JUDGMENT J.N. Dubey, J. - Jagir Singh and others have filed this writ petition challenging the order dated 16.3.1974 of the Deputy Director of Consolidation Rae Bareilly, camp at Nainital by which he has allowed the revision filed by the opposite party no. 2 and set aside the order dated 26.4.1972 of the Settlement Officer Consolidation dismissing his restoration application in default. 2. It appears that in the basic year the land in dispute was recorded in the name of the petitioners. Opposite party no. 2 filed an objection under Section 2 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) claiming that he was sole tenant of the land in dispute but the name of the petitioners were wrongly recorded in the revenue records. The Consolidation Officer Kashipur who heard the objection rejected it on 21.3.1971. 3. The opposite party, party no. 2 filed appeal to the Settlement Officer Consolidation which was dismissed in default on 24.6 1971. The opposite party no. 2 moved a restoration application on 24.2.1972 along with an affidavit for condoning delay in filing the restoration application. However, the opposite party no. 2 again absented on 26.4.1972 when his restoration application was taken up. Accordingly it was also dismissed in default. The opposite party no. 2 did not move any application for setting aside the order dated 26.4.1972 of the Settlement Officer Consolidation, on the other land, he filed a revision to the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 15.6.1973 against both the orders dated 24.6.1971 and 26.4.1972 of the Settlement Officer Consolidation. He also filed an affidavit by which he tried to explain why he failed to appear before the Settlement Officer Consolidation on the relevant delay. The petitioners filed counter affidavit but it appears that no rejoinder affidavit was filed to it by the opposite party no. 2. 4. The Deputy Director of Consolidation came to the conclusion that the opposite party no. 2 was not legally entitled to file one revision against the two orders of the Settlement Officer Consolidation and he accordingly treated the revision of the opposite party no. 2 only against the order dated 26.4.1972 by which the Settlement Officer Consolidation had dismissed his restoration application in default. The Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the revision of the opposite party no. 2 and set aside order dated 26.4.1972 of the Settlement Officer Consolidation. 5. 2 only against the order dated 26.4.1972 by which the Settlement Officer Consolidation had dismissed his restoration application in default. The Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the revision of the opposite party no. 2 and set aside order dated 26.4.1972 of the Settlement Officer Consolidation. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and have perused the record. No one has appeared to contest the writ petition on behalf of the opposite party no. 2 in spite of service. It has been urged before me by the learned counsel for the petitioners that no revision against the order dated 24.4.1972 was legally maintainable and only remedy available for the opposite party no. 2 was to have filed a restoration application before the Settlement Officer Consolidation for recalling the said order or in the alternative he could have challenged the main order dated 24.6.1971 of the settlement Officer Consolidation by which his appeal was dismissed is default. 6. In my opinion, learned counsel for the petitioner is not right when he says that the revision against the order dated 26.4.1972 was absolutely barred but I agree with his contention that no revision was maintainable against the order dated 26.4.1972 on the grounds raised by the opposite party no. 2 in his revision application. A perusal of the certified copy of the revision application filed by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the court shows that the ground for attaching the order dated 26.4.1972 of the Settlement Officer Consolidation were in the nature of restoration application in as much as he tried to impress upon the court that there was sufficient cause for non-appearance in the court of Settlement Officer Consolidation on 26.4.1972 then his restoration application was dismissed in default. In may opinion, if the opposite party no. 2 wanted to satisfy the Court that he was prevented from appearing before the Settlement Officer Consolidation on 24.4.1971 then he should have approached to the Settlement Officer Consolidation himself but he could not get any relief by filing revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. In may opinion, if the opposite party no. 2 wanted to satisfy the Court that he was prevented from appearing before the Settlement Officer Consolidation on 24.4.1971 then he should have approached to the Settlement Officer Consolidation himself but he could not get any relief by filing revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Thus the Deputy Director of Consolidation committed an error apparent on the face of the record in deciding the revision application on the allegations which could have been taken in the restoration application in as much as in the revisional jurisdiction he has to find out whether the subordinate court has acted in accordance with law or not. 7. Coming to the merits of the case also I am of the view that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has erred in allowing the revision application. The main basis of the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation appears to be that none of the two parties had appeared before the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 12.4.1972 which stand disproved from para 2 of the revision application of the opposite party No. 2 himself. The opposite party no. 2 himself had stated in paragraph 3 of the revision application that he was present in the court of the Settlement Officer Consolidation on 12.4.1972 and as such the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not legally justified in setting aside the order dated 26.4.1972 of the Settlement Officer Consolidation on this ground. The Deputy Director of Consolidation was unduly influenced by the fact that the petitioner did not specifically challenge this fact in his counter affidavit. It is noteworthy that when the Opposite party himself had come with the case in his revision application that he was present in the Court of the Settlement Officer Consolidation on 12.4.1972 there was absolutely no necessity for the petitioner to controvert these allegations. It appears that Deputy Director of Consolidation has allowed the revision application without application of mind. Admittedly, the revision application of the opposite party was filed beyond time but no attempt was made by the Deputy Director of Consolidation to consider the same and completely ignored this aspect of the matter and allowed revision. It appears that Deputy Director of Consolidation has allowed the revision application without application of mind. Admittedly, the revision application of the opposite party was filed beyond time but no attempt was made by the Deputy Director of Consolidation to consider the same and completely ignored this aspect of the matter and allowed revision. The revision application having been filed after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation was liable to be dismissed on the ground alone unless the delay was condoned under Section 6 of the Indian Limitation Act. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has not even considered this matter what to any of condoning the delay caused in filing the revision. 8. In this result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 16.3.1974 of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is quashed. However, in the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.