Two questions charged with high-voltage socio-jural potential are agitated in this case, Who is a "wife" ? When is she "'unable to maintain herself" ? These questions arise in the context of Section 125 Cr. P. C. Though it is for socio­logists to decipher the enigma of the social phenomena- the growing "awareness" and bulgeoning "litigation" in this field-should this court merely reflect on this reality ? No, it must face the interpretative crisis at the judicial level. 2. In the instant case wife's application Laving been granted husband has petitioned this court invoking its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under section 482 Criminal Procedure Code challenging maintainability of the action. The respondent claimed in her application that she was married in 1965 at Goalpara to the petitioner according to Hindu customary rites and articles valued at Rs. 4715/- were given in dowry besides a plot of land which tier mother purchased for the petitioner and a cash amount of Rs. 2,000/- which she also gave him for his business. The petitioner had taken another wife and through her he had a child. After the second marriage he started ill-treating her compelling bar to leave his house. As she was unable to maintain herself she claimed Rs. 500/-per month from the petitioner for her maintenance. She also asserted that the petitioner's monthly income was between 1,000/- and Rs. 1,200/-. All these allegations were denied by the petitioner in his written statement. He also asserted that he was a petty businessman earning not more than Rs. 300/- per month and further that the respondent was able to earn her livelihood as she knew knitting and sewing. 3. Both sides adduced evidence and on behalf of the "wife' certain letters written to her by the petitioner were also exhi­bited in the case. Learned Magistrate on a consideration of the evidence adduced in the case held that the ceremonial per­formance of the marriage as claimed by the respondent was doubtful. However he held that the evidence of D.Ws. 2 and 3 proved the fact that the petitioner and the respondent were living together for 8/9 years and this fact was also admitted in his cross examination by the petitioner. However he held that the evidence of D.Ws. 2 and 3 proved the fact that the petitioner and the respondent were living together for 8/9 years and this fact was also admitted in his cross examination by the petitioner. On this evidence he concluded that long co-habitation between the parties having been proved beyond all reasonable doubt strict proof of their marriage was not necessary to entitle the wife to an order under-section 125 Cr.P.C. He also held that ill-treatment and torture of the respondent by the petitioner was proved and that their relation became strained after the second marriage which had been amply proved. That the petitioner got a child through this second wife, learned Magistrate held, was also proved. He also held that the petitioner was carrying on business and had suffi­cient means. Therefore, he could not be relieved of the obliga­tion to maintain the respondent even though she was "able to earn back something through tailoring and tution". Accordingly he allowed the application and ordered the petitioner to pay Rs. 200/- per month to the respondent for her maintenance from the date of the petition. On a revision preferred to the Sessions Judge by the petitioner the order was maintained. Learned Sessions Judge held that though there was evidence that the respondent did some sewing and tutioning that may not give her any "regular income like service" and that income from such sources was always "uncertain". He dittoed the findings of the learned Magistrate that the parties lived together as hus­band and wife for a long period and, therefore, she is to be considered as a legally married wife of the petitioner. This he did on a reappraisal of the evidence on record. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. P. K. Goswami has very fairly placed before me all relevant decisions on which he could lay his hands on the interpretation of the word “wife” of section 125 but I may refer first to the explanation appended to sub section (1) of section 125. It says that "wife" for the purpose of this Chapter (Chapter IX) "includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried". It says that "wife" for the purpose of this Chapter (Chapter IX) "includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried". I may also mention that according to section 125 (1) (a) "If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his wife, unable to main­tain herself", the Magistrate may, upon proof of such neglec or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife. Sub-section (4) contemplates that no wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance under section 125 if she is living in adultary' or if without any sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent. 5. On a review of the authorities cited at the bar if appears clear to me that the judicial trend