R. A. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner original accused has challenged the issuance of process under secs. 465 468 and 201 I. P. C. on the ground that the requisite sanction under sec. 197 Cri. P. C. 1973; is not obtained and therefore the court could not have taken cognizance and issued the process. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has stated that the petitioner does not want to lead any evidence for a decision on the question of necessity of sanction. ( 2 ) THE facts are simple and not in dispute for the purpose of deciding the present question. The petitioner has been in the pay and service of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation a Local authority. He is Laboratory Officer in Ahmedabad municipal Corporation and therefore he is a public servant as defined in sec. 21 (twelfth) (b) I. P. C. which reads as under:the words public servant denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following namely: xx xx xx xx xx twelfth: Every person: (a) in the service or pay of the Government U for the performance of any public duty by the Government; (b) in the service or pay of a local authority. a corporation established by or under a Central Provincial or state Act or a Government company as defined in sec. 617 of the Companies Act 1956 (1 of 1956) ( 3 ) THUS he is a public servant as defined in clause (b ). It is not his case that he is a public servant falling under any other clause of sec. 21. ( 4 ) UNDER sec. 8 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 the State Government by a notification dt. 21/12/1966 in the Official Gazette appointed the petitioner to be Public Analyst for the local area comprised within the limits of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. There is no dispute that thereby he is not the the service or pay of the government or remunerated by fees or commission by government. ( 5 ) UNDER sec. 8 or under any other provision of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 he is not deemed to be a public servant unlike Food Inspectors appointed under sec. 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act where every Food inspector is deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of see. ( 5 ) UNDER sec. 8 or under any other provision of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 he is not deemed to be a public servant unlike Food Inspectors appointed under sec. 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act where every Food inspector is deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of see. 21 I. P. C. Since the State Government has the power to appoint person to be Public Analyst such person cannot be removed from the office of the Public Analyst save by the State Government because the power to appoint includes the power to dismiss under sec. 16 of the General Clauses Act. The allegations in the complaint are that while acting as the Public Analyst the petitioner had committed certain acts which amounted to offences under secs. 465 468 and 201 I. P. C. On these facts it is contended that sanction is required under sec. 197 Cri. P C. ( 6 ) SEC. 197 (1) of Cri. P. C. reads as under:197 Prosecution or Judges and public servants: (1 When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his ogre save by or with the selection of the (government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction: (a) in the case of a person who is employed or as the case may be was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in connection with the affairs of the Union of the Central Government: (b) in the case of a person who is employ d or as the case may be was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed in connection with the affairs of a State of the state Government of the learned Counsel for the petitioner his argued that since: (i) the petitioner as a municipal servant is a public servant (sec. 21-Twelfth (b)); and (ii) he is not removable from his office (of public Analyst) save by the Government; and (iii) he is accused of offences alleged to have been committed by him while acting as Public Analyst. 21-Twelfth (b)); and (ii) he is not removable from his office (of public Analyst) save by the Government; and (iii) he is accused of offences alleged to have been committed by him while acting as Public Analyst. ( 7 ) THE cognizance of the offences could not have been taken without the previous sanction of the State Government as required under that section. ( 8 ) IT is clear that the petitioner is a public servant (as an employee of the local authority) and as such public servant he is removable by the local authority namely the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and he is not removable by the State Government. The State Government being the appointing authority is competent to remove him from the office of the Public Analyst but the State Government cannot remove him from his office of Public servant as an employee of the Municipal Corporation. Even by virtue of his appointment by the State Government as Public Analyst he is not in government service or pay and therefore he is not covered by sec. 21. Twelfth (a) and therefore as a Public Analyst he is not a Public servant. ( 9 ) IF a public servant is not removable from his office as such public servant by the Government there is no question of the Government considering and granting the sanction for prosecution of such public servant. The Government is admittedly not competent to remove the petitioner from his office as public servant. The competence of the Government to remove the petitioner is only with regard to his office as Public Analyst and in such office he is admittedly not a public servant. In the present case infact even though the government has cancelled the notification of the appointment of the petitioner as Public Analyst on 23/03/1982 and he ceased to be Public Analyst he continues to be a municipal employee and a public servant till today. The requirement of sanction of the government would be attracted only if the government were competent to remove the concerned public servant from his office as such public servant. The protection intended to be given by the section is to public servants in office as public servants and not to any other office or capacity which he might be holding. The requirement of sanction of the government would be attracted only if the government were competent to remove the concerned public servant from his office as such public servant. The protection intended to be given by the section is to public servants in office as public servants and not to any other office or capacity which he might be holding. Thus the first condition of being a public servant is satisfied but the second condition of the State Government being competent to remove him from his office of public servant is not satisfied unless both the conditions are satisfied. sanction of the government is not necessary. ( 10 ) IT is argued on behalf of the respondent that the sanction of the State Government if at all would be required only if such person is employed in connection with the affairs with the State and since in the present case the petitioner was not employed in connection with the affairs of the State or of the Union