Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1984 DIGILAW 474 (ALL)

Ram Asrey Misra v. Vice Chancellor, Gorakhpur University

1984-07-12

A.N.DIKSHITA, A.N.VERMA

body1984
ORDER 1. The petitioner who was a lecturer in the Sri Krishna Dutt Degree College, Jaunpur was appointed on 2-10-1972 to officiate as Principal in the leave vacancy of one Dr. Akhilesh Chandra Upa-dhyaya. Dr. Akhilesh Chandra Upadhyaya returned from leave on 11-3-1975 on or about which date the Management of the institution sought to revert the petitioner to his substantive position as a lecturer. Aggrieved by this action the petitioner approached this Court by way of a Writ Petition No. 3625 of 1975 which was admitted on 2-4-1975 and an interim order was also passed restraining the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 of that Petition from interfering with the functioning of the petitioner as Principal till further order. With certain modifications with regard to the payment of salary of the petitioner during the pendency of the petition, the interim order dated 2-4-1975 was vacated by this Court on 19-6-1975. Subsequently by an interim order dated 5-9-1975 passed at the instance of the petitioner another interim order was made by this Court on 5-9-1975 to the following effect: "Respondents are granted 10 days time to file reply to this application. Meanwhile the respondents will not take any further action against the petitioner." Sd. K.N.S. 5-9-1975" This petition was eventually allowed by a learned single Judge by an order dated 19-9-1975. The order reverting the petitioner was quashed. Against this decision a Special Appeal was filed by the Management, which was allowed by an order dated 12th Nov. 1975. The order passed by the learned single Judge was set aside and the writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed. The finding returned by the Division Bench was that in consequence of Dr. Akhilesh Chandra Upadhyaya's rejoining as Principal on 11-3-1975 the petitioner stood automatically reverted to the status of a teacher. 2. Meanwhile, it appears that Management received complaints against the petitioner of large scale misappropriation of the college funds. It was said that the fees collected by the petitioner as officiating Principal of the College were not deposited by him and were retained with him dishonestly. Certain other dues were also said to have been misappropriated by the petitioner. As a result, a first information report was lodged by the Management against the petitioner on 13-7-1975. On 23-7-1975 the petitioner was suspended. Certain other dues were also said to have been misappropriated by the petitioner. As a result, a first information report was lodged by the Management against the petitioner on 13-7-1975. On 23-7-1975 the petitioner was suspended. Thereafter according to the respondent (Management) a charge-sheet was sent to the petitioner containing these allegations of misappropriation through College Peon on 5-8-1975 which the petitioner refused to accept. The Management then published a notice in a local newspaper of 12th August 1975 notifying that the College proposes to take disciplinary action against the petitioner in regard to which a show cause notice had already been sent to the petitioner through peon of the College as well as by a registered post both of which the petitioner refused to accept. Consequently by means of that notice the petitioner was being given yet another opportunity to show cause within five days failing which the Management will presume that the charges framed against the petitioner were correct and consequential action will be taken against him. It is further asserted on behalf of the respondent (Management) by the Manager in the counter affidavit filed on its behalf that yet another opportunity was given to the petitioner on 28th August, 1975 calling upon the petitioner to show cause. The petitioner again failed to avail himself of that opportunity. The Management then considered the charges and by a resolution dated 31st Aug 1975 terminated the services of the petitioner, a copy of which was sent both to the Vice Chancellor of the Gorakhpur University to which the respondent-institution is affiliated as well as to the petitioner. By an order dated 11-12-1975 the Vice-Chancellor to whom the resolution of termination was sent for approval accorded his approval which was communicated to the petitioner on 13-12-1975. 3. The petitioner challenges the legality of the resolution dated 31st August, 1975 passed by the Management as well as the order of the Vice-Chancellor granting approval to the said resolution on a variety of grounds. We will take up these grounds one by one. 4. The first submission of the learned counsel was that in view of the fact that the petitioner's earlier writ petition was allowed on 19-9-1975 and in the Special Appeal filed by the Management it was found that the petitioner stood reverted as a teacher on the rejoining of Dr. We will take up these grounds one by one. 4. The first submission of the learned counsel was that in view of the fact that the petitioner's earlier writ petition was allowed on 19-9-1975 and in the Special Appeal filed by the Management it was found that the petitioner stood reverted as a teacher on the rejoining of Dr. Akhilesh Chandra Upadhyaya, any action taken by the Management prior to the disposal of the Special Appeal and the writ petition must be deemed to be void and ineffectual in law. 5. We find no merit in the above contention. The previous litigation initiated by the petitioner was in regard to a controversy which was entirely different. The controversy which was the subject-matter of the previous writ petition was whether the petitioner was entitled to continue as Principal or was liable to be reverted on the return of Dr. Akhilesh Chandra Upadhyaya. In this litigation the legality of the disciplinary action taken by the respondent-Management was not directly or indirectly involved. The scope of the earlier writ petition was entirely different and it did not in any way preclude the Management from taking any disciplinary action against the petitioner during the pendency of the writ petition in the capacity of the petitioner as a teacher. The findings which were given by the Special Appeal will have to be read in the context of the issues which were involved. The Special Appeal was allowed and the order passed by the learned single Judge was set aside. The writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed in Special Appeal. In this view of the matter the observations made by the Division Bench in Special Appeal that the petitioner stood reverted as a teacher on the rejoining of Dr. Akhilesh Chandra Upadhyaya could not have the legal effect of wiping out the orders which were passed against the petitioner in consequence of disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner, as a result of which the petitioner's services as a teacher were terminated. 