JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - This is a defendants second appeal arising out of the judgment of the lower appellate court approving the final decree proposed by the Commissioner. 2. Ramesh Chandra and Munshilal filed suit no. 108 of 1963 for partition against Rameshwar Dayal and others claiming one-fourth share of two-third share in the house in suit. The suit was decreed, and a preliminary decree was passed for partition of one-fourth share on 30.2.1964. In pursuance of the preliminary decree, proceedings for preparation of partition scheme started'. Raghunath Prasad, Advocate, was appointed as Commissioner to prepare the scheme. He submitted a scheme along with a map 104/Ka. From this map it appears that portion FECD, which was one-third of the whole, house, had already been separated in pursuance of the decree in suit no. 1106 of 1948. The available two-third share of that house was noted by letters ABEG. The one-fourth portion claimed by the plaintiff Ramesh Chandra in the present suit was shown in red colour by the Commissioner Raghunath Prasad and was mentioned as Qura of the Plaintiff. The Qura shown by yellow portion was allotted to the defendants. An objection was filed to the report of the Commissioner by the defendant, which was 100/C 2. They asserted that the portion available for partition had wrongly been shown by the Commissioner in his map. 3. The learned Munsif rejected the objection and prepared the final decree in accordance with the scheme prepared by the Commissioner Raghunath Prasad. As the plaintiff also felt aggrieved by the decree of the trial court prepared in accordance with the aforesaid report of the Commissioner, the plaintiff filed. Civil Appeal no. 288 of 1966, whereas Civil Appeal No. 251 of 1966 was filed by Rameshwar Dayal and others. Both of these appeals were dismissed by a common judgment dated April 28, 1967, by the learned III Additional Civil Judge, Meerut. Being aggrieved the defendants Rameshwar Dayal and others have filed this appeal. 4. The admitted position appears to be that during the Pendency of the suit for partition, the defendants made some constructions which have been described by the Commissioner in his map as hew pucca rooms. They were situated towards the north. These two rooms were given to the plaintiff and the house which was in occupation of the plaintiff was given to the defendants. They were situated towards the north. These two rooms were given to the plaintiff and the house which was in occupation of the plaintiff was given to the defendants. The Commissioner held that for the constructions which had been made by the plaintiff in his house and which had been allotted to the defendants, the former would not be entitled to get any compensation. To the same effect was the recommendation of the Commissioner with regard to these two new rooms constructed by the defendants, during the pendency of the suit. 5. Sri Santosh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, submitted that the trial court should have adjusted the equity by allotting the pucca rooms to the defendants, and the scheme prepared by the Commissioner was against the settled principle of law of partition and as such this Court should reverse the judgments of the courts below and direct the Commissioner to prepare the scheme afresh. I am unable to uphold this contention. The defendants were wrong in making constructions over the joint land when the suit for partition of the same was pending between the plaintiff and the defendants in the trial court. However, the trial court took into account the fact of construction having been made in favour of the defendants and held that as in respect of the constructions made by the plaintiff in his house which was being allotted to the defendants, no compensation had been awarded, it was in the fitness of things that the defendants were also not given any compensation for the new rooms constructed by them. 6. The next submission was that without finding the valuation of the constructions in the respective two houses, the courts below could not possibly adjust the equity on the first impression one is led away by that argument, but on a closer scrutiny it appears that the trial court had the entire material before it. The Commissioner had also gone into the matter in great detail and-thereafter had recommended that equities could be adjusted by not awarding compensation to either of them. The trial court accepted the recommendation of the Commissioner, which was affirmed in appeal. In the second appeal, it is not possible for me to take a different view. The Commissioner had also gone into the matter in great detail and-thereafter had recommended that equities could be adjusted by not awarding compensation to either of them. The trial court accepted the recommendation of the Commissioner, which was affirmed in appeal. In the second appeal, it is not possible for me to take a different view. From even the objection to the Commissioners report, nothing appears to have been alleged by the defendants about the money which was spent by them in constructing the new rooms. No evidence was given on that point. It would, therefore, be trespassing the limits of second appeal if I were to set aside the judgments of the two courts below on the argument suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant and direct the Commissioner to submit a fresh scheme. The suit was filed in the year 1965 and it would not be in the interest of justice now to reverse the whole thing done after a great labour by the Commissioner. The appeal thus has no substance. 7. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.