The preliminary objection taken in this case challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the instant application under section 438 Cr. P. C. has acquired the complexion of an important question of law. Because the petitioners had earlier invoked unsuccessfully the jurisdiction of the Court of Session in the matter, it is submitted, a second application to this Court for the same relief is not maintainable. The petiti­oners made their choice and, it is submitted, the provision con­template that they thereby exhausted their right to the relief contemplated thereunder. Whether or not their liberty was jeo­pardised this Court will not hear them, so it is asserted. 2. Learned Public Prosecutor, Tripura, Mr. S. Deb has done good home work in this case and has dug out authorities to impress me by the weight thereof in pressing forcefully the preliminary objection. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Onkar Nath vs. State, 1976 Cri. L. J. 1142, on a reference made to it, decided the question in similar circums­tances against the bail-petitioner, so it is contended before me by Mr. Deb. However, according to me the question which their Lordships in that case were asked to decide was a diffe­rent one. The question was, whether an application under sec­tion 438 is maintainable in the High Court without such an application having been moved and rejected in the Court of Session? It was answered in the affirmative. It was held in that case that two forums are contemplated under section 438 for moving an application for anticipatory bail and the juris­diction of both Courts, Court of Session and the High Court, are concurrent. It is true, the Court also observed, that it was left to the person to choose the forum but at the same time it was held that the provision read as a whole did not prima fade create any Bar that he must first apply to the Court of Session before coming to the High Court to seek his redress. The central theme of the decision, it appears to me, is that the High Court which was invested to entertain an application under section 438 must exercise the jurisdiction in an "unfettered" manner and therefore the fact that the petitioner had not moved Court of Session initially, which would be some form of a "fetter", has to be ignored. The central theme of the decision, it appears to me, is that the High Court which was invested to entertain an application under section 438 must exercise the jurisdiction in an "unfettered" manner and therefore the fact that the petitioner had not moved Court of Session initially, which would be some form of a "fetter", has to be ignored. The next decision on which reliance is placed by Mr. Deb is one which unambiguously and in no uncertain terms supports Mr. Deb's contention. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Amiya Kumar vs. State of W. B., 1979 Cri. L. J. 288, categorically held that the person who had applied to Sessions Court and his application was rejected he could not make fresh application to the High Court on the same ground. Herein too, their Lordships considered section 438 from the view point of a "choice" and observed that it was open to a party to choose his forum and because it was a question of choice it impliedly "restricted"' the choice or in other words the provision was for "alternative choice" which, according to their Lordship?, was consistent with the object of the 1973 Code to avoid delay in disposal of criminal cases and to avoid the abuse of processes of the Court and also wastage of Court's time. The Calcutta Bench also considered etymologically import of the word "or" used in section 438 (1) and placing a "grammatical construction" on the said provision held that it was used in disjunctive sense or in other words in "alternative or exclusive sense". 3. The Calcutta Bench also considered etymologically import of the word "or" used in section 438 (1) and placing a "grammatical construction" on the said provision held that it was used in disjunctive sense or in other words in "alternative or exclusive sense". 3. Before dealing with the leading case on the subject (Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, A.I.R. 1980 SC 1632), I may first read the relevant provision, indeed only its relevant portion :- "438(1) When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section; and that Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on bail." However, it is necessary also to observe in this connection that the entire provision relating to "Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest" which was for the first time brought on the statute book, is contained in section 438 which is reposited in Chapter XXXIII of the 1973 Code, captioned "Provisions as to Bail and Bonds". Indeed, the other parts of section 438, namely, sub-sections (2) and (3) and the other provisions of Chapter XXXIII unmistakably indicate that section 438 is a complete Code in itself. As the provision has to be construed in its setting and context a comparison of the phraseology of section 438 with that of section 439 is also necessary in my opinion because, in section 439 is similarly posited 'Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail". In sub-section (1) in both cases the expression used is "High Court or the Court of Session." 4. Although in Gurbaksh Singh (supra) the question that has been posed before me did not come up for consideration some observations made therein by the apex court are relied on by Mr. Deb. The matter came up before their Lordships in an appeal by special leave from a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court which had refused bail under section 438 to the appellant. What was squarely and directly in issue in that case was the ambit not of the jurisdiction of the two Courts but of the discretion of each Court in dealing with an application under section 438. What was squarely and directly in issue in that case was the ambit not of the jurisdiction of the two Courts but of the discretion of each Court in dealing with an application under section 438. The Court held that "The High Court and the Court of Session to whom the application for ancipatory bail is made ought to be left free in the exercise of their judicial discretion to grant bail if they consider it fit so to do on the facts and circumstances of the case and on such condition as the case may warrant." While saying so their Lordships also added as follows :- "There is no risk involved in entrusting a wide discretion to the Court of Session and the High Court in granting anticipatory bail because, firstly, these are higher courts manned by experienced persons, secondly, their orders are not final but are open to appellate or revisional scrutiny and above all because, discretion has always to be exer­cised by courts judicially and not according to whim, caprice or fancy." 5 What however is more significant according to me, to be noted is the further observation of their Lordships that "There is a risk in foreclosing categories of cases in which anticipatory bail may be allowed because life throws up unfore­seen possibilities and offers new challenges.". I say so because Mr. Deb sought to canvass before me the position that when an order is passed under section 438 by the Court of Session it becomes revisable order because the apex court had said so. I do not think that their Lordships said so or otherwise even such an order could be open in revision under section 401 Cr. P. C. Indeed if the order could not be an order revisable under section 401 it stands to reason that their Lordships would not say that it was revisable. As I have observed above section 438, according to me, is a complete Code and even on reading section 401 I do not find that an order passed under section 438 is revisable thereunder. On the other hand, the anxiety of their Lordships to avoid the "risk in foreclosing categories of cases" in my opinion should guide me in diving the true legislative intent of the expression "High Court or Court of Session" used in section 438. On the other hand, the anxiety of their Lordships to avoid the "risk in foreclosing categories of cases" in my opinion should guide me in diving the true legislative intent of the expression "High Court or Court of Session" used in section 438. What their Lordships observed about the object of the anticipatory bail is also noteworthy and accor­ding to me indicative of relevant guidelines for the purpose of answering the question raised in this application. I may, there­fore, extract, firstly, a portion from para 39.9 of the 41st Report of the Law Commission which their Lordships quoted in their judgment :- " * * * In recent times, with the accentuation of political rivalry, this tendency is showing signs of steady increase. Apart from false cases, where there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail, there seems no justification to require him first to submit to custody, remain in prison for some days and then apply for bail. 6. Their Lordships also observed that "The act of arrest directly affects freedom of movement of the person arrested by the police, and speaking generally, an order of bail gives back to the accused that freedom on condition that he will appear to take his trial" and held that an order of anticipatory bail constitutes ''an insurance against police custody following upon arrest for offence or offences in respect of which the order is issued". In Hussainara series of cases (See AIR 1979 SC 1360 etc.) also the dimension added to the right of bail is noteworthy. 7. It is well settled in law, according to me, that when concurrent jurisdiction is conferred on two Courts or Tribunals unless the jurisdiction of one is expressly restricted in any manner on a plain reading of the concerned provision, it will be against the accepted and well established cannons of inter­pretation to read any implied prohibition in the exercise in any manner of the jurisdiction of any of the Courts or Tribu­nals. This position is amply and candidly reflected in the pro­visions of sub section (3) of both sections 397 and 399. This position is amply and candidly reflected in the pro­visions of sub section (3) of both sections 397 and 399. The new Code of 1973 for the first time invested concurrent revisional jurisdiction in the High Court and in the Sessions Judge and while doing so care was taken to see that when the juris­diction was once exercised by any one of the two Courts it was not exercised for a second time by the other Court. This position is not reflected either in S. 438 or in S. 439 and both deal with beil". That apart, it is also an well established rule of interpretation that procedural enactments should be construed liberally and in such manner as to render the enforce­ment of such substantive rights effective. (See AIR 1960 SC 422, Veluswami vs. Raja Nainar). There cannot be any doubt that a new right, and indeed a substantive right, albeit, of constitutional complexion, has been posited in section 438 of the new Code and the moot question is, in what manner this right can be effectively enforced. 8. What is therefore of signal importance in this matter is to consider whether giving a restrictive interpretation to section 438 will accord well with the constitutional mandate of Article 21. The High Court, acting as a constitutional court, is cons­titutionally obligated to act in a manner as will fulfill the mandate of Article 21. It can, therefore, be said that it must adopt such a procedure in dealing with an application under section 438 which can be said to be a reasonable procedure, a procedure not restrictive of the right to personal liberty. If an application under Section 438 is refused on the mere ground that an application was earlier made and rejected by the Sessions Judge can it be called a fair and reasonable procedure? There may be circumstances when a person may not have a free but a forced choice in making first an application to the Court of Session. Should he, for that reason, lose his right to approach the High Court? The Calcutta decision has not taken into consideration this constitutional aspect and therefore, in my opinion, it is possible to say that the concept of "alternative" or "restrictive" choice sought to be injected by their Lordships into section 438, would be clearly violative of the constitutional mandate. Should he, for that reason, lose his right to approach the High Court? The Calcutta decision has not taken into consideration this constitutional aspect and therefore, in my opinion, it is possible to say that the concept of "alternative" or "restrictive" choice sought to be injected by their Lordships into section 438, would be clearly violative of the constitutional mandate. Presumption of constitutionality is an accepted norm of interpretative technology and I would, therefore, with due respect to their Lordships, hold that such a concept has to be eschewed in interpreting section 438. Indeed, the Allahabad decision, though it refers to "choise of forums" has guarded itself against importing such a consideration in its interpretation However, the consideration that tbe applicant in any case had unsuccessfully moved the Court of Session can be said, on the reasoning adopted in the said decision, to put "fetters" on the exercise by the High Court of its concurrent jurisdiction, which, has, therefore, to be avoided. 9. Both decisions could not obviously anticipate what the apex co-art has recently said in Maneka Gandhi ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) and reiterated in Prem Shankar ( AIR 1980 SC 1535 ) but the Calcutta decision has also overlooked even the "general" long established, and not only the "special" emergent norms of interpretation. That the word "or" is not always disjunctive and that it is the context, setting and for that matter the intention of the legislature to be gathered there from and from the object of the provisions which will decide if it is to be read cumulatively or alternatively, according to me, is well established. (See AIR 1958 SC 861 Mazagaon Dock, AIR 1963 SC 1850 , State of A. P. vs. C. Ganeswara Rao, AIR 1968 SC 1450 , Iswar Singh Bindra). The Apex Court has also ruled that not always grammatical construction but invariably and primarily purposive construction as may promote the legislateve object, must be accorded primacy in the interpretative process. (See Ganeswara Rao (Supra), also AIR 1965 SC 951 , Dy. Custo­dian E. P.). It also bears emphasis that if two views of inter­pretation of a provision are possible one which favours the citizen and that too for buttressing his right to personal liberty, must be adopted. (See Ganeswara Rao (Supra), also AIR 1965 SC 951 , Dy. Custo­dian E. P.). It also bears emphasis that if two views of inter­pretation of a provision are possible one which favours the citizen and that too for buttressing his right to personal liberty, must be adopted. In Gurbaksh Singh, the object of the new provision (S. 438) is explained and their Lordships have taken pains to show how the new right acts as an effective antidote against the virus of threshold restriction on personal liberty. 10. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Deb has no force and the same must, therefore, be rejected. 11. Mr. Deb has fairly conceded that on facts, the grant of anticipatory bail being a matter of discretion if this Court on a perusal of the application and considering the facts and circumstances of the case was disposed to allow the prayer, he had nothing to say. 12. Five petitioners have approached this Court for an order of pre-arrest bail on the ground that they are wanted by the police in connection with Sidhai P. S. Case No. 7(3) of 84 under Section 304/201/120B/34 IPC. The police has raided their houses also. The third and the fifth petitioners are not named in the F.I. R. but even against the other petitioners there is no specific allegation. They are being hounded on mere surmises and conjectures. The deceased was a renowned smuggler and he had many enemies as he indulged in many anti-social activi­ties. The petitioners are small traders and cultivators and have a good reputation. It is further submitted that two other per­sons named in the F. I. R. were granted anticipatory bail by the learned Sessions Judge by his order passed on 27. 3. 84 and the petitioner's case was not properly considered by him. Upon hearing learned counsel for the petitioners and giving my anxious considerations to the petition and also to the submissions made in support thereof and on a perusal of the F. I. R., I am of the opinion that a case for grant of pre-arrest bail has been made out by the petitioners. Indeed, as alluded, learned Public Prosecutor has not opposed seriously on facts the petitioners' case and indeed he could not place any material to counter? Indeed, as alluded, learned Public Prosecutor has not opposed seriously on facts the petitioners' case and indeed he could not place any material to counter? the statements of the petitioners and the submissions on facts of their learned counsel. 13. I accordingly, direct that each of the petitioners shall be enlarged on a bail of Rs. 3,000/- each with one surety in the like amount in the event of his arrest and that the bail shall be furnished to the satisfaction of the officer concerned making the arrest. However, they shall make themselves available for inter-rogation as and when required and they shall not leave the Ideal limits of the jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala, without his prior permission. It shall also be necessary for then to report at Sidhai P. S. once in every fortnight. 14. In the result, the application is allowed and the Misc. case is accordingly disposed of.