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1984 DIGILAW 48 (RAJ)

Ram Prasad Dagdi v. Judge Labour Court

1984-01-24

G.K.SHARMA, G.M.LODHA

body1984
JUDGMENT 1. - This is a special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinace against the Order of learned single judge in S. B. Civil Writ petition No. 1355/80, by which the writ petition was dismissed. 2. There is a chequered history of this case in asmuchas the earlier Award of the Labour Court was made subject matter of writ petition and that writ petition was ultimately accepted by the Division Bench in special appeal though dismissed by the single Bench. Alter the judgment in D.B. Special Appeal No. 187/73 dated Feb 28, 1980, the Labour Court was again approached against the order of dismissal. After this a writ petition was filed for the second time and that is the judgment, which is subject matter of this appeal now. 3. Even before this Court. this matter was argued for a number of times for admission and since learned counsel for the appellant repeatedly tried to argue beyond the points decided by the learned single Judge, this court did not allow the same, on which he tried to file affidavit. Ultimately, it appears that the case was taken up and as per the order sheet dated 31-8-1982, some affidavit was filed of the appellant and Mr. Pathak took time to file counter. This was done and ultimately the case has come up for admission again. 4. It would be pertinent to refer the order sheet dated 31-8-1982, which reads as under : "Hon'ble Shrimal J. Hon'ble G.M. Lodha J.Mr. N.K. Mishra for the appellants,Mr. B.K. Pathak, Caveater for respondent No. 2. "Learned counsel for the appellant states that he has filed an affidavit. Mr. B. K. Pathak who has filed a caveat on behalf of the Central Cooperative Bank Ajmer, states that he has not been supplied with a copy of memo of special appeal and the affidavit. Learned counsel for the appellant is directed to give the copy of the memo of special appeal as well as of the affidavit to the learned counsel for respondent No. 2, within 10 days, put up after two weeks. Sd/-M.L. Shrintal J; Sd/-G.M. Lodha J." 5. We have heard arguments at length today. Learned counsel for the appellant is directed to give the copy of the memo of special appeal as well as of the affidavit to the learned counsel for respondent No. 2, within 10 days, put up after two weeks. Sd/-M.L. Shrintal J; Sd/-G.M. Lodha J." 5. We have heard arguments at length today. Before we proceed further, we will mention that the learned single Judge has dealt with in details the various points and ultimately found that whereas charges No. 1 and 2 are not proved, but charge No. 3 has been proved Charge No. 3 reads as under : "That Shri Dagdi remained absent without sanction for leave." 6. According to the learned single judge, the petitioner applied for leave from October 10, 1965 to November 10, 1965 but the same was refused and a telegram was sent on October 16, 1965 requiring him to join duty immediately followed by a registered letter dated October 18, 1963, but inspire of that the petitioner did not join the duty and he came only on November 17, 1967 i. e. about month after. The learned single Judge also found that the petitioner has failed to adduce necessary evidence before the Enquiry Officer that on account of serious illness of his brother, the absence of the petitioner was involuntary. The learned single Judge has dealt with this charge in detail and ultimately held that the petitioner was guilty of the misconduct referred to in sub-clause (e) of Clause (3) of Standing Order No. 14 of the Model Standing Orders. 7. Regarding punishment, the learned single Judge observed that Section 11 (A) was introduced in 1971 and the present case relates to misconduct of 1966 and, therefrom the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the decision of management in the matter of punishment, as it could not be said that it is grossly excessive. 8. 7. Regarding punishment, the learned single Judge observed that Section 11 (A) was introduced in 1971 and the present case relates to misconduct of 1966 and, therefrom the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the decision of management in the matter of punishment, as it could not be said that it is grossly excessive. 8. Even then learned single Judge himself applied his mind in order to find out whether the punishment imposed deserves to be reduced and then observed as under : "Taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner was holding the post of Cashier and he left headquarters without obtaining leave on October 8, 1965 and failed to report for duty even though intimation about refusal of leave was sent to him it is not possible to hold that the Labour Court in arriving at the finding that the punishment imposed on the petitioner could not be said to be grossly excessive, has committed an error which may justify on interference with the Award of the Labour Court by issuing a writ of Certiorari. In my opinion, therefore, no ground is made out for interference by this court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the Award of the Labour Court." 9. Before this Court, Mr. Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that, the punishment is based on extraneous matters as would be obvious from the final order of punishment, in which the past conduct of the appellant, his conduct during the hearing and language used have been taken into account for holding that he is guilty of insubordination and insincerity. In this respect Mr. Tiwari read the order of punishment and further he pointed out that after the remand this point was pressed before the Labour Court, but the Labour Court, as well as the learned single judge ignored it. 10. Mr. Tiwari pointed out that before the learned single judge also this point was argued and it was pointed out that the punishment cannot be imopsed on the grounds which were not the subject matter of the charge sheet and more so without giving an opportunity of hearing and inquiry because that would tantamount to violation of principle of natural justice. In this respect Mr. Tiwari referred to number of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and other courts. 11. Mr. In this respect Mr. Tiwari referred to number of decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and other courts. 11. Mr. Tiwari also submitted that once out of more that one charge, the other charges result in exoneration and only one charge is held to be proved later on, the punishment awarded on the basis of all the charges cumulatively cannot be sustained, because that would tantamount to confirming the punishment without knowing how the mind of disciplinary authority was affected as it is always possible that the punishment may be mainly motivated on account of those charges, which have not been proved ultimately. In this connection, he referred to the decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in (1) Railway Board and another v. Niranjan Singh 1964 (f) L L J. 321, and a decision of Madras High Court in (2) Royal Printing Works v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras and others 1963 (2) L L J. 60. 12. Mr. Tiwari in this connection also referred to an affidavit said to have been filed by Mr. Ugam Raj Munet, Advocate who appeared before the learned single judge. 13. The above submissions of Mr. Tiwari were controverted by Mr. C. N. Sharma. Mr. Sharma, first of all pointed out that Mr. Pathak, a senior Advocate of this Court was the counsel, who argued the case before the learned single Judge and who has given affidavit that no other point except the points dealt with by the learned single judge in his judgment was argued before the learned single Judge. He then pointed out that the copy of the affidavit given to him purporting to be the affidavit of Shri Ugam Raj Munet, which reads as under : "That the objection taken in the writ petition and the rejoinder filed before the Bench were argued and pressed by him before the learned single judge " 14. Mr. He then pointed out that the copy of the affidavit given to him purporting to be the affidavit of Shri Ugam Raj Munet, which reads as under : "That the objection taken in the writ petition and the rejoinder filed before the Bench were argued and pressed by him before the learned single judge " 14. Mr. Sharma pointed out that this affidavit is too vague and general in nature because what was discussed by this Court in his order dated 20th April, 1982, was that the counsel, who argued the case should file an affidavit that the following points were argued and pressed : "That there was no charge in an enquiry about insincerity, insubordination and the past conduct including language used in several hearings in the final order dated April 6, 1966 and the termination made was based on it." Shri Sharma pointed out that no such affidavit has been filed by Mr. Munet as desired by the order dated 20th April, 1982 and in any case counter affidavit of Mr. Pathak clinches the issue. 15. Mr. Tiwari pointed out to us a copy from his record of the affidavit, which reads as under : 1. That I argued & pressed the point that there was no charge about insincerity & insubordination, past conduct or language used in various letters and that termination order who based upon these & other grounds like habitual negligence & neglect of duty and habitual absence without leave for which there was no charge at all. 2. I also argued & pressed that there was no validly framed charge for more than 10 days absence without leave & that there was no refusal of leave within the prescribed period fixed by the rules and that the burden of proving that there was a valid refusal of leave was upon the management. I also argued and pressed "on the basis of Supreme Court Rulings" that when the finding of the enquiry officer on charge No. 3 to the effect that "Ram Prasad could not resume duty because of the serious condition of his brother" and was accepted by the management. The Court had no jurisdiction to go beyond the finding. I also argued and pressed "on the basis of Supreme Court Rulings" that when the finding of the enquiry officer on charge No. 3 to the effect that "Ram Prasad could not resume duty because of the serious condition of his brother" and was accepted by the management. The Court had no jurisdiction to go beyond the finding. Moreover when the statement of Ram Prasad was not challenged by cross-examination and when no rebuttle was produced, the enquiry Officer had no alternative but to accept the statement of Ram Prasad on its face value. As such it was not necessary for Ram Prasad to have produced further proof". 16. We found that as far as record of the court is concerned, there is no original affidavit of Shri Ugam Ram Munet and we asked the Registry to search for it in order to find out whether the copy shown by Mr. Sharma contains the correct version of the affidavit purporting to have been filed by Shri Ugam Raj Munet or the copy shown by Shri Tiwari, is the correct copy or both were filed. We find 'hat during inquiry of the search from the registry the original affidavit is not available. 17. Confronted with the above situation, which is far from satisfactory, we are required to first consider and decide whether the learned single judge failed to consider and decide the points, which according to Mr. Tiwari were of very important nature and which were pressed by him during arguments. Obviously, apart from the fact that there is good deal of confusion as to which affidavit was filed by the counsel for the petitioner Shri Munet and whether any original affidavit, which is not on the record, was filed, is missing from the Office, the undisputed facts remained that Mr. Pathak, a senior Advocate of this court has given an affidavit that apart from the points discussed by Hon'ble judge in the impugned judgment, no other point was raised much less pressed before the learned single Judge. Mr. Pathak was also present before us. 18. Pathak, a senior Advocate of this court has given an affidavit that apart from the points discussed by Hon'ble judge in the impugned judgment, no other point was raised much less pressed before the learned single Judge. Mr. Pathak was also present before us. 18. In view of the controversy raised by the affidavit and counter affidavit, we are assured of the correctness and the propriety of the practice that in case where the judgment of the courts are alleged to commit any important matter raised before that court, the proper consideration is to file an application with an affidavit pointing out the same before that court itself immediately either in the forum of review or otherwise. This practice permits the Presiding Officer of that court also to express his opinion and to correct the omission if by inadvertance some lapse has happened in due consideration of the points raised before him. 19. We accordingly hold that in such cases it should be presumed that apart from the points discussed by the learned single judge in his judgment, no other point was raised. 