JUDGMENT J.N. Dubey, J.- This writ petition has been filed by Ramjas and others challenging the order dated 23-8 1971 of Sri Parmanand Mishra, Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur dismissing their revision and confirming the orders of the Courts below. 2. The following pedigree will be useful for understanding the case of the parties. 3. It appears that in the basic year land in dispute was recorded in the name of Achhaibar father of the petitioners, opposite parties nos. 5 and 6 and few other persons. The petitioners filed objection under Section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act claiming that Achhaibar has died and they being his sons and opposite parties nos. 5 and 6 were co-tenants of the land in dispute with equal shares and the other persons recorded in the basic year have no share therein. Their case was that the land in dispute originally belonged to Prahlad and on his death it devolved upon his three sons Thakur, Devi and Niddhi. After the death of Niddhi his share devolved upon Bhagwan and as Bhagwan died issueless his one-third share devolved upon the branch of Thakur and Devi. Thus the share of branches of Thakur and Devi became half and half in the land in dispute. It was further pleaded that their father Achhaibar filed suit no. 481 of 1951 claiming half share in the land in dispute which was decreed in terms of compromise on 13-2-1974. In the compromise Achhaibar had agreed to give 2 bighas more land to opposite parties nos. 5 and 6 in addition to his half share therein. Subsequently, he filed suit no. 239 of 1966 and 240 of 1966 under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act which were also decreed on the basis of alleged compromise and opposite parties nos. 5 and 6 were given two-third share. They further claimed that Achhaibar did not enter into any compromise and in fact of being unsound mind he could not have done so and the compromise decree in suit no. 239 of 1966 and 240 of 1966 were obtained by playing fraud upon him. On coming to know of the compromise decree they filed suit no. 166 of 1969 in the Court of Munsif Jaunpur for cancellation thereof which was abated under Section 5 of the Act. 4. The objection was contented by the opposite parties nos. 239 of 1966 and 240 of 1966 were obtained by playing fraud upon him. On coming to know of the compromise decree they filed suit no. 166 of 1969 in the Court of Munsif Jaunpur for cancellation thereof which was abated under Section 5 of the Act. 4. The objection was contented by the opposite parties nos. 5 and 6 on the ground that the compromise decree passed in Suit No. 481 of 1951 was never acted upon and that the compromise decree in suit No 239 of 1966 and 240 of 1966 passed by Revenue Court under Section 229-B of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was binding upon the parties. They denied that the fraud was played upon Achhaibar. 5. The Consolidation Officer who heard the objections, dismissed it on 12-1-1970. The petitioners filed an appeal to the Settlement Officer Consolidation which was also dismissed on 22-10-1971. The petitioners thereafter filed revision to the Deputy Director of Consolidation but it was also dismissed. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the opposite parties nos. 5 and 6 drew my attention to the order dated 11-10-1982 of this Court by which the writ petition was abated against the opposite parties nos, 20, 21 and 26 for the failure of the petitioners to bring on record their heir and legal representatives and argued that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed as a whole as the interest of the deceased opposite parties nos. 20, 21 and 26 were inseparable from that of the other opposite parties. On the other hand it was urged on behalf of the petitioners that the dispute between the petitioners and the opposite parties nos. 5 and 6 has been with respect to the share of Bhagwan and deceased opposite parties had nothing to do with it. After considering the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that the controversy between the petitioners and the opposite parties nos. 5 and 6 is only with respect to the share of Bhagwan and, therefore, it could not be said that the interest of the deceased opposite parties were inseperable from the other opposite parties or that there was a possibility of two conflicting orders being passed by this Court. Accordingly, I hold that the abatement of writ petition again opposite parties nos. Accordingly, I hold that the abatement of writ petition again opposite parties nos. 20, 21 and 26 cannot result in the dismissal of the writ petition as a whole as claimed by the learned counsel for the opposite parties nos. 5 and 6. 7. Coming to the merits of the case I find that the Consolidation Officer had rejected the claim of the petitioners on the ground that the order passed in suit nos. 239 of 1966 and 240 of 1966 by the revenue court under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act operate as res judicata in the present proceedings. This finding of the Consolidation Officer was affirmed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation with the observation that neither the petitioners were entitled to challenge the compromise decree passed in the declaration suit nor had he any jurisdiction to investigate into the validity thereof on the ground that it was obtained by playing fraud upon the father of the petitioners. The Deputy Director of Consolidation in his turn also confirmed the order of the two courts below with the observation that there is no reason why compromise decrees passed in the revenue suits should not be held final between the parties. Thus, although the Settlement Officer Consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation have not used the word res judicata in their order it appears that they were in agreement with the Consolidation Officer on this point. In my opinion, the Consolidation authorities committed an error apparent on the face of the record in holding that the compromise decree passed by the revenue courts in declaration suit would operate as res judicata in these proceedings. It is now well settled that a compromise decree is not a case decided so as to operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties. It can at the most operate as estoppel provided the estoppel is specifically pleaded and proved by the party trying to take advantage out of the compromise decree. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao and others v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao (deceased) by his heirs and legal representative and others, ( AIR 1967 SC 591 ) is a direct authority on this point. The opposite parties nos. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao and others v. Valluri Jagannadha Rao (deceased) by his heirs and legal representative and others, ( AIR 1967 SC 591 ) is a direct authority on this point. The opposite parties nos. 5 and 6 did not plead that the said compromise decree will operate as estoppel against the petitioners nor they appear to have lead any evidence to that effect, and, therefore, question of its operating as estoppel also does not arise. 8. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. However, instead of quashing the orders of all the consolidation authorities I consider it proper to quash the order dated 23-8-1971 of the Deputy Director of Consolidation and send back the case to him for deciding afresh in accordance with law and the observations made above. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.