JUDGMENT J.N. Dubey, J. - This writ petition was filed by Dal Singar Rai challenging the order dated 4-7-1973 of Sri K.S. Pippal Deputy Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur, allowing the revision filed by opposite parties no. 4 and 5. 2. It appears that in the basic year the land in dispute was recorded in the name of the petitioner and opposite party no. 4 to 5. Opposite Parties no 4 and 5 filed objection under Section 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act claiming that the name of the practitioner was wrongly recorded in the revenue records. The land in dispute was originally recorded in the names of Lutai, Badri and a few others. They purchased one-third share of Badri and their names were also mutated in the revenue records. They alleged that they also purchased one-third share of Lutai on 26-4-1947 but their names were not mutated so far. It was further asserted that the petitioner had filed a suit under Section 59/61 of the U. P. Tenancy Act claiming one third share in the land in dispute on the basis of sale deed dated 3-5-1946 alleged to have been Executed by Lutai in his favour which was dismissed in default and no attempt was made by the petitioner to get the order of dismissal set aside. That being so, the petitioner was not entitled to claim any right in the land in dispute on the basis of the sale deed dated 3-5-1946. Lutai did not execute any sale deed in favour of the petitioner and the sale deed alleged to have been executed by him in his favour on 3-5-1946 was forged document. Although they did not pray for recording of their names in the revenue papers on the land in dispute on the basis of the sale deed executed by Lutai in their favour on 26-4-1947 they had made a mention of it in the body of their objection. 3. The petitioner contested the objection on the ground that he had purchased the one third share of Lutai in the land in dispute on 3-5-1946 and, therefore, he was rightly recorded in the revenue records on the basis of the sale deed dated 3-5-1946. It was alleged that even if the sale deed alleged to have been executed by Lutai in favour of the opposite parties no. It was alleged that even if the sale deed alleged to have been executed by Lutai in favour of the opposite parties no. 4 and 5 was a genuine document it was not capable of conferring any right in as much as Lutai having already sold his one-third share to the petitioner on 3-5-1946 had no subsisting right on 26-4-1947 so as to entitle him to execute a sale deed in favour of the opposite parties no. 4 and 5. It was, further claimed that the suit filed by him under Section 59/61 of U.P. Tenancy Act was dismissed in default which could not be considered as a decision on merits so as to debar the petitioner from claiming the land in dispute on the basis of sale deed dated 3-5-1946. 4. The Consolidation Officer allowed the objection of the opposite parties no. 4 and 5 on 31-8-1972 and ordered for expunging the name of the petitioner from the revenue records. 5. The petitioner filed an appeal to the Settlement Officer Consolidation which was allowed by him on 24-4-1973 and the basic year entry in favour of the petitioner was restored. Feeling aggrieved from the order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation the opposite parties 4 and 5 filed revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation which was allowed by him on 4-7-1973. 6. Dal Singar has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order dated 4-7-1973 of the Deputy Director of Consolidation by which he had set aside the order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation and ordered for expunging the name of the petitioner from the revenue records. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that the Settlement Officer Consolidation has given detailed reasonings in support of his order but the Deputy Director of Consolidation while allowing the revision has not considered the said reasonings. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner if the Deputy Director of Consolidation had decided to reverse the order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation it was incumbent upon him to have dealt with the reasonings given by the Settlement Officer Consolidation for deciding the case in his favour and the Deputy Director of Consolidation not having done so has committed an error apparent on the face of the record. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also assailed the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation on few other points but in my opinion it is not necessary for me to consider the same in view of the fact that the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation deserves to be quashed on the first point alone. The Settlement Officer Consolidation in his judgment held that the opposite parties 4 and 5 themselves admitted in their written statement before the Consolidation Officer that the sale deed dated 3-5-1946 executed by Lutai in favour of the petitioner was prior in time and that they did not file the original sale deed and also did not take permission of the court to lead secondary evidence and therefore, the copy of the sale deed filed by them before the Consolidation Officer cannot be read in evidence. He has also held that as the order of the revenue court under Section 59/61 of the U.P. Tenancy Act was not on merit it would neither operate as res judicata in these proceedings nor debar the petitioner to set up his case on the basis of the sale deed dated 3-5-1946 The Deputy Director of Consolidation in his order has not touched any of these findings and has allowed the revision on different points. It is true that the Deputy Director of Consolidation being the last court of fact was quite competent to reverse each and every finding of the Settlement Officer Consolidation even on the question of fact but in ray opinion, he was not legally justified in reversing the order of the Settlement Officer Consolidation without dealing with the reasonings given by him is accepting the claim of the petitioner and rejecting that of the opposite parties 4 and 5. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, not having considered the reasonings given by the Settlement Officer Consolidation for all wing the appeal of the petitioner, while allowing the revision of the opposite parties 4 and 5, has committed an error of the face on the record. 8. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 4-7-1973 of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is quashed. The case is sent back to the Deputy Director of Consolidation for deciding afresh in accordance with law and the observations made above. 8. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 4-7-1973 of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is quashed. The case is sent back to the Deputy Director of Consolidation for deciding afresh in accordance with law and the observations made above. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.