20. In the instant case, we find that the judgment in appeal is of the High Court itself and we have got no reason to take the view that even though detailed speaking judgment has been given, but the learned single judge by mentioning the points raised and then discussing their merits, the learned single Judge would avoid deciding the important questions, which according to Mr. Tiwari go to the root of the case and were raised before him. We accordingly hold that apart from the points discussed in the judgment of the learned single Judge, no other points were raised before him. 21. The next question, which comes for consideration is whether even though these points were not raised before the learned single judge, we may now ourselves consider them for the first time in the interest of justice. 22. We have given a thoughtful consideration to this aspect of the case also. We have read the impugned order of the termination of the service passed finally against the petitioner and we find that the order refers to the various developments which have taken place including the finding of the Enquiry Officer and the show-cause notice which was given earlier and the second opportunity which was given after having the tentative decision of termination of services. 23. We, in the facts and circumstances of the case, feel that no fresh controversy should be allowed to be raised in this special appeal before the Division Bench. 24. So far as the purely legal question raised by Mr. Tiwari that if the punishment is based on three charges primarily and then one or two of them are held to be not proved then the logical and legal effect of it is that that punishment cannot be sustained, we are inclined to entertain it as pure question of law only. We find that the basic decision on which reliance has been placed in the decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court (Supra) was reversed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in (3) R. B. R. The Union of India v. Niranjan Singh 1969 S. C. C. 502 and para 3 and 7, which are relevant for our purposes reads as under : 3. "The findings of the learned single judge as well as the judges of the appellate court were challenged before us by the appellant. It was urged on its behalf that the finding of the General Manager on the first charge being a finding of fact, the same not having been held either not supported by any evidence or as perverse, it was not open to the High Court to review the evidence afresh and come to a conclusion of its own. It was further urged on its behalf that the opinion of the Appellate Court that if one of the several charges on the basis of which a punishment is imposed held to be unsustainable, the punishment imposed should be set aside as it is not known whether the authority in question would have imposed the impugned punishment without that charge having been established, does not represent the correct legal position as expounded by this Court. The learned counsel for the respondent not only supported the conclusions of the appellate court, he also strongly commended for our acceptance the finding of the learned single Judge that General Manager's direction contained in his letter of June 19, 1956, was violative of Article 19 (1) (a) to (c)." 7. "Before we take up for consideretion point No. 2 formulated above, it would be convenient to deal with point No. 3. "Before we take up for consideretion point No. 2 formulated above, it would be convenient to deal with point No. 3. It was not disputed before us that the first charge levelled against the respondent is a serious charge and it would have been appropriate for the General Manager to remove the respondent from service on the basis of his finding an that charge. But we are toll that we cannot assume that the General Manager would have inflicted that punishment solely on the basis of that charge and consequently we cannot sustain the punishment imposed if we hold that one of the two charges on the basis of which it was imposed is unsustatianble. This contention cannot be accepted in view of the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Bidyabhan Mahaptra (1963 Supp I SCR 648), wherein it was held that if the order in an enquiry under Article 311 can be supported on any finding as substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment imposed can lawfully be imposed it is not for the court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment in question." 25. In para No. 7, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have referred to the earlier decision of (4) State of Orissa v. Bidyabhan (1963 Stipp. I SCR 648), in which it has been held in terms that if an enquiry under Article 311 can be supported on any finding as substantial misdemeanour of which the punishment imposed can lawfully be imposed it is not for the court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment in question. 26. In view of the above decision of the appeal court we are convinced that there was no infirmity in imposing the punishment and upholding it by the learned single Judge after holding that charge No. 3 only was proved. 27. We further find that the learned single judge was conscious and he applied his own mind and found that for a bank employee holding a responsible job if he commits the misconduct of voluntary absence from duty, the punishment imposed of termination cannot be called or termed as excessive. 27. We further find that the learned single judge was conscious and he applied his own mind and found that for a bank employee holding a responsible job if he commits the misconduct of voluntary absence from duty, the punishment imposed of termination cannot be called or termed as excessive. In our view also a person holding a responsible office should not remain absent by leaving office without obtaining proper leave for a long time and that would create serious hazards for the bank and, therefore, the punishment imposed cannot be said to be excessive. 28. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this appeal viewed from any angle cannot succeed and consequently the same is dismissed. 29. Mr. Tiwari further argued that even if the point was not raised before the learned single judge, it was the duty of the learned single judge in the writ of certiorari to study the entire record and find out if there was any infirmity, which requires interference. 30. We are of the opinion that in the cases where the parties are represented by the counsel and arguments are addressed in details as has been done in this case, a practice not to act upon these arguments but to look into the entire recorded to make a search to find out what infirmity can possibly be there, is neither practicable nor feasible. 31. The appeal is dismissed without costs. *******