is to give a liberal inter­pretation by which not only the legislative object of the pro­vision is promoted but tie constitutional imperatives are appropriately enforced. In this connection, I may first refer to the celebrated decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bai Tahira's case ( AIR 1979 SC 362 ) wherein their Lordships observed that Article 25(3) of the Constitution has "compelling, compassionate relevance in the context of S. 125 and the benefit of doubt, if any, in statutory interpretation belongs to the ill-used wife and the derelict divorces. Notice is also taken by their Lordships of the provisions of Article 39 and indeed of Articles 37 and 38 as was to say that the Par­liament had in view these constitutional imperatives while enacting these special provisions to help "women in distress east away by divorce". In that ease, the question was, whether a divorcee was entitled to invoke section 125 because objection was taken that mutual consent to live separately in terms of section 125(4) not having been proved the application was not maintainable. The contention was repelled and the Court field that a divorcee need not have proved mutual consent to live apart because "divorce painfully implies that the husband orders her out of the conjugal home". 6. I may now refer to the relevent decisions of this Court in dealing with the issue agitated in this petition. The contention was repelled and the Court field that a divorcee need not have proved mutual consent to live apart because "divorce painfully implies that the husband orders her out of the conjugal home". 6. I may now refer to the relevent decisions of this Court in dealing with the issue agitated in this petition. Bai Tahira (supra) was relied on by Lahiri, J. in 1981 Cri.L.J. 674 (Boli Narayan vs. Shiddheswari) to hold that when "a women who conies in the life of a man, gives herself to the man, takes the family-life of the man and the man uses her as such, reco­gnises her as his wife, must come within the fold of the term "wife", absence of ceremonial marriage notwithstanding". In that case, however, unlike in the instant case, the wife got recogni­tion of the society as to her marital status and because of this fact Mr. Goswami tried to distinguish this decision. However, a constricted view of the provision appears to have been expressed by Das, J. in (1983) 1 G.L.R. 45, Dharmibala vs. Mani Ram, wherein stress was laid on the proof of "legal marriage" and it was held that the husband cannot be saddled with any liability if such marriage was not proved by the applicant, I had also an occasion to deal with the purport of section 125 Cr. P. C. in Niru Bala's case, (1984) 1 G.L.R. (NOC) 10. I observed therein that whatever may be the provision under personal law of the parties as respects other rights and duties, the obligation to maintain wife and minor children, who are unable to main­tain themselves, flows from the right of the man to marry and set up a family as recognised in Article 16 of the Uni­versal Declaration of Human Rights which also provide that a family as a Fundamental Group Unit of the Society" is entitled to protection and the State and this mandate was fulfilled by section 125 by ensuring that the wife and children are not beggared and destituted. In Niru Bala's case, (1983) 1 G.L.R. (NOC) 21 a Division Bench of this Court held that presumption of validity of a marriage having earned early judicial recognition in this country became deeply entranched in our legal system. In Niru Bala's case, (1983) 1 G.L.R. (NOC) 21 a Division Bench of this Court held that presumption of validity of a marriage having earned early judicial recognition in this country became deeply entranched in our legal system. It was held that a legislative shift of the Hindu Marriage Act wherein departing from the Sastric Law emphasis is laid on the element of "consent" in preference to "ceremonies" for the validity of a Hindu marriage. 7. I may refer to some other decisions which were placed before me by the learned counsel. In AIR 1983 Madras 66 (A.T. Lakshmi Ambalam vs. Andiammal) an extreme view is ex­pressed. The Court held that only because a woman lived with a man as his wife for 12 years and had also borne him a child would not entitle her to maintenance as only a legally married wife is entitled to an order under section 488 Cr.P.C (old). A similar view was expressed by the Mysore High Court in 1968(1) Cr.L.J.131 wherein the Court held that "wife" meant only a "legitimate" wife. However, it was further held that man and woman living together as husband and wife for more than 20 years and having children whom he acknowledged as his own would raise a rebuttable presumption that the woman was his legally married wife. A learned Single Judge, in AIR 1965 Allahabad 464 (Ishwar Singh vs. Smti. Hukum Kaur) took the view that because the previous husband of the applicant has alive her second marriage with the respondent would not entitle her to claim maintenance under Section 488 Cr.P.C. because such marriage would be illegal in view of the provi­sions of the Hindu Marriage Act. A Division Bench, in AIR 1967 Patna 277, Bangshidhar vs. Chhabi Chatterjee held that under Section 488 a woman could claim maintenance from a person only if she was his legally wedded wife. Maintenance to the applicant was refused because there subsisted a valid legal marriage of the respondent with another woman due to which her subsequent alleged marriage with the respondent was con­sidered to be void. 8. On a survey of the authorities cited at the Bar, I am of the opinion that giving a restricted meaning to the word "wife" would certainly defeat the object of the provision and would indeed run counter to the constitutional imperative though, apparently, with some courts such interpretation has found favour. 8. On a survey of the authorities cited at the Bar, I am of the opinion that giving a restricted meaning to the word "wife" would certainly defeat the object of the provision and would indeed run counter to the constitutional imperative though, apparently, with some courts such interpretation has found favour. For, by providing an effective and speedy remedy the legisla­ture intended to relieve ''women in distress" and as in "Bai Tahira (supra) " the compelling compassionate relevance "of the object of Section 125 must be so read. Though Bai Tahira was the case of a divorcee and the Explanation refers explicitly merely to the case of divorce, the decision does project the interpretative crisis and at the same time also resolution of the conflict stating that benefit of doubt in such cases belongs to the "ill-used wife and the derelict devorcee". According to me, therefore, it is the right of a "woman" to a dignified living which is protected under Sec. 125; she must not be pushed to the abyss of vice to be irretrievably lost to humanity. If the men, who enjoys the company of a woman preferring services to him like a ''wife", living with him under the same roof, setting up a "conjugal home" with him with the intention of found­ing a "family", is granted the legal license to treat her like a chattel, where and when shall be found worth of the "human person" ? Does such a "conjugal life" cannote an inferior existence because, only religious and societal sanctions can, in-deed because of the "law" metamophosize two human lives ? Will never the "woman" become a "wife" unless the marriage tie or knot binds the two lives ? If subsistence or pre-existence of the tie or knot had been the condition-precedent for invoking S. 125, why have "divorcees" been cared for ? That the ill-used "woman" cannot be deprived of the benevolent soothing succour of S.I 25 is by Sub-Sec. (4) itself underwritten in it as it lays emphasis explicitly on companionship between the two which is also projected by the words "has not remarried” used in the concerned Explanation (b) of Sub Sec. (1) used in relation to a divorce. 9. That the ill-used "woman" cannot be deprived of the benevolent soothing succour of S.I 25 is by Sub-Sec. (4) itself underwritten in it as it lays emphasis explicitly on companionship between the two which is also projected by the words "has not remarried” used in the concerned Explanation (b) of Sub Sec. (1) used in relation to a divorce. 9. I may usefully recapitulate in this connection that Art. 15(3) refers to the right of a "woman" to special protection and Art. 39(a) postulates that the State in making laws shill ensure that -men and women equally" have adequate "means to livlihood". The man who had set up a conjugal home and installed therein his life's partner with the object of found­ing a family must share with his partner and progency, depen­dent on him for their existence, the bread he earns. However, whether in the course of the their conjugal life, the two had any progeny and indeed, possibly, for that reason they failed to obtain societal recognition for their conjugated existence are fac­tors which are foreign, is my opinion, to the "compelling compas­sionate relevance" of S. 125. They cannot defeat the right of the "woman" to prefer claim thereunder if it is established that she lived with the "man" with the intention to found a family and she did not for shake his company of her own volition, as to terminate the relationship. It must, therefore, be stressed that their companionship should not be of an epheme­ral complexion or duration. A chance encounter followed by spells of libidinous adventures would not, per se, establish a relationship manifesting intention of the couple to found a family with concomitant responsibilities and mutual obligations. There must exist between the two a stable relationship mani­fested by a course of positive conduct binding them by humane obligations. In this context a pertinent question arises-What makes a marriage tie sacred? Is it not the vow of fidelity which inculcated in each marriage partner a sense of mutual trust and responsibility ? Should, therefore, absence of sacred fire or of other artificial and imposed ceremonies and sanctions rob the natural band of human compassion and companionship its sanctity because such bond is not the product of a con­ventional marriage ? Indeed, what a "marriage" truly is must be understood to answer this question. Should, therefore, absence of sacred fire or of other artificial and imposed ceremonies and sanctions rob the natural band of human compassion and companionship its sanctity because such bond is not the product of a con­ventional marriage ? Indeed, what a "marriage" truly is must be understood to answer this question. I extract below, therefore, without albeit, adapting or accepting the whole of it, an of quoted adjural exposition of the term, albeit from a wintage viewpoint : "Besides the procreation and education of children marriage has for its object the mutual society, help and comfort, that the one ought to have of the mother both in prosperity and adversity. Marriage is the most solemn engagement which one human being can contract with another. It is contract formed with a view not only to the benefit of the parties themselves, but to the benefit of third parties; to the benefit of their common off spring, and to the moral order of civilised society". (Shelford of Marriage and Divorce (1841), p. 3, quoted in Weatherley vs. Weatherley, (1946) 2 All ER 1, 11). 10. Why I say that absence of societal recognition should not debar the woman to claim equality in the matter of livelihood it is because I cannot shut my eyes to the social realities indeed projected in the Basic Statute itself. It is because I see that our society has undeniably, inb­uilt inhibitions which may deny its due to a conjugated life, withholding recognition to conjugated existence. Our plural society still inheres strains of tribal loyalties, is still unable to free itself from the inexorable dogmas, of caste, creed and religion which is reflected in the position that it does not clamour for, but clamours against, an uniform and common Civil Code fop all citizens throwing to the wind the constitutional mandate of Art. 14. Stratification in our society runs along lines demarcating among others economic, social and cultural "backwardness", though inhabiting many parts of our land there are ethnic groups of people who live in a "natural state" uneffected by such prejudices. They must not, by law, be robbed of their blissful life and existence. If national integration must mean anything in term of Art. 51A (e) nobler values which inform their lives must also inform the value system of national laws not only to integrate such group? They must not, by law, be robbed of their blissful life and existence. If national integration must mean anything in term of Art. 51A (e) nobler values which inform their lives must also inform the value system of national laws not only to integrate such group? into the national main stream bat also to bring the latter itself closer to the emerging stream of international human rights jurisprudence. Extrant legal concepts of a "marriage", such as "valid' "void" and "voidable", tend to deny the benefit of the humane provision of S. 125 to a large section of our people which could not be the inten­tion of the legislature. Therefore; emphasis on social recognition must be eschewed. The '”husband" must discharge as a "man" his humane obligation to the "woman" whom he accepted by his conduct as his ''wife", as his life's companion to found a family. He will thus be upholding truly societal interest to care for the "family" as its "fundamental group unit". State, must, therefore, enforce the humane obligation for promo­ting a healthy national as well as international order. This, according to me, is the message of Arts. 15 (3), 39 (a), 44, 51 (c) and 51A (e) which must inform the provisions of S. 125 Cr.P.C. to uphold the "dignity of the woman" and her right to a dignified living. 11. In this view of the matter, I have no doubt that on the findings of both courts below the application of the respondent was maintainable, as she was a "wife" within the meaning of the term used in S. 125 Cr. P. C.. It is true that in the instant case evidence of societal recognition of con­jugated existence; of parties is absent. The fact however rema­ins that there is preponderance of evidence, as discussed by the courts below, suggesting that the respondent and the petitioner lived together in a ''conjugal home" for many long years. Respondent's intention to conjugate with the petitioner to set up such a home is also proved as she left her job in Arunachal Pradesh to settle down to a conjugal life with the intention to found a family. This fact is also established that the petitioner himself recognised the respondent as his "wife" as proved by the letters to which both courts have referred. Mr. This fact is also established that the petitioner himself recognised the respondent as his "wife" as proved by the letters to which both courts have referred. Mr. Goswami tried to impugn admissibility of these documents but the short answer to his objection is supplied by Sections 136 and 167 of the Evidence Act because objection as to admissibility had to be taken at the earliest stage and this question cannot be agitated in a petition under section 482 Cr.P.C.. Unfortunately, during the long course of co-habitation, the parties were not blessed with any issue sad indeed it is for that reason perhaps that the petitioner took, a second wife. That fact itself would not, in my opinion, demo­lish either the presumption of legitimacy of marriage arising from long co-habitation or the presumption inspired by the constitutional mandates (national and international) that a "woman" who shared the joys and sorrows of a "man" and gave him conjugated company for long years to become a partner in his mundane pursuits and, therefore, had depended on him for her mundane existence, could not be destituted and consigned to a bleak and vacant future. 12. I am now left to deal with the second question but happily the answer thereto is provided by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in AIR 1975 SC 86, Bhagwan Dutt vs. Smt. Kamala Devi, wherein their Lordships rejected the objection that the expression "unable to maintain herself" was a condition-precedent to apply under sec. 125. As I do not consider it necessary to refer to the other decisions cited on this point I may only indicate that I respectfully agree with the view expressed in a Bench Decision of the Karnataka High Court that burden lies on the husband to prove that the wife was able to maintain herself (see, 1981 Cri. L. J. 184, Malan vs. Baburao). However, at para 22 of the report in Bhagawan Dutt the broader issue itself is discussed and the court approved the decision of Kerala High Court on this point reported in AIR 1971 Ker, 22 (P. T. Ramankutty vs. Kalyanikutty) The Kerala High Court has held "A wife can file a petition under section 488 (old) irrespective of the question whether she is able or unable to maintain herself". Their Lordships, however, in dealing with another aspect of the same issue, held as follows : "* * * the Magistrate has to find out as to what is required by the wife to maintain a standard of living which is neither luxurious nor penurious, but is modestly consistent with the status of the family. The needs and requirements of the wife for such moderate living can be fairly determined, only if her seperate income, also, is taken into account together with the earnings of the husband and his commitments." Their Lordships held that any other contraction would be subversive of the primary purpose of the Section and encourage vindictive wives having ample income and means of their own, to misuse the section as a punitive weapon against their husbands. 13. In the instant case, as alluded, although both courts took note of the fact that the respondent (wife) had some income, in quantifying the maintenance payable by the petitioner that has not been taken into consideration. It is true that learned Sessions Judge has observed that the income which the wife might be having was "uncertain"; it was nevertheless incum­bent on him to come to a conclusion on the evidence on record if that uncertain income should be totally left out of consideration. I say so because it is also his finding that the business of the petitioner was not "very good" and therefore, whether he ought to be saddled with a continuing or recurring liability of Rs. 200/-per month to maintain the respondent was a fact which needed further consideration. In this view of the matter, I consider it appropriate to remand the case to the learned Sessions Judge who will deal with this aspect of the matter in the light of observations hereinabove made and then dispose of the revision application. It shall be open to him on a consideration of the evidence on record to confirm or reduce the amount of monthly maintenance granted by the learned Magistrate to the respon­dent. However, it is necessary in this context to make it cleat further that the order so passed by him shall not foreclose the right of the respondent to take proceedings at any time under Section 127 Cr.P.C. if and when she chooses to do. However, it is necessary in this context to make it cleat further that the order so passed by him shall not foreclose the right of the respondent to take proceedings at any time under Section 127 Cr.P.C. if and when she chooses to do. I say so because the quantification of the maintenance two years ago is apt to lose the relevance with the spiralling inflation. 14. In the result, this application is allowed to the extent indicated above and the case is remanded to the learned Sessions Judge, Goalpara, with above observations. Let the records be transmitted to his court forthwith to enable him to dispose of the matter expeditiously, if possible, within two months of the receipts of the records by him. 15. My judicial sojourns first at Imphal and then at Agartala made it difficult for me to pronounce this judgment earlier and I am availing to-day the earliest opportunity of doing so which the intervening holidays had also so long denied me.