6. For the petitioner it was next urged that in view of the interim order passed by this Court in the earlier writ petition from time to time the order purporting to terminate the services of the petitioner as a teacher was wholly null and void having been passed in contravention of the injunction issued by this Court. 6. For the petitioner it was next urged that in view of the interim order passed by this Court in the earlier writ petition from time to time the order purporting to terminate the services of the petitioner as a teacher was wholly null and void having been passed in contravention of the injunction issued by this Court. The point again has no merit. The first interim order passed on 2-4-1975 merely restrained the respondent (Management) from interfering with the petitioner's functioning as Principal of the College. Even this order was vacated on 9-5-1975. Neither of these two orders restrained the respondents from taking disciplinary action against the petitioner in regard to his duties as a teacher of the College as distinct from the Principal thereof. The last order was passed on 5-9-1975 whereas the resolution terminating the petitioner's services had already been passed on 31st August, 1975. There was hence no violation even of this order. At any rate, with the dismissal of the writ petition itself in the Special Appeal, all these orders lapsed and the petitioner cannot claim any rights on the basis of orders which might have been passed therein. 7. The third submission was that no notice was given to the petitioner as was required under Statute No. 17.04 (3) of Chapter XVII of the Statutes framed by the Gorakhpur University and consequently the order of termination is null and void. 8. We are unable to agree. Clause (3) of Statute 17.04 of the Statutes framed by the Gorakhpur University reads as follows: "Except as provided by clause (4), not less than three months notice (or where notice is given after the month of October, then three months notice or notice ending with the close of the session whichever is longer) shall be given on either side for terminating the contract, or in lieu of such notice, salary for three months (or longer period as aforesaid) shall be paid: Provided that where the Management dismisses or removes or terminates the services of a teacher under clause (1) or clause (2) or when the teacher terminates the contract for breach of any of its terms by the Management, no such notice shall be necessary; Provided further that the parties will be free to waive the condition of notice, in whole or in part by mutual agreement." 9. It is apparent from a reading of Clause (3) of the aforesaid Statutes that the three months notice is not required where the Management dismisses or removes or terminates the services of a teacher under Clause (1) or (2) of that Statute. From the facts brought out in counter affidavit it is apparent that the impugned action was taken by the Management under Clause (1) of Statute 17.04 of the said Statutes which provides for various grounds on which a teacher may be dismissed or removed or his services terminated. The grounds mentioned therein clearly include a ground based on allegation of misappropriation of College funds. 10. The last submission of the learned counsel was that the provisions of Statute 17.06 of the aforesaid Statutes which provide for communication of a charge-sheet with a teacher against whom action is proposed to be taken under Clauses (1) and (2) of Statute 17.04 was not complied with in the present case. It is urged that the provision was of mandatory character and not having been followed the order of termination must be struck down as invalid. 11. This submission too is devoid of any merit. In paras 12, 13 and 30 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Management it has been very clearly asserted that the charge-sheet was sought to be served on the petitioner personally through the College peon but the petitioner refused to accept the same as a consequence of which the Management took the extra precaution of getting the notice published in a local newspaper. It has further been asserted that the charge-sheet was sought to be served on the petitioner on repeated occasions but each time the petitioner evaded service thereof. We have no reasons to doubt the correctness of these assertions made in the counter-affidavit according to which there is little doubt that the provisions of Statute 17.06 were fully complied with by the Management before terminating the petitioner's service. 12. Lastly, it was urged that the Management did not comply with Clause (3) of Statute 17.06 of the Statutes in that the Management did not communicate to the petitioner the resolution passed by it terminating the services of the petitioner. 12. Lastly, it was urged that the Management did not comply with Clause (3) of Statute 17.06 of the Statutes in that the Management did not communicate to the petitioner the resolution passed by it terminating the services of the petitioner. In para 32 of the counter-affidavit it has been clearly stated on behalf of the Management that the papers of the meeting held on 31st August, 1975 by the Managing Committee at which the services of the petitioner were terminated were duly sent for approval to the Vice-Chancellor the same day and that it was also sent to the petitioner that very day but as usual he refused to take the same and rushed to this Court. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the petitioner was not served with the copy of the resolution passed by the Management on 31st. August, 1975. 13. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.