Order: The petitioner filed an application for maintenance under S.125 of the Code of Criminal procedure claiming to be the wife of the first respondent. The first respondent disputed the factum of marriage. The trial Court on an elaborate consideration of the evidence, adduced on both sides, found in favour of the petitioner and directed the first respondent to pay a sum of Rs.50/-towards maintenance from the date of the application, 7.12.1978. 2. The first respondent challenged this order before the Sessions Court. The Sessions Court did not consider the revision on the merits but directed that the question of marriage will be decided by the Civil Court. It is seen from the order that the counsel for both sides willingly accepted the suggestion made by Court as would be evident from the following observations in the lower Court's order. “At the time of arguments when 1 suggested, that, if this point is decided by a Civil Court, it will be better for the parties, the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the respondent fairly submitted before me that the question of marriage of the petitioner with the respondent can be decided in a Civil Court and hence there is no necessity to consider this question by this Court in this revision petition. The respondent if advised will file a civil suit in the appropriate Court for a declaration that the petitioner herein is her legally wedded husband and if proper Court fee is paid by the respondent, the respondent can claim past maintenance from 10.7.78 upto the date of filing the suit. It Is better in the interest of both parties to decide this question by a Civil Court. But when the marriage has been disputed and when the respondent herein has only cohabited with the petitioner for less than 2 months even according to the respondent, in my view, it is better to decide the dispute by a Civil Court. With this observation the order passed by the learned Magistrate is set aside.” 3. This order is challenged by the alleged wife. 4. With this observation the order passed by the learned Magistrate is set aside.” 3. This order is challenged by the alleged wife. 4. It is contended that the Court below has misunderstood the scope of the submissions made by the counsel appearing on her behalf, that in any case the Court cannot abdicate its powers under S.125 of the Code by refusing to decide the question of marriage and relegating it to be decided by a Civil Court. The petitioner also relied on the decision reported in H.P.Gupta v. Manohar Lal (1979)1 S.C.J. 383: (1979) MLJ.(Crl.) 199: (1979) S.C.C.(Crl.) 530: (1979)2 S.C.C. 486 : (1979)2 S.C.R. 208 : (1979) MLJ.(Crl.) 322: A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 443 and particularly the following observation: “7. We are concerned with a Code which is complete on the topic and any defence against an order passed under S.125, Cr.P.C., must be founded on a provision In the Code. S.125 is a provision to protect the weaker of the two parties, namely, the neglected wife. If an order for maintenance has been made against the deserter it will operate until vacated or altered in terms of the provisions of the Code itself. If the husband has a case under S.125(4), (5) or S.127 of the Code it is open to him to initiate appropriate proceedings. But until the original order for maintenance is modified or cancelled by a higher Court or is varied or vacated in terms of S.125(4) or (5) or S.127, Its validity survives. It is enforceable and no plea that there has been cohabitation in the interregnum or that there has been a compromise between the parties can hold good as a valid defence. In this view, we hold that the decisions cited before us in favour of the proposition contended for by the petitioner are not good law and that the view taken by Sir Shadi Lal, Chief Justice is sound”. 5. Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a statutory docket for neglected wives, children and even parents assuring a strong, speedy and summary remedy to realise and receive maintenance. Factum and validity of the marriage or the paternity of the child may be in serious dispute. The Court exercising powers under S.125 of the Code cannot shelve the question raised or direct the parties to approach a Civil Court to settle the dispute. Factum and validity of the marriage or the paternity of the child may be in serious dispute. The Court exercising powers under S.125 of the Code cannot shelve the question raised or direct the parties to approach a Civil Court to settle the dispute. In that event it abdicates power; it shirks responsibility. It is a statutory mandate to the Court to decide on the materials available whether the applicant is entitled to be maintained or not. It fails to discharge that statutory obligation when it refuses to decide the cardinal questions of the factum and validity of the marriage or the paternity of the child. It does not, in the process, usurp the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The framers of the Code were aware of the Civil rights involved, the undoubted jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and then provided under S.127(2) of the Code, that the Magistrate shall cancel the order of maintenance, in consequence of any decision of any competent Civil Court. S.127(4) goes a little further when it states that the Civil Court shall take into account the sum which has been paid or recovered under the Code. 6. The factum of marriage is the only dispute and the trial Court on an appreciation of evidence, found in favour of the marriage. The Sessions Court did not decide that crucial aspect, it was not interested in deciding the question. If found a short cut for disposal. It made some suggestion. The counsel naturally, accepted; but unfortunately not knowing the legal implications. The result was that the Court did not decide the question in controversy, and the parties are left to the fluid state of the vagaries of a civil litigation. This cannot be allowed. The object and purpose of these provisions will be defeated. 7. A wrong concession by counsel, probably emboldened by a suggestion emanating from the Bench, cannot lull the Criminal Court into inactivity or deprive its legitimate authority to grant or refuse maintenance. 8. The Court below has therefore to consider afresh on the merits the question raised and then dispose of the revision. 9. The order of the Sessions Court in Crl.R.P.No.102 of 1979 dated 18.2.1981 is set aside and the matter is sent back to the lower Court for fresh consideration in accordance with Jaw and inthe light of the observations made above. Crl.R.P. is disposed of as above. Crl.R.P. allowed.