ORDER The petitioner was appointed an M. R. Dealer at Ketugram, Subsequent to such appointment, an agreement was executed by the petitioner and also by the respondent No.3, Sub-Divisional Controller (F & S), Asansol, on behalf of the Governor of the State of West Bengal. The order passed by the respondent No.3, cancelling the said agreement with effect from 10/12.11.1981, which is the date of the order, is the subject-matter of challenge in this writ proceeding. 2. Mr. Kashikanta Moitra, appearing for the petitioner, has submitted, in the first place, that the impugned order of cancellation is void and inoperative for non-compliance with the terms of Clause 17 of the agreement, under which the same is purported to have been passed According to Mr. Moitra, Clause 17 imposes an obligation on the respondent No. 3, the cancelling authority, to obtain the approval of the District Magistrate before the order of cancellation was passed. At this point, it is useful to quote Clause 17 of the agreement, which is as follows : "17. The District Magistrate or the Controller with the approval of the District Magistrate without assigning any reason and without prejudice to the right and remedies of the Government against the Retailer may suspend supply of foodstuff to him forthwith and cancel this agreement if in the opinion of the Controller which shall be final, the Retailer has failed to observe fulfil or perform any of the terms and conditions on the part of the Retailer herein contained or to carry out or observe any directions given to the Retailer herein contained or to carry out or observe any directions given to the Retailer under the provisions of this agreement". 3. Mr. Moitra has contended that if suspension of supply to a retailer for his failure to carry out the terms and conditions of the said agreement requires the approval of the District Magistrate, cancellation of the agreement, which is more serious and of greater impact and consequence must be preceded by such approval. Mr. 3. Mr. Moitra has contended that if suspension of supply to a retailer for his failure to carry out the terms and conditions of the said agreement requires the approval of the District Magistrate, cancellation of the agreement, which is more serious and of greater impact and consequence must be preceded by such approval. Mr. Dutt, appearing for the respondents, has not seriously challenged the necessity of approval of the District Magistrate in the matter of such cancellation but he has contended that, in the instant case, necessary approval for cancellation was obtained and the same would be apparent from the statements made in paragraph 12 of the affidavit-in-opposition, filed on behalf of the respondents, which quoted the contents of the Memo of the District Magistrate, addressed to the Sub-Divisional Controller (Food & Supplies), Katwa, as follows : "Sub : Cancellation of M. R. Dealership. I am sending herewith a copy of Memo No. 700/DEB dated 18.2.81 received from Supdt of Police, DEB Burdwan with request to take action for cancellation of the dealership of Shri Abdul Azim of Ketugram." 4. The contents of the said Memo, cannot be equated to an approval within the meaning of Clause 17 of the agreement. The term 'approval' has been defined in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary as an act with full knowledge of the authority approving. In the instant case, the District Magistrate, while forwarding the Memo. of the S.P, D.E.B., Burdwan, cannot be said to have applied his mind to the necessity of cancellation of the agreement with the petitioner, not to speak of considering the materials and facts relevant for the purpose of or having reasonable nexus to such cancellation. While grating such approval, the District Magistrate must apply his mind to such facts and materials in the context of a proposal for cancellation by the Sub-Divisional Controller of Food & Supplies and must be satisfied about the complete absence of any ground for condonation of the default on the part of the delinquent retailer in complying with the terms of the agreement which calls for an order of cancellation. In the instant case, it is found that not only such factors were not considered but also all the facts, connected with the allegations which were more than what was stated in the Memo referred to above and which ultimately led to the cancellation of the agreement in favour of the petitioner did not receive consideration of the District Magistrate. Apart from the aforesaid fact, it can also be stated that mere conviction of the petitioner in a criminal case was not a default in carrying out any of the terms of the agreement in question. For the foregoing reasons in my view, the order of cancellation made in the proceeding is null and void. 5. Secondly, Mr. Moitra has contended further that the respondents having chosen to take recourse to the procedure analogous to a disciplinary proceeding cannot now be allowed to invoke clause 17 of the agreement and pass an order of cancellation in terms thereof. In this context, Mr. Moitra has relied on the principles laid down in the case of Mahabir Prasad Bansal v. State of West Bengal reported in 1976 (II) CLJ at page 79, which laid down in no uncertain terms, that it was for the authorities to decide whether to take recourse to a contractual clause for termination of the agreement or to follow a quasi-judicial procedure. If the authorities choose to follow a quasi-judicial procedure and becomes satisfied objectively that the dealer is guilty of non-compliance with the terms of the agreement, it cannot, thereafter, fall back upon the contract and terminate the agreement in terms of a clause thereof. Such a decision casts a slur and aspersion on the conduct of the petitioner as a businessman which would not have come into existence if the contractual clause had been followed. The invocation of clause 17 of the agreement as a step for culmination of the disciplinary proceeding which is extraneous to the agreement, is clearly inconsistent and illegal. The submissions of Mr. Dutt, appearing for the respondents, based upon the decision reported in 1977(1) CLJ at page 80 to the effect that, even in such a case, the Writ Court is unable to grant any relief to the petitioner in view of the fact that the relationship between the petitioner and the cancelling authority arises out of contract, cannot be accepted. The decision of M. N. Roy, J. cited by Mr. The decision of M. N. Roy, J. cited by Mr. Dutt (supra), does not, in any way, affect the decision reported in 1976(II) CLJ at page 79 facts of which are more or less similar to those of the instant case M. N. Roy, J. himself stated that the case of Mahabir Prasad Bansal was distinguishable on facts from the case dealt with by His Lordship. Moreover, in view of the expansion of the law, consistently with the concept of Welfare State, it cannot now possibly be urged that in contractual cases, where Government is one of the contracting parties, writ does not lie. Reference in this connection may be made to the well known case of Ramana v. International Air Port Authority reported in AIR 1979 SC at page 1628, where it has been laid down by, Their Lordships, agreeing with the observations made in the case of V. Punnan Thomas v State of Kerala reported in AIR 1969 Kerala at page 81, that the Government should not be as free as an individual; whatever its activity Government is still a Government and will be subject to restraints, inherent in its position in a democratic Society. The Government in a Welfare State is the regulator and dispenser of special services including job contracts, licences etc. Such licences may partake the nature of permission to engage in some kind of business or work Government contracts also are very frequent features in such Welfare States. If every Government action is amenable to the Writ Jurisdiction as held above there is no reason why instances like the present ones should be kept outside the purview of scrutiny of Writ Courts on the ground that the same arise out of contracts. The contractual origin of a particular transaction should no longer be an absolute bar to the aggrieved party for invocation of the writ jurisdiction. In cases like the present one, writ court can certainly hold the authority "bound by its own procedural sword." For the reasons stated above, in my view, there is considerable force in the submissions of Mr. Moitra and the impugned order is liable to be set aside. The authorities are not permitted to juxtapose the contractual procedure and disciplinary procedure. 6. Thirdly, Mr. Moitra and the impugned order is liable to be set aside. The authorities are not permitted to juxtapose the contractual procedure and disciplinary procedure. 6. Thirdly, Mr. Moitra has contended that the order of cancellation also suffers from serious infirmities inasmuch as it does not disclose the reasons for which the explanations tendered by the petitioner could not be accepted. Nor was such order passed after giving the petitioner an opportunity of considering the reports of the Inspector of D.E.B. Ketugram, Katwa, and Inspector (F & S), which appear to have been considered by the respondent No.3 while passing the order of cancellation. Mr. Dutt has tried to meet this argument of Mr. Moitra by submitting that the non-furnishing of such reports did not in any way prejudice the rights of the petitioner inasmuch as the factual contents of such reports were merely quoted in the order of cancellation. In reply, Mr. Moitra assailed the propriety and correctness of Mr. Dutt's submission by placing reliance upon AIR 1969 SC 1302 in the case of State of Maharastra v. B. A. Joshi (paragraphs 5, 6 to 9). On the basis of the said decision Mr. Moitra has contended that for observance of the principles of natural justice the copies of such reports ought to have been furnished to the petitioner inasmuch as the contents of the report might have been beneficially utilised by the petitioner for the purpose of dissuading the respondent No.3 from passing the impugned order of cancellation. Moreover, the said reports having been available to the respondent No.3 the possibility of he being influenced by the contents of the said report cannot be ruled out. No doubt, Mr. Moitra has further argued, that the procedure for meting out natural justice is not a straight-jacket formula but is to be modulated in accordance with the situation, yet it is equally true that only in very rare cases, as has been observed by Gajendragadkar, J. (as His Lordship then was) in the case of H. C. Goel reported in AIR 1964 SC 364 at page 368, that it can be said that delinquent would not be prejudiced by the non-supply of such reports. 7. In my view, there is considerable force in the submissions of Mr. 7. In my view, there is considerable force in the submissions of Mr. Moitra and from the order itself it appears that such reports were available to the respondent No. 3 before he passed the order of cancellation and, accordingly, I hold that the probability of he being influenced by such reports or the contents thereof cannot be totally ruled out. The petitioner not having been granted inspection of such reports, there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice and even accepting the fact that the petitioner was given a personal hearing it cannot be said that the said hearing did cure the lacuna and regularise the proceeding. The order of cancellation is also liable to be set aside on that ground. 8. The other contention of Mr. Moitra on the merits of the impugned order itself has also to be accepted. The order no doubt after reciting the allegations records findings about such allegations, but does not disclose the reason for which the explanation given by the petitioner could not be accepted. In this connection, Mr. Moitra has relied on the decision in the case of Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U. P. reported in AIR 1970 SC at page 1302 paragraph 5, where the attributes of a quasi-judicial order had been laid down and it was held that failure of the authorities to give reasons for acceptance of the charges as proved and for non-acceptance of the explanations given by the delinquent vitiates the order of cancellation. It is to be remembered, in this connection, that the drastic power given to the executive in the matter of suspensor of supply and cancellation of the agreement of the retailers, requires all the more that reasons for non-acceptance of the explanations of delinquents as the petitioner should be given. In the instant case, no such reason has been given. The order suffers, accordingly, from the vice of absence of the necessary attributes of a quasi-judicial order. In this connection, Mr. Moitra has also contended that conviction in a criminal case does not ipso facto result in termination or cancellation of the agreement with the retailer nor does it constitute one of the terms of the agreement for violation of which clause 17 of 18 of the agreement can be invoked. In this connection, Mr. Moitra has also contended that conviction in a criminal case does not ipso facto result in termination or cancellation of the agreement with the retailer nor does it constitute one of the terms of the agreement for violation of which clause 17 of 18 of the agreement can be invoked. It is also not possible to extricate the effect of inclusion of such a ground in the final order of cancellation along with the allegations based on contractual violation. It is not possible to say whether on this ground alone the authority would have passed the order of cancellation. Mr. Dutt's contention that violation of one of the terms of the contract was good enough to empower the authority to cancel the agreement does not appeal to me. 9. In the result, the Rule is made absolute. The impugned order of cancellation is quashed. Let a Writ of Mandamus be issued against the respondents, commanding them not to give effect to the said order of cancellation. It will, however, be open to the respondents to consider manner of the distribution and/or allotment of the Cards between the petitioner and the added respondent, who was the previous M. R. Dealer with regard to the very same area. There will, however, be no order as to costs. On the prayer of Mr. Dutt let the operation of the order remain stayed for a period of four weeks from today. Rule made absolute.