Judgment :- The petitioner herein claims to be one of the partners of Messrs.Raja-lakshmi Textiles, Madurai, a firm producing and dealing in handloom goods. In the course of its business as a manufacturer of handlooms, the firm Rajalakshmi Textiles had borrowed by way of various types of loans from the State Bank of India in the year 1950. Since there was delay in repayment of the loans taken from the State Bank, the Bank has filed a suit O.S.No.425 of 1983 on the file of the Sub-Court, Madurai. The claim consists of two amounts Rs.1,26,255.55 under the term Loan Account and Rs.6,64,217.34 under the cash credit Loan Account. The said suit is resisted by the petitioner and others as partners of the said firm on various grounds. When the suit is pending disposal, the petitioner has chosen to come before this Court by way of this writ petition seeking a writ of declaration declaring the provisions of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908) as unconstitutional in so far as it affects the petitioner. The three grounds urged in support of the petitioners case that section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure is unconstitutional are these: (1) The provisions of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not contain any guidelines subject to which the discretionary power given thereunder to the Court could be exercised; (2) In so far as the said section 34, C.P.C. makes a differentiation between a commercial transaction and a non-commercial transaction the provision should be taken to violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India; (3) In any event the interest claimed in the plaint by the plaintiff if allowed by the court, will be hit by Usurious Loans Act 10 of 1918. 2. In this case as already stated the suit filed against the petitioner and others by the first respondent is pending and there is no knowing at this stage as to how the court will exercise the discretion available to it under the said section. Whether the discretion will be exercised in favour of the petitioner or against him will be a matter of guess at this stage. If the discretion were to be exercised by the Court in favour of the petitioner by way of reduction of interest, the petitioner cannot have any grievance at all. Whether the discretion will be exercised in favour of the petitioner or against him will be a matter of guess at this stage. If the discretion were to be exercised by the Court in favour of the petitioner by way of reduction of interest, the petitioner cannot have any grievance at all. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be said to be an aggrieved person as on this date. Apart from this aspect of the matter, I am of the view that the grounds of attack made by the petitioner as against the provision of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not legally tenable. Section 34 contemplates three situations. Sub-section (1) of section 34 contemplates the application of the three rates of interest for three distinct periods, namely, (1) for any period prior to the suit, (2) for the period between the date of suit and the date of decree, and (3) for the period between the date of decree till the date of realisation. Section 34 provides that so far as the first period is concerned, that is, for the period prior to the suit, normally the contract rate of interest will have to govern the rights of parties. But the court is given the power to order interest on the principal sum adjudged at such rate not exceeding the contract rate if any, as the court deems reasonable. As regards the second period, that is, the period between the date of suit till the date of decree, a similar discretion is given to the Court to award interest at the reasonable rate on the principal sum. As regards the third period between the date of decree till the date of realisation, the Court has to grant interest at such reasonable rates of interest not exceeding the statutory rate of 6 per cent. It is no doubt true as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, a discretion is given to the court to fix the rate of interest for the three different periods. For the first period, the contract rate of interest should normally govern the rights of parties, but the court is given discretion to fix reasonable rate of interest not exceeding the contract rate. Similarly, for the second period, the court is also given the discretionary power to fix the reasonable rate of interest on the principal sum not exceeding the contract rate. Similarly, for the second period, the court is also given the discretionary power to fix the reasonable rate of interest on the principal sum not exceeding the contract rate. So far as the third period is concerned, the court has got the discretion to fix reasonable rate of interest not exceeding the statutory percentage. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, there are no guidelines in-built in the section itself for the proper exercise of the discretion given to the court. According to him even judicial discretion should be exercised on certain guidelines and if the guidelines are not set down in the statute giving such a discretionary power to the Court, it is capable of arbitrary exercise. Section 34 which does not contain any guidelines should therefore be struck down as unconstitutional. I am not in a position to agree with the learned counsel. I am of the view the discretion contained in section 34 has to be exercised judicially and any improper exercise of jurisdiction can be corrected by a higher Court. Further section 34 provides for reasonable rate of interest has normally to be decided by the Court on the facts and circumstances of each case. There cannot be a set guide lines for the exercise of discretion contained in section 34, C.P.C. I am therefore, of the view that as the section itself says a reasonable rate of interest within ceiling limit the discretionary power given to the court to fix the rate of interest cannot be taken to be unguided. As already stated what is reasonable will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, particularly the capacity of the parties, the nature of transaction of the borrowing, the circumstances under which the borrowal took place and all the relevant and surrounding circumstances. It is not therefore, possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the section is bad, as it does not provide for any guidelines for the exercise of discretion by the Civil Court as regards the fixing of rate of interest. 3. It is not therefore, possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the section is bad, as it does not provide for any guidelines for the exercise of discretion by the Civil Court as regards the fixing of rate of interest. 3. Coming to the next contention urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the differentiation made between commercial transaction and non-commercial transaction and providing for a higher rate of interest for commercial transaction, cannot legally be sustained, I do not see how the classification between a commercial transaction and a noncommercial transaction will violate Article 14 of the Constitution. A commercial transaction has been defined in Explanation II of sub-section (1) of section 34, C.P.C. and the fact that the Legislature wanted to treat a commercial transaction in a different manner from other transactions shows that the rate of interest fixed in a commercial transaction is presumed to be reasonable and that in such cases the Court has to proceed on the basis of contract rate so far as the period prior to the suit is concerned. The distinction made between a commercial transaction and a non-commercial transaction in the matter of collection of Interest, has got sufficient nexus with the object of improving the trade, commerce and industry and such a classification is in the interests of the nation. So far as the differentiation has got a nexus with the object sought to be achieved, that is, the development of the countrys trade, commerce and industry, it cannot be said to be violative of Article 14 or Article 19 of Constitution of India. 4. Coming to the third contention that if the contract rate of interest is allowed to stand and if the court has no discretion in the matter, then the transaction will be affected by the provisions of the Usurious Loans Act. As already stated in this case the suit is pending and it is not possible at this stage to know as to how the court will exercise its discretion. It may affirm the rate of interest agreed between the parties or reduce the same. As already stated in this case the suit is pending and it is not possible at this stage to know as to how the court will exercise its discretion. It may affirm the rate of interest agreed between the parties or reduce the same. If really the contract rate of interest as claimed by the plaintiff in the suit is found to be usurious, it is open to the petitioner to invoke the provisions of the Usurious Loans Act, Act 10 of 1918 Or the provisions of Act 28 of 1855, Usurious Laws Repeal Act, 1855. Therefore, nerely because the contract rate of interest is claimed by the defendant to be high and excessive, the provisions of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be struck down. If the petitioner feels that the contract rate of interest is highly excessive and therefore, the transaction of borrowing amounts to be an usurious loan, he can seek the relief from the Court in which the suit is pending at the trial stage. At this stage, it is not possible for the Court to assume that the rate of interest which the court may fix for the period referred to above is excessive and proceed to decide whether such rate of interest is usurious or not. In this view of the matter none of three contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner succeeds. 5. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed.