Judgment The complainant has preferred this revision for enhancement of the sentence awarded to the respondent by the learned Sessions Judge, Pudukottai. 2. The petitioner herein had preferred a complaint for defamation under Section 500, I.P.C., against the respondent in C.C.No.671 of 1979 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai, alleging that the respondent, who was prosecuted in C.C.No.180 of 1979 for the offence committed under Section 290, I.P.C., in which the petitioner was examined as a witness, has stated in her Section 313, Cr.P.C., statement that the petitioner invited her to have illicit intimacy with him and since she refused, he has preferred a false complaint against her, that such a statement was recklossly made and it was highly defamatory, that the complainant, who was aged about 65 years, and who was a freedom fighter, was getting pension from the Government and that on account of the defamatory statement made by the respondent, he suffered mental agony. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, convicted the respondent and sentenced her to pay a fine of Rs.500/-in default to undergo R.I., for three months and awarded compensation in a sum of Rs.250/-to the petitioner, out of the fine amount collected. The learned Sessions Judge, on appeal, confirmed the conviction, but released the respondent under Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act on her executing a bond for Rs.1,000/-with two sureties for the like sum for her good behaviour for a period of one year and directed her to pay the said compensation of Rs.250/- to the petitioner. Aggrieved by the modification of the sentence, this revision was filed by the complainant for enhancement of the sentence of the respondent. 3. Mr.R.Santhanam, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the respondent was not entitled to any absolute privilege in making the above statement and in any event, the respondent should have been awarded with deterrent punishment instead of releasing her under the Probation of Offenders Act. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the statement made by the accused in a criminal case under Section 313, Cr.P.C., is absolutely privileged one, that since the revision is filed by the other side, this Court has got ample power to interfere with the conviction against the respondent and that the petitioner is not entitled to maintain this revision seeking enhancement of the sentence. 5. 5. In view of the rival contentions raised by the counsel appearing on either side, two main points emerge for consideration in this revision. They are: (1) Whether the statement made under Section 313, Cr.P.C. (old S.342, Cr.P.C.) is an absolutely privileged statement or qualifiedly privileged one? (2) Whether the private complainant is entitled to file this revision for enhancement of the sentence? 6. As regards the question whether the statement of an accused under Section 313, Cr.P.C., is an absolutely privileged statement or qualifiedly privileged the learned counsel for the respondent relying on the decision of this Court reported in Potaraju Venkta Reddy v.Emperor, 23 M.L.J. 39:(1913) I.L.R. 36 Mad. 216: (1912) M.W.N. 476 (F.B.), submitted that the statement by the accused person in answer to questions put by the Court is absolutely privileged statement. On the other hand, relying on the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Narayana Iyyar v.Veerappa Pillai, (1950)2 M.L.J. 686 : (1950) M.W.N. 878: (1950) M.W.N. (Crl.) 282: I.L.R. (1951) Mad. 661: A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 34. Mr.R.Santhanam, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that since the statement is only privileged one and since the accused had made a reckless defamatory statement against a respectable man, the respondent is not entitled to Exception 9 to Section 499, I.P.C. I have gone through the above decisions and I find that the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent was overruled by a Full Bench consisting of 3 Judges in Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tripurasundari Ammal, 51 M.L.J. 112: (1926) M.W.N. 606: (1926) I.L.R. 49 Mad. 728: A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 906, on the ground that the matter specifically dealt with by the Penal Code such as the one under consideration should not be denied by the application of the common law. Further, the Full Bench of this Court in Narayana Iyyar’s Case, (1950)2 M.L.J. 686 : (1950) M.W.N. 878 (above cited) also referred to the above decision in Potaraju’s case, (1912) M.W.N. 476: I.L.R. 36 Mad. 216, and observed that it was already overruled by 5 Judges and held that criminal law in this country having been codified, the common law doctrine could not be imported any more in this country, and hence only a qualified privilege is available to parties and witnesses in regard to statements and averments and evidence given in the course of judicial proceedings. In view of the Full Bench decision referred to above, the law is now well settled that the statement given by the accused under Section 313, Cr.P.C., is only a qualified privilege and not an absolute privilege as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent. There are no materials whatsoever, placed before me to interfere with the concurrent finding of both the Courts below. On a careful consideration of the materials placed before me, it is also clear that the respondent has made highly defamatory in a reckless manner against the petitioner who was aged about 65 years and was freedom fighter. 7. As regards the maintainability of the revision by the private complainant for enhancement of the sentence, a Division Bench of this Court in Krishnamurthy and Elumalai, In re., (1983) L.W.(Crl.) 166: (1984) Crl.L.J. 243, held as follows; "....In the matter of enhancement of sentence, the High Court’s powers of revision are circumscribed by the terms of S.377, itself. As per that Section, it is only the State Government under sub-S.(1) or in appropriate cases the Central Government under sub-S.(2) that can file an appeal for enhancement of sentence. Such being the case, it can never be said that the High Court can entertain a revision at the instance of a private party for enhancement. To hold otherwise would result in transgrassing the parameters of S.377, Cr.P.C., set out by Parliament." In the light of the above decision and as the sentence is entirely in the discretion of the Court, I hold that this revision for enhancement of sentence is not maintainable. 8. In the result, the judgment passed by the appellate Court is confirmed and this revision stand dismissed.