there was no question of sanction. In the case of R. R. CHARI V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 1573 at 1581 in para 21 the question of affairs under sec. 197 is considered and on the basis of the observations made therein it is argued by the respondents that unless a person is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of the State there is no question of any sanction because the State Government can grant sanction only if he is employed in connection with the affairs of the State or Central Government can grant the sanction only if he is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and in the present case according to the respondents the petitioner was not employed in connection with the affairs of the State or of the Union and therefore neither the sanction of the State Government nor of the Central Government is required. Unlike sec. 6 of Prevention of Corruption Act sec. 197 does not provide for residuary third category of 44any other person. Unless it is shown that the petitioner was employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of the State Government neither of them could grant any sanction and therefore sec. 197 will have to application. Unlike sec. 6 of Prevention of Corruption Act sec. 197 does not provide for residuary third category of 44any other person. Unless it is shown that the petitioner was employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of the State Government neither of them could grant any sanction and therefore sec. 197 will have to application. It appears that in a local area the administration of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is with the local authority and Local (Health) Authority as defined in sec. 2 (vii) (viii) and (viii-a ). Appointments of Public Analyst and Food Inspectors are for the local areas and they are in service and pay of the local authority. Rule 4 of Gujarat Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules 1961 provides that the local authority shall be responsible for the proper day-to-day administration and enforcement of the Act within its jurisdiction subject to the provisions of rule 3 regarding the powers of Food (Health) Authority. Under rule 4 (5) a Municipal Corporation in the State which maintains its own laboratory is also entitled to appoint qualified persons as Public Analysts. In view of all these it is argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner is employed in connec- tion with the affairs of the municipal corporation and not in Connection with the affairs of the State or of Union. It is clear that he is employed as a public servant by the municipal corporation in connection with the affairs of the municipal corporation which is also a local authority under the Prevention of Food Adultera- tion Act. By appointing him as a Public Analyst under sec. 8 the State Government has not employed him in connection with the affairs of the State but the appointment is in connection with the affairs of the local authority and only a power or function is conferred on him by that appointment. It would not be correct to describe this appointment as employment in connection with the affairs of the State. The petitioner had challenged the notification cancelling his appointment as Public Analyst by Special Civil Application No. 1504 of 1982 wherein it was contended that his removal from the office of the Public Analyst was violative of Art. 311 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge by his judgment and order dt. The petitioner had challenged the notification cancelling his appointment as Public Analyst by Special Civil Application No. 1504 of 1982 wherein it was contended that his removal from the office of the Public Analyst was violative of Art. 311 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge by his judgment and order dt. 12/07/1982 has observed as follows:i do not find any substance in this petition. Petitioner has been found guilty of creating false evidence and tampering with record by the competent authority after holding an inquiry. The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation who is the employer of the petitioner has accepted the report of the inquiry officer and imposed punishment of withholding two increments of the petitioner. It is in the background of these facts that the government did not think it fit to continue the petitioner as Public Analyst and withdrew his appointment as such. Petitioner was not the employee of the State Government. It was appointed as Public Analyst because he held the requisite qualifications for appointment as Public Analyst and he was in employment as Chemist or Laboratory Officer of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. It was on account of his being employed by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation that he was appointed as Public Analyst by the Government. However in view of the fact that the charges levelled against the petitioner were found proved that his continuance as Public Analyst was not considered in the public interest by the Government. In the circumstances stated above I do not see how the petitioner can seek protection of Art. 3 k of the Constitution of India. ( 11 ) THE petitioner carried the matter in appeal being Letters Patent Appeal No. 280 of 1982 before the Division Bench. The Division Bench also by a speaking order dated 19/07/1982 (per No. P Thakkar C. J. as he then was in this Court) observed that the petitioner a municipal employee was entrusted by the State Government with the functions of a Public Analyst under sec. 8 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 and the Division Bench held that petitioner has no right to insist that powers of Public Analyst under sec. 8 should be conferred on him. Since he has nv such legal right it was not necessary for the State Government to afford him a hearing before withdrawing the power. 8 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 and the Division Bench held that petitioner has no right to insist that powers of Public Analyst under sec. 8 should be conferred on him. Since he has nv such legal right it was not necessary for the State Government to afford him a hearing before withdrawing the power. Hence the learned Single Judge was held perfectly justified in rejecting the petition and the appeal was also rejected. It thus appears that he was not employed in connection with the affairs of the State and that he was not holding any public office of affairs of State but the State Government had merely entrusted him with the functions of a Public Analyst which could be granted and taken back by an Administrative Act. Since the petitioner was an employee in connection with the affairs of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (and not those of the State or of the Union) there was no question of State Government or the Central Government according any sanction in the present case. ( 12 ) REGARDING the third contention of the acts having been committed in discharge of his official duty the nature of the acts alleged against the petitioner have to be seen. It is alleged that while exercising the functions as Public Analyst the petitioner had destroyed his report regarding a food sample wherein it is alleged the sample was found adulterated and by destroying that report and evidence he had screened the offender and thereby he had committed offences punish- able under sec. 201. It is also alleged that he had committed offences punishable under secs. 465 and 468 by forging documents so as to make it appear that the missing report in respect of the sample had shown the sample as pure and not as adulterated. It is argued by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the petitioner had allegedly committed all these acts while discharging his official duty as Public Analyst and therefore the sanction is necessary. It is to be noted that while discharging the functions as Public Analyst he was not discharging any function as a public servant and therefore the requirement of the section is not fulfilled. It is to be noted that while discharging the functions as Public Analyst he was not discharging any function as a public servant and therefore the requirement of the section is not fulfilled. Secondly the act alleged against him cannot be said to have been committed while acting or purporting to act in dis- charge of his official duty even as a Public Analyst. As a public Analyst it was not even remotely within his official duty to remove or destroy the report of the analysis nor was it his official duty to tamper with the record so as to show that the destroyed report did not show the sample as adulterated. By forging and tampering with such documents the act of cheating takes place. Those acts have no reasonable con- nection with his office as Public Analyst and/or a public servant. His office merely gave him an opportunity and colour of authority. However that would not bring it within the scope of even purported discharge of his official duty. ( 13 ) IN K. SATWANT SINGH V. THE STATE OF PUNJAB A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 266 at page 271 the Supreme Court held that some offences cannot by their very nature be regarded as having been committed by public servants while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of their official duty. The Supreme Court further observed that:we have no hesitation in saying that where a public servant commits the offence of cheating or abets another so to cheat the offence committed by him is not one while he is acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty as such offences have no necessary connection between them and the performance of the duties of a public servant the official status furnishing only the occasion or opportunity for the commission of the offences (vide AMRIK SINGH V. STATE OF PEPSU 1955 1302 (S) AIR 1955 SC 309 ). The act of cheating or abetment thereof has no reasonable connection with the discharge of official duty. The act must bear such relation to the duty that the public servant could lay a reasonable but not a pretended or fenciful claim that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty (vide MATAJOG DOBEY V. H. C. BHARI 1955-2 STR 925: (S) AIR 1956 SC 44 ). The act must bear such relation to the duty that the public servant could lay a reasonable but not a pretended or fenciful claim that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty (vide MATAJOG DOBEY V. H. C. BHARI 1955-2 STR 925: (S) AIR 1956 SC 44 ). It was urged however that in the present case the act of Henderson in certifying the appellants claims as true was an official act because it was his duty either to certify or not to certify claim as true and that if he falsely certified the claim as true he was acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. It is however to be remembered that Henderson was not prosecuted for any offence concerning his act of certification. He was prosecuted for abetting the appellant to cheat. We are firmly of the opinion that Hendersons offence was not one commit- ted by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. Such being the position the provisions of sec. 197 of the Code are inapplicable even if Henderson be regarded as a public servant who was removable from his office by the Governor-General-in-Council or a Provincial Government. ( 14 ) IN the present case also the petitioner is not being prosecuted for giving a false certificate or report as to the adulterated nature of the sample but is being prosecuted for destroying the evidence and for cheating by forgery and these acts are not committed in discharge or purported discharge of the official duty. ( 15 ) IN the case of T. V. SHARMA V. R. MEERIAH and ORS. A. I. R. 1980 A. P. 219 (FULL BENCH) the act (the offence under sec. 201) of suppres- sing evidence by the Police Officers to screen the murderer from legal punishment was held not to be purporting to act in discharge of his official duty and it was observed as follows:it is ridiculous to argue that it is a part of the duty of the police officer to be a party to the criminal conspiracy to suppress the evidence of the murder or screening offender from legal punishment. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that no sanction is required under sec. 197. Cri. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that no sanction is required under sec. 197. Cri. P. C. ( 16 ) IT thus appears that the acts alleged against the petitioner cannot be reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty as a Public Analyst or as a public servant. ( 17 ) FROM the above discussion? it is clear that in order to get the protection and to require sanction for prosecution under sec. 197 all the following conditions are required to be satisfied: (I) the accused must be a public servant; (ii) he must be removable from his office of the public servant by or with sanction of Government i. e. removability as public servant; conversely if a public servant holds some other office (which is not included in the categories of public servants under sec. 21 of I. P. C. or any other provision of law) and from such other office he is removable by the government this condition is not fulfilled; (iii) the alleged offence must have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty as a public servant; (iv) the alleged act not must have necessary and reasonable connection with discharge of his official duty. If his office gave him merely an opportunity occasion and colour of authority to commit the alleged acts they would not bring the case within pur- parted discharge of duty. The offences of cheating cheating by forgery and destroying evidence cannot have the necessary connection with official duty; (v) the accused as a public servant must be employed in connection with the affairs of the State or the Union and not in connec- tion with municipal affairs or affairs other than those of State and Union. ( 18 ) THE petitioner satisfies only the first condition which is not relevant for the present purposes and fails to fulfil the rest of the conditions. Therefore no sanction is required under sec. 197 in the present case. ( 19 ) HENCE the petition fails. Rule discharged. ( 20 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner requests that the interim stay granted in this matter be continued for a period of one month. It is directed that the interim stay granted earlier shall continue till 13/02/1984 and will A and vacated from 14/02/1984 petition dismissed. .