JUDGMENT : P.C. Misra, J. - The petitioner in this case is a practising advocate of Parlakhemedi and has filed this application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with a prayer to discharge him and quash the proceeding in S.C. No. 20/1983 pending against him in the court of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge. Parlakhemedi and to set aside the order in Annexures-4, 5 and 6. 2. In this application under section 482 it has been alleged that the petitioner is a leading citizen of the town and was previously the Vice-Chairman of the Parlakhemedi Municipality and at present continuing as a sitting Councillor of the said Municipality. According to him he being a social worker he had occasion of addressing meetings and taking leading part in various activities for which some people of the locality have developed animosity against him. In the application various litigations have been mentioned to have been initiated against the petitioner, most of which met an unsuccessful end. The petitioner further alleges that he was the lawyer against the officer-in-charge of the local police station in a civil suit for which he was displeased with him. On 1-4-1982 an F.I.R. was lodged by one Mohan Sahukar against whom the petitioner had filed a suit as the lawyer for the Plaintiff I. Venkata Rao on the allegations that on the said date at about 9 p.m. he (Informant) along with some Others were sitting on the verandah of his uncle when 9 persons came and abused them due to prior enmity. When the informant and Others protested, they went back and after half an hour came in a larger group of about 20 persons armed with axe, lathi, bomb etc. They are alleged to have hurled some bombs towards the informant party and to have set fire to three cowsheds of one Hrudayananda Sahukar and of the informant. The informant alleged that he doubted that the petitioner and Others might have advised the accused persons to commit the aforesaid offence. They are alleged to have hurled some bombs towards the informant party and to have set fire to three cowsheds of one Hrudayananda Sahukar and of the informant. The informant alleged that he doubted that the petitioner and Others might have advised the accused persons to commit the aforesaid offence. It is stated that during the course of investigation police recorded statements of certain persons and the statements of Kamal Nabham and S. Laxminarayan were recorded under section 164, Cr.P.C. According to the statement of the said persons, at about 3 months back when they were returning from Sidha Madaga at about 9 p. m, in the night they found 3 persons including the petitioner standing on the Tinichoka Road and about 8 persons were standing on the other side of the road and some time thereafter they found that the houses of the aforesaid persons have been set on fire. It was registered as G.R Case No. 129 of 1982. Charge sheet under sections 147, 149, 148, 436, 337, 323, 286, 186, 114, I.P.C. and under section 4(3) of the Indian Explosives Act has thereafter been filed against the petitioner and some Others. The allegation in the charge sheet against the petitioner is confined to offence under sections 114/436, I.P.C. The petitioner thereafter moved the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Parlakhemedi for his discharge. But the said petition was rejected on merits. The petitioner also moved the learned Sessions Judge, Ganjam in Cr. Rev. No. 117/1983-G but the learned Sessions Judge confirmed the order of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge. The petitioner invokes the inherent powers of this Court under section 482, Cr. P.C to quash the proceeding so far as he is concerned. 3. At the outset a contention was raised on behalf of the State that the High Court should not exercise powers under section 482. Cr. P.C. in cases where powers under section 397(2), Cr. P.C. have already been exercised by a Court competent to exercise such powers. I do not find any merit in the said contention. Sections 397 and 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code cover different fields independent of each other. The former relates to. regular jurisdiction of a superior court whereas the latter relates to the inherent powers of the High Court. I do not find any merit in the said contention. Sections 397 and 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code cover different fields independent of each other. The former relates to. regular jurisdiction of a superior court whereas the latter relates to the inherent powers of the High Court. The inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 is distinct and independent of the powers of a revisional court and may be exercised when the same is necessary in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and where no other remedy is available under the Code. Therefore, the fact that the petitioner had invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge would not be a bar for exercise of the powers of the High Court under section 482 Cr. P.C. 4. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court may be exercised to quash the proceeding in proper cases either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice Though ordinarily the High Court would not interfere at an interlocutory stage of a criminal proceeding pending in a subordinate court, it would do so, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, where there is an exceptional and extraordinary reason in order to prevent abuse of the process of the court or where such interference is necessary to secure the ends of justice. There may be the cases where the allegations made against the accused in the F.I.R. or the complaint taken at their face value do not constitute the offence alleged. In such cases there is no question of appreciating the evidence and the High Court may exercise of its powers under section 482, Cr. P.C to quash the proceeding. There may be cases where the allegations made against the accused do constitute of an offence but there is no legal evidence in support of the accusation or the evidence adduced clearly and manifestly fails to prove the charge. In such cases the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482, Cr. P.C. may be available to be exercised in order to prevent the harassment of a party to go through the ordeals of a trial. But cases where there is legal evidence on record which may or may not support the accusation depending upon the appreciation thereof. In such cases the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482, Cr. P.C. may be available to be exercised in order to prevent the harassment of a party to go through the ordeals of a trial. But cases where there is legal evidence on record which may or may not support the accusation depending upon the appreciation thereof. In exercise of its jurisdiction under section 482 the High Court would not embark on an enquiry as to whether the evidence on record in reliable or not, and therefore in such cases where the exercise of jurisdiction under section 482, Cr. P.C depends upon appreciation of evidence, the High Court would not interfere to quash a proceeding. The present case does not tall within the first two categories of cases enumerated above. 5. As already stated, extraordinary power conferred by the Code on the High Court is available to be exercised in exceptional cases where no other remedy is provided by the statute and the exercise of which is necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Taking the allegations and the evidence available on record as they are, if no offence is made out the quashing of the proceeding under section 482, Cr. P. C. may be justified. Applying the above test. I find that the informant named the petitioner as one of the persons who is believed to have abated the commission of the offence. The persons whose statements have been recorded under section 164. Cr. P. C. have also named the petitioner to be one of those who instigated some Others for it committing the offence. I do not intend to express any opinion as to whether the said evidence is reliable or not as it is not permissible to do so at this stage. At the stage of framing of charges a general consideration of the materials placed before the court is to be made and not a detailed examination thereof. At the stage of framing of charges, the standard of test and weighing of evidence meticulously is not to be applied. The examination of the materials on record, as they are, should be, limited for the purpose for finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. At the stage of framing of charges, the standard of test and weighing of evidence meticulously is not to be applied. The examination of the materials on record, as they are, should be, limited for the purpose for finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. Taking the facts as they are, I do not think that any compelling reasons exist for interference by this court under section 482, Cr. P.C. The background of the present prosecution as stated by the petitioner in his application before this court be taken for granted, it is not a case where the facts alleged do not constitute an offence. It cannot be equally said that there is no evidence at all to support the allegations. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision reported in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal AIR 1979 S.C. 366 where it has been held that while ' considering the question of framing the charges under section 227 of the Code of the Court has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. It has also been held that the court is not to act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. An word of 'caution' has also been given that the Judge should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. In the facts of that case their Lordships came to hold that the courts below were legally justified in discharging the respondents. The principles enumerated by the Supreme Court in the said case has no application whatsoever to the facts of this case. After going through the records of this case, I do not see any justification for interference under section 482, Cr. P.C. 7. In the result, this case is dismissed, but there is no order as to cost. Final Result : Dismissed