wages and (iii) making of an application for approval should be simultaneous and part of the same transaction and that the question whether the application for approval was made as part of the same transaction or at the same time when the action was taken would be a question of fact and will depend upon the circumstances of each case. For the reasons given in the context of the discussion of the Straw Board case, the ratio of P. H. Kalayani (ibid) is not of any help to us in resolving the present controversy. 16. The third authority cited by Mr. Rangrajan is reported in Calcutta Transport Corporation vs. Noor Alam (6). For the reasons given in the context of the discussion of the Straw Board case, the ratio of P. H. Kalayani (ibid) is not of any help to us in resolving the present controversy. 16. The third authority cited by Mr. Rangrajan is reported in Calcutta Transport Corporation vs. Noor Alam (6). This again is a case dealing with the making of an application for approval in terms of the proviso to section 33 (2) (b). The workman was removed from service on July 1, 1967, and the application for approval was made on July 3, 1967. the preceding day, i.e. July 2, being a Sunday. Their Lordships held following the earlier two rulings, discussed above, that, in the facts of the cited case, a difference of a day in doing one thing or the other may not be of material consequence so long as it is clear that the employer meant to do all the three things as part of one and the same transaction. It must be borne in mind that these observations were made in the context of making an application for approval. It would be idle to speculate what their Lordships would have held if after removing the workman from service on July 1,1967, the employer had withheld the payment of wages till July 3,1967. It must be mentioned here that the payment of wages in the cited case was made on July 1, 1967, i. e.. on the same day when the order of termination of service of the workman took effect, and their Lordships also under-scored this fact again and again in the cited judgment. 17. Mr. Rangrajan also cited N. Rarichan V.R.K. Venu Nair(7) & Work-ment D.C. Mills Ltd. vs. Industrial Tribunal, Bengalore(8), in support of his contention that what is important in the context of both section 25-F and section 33 (2) (b) of the Act is that the requirements of these two sections operating in their respective fields, must be complied with as "part of the same transaction of retrenchment or removal from service, as the case may be, and that a delay of a day or two in doing one thing or the other will not be of material consequence. These cases, which are based on the Supreme Court rulings discussed above could not be more useful to us in the instant case than the said rulings which as already stated, are not applicable to the facts of this case. 18. In addition to the aforementioned citation of the three Supreme Court rulings dealing with the question of making an application for approval under section 33 (2) (b), proviso, Mr. Rangrajan cited another Supreme Court authority dealing with the question of payment of one months wages under the said proviso, in an attempt to show that no matter whether the question involved is the making of an application for approval or the payment of wages under the proviso, the same principle, namely, that the dismissal or discharge, payment of wages and making of an application for approval, should be performed as part of the same transaction, is applicable uniformly. It is true that in Indian Oxygen Ltd. vs. Narayana Bhoumik (9) payment of wages under section 33 (2) (b) proviso was under consideration. Having regard, to the facts that a domestic enquiry had been held against the workmen on the charge of committing theft, that on the charge having been proved the employer passed an order, dated, July 28, 1964, dismissing him from service, that one months wages and the order of dismissal were sent to the workmen be money order and registered post, respectively, on July 28, itself, that the workman chose not to accept payment of the amount sent by money order, and the workman, in his written statement in answer to the employers application for approval made before he Tribunal under section 33 (2) (b), proviso had not denied the employers averment that one months wages had been paid to the workman at the time of passing the order of dismissal, the Supreme Court held that the employer had done everything he was required to do to comply with the condition of the proviso regarding payment of one months wages at the time of passing the order of dismissal. It will thus be seen on the facts of the cited case that there was no delay in the tender by the employer of payment to the workman of one months wager and that in fact the workmen had not denied in his written statement the employers averment that the payment had been made to the workman in accordance with the provisions of section 33(2) (b), proviso. This authority is therefore of no help to the Corporation in support of its contention that the delay of one or two days in the payment of wages in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation under section 25-F, is of no material consequence. Apart from the fact that the cited case deals with section 33 (2) (b), and not section 25-F, it is also distinguishable on facts, because there was in it no delay at all in the payment of one months wages under section 33 (2) (b). proviso. 19. On a careful consideration and comparative study of the provisions of section 25-F and section 33 (2) (b) of the Act, I am of opinion that they as entirely different in tone, tenor, contents and the subject of their treatment. Section 25-F deals with the subject of their treatment. Section 25-F deals with the subject of retrenchment laying down certain conditions precedent which must be complied with before the employer may retrench a workman. It is now well settled by a number of rulings of the Supreme Court (see for example State of Bombay V. Bombay Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (10) and Bombay Union of Journalists vs. State of Bombay(11) that provisions of section 25-F ciauses(a) and (b) must be complied with before a workman may be validly retrenched and that any violation of these two clauses renders the retrenchment invalid and inoperative. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held in a catena of cases that if the workman is dismissed as a result of proper domestic enquiry during the pendency of an industrial dispute before the Tribunal, the dismissal cannot be set aside merely because the employer is found to be guilty of non -compliance with the provisions of section 33 (2) (b), proviso in Equitable Coal Co. Ltd. vs. Algu Singh (12) the Supreme Court regarded such non-compliance by the employer as a mere "technical breach" not worthy of notice even for the award of compensation to workman. Ltd. vs. Algu Singh (12) the Supreme Court regarded such non-compliance by the employer as a mere "technical breach" not worthy of notice even for the award of compensation to workman. Similarly, in Punjab Reverages vs. Suresh Chand, (13). the Supreme Court held that reading section 33 (2) (b) and 33 A together it is clear that the legislative intent was not to invalidate an order of discharge or dismissal passed in contravention of section 33, and that breach of section 33 (2) (b) is a mere "technical breach." 20. It may be argued on the basis of certain observations in Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. V Govind (Supra) and Tata Iron & Steel Co. V Modak (14), that if an application for approval of dismissal of a workman is rejected on the ground of non-compliance with the proviso to section 33 (2) (b), the result would be that the dismissal ordered by the employer during the pendency of the industrial dispute before the Tribunal will fall on that ground alone and the workman would be deemed never to have been dismissed. A careful study of the two rulings would however reveal that the said observations have been made in the context of refusal of the Tribunal to accord approval to the order of dismissal as a consequence of its decision to uphold the complaint of the workman under section 33-A to the effect that dismissal was brought about without valid domestic enquiry and the finding by the Tribunal during the enquiry by it that the employer has failed to satisfy it that the dismissal was justified. 21. I am therefore of the considered opinion that the case law bearing on the interpretation of section 33 (2) (b), proviso, cannot be of any help for the correct interpretation of section 25-F. I respectfully agree with Chinnappa Reddy J. (as he then was) in Penguina Textiles Ltd. V. Labour Court Hyderabad (15) wherein his Lordship observed that what has been said by the Supreme Court in Calcutta State Transport Corporation V. Noor Alain (supra) in connection with the requirements of the proviso to section 33 (2) (b) cannot apply with reference to the requirements of section 25-F. The contrary view, expressed by the Allahabad High Court in M/s Swadesh Press V. The State of UP. (16) and by the Delhi High Court in Management of Bandbox(P) Ltd. V. Suresh Kumar (17) ignores the fundamental difference between section 25-F which enacts conditions precedent to valid retrenchment, the breach of which would entail the consequence of rendering retrenchment invalid and inoperative, and section 33(2) (b), proviso, the breach of which constitutes a mere "technical breach and therefore does not per se reader dismissal or discharge of the workman concerned as invalid and inoperative. 22. To sum up, therefore, I find myself in agreement with the Tribunal that the Corporation retrenched the workmen concerned on June, 1982, with effect from the even date, and that, before or at the time of retrenchment, the Corporation did not pay or tender for payment to the workmen their respective dues payable under sec. 25-F (a) and (b) of the Act. After making the retrenchment effective on June 1, 1982. the Corporation started the process of remitting the dues to the workmen at about 6 P. M. that day. All it could do on June 1, 1982,in the matter of these remittances was to put in the process of mail bank drafts for 20 workmen only. The remaining 96 drafts were put in the process of mail on June 2. Thus, none of the 116 workmen to whom demand drafts were mailed on June 1. evening, and June 2, forenoon could have possibly received those drafts before June 3. Under the circumstances, it is impossible to say that the Corporation had complied with the conditions precedent enacted in section 25-F (a) and (b) before or at the time of retrenchment It is unfortunate that the officials of the Corporation who handled this matter did not realise that the requirements of section 25-F, as interpreted by the Supreme Court from time to time are very strict, and that the courts are not prepared to condone any delay, whatever the reason in the payment of wages in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation to the workmen in accordance with the provisions of section 25-F. As already stated, the Corporation could have acted with better judgment and anticipation, and by doing so. the payments could be so arranged as to precede or synchronize with the retrenchment. As it is, the conclusion is inescapable that the Corporation failed to comply with the conditions precedent to retrenchment as contained in clauses (a) and (b) of sec. the payments could be so arranged as to precede or synchronize with the retrenchment. As it is, the conclusion is inescapable that the Corporation failed to comply with the conditions precedent to retrenchment as contained in clauses (a) and (b) of sec. 25-F of the Act. This brings me to the question of relief. 23. The law is now well settled (see for example State of Bombay V. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, (Supra) that non-compliance with the provisions of section 25-F renders the retrenchment invalid and inoperative. This means that a retrenchment brought about without compliance with the mandatory provisions of section 25-F. as in the instant case, is no retrenchment in the eye of law, and therefore all the workmen are entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and back-wages. It must however be added here that the impugned retrenchment is being struck - down on a somewhat technical ground arising out of the delay of one to three days in the remittance of wages in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation to the workmen. It is obvious on the basis of the material placed on the record that the delay occurred inspite of the intention of the management to make the payment at the time of retrenchment Whatever might have been the reason for the delay, the retrenchment did not take effect by reason of non-compliance with the provisions of section 25-F. The management must therefore reinstate the workmen with continuity of service and back wages. 24. Before parting with this judgment, I may also say that there is enough material on the record to prove that the management had taken a bonafide decision on grounds of economy to retrench these workmen. The Economy Committee appointed by the management to go into this question had recommended the retrenchment of almost the entire established consisting of workmen employed in the Civil Engineering Department of the Corporation. Acting on the said recommendation, the Corporation decided to retrench the surplus staff in Civil Engineering Department and to get the work done, as and when necessary through the building contractors. It is well settled law that an employer has a right to reorganise his business in any fashion he likes for the purpose of economy and convenience. Acting on the said recommendation, the Corporation decided to retrench the surplus staff in Civil Engineering Department and to get the work done, as and when necessary through the building contractors. It is well settled law that an employer has a right to reorganise his business in any fashion he likes for the purpose of economy and convenience. This means that if the management of the Corporation finds that the reasons which exempted it to retrench the workmen in 1982 still persist, it will be free to retrench them in accordance with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act. This is not to suggest that retrenchment is the only way to effect economy in the running of the business of the Corporation. On the contrary, no enlightened employer should take recourse to retrenchment, except as a last resort to save his business from total collapse. This caveat applies with greater force if the employer happens to be a public undertaking like the Corporation. I must therefore conclude with the remarks that through the Corporation has a right to retrench the surplus labour and can still retrench the workmen concerned hereafter if it finds that they continue to be surplus, it is earnestly hoped that such continuancy may not arise. 25. In conclusion, this writ petition fails